contention defense in Washington

2014State v. Marko, 107 Wn.

2014State v. Marko, 107 Wn.

2007Conn. 1986), a case involving criminal prosecution for failure to file federal income tax returns, the court “found no authority to support the defendant’s contention that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may ever be invoked to defeat a criminal prosecution” and observed that “doctrines of equity, which typically can be invoked only by persons who have demonstrated their own ‘clean hands,’ seem unsuitable for general incorporation into the criminal law.” Id. at 1109 .

2007In United States v. Anderson, 637 F.Supp. 1106 (D.Conn.1986), a case involving criminal prosecution for failure to file federal income tax returns, the court "found no authority to support the defendant's contention that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may ever be invoked to defeat a criminal prosecution" and observed that "doctrines of equity, which typically can be invoked only by persons who have demonstrated their own `clean hands,' seem unsuitable for general incorporation into the criminal law." Id. at 1109 .

2007Likewise, in United States v. Alexander, 736 F. Supp. 968 (D.

2007Likewise, in United States v. Alexander, 736 F.Supp. 968 (D.Minn.1990), the court rejected the argument — whether based on equitable estoppel or due process — that the government's delayed obscenity prosecution had to be foreclosed.

1985Fire Ass'n, 59 Wash. 125 , 109 P. 280 (1910), in which the Supreme Court rejected an insured's contention that a defense of incendiarism must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and, joining the majority of courts, adopted the "fair preponderance of the evidence" test.

1985Fire Ass'n, 59 Wash. 125 , 109 P. 280 (1910), in which the Supreme Court rejected an insured's contention that a defense of incendiarism must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and, joining the majority of courts, adopted the "fair preponderance of the evidence" test.

2017Greiff, 141 Wn.2d at 921 .

2011Labanowski, 117 Wash.2d at 424 , 816 P.2d 26 .

2011Labanowski, 117 Wash.2d at 424 , 816 P.2d 26 .

1988State v. Brown, 48 Wn.

1981App. 284 , 492 P.2d 249 (1972). *358 Because we conclude it was not error to refuse Dorman's instruction, we need not reach the State's contention that the instruction was not relevant to Dorman's subsequent embezzlement of funds legally acquired.

1981App. 233 , 566 P.2d 1277 (1977), we reject the State's contention that the privilege may only be asserted by the government.

1979The Bruff rule was adhered to in King v. King, 83 Wash. 615 , 145 P. 971 (1915).

1979The Bruff rule was adhered to in King v. King, 83 Wash. 615 , 145 P. 971 (1915).

1976Plaintiffs counter with a contention that the defense afforded by the statute of limitations is overcome (1) by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, citing Shafer v. State, 83 Wn.2d 618 , 521 P.2d 736 (1974), and (2) by the fact that the purchaser under the tax deed was never in possession of the realty, citing Kupka v. Reid, 50 Wn.2d 465 , 312 P.2d 1056 (1957).

1976Plaintiffs counter with a contention that the defense afforded by the statute of limitations is overcome (1) by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, citing Shafer v. State, 83 Wn.2d 618 , 521 P.2d 736 (1974), and (2) by the fact that the purchaser under the tax deed was never in possession of the realty, citing Kupka v. Reid, 50 Wn.2d 465 , 312 P.2d 1056 (1957).

1976Plaintiffs counter with a contention that the defense afforded by the statute of limitations is overcome (1) by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, citing Shafer v. State, 83 Wn.2d 618 , 521 P.2d 736 (1974), and (2) by the fact that the purchaser under the tax deed was never in possession of the realty, citing Kupka v. Reid, 50 Wn.2d 465 , 312 P.2d 1056 (1957).

1976Plaintiffs counter with a contention that the defense afforded by the statute of limitations is overcome (1) by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, citing Shafer v. State, 83 Wn.2d 618 , 521 P.2d 736 (1974), and (2) by the fact that the purchaser under the tax deed was never in possession of the realty, citing Kupka v. Reid, 50 Wn.2d 465 , 312 P.2d 1056 (1957).

1974They are Fordney v. King County, 9 Wn.2d 546 , 115 P.2d 667 (1941), and Seattle v. Stirrat, 55 Wash. 560 , 104 P. 834 (1909).

1974They are Fordney v. King County, 9 Wn.2d 546 , 115 P.2d 667 (1941), and Seattle v. Stirrat, 55 Wash. 560 , 104 P. 834 (1909).

1974They are Fordney v. King County, 9 Wn.2d 546 , 115 P.2d 667 (1941), and Seattle v. Stirrat, 55 Wash. 560 , 104 P. 834 (1909).

1974They are Fordney v. King County, 9 Wn.2d 546 , 115 P.2d 667 (1941), and Seattle v. Stirrat, 55 Wash. 560 , 104 P. 834 (1909).

1972The contention is that this instruction is comparable to the one condemned in Ulve v. Raymond, 51 Wn.2d 241 , 317 P.2d 908 (1957).

1972The contention is that this instruction is comparable to the one condemned in Ulve v. Raymond, 51 Wn.2d 241 , 317 P.2d 908 (1957).

1970In Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 60 Wn.2d 310 , 373 P.2d 767 (1962), our Supreme Court, at 319, stated: The time has now come, therefore, to state unqualifiedly that an employer has a duty to his employees to exercise reasonable care to furnish them with a reasonably safe place to work.

1970In Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 60 Wn.2d 310 , 373 P.2d 767 (1962), our Supreme Court, at 319, stated: The time has now come, therefore, to state unqualifiedly that an employer has a duty to his employees to exercise reasonable care to furnish them with a reasonably safe place to work.

1967As to the plaintiff’s contention that defense of res judicata cannot apply here because there is no mutuality of estoppel, the controlling rule is found in Greene v. Rothschild, 60 Wn.2d 508 , 374 P.2d 566 (1962), and 68 Wn.2d 1 , 402 P.2d 356 , 414 P.2d 1013 (1966).

1967As to the plaintiff’s contention that defense of res judicata cannot apply here because there is no mutuality of estoppel, the controlling rule is found in Greene v. Rothschild, 60 Wn.2d 508 , 374 P.2d 566 (1962), and 68 Wn.2d 1 , 402 P.2d 356 , 414 P.2d 1013 (1966).

1967As to the plaintiff’s contention that defense of res judicata cannot apply here because there is no mutuality of estoppel, the controlling rule is found in Greene v. Rothschild, 60 Wn.2d 508 , 374 P.2d 566 (1962), and 68 Wn.2d 1 , 402 P.2d 356 , 414 P.2d 1013 (1966).

1967As to the plaintiff’s contention that defense of res judicata cannot apply here because there is no mutuality of estoppel, the controlling rule is found in Greene v. Rothschild, 60 Wn.2d 508 , 374 P.2d 566 (1962), and 68 Wn.2d 1 , 402 P.2d 356 , 414 P.2d 1013 (1966).

1960Ranniger v. Bryce (1957), 51 Wn. (2d) 383, 318 P. (2d) 618 ; Robbins v. Greene (1953), 43 Wn. (2d) 315, 261 P. (2d) 83 . *276 [2] The contention that instruction No. 14 is contradictory to instructions No. 12 and No. 13, and that the jury was confused thereby, is untenable.

1960In People v. Klukofsky, 201 Misc. 457 , 114 N. Y.

1960Ranniger v. Bryce (1957), 51 Wn. (2d) 383, 318 P. (2d) 618 ; Robbins v. Greene (1953), 43 Wn. (2d) 315, 261 P. (2d) 83 . *276 [2] The contention that instruction No. 14 is contradictory to instructions No. 12 and No. 13, and that the jury was confused thereby, is untenable.

1958A mere reference to the recent case of DeYoung v. Campbell (1957), 51 Wn. (2d) 1, 315 P. (2d) 629 , is sufficient to dispose of the city’s contention that the standard construction of the tracks negated negligence on the part of the city.

1954While the statute enumerates as particular grounds for contest certain things going to the validity of the will arising at the time of its execution, namely, testamentary capacity, restraint, undue influence, and fraudulent representations, it adds, ‘or for any other cause affecting the validity of such will.’ This clause is certainly broad enough to include any cause affecting the validity of the will at the time of probate, and must be so construed, since the right of contest only arises on the probate, and is accorded by the statute for the very purpose of testing the validity of the instru

1954While the statute enumerates as particular grounds for contest certain things going to the validity of the will arising at the time of its execution, namely, testamentary capacity, restraint, undue influence, and fraudulent representations, it adds, ‘or for any other cause affecting the validity of such will.’ This clause is certainly broad enough to include any cause affecting the validity of the will at the time of probate, and must be so construed, since the right of contest only arises on the probate, and is accorded by the statute for the very purpose of testing the validity of the instru

1923The cases of Miller v. Calvin Philips & Co., 44 Wash. 226 , 87 Pac. 264 ; Hoffman v. Titlow, 48 Wash. 80 , 92 Pac. 888 ; Sutthoff v. Maruca, 57 Wash. 102 , 106 Pac. 632 ; M’Whorter v. Forney Brothers & Co., 69 Wash. 414 , 125 Pac. 164 ; Schaefer v. Gregory Co., 112 Wash. 408 , 192 Pac. 968 , and Henderson v. Miller, 119 Wash. 362 , 205 Pac. 1 , are all clearly distinguishable on the ■facts, and none of them presented a situation such as to even invite a contention that the rule should he applied.

1923The cases of Miller v. Calvin Philips & Co., 44 Wash. 226 , 87 Pac. 264 ; Hoffman v. Titlow, 48 Wash. 80 , 92 Pac. 888 ; Sutthoff v. Maruca, 57 Wash. 102 , 106 Pac. 632 ; M’Whorter v. Forney Brothers & Co., 69 Wash. 414 , 125 Pac. 164 ; Schaefer v. Gregory Co., 112 Wash. 408 , 192 Pac. 968 , and Henderson v. Miller, 119 Wash. 362 , 205 Pac. 1 , are all clearly distinguishable on the ■facts, and none of them presented a situation such as to even invite a contention that the rule should he applied.

1923The cases of Miller v. Calvin Philips & Co., 44 Wash. 226 , 87 Pac. 264 ; Hoffman v. Titlow, 48 Wash. 80 , 92 Pac. 888 ; Sutthoff v. Maruca, 57 Wash. 102 , 106 Pac. 632 ; M’Whorter v. Forney Brothers & Co., 69 Wash. 414 , 125 Pac. 164 ; Schaefer v. Gregory Co., 112 Wash. 408 , 192 Pac. 968 , and Henderson v. Miller, 119 Wash. 362 , 205 Pac. 1 , are all clearly distinguishable on the ■facts, and none of them presented a situation such as to even invite a contention that the rule should he applied.

1923The cases of Miller v. Calvin Philips & Co., 44 Wash. 226 , 87 Pac. 264 ; Hoffman v. Titlow, 48 Wash. 80 , 92 Pac. 888 ; Sutthoff v. Maruca, 57 Wash. 102 , 106 Pac. 632 ; M’Whorter v. Forney Brothers & Co., 69 Wash. 414 , 125 Pac. 164 ; Schaefer v. Gregory Co., 112 Wash. 408 , 192 Pac. 968 , and Henderson v. Miller, 119 Wash. 362 , 205 Pac. 1 , are all clearly distinguishable on the ■facts, and none of them presented a situation such as to even invite a contention that the rule should he applied.

1923The cases of Miller v. Calvin Philips & Co., 44 Wash. 226 , 87 Pac. 264 ; Hoffman v. Titlow, 48 Wash. 80 , 92 Pac. 888 ; Sutthoff v. Maruca, 57 Wash. 102 , 106 Pac. 632 ; M’Whorter v. Forney Brothers & Co., 69 Wash. 414 , 125 Pac. 164 ; Schaefer v. Gregory Co., 112 Wash. 408 , 192 Pac. 968 , and Henderson v. Miller, 119 Wash. 362 , 205 Pac. 1 , are all clearly distinguishable on the ■facts, and none of them presented a situation such as to even invite a contention that the rule should he applied.

1923The cases of Miller v. Calvin Philips & Co., 44 Wash. 226 , 87 Pac. 264 ; Hoffman v. Titlow, 48 Wash. 80 , 92 Pac. 888 ; Sutthoff v. Maruca, 57 Wash. 102 , 106 Pac. 632 ; M’Whorter v. Forney Brothers & Co., 69 Wash. 414 , 125 Pac. 164 ; Schaefer v. Gregory Co., 112 Wash. 408 , 192 Pac. 968 , and Henderson v. Miller, 119 Wash. 362 , 205 Pac. 1 , are all clearly distinguishable on the ■facts, and none of them presented a situation such as to even invite a contention that the rule should he applied.

1923The cases of Miller v. Calvin Philips & Co., 44 Wash. 226 , 87 Pac. 264 ; Hoffman v. Titlow, 48 Wash. 80 , 92 Pac. 888 ; Sutthoff v. Maruca, 57 Wash. 102 , 106 Pac. 632 ; M’Whorter v. Forney Brothers & Co., 69 Wash. 414 , 125 Pac. 164 ; Schaefer v. Gregory Co., 112 Wash. 408 , 192 Pac. 968 , and Henderson v. Miller, 119 Wash. 362 , 205 Pac. 1 , are all clearly distinguishable on the ■facts, and none of them presented a situation such as to even invite a contention that the rule should he applied.

1923The cases of Miller v. Calvin Philips & Co., 44 Wash. 226 , 87 Pac. 264 ; Hoffman v. Titlow, 48 Wash. 80 , 92 Pac. 888 ; Sutthoff v. Maruca, 57 Wash. 102 , 106 Pac. 632 ; M’Whorter v. Forney Brothers & Co., 69 Wash. 414 , 125 Pac. 164 ; Schaefer v. Gregory Co., 112 Wash. 408 , 192 Pac. 968 , and Henderson v. Miller, 119 Wash. 362 , 205 Pac. 1 , are all clearly distinguishable on the ■facts, and none of them presented a situation such as to even invite a contention that the rule should he applied.

1923The cases of Miller v. Calvin Philips & Co., 44 Wash. 226 , 87 Pac. 264 ; Hoffman v. Titlow, 48 Wash. 80 , 92 Pac. 888 ; Sutthoff v. Maruca, 57 Wash. 102 , 106 Pac. 632 ; M’Whorter v. Forney Brothers & Co., 69 Wash. 414 , 125 Pac. 164 ; Schaefer v. Gregory Co., 112 Wash. 408 , 192 Pac. 968 , and Henderson v. Miller, 119 Wash. 362 , 205 Pac. 1 , are all clearly distinguishable on the ■facts, and none of them presented a situation such as to even invite a contention that the rule should he applied.