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18 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1923–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sherley v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1998Co., 694 S.W.2d 327 (Tenn. App.1985) (The initial appeal did not establish the law of the case because the facts in the second appeal were not substantially the same as the facts in the prior appeal); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, n. 8 , 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, n. 8 , 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983) (The doctrine does not apply if the court is “convinced that [its prior decision] is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”); Sherley v. Commonwealth, 889 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Ky.1994) (The law of the case doctrine does not apply where there has been an intervening change of controllin 1998Co., 694 S.W.2d 327 (Tenn. App. 1985) (The initial appeal did not establish the law of the case because the facts in the second appeal were not substantially the same as the facts in the prior appeal); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, n. 8 , 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, n. 8 , 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983) (The doctrine does not apply if the court is “convinced that [its prior decision] is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”); Sherley v. Commonwealth, 889 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Ky. 1994) (The law of the case doctrine does not apply where there has been an intervening change of controll | 2 | 2 |
Arizona v. Californiagreen2 sentences1998Co., 694 S.W.2d 327 (Tenn. App.1985) (The initial appeal did not establish the law of the case because the facts in the second appeal were not substantially the same as the facts in the prior appeal); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, n. 8 , 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, n. 8 , 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983) (The doctrine does not apply if the court is “convinced that [its prior decision] is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”); Sherley v. Commonwealth, 889 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Ky.1994) (The law of the case doctrine does not apply where there has been an intervening change of controllin 1998Co., 694 S.W.2d 327 (Tenn. App.1985) (The initial appeal did not establish the law of the case because the facts in the second appeal were not substantially the same as the facts in the prior appeal); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, n. 8 , 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, n. 8 , 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983) (The doctrine does not apply if the court is “convinced that [its prior decision] is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”); Sherley v. Commonwealth, 889 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Ky.1994) (The law of the case doctrine does not apply where there has been an intervening change of controllin | 2 | 2 |
State v. Greengreen1 sentence2021First, we address the Defendant’s contention that his waiver could not have been knowing because he “did not have ‘any idea’ what Detective Spearman wanted to speak with him about.” This court has held that “the failure of law enforcement officials to inform a suspect of all the possible subjects of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his or her Fifth Amendment privilege.” State v. Green, 995 S.W.2d 591, 600 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Stamp v. Honest Abe Log Homes, Inc.green1 sentence2019Rather, the Ritter court held that Section 552’s language “obviously includes non-professionals involved in certain business activities or transactions” including construction managers, John Martin, 819 S.W.2d at 431 , accountants, Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d -7- 592, 595 (Tenn. 1991), the seller of a log home kit, Stamp v. Honest Abe Log Homes, Inc., 804 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), a landlord, Keller v. West-Morr Investors, Ltd., 770 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988), and a seller of real estate. | 1 | 1 |
Keller v. West-Morr Investors, Ltd.green1 sentence2019Rather, the Ritter court held that Section 552’s language “obviously includes non-professionals involved in certain business activities or transactions” including construction managers, John Martin, 819 S.W.2d at 431 , accountants, Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d -7- 592, 595 (Tenn. 1991), the seller of a log home kit, Stamp v. Honest Abe Log Homes, Inc., 804 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), a landlord, Keller v. West-Morr Investors, Ltd., 770 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988), and a seller of real estate. | 1 | 1 |
State of Tennessee v. Christine Caudlegreen1 sentence2013By adopting this standard, we reject the Defendant’s contention that the presumption of reasonableness should not apply to consecutive sentencing because our holdings in Bise and Caudle only refer to a “presumption of reasonableness [for] within-range sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 707 (emphasis added); see also Caudle, 388 S.W.3d at 279 . | 1 | 1 |
State of Tennessee v. Susan Renee Bisegreen1 sentence2013By adopting this standard, we reject the Defendant’s contention that the presumption of reasonableness should not apply to consecutive sentencing because our holdings in Bise and Caudle only refer to a “presumption of reasonableness [for] within-range sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 707 (emphasis added); see also Caudle, 388 S.W.3d at 279 . | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Glasgow v. Whittumgreen1 sentence2012We observed that the greater weight of authority requires a confidential relationship. -8- S.W.3d 530, 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); Estate of Glasgow v. Whittum, 106 S.W.3d 25, 31 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen1 sentence2003A waiver of the assistance of counsel "must not only be voluntary, but constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the back-ground, experience and conduct of the accused.'" Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938); State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tenn. 1976); State v. Coleman, 519 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tenn. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Colemangreen1 sentence2003A waiver of the assistance of counsel "must not only be voluntary, but constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the back-ground, experience and conduct of the accused.'" Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938); State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tenn. 1976); State v. Coleman, 519 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tenn. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burkhartgreen1 sentence2003A waiver of the assistance of counsel "must not only be voluntary, but constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the back-ground, experience and conduct of the accused.'" Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938); State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tenn. 1976); State v. Coleman, 519 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tenn. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2003A waiver of the assistance of counsel "must not only be voluntary, but constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the back-ground, experience and conduct of the accused.'" Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938); State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tenn. 1976); State v. Coleman, 519 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tenn. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
Wooten v. Stategreen2 sentences1980Wooten v. State, 203 Tenn. 473, 482, 483 , 314 S.W.2d 1 (1958). 1980Wooten v. State, 203 Tenn. 473, 482, 483 , 314 S.W.2d 1 (1958). | 1 | 1 |
McDonald v. Hudspethgreen1 sentence1966See also, McDonald v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 196, 199 , C.A. 10, cert. den., 317 U.S. 665 [ 63 S.Ct. 75 , 87 L.Ed. 535 ]; Moore v. Aderhold, 108 F.2d 729, 731 , C.A. 10. | 1 | 1 |
Goldsby v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1966“The contention at bar, that, because there had been no preliminary examination of the accused, he was thereby deprived of his constitutional guarantee to be confronted by the witnesses, by mere statement, demonstrates its error. ’ ’ Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 73 [ 16 S.Ct 216, 218 , 40 L.Ed. 343 ]. 1966“The contention at bar, that, because there had been no preliminary examination of the accused, he was thereby deprived of his constitutional guarantee to be confronted by the witnesses, by mere statement, demonstrates its error. ’ ’ Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 73 [ 16 S.Ct 216, 218 , 40 L.Ed. 343 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Andrews v. Metropolitan Jockey Clubgreen1 sentence1966See also, McDonald v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 196, 199 , C.A. 10, cert. den., 317 U.S. 665 [ 63 S.Ct. 75 , 87 L.Ed. 535 ]; Moore v. Aderhold, 108 F.2d 729, 731 , C.A. 10. | 1 | 1 |
Gilreath v. Greenville Countygreen1 sentence1966See also, McDonald v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 196, 199 , C.A. 10, cert. den., 317 U.S. 665 [ 63 S.Ct. 75 , 87 L.Ed. 535 ]; Moore v. Aderhold, 108 F.2d 729, 731 , C.A. 10. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Clingan v. Vulcan Life Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1998Co., 694 S.W.2d 327 (Tenn. App.1985) (The initial appeal did not establish the law of the case because the facts in the second appeal were not substantially the same as the facts in the prior appeal); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, n. 8 , 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, n. 8 , 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983) (The doctrine does not apply if the court is “convinced that [its prior decision] is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”); Sherley v. Commonwealth, 889 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Ky.1994) (The law of the case doctrine does not apply where there has been an intervening change of controllin 1998Co., 694 S.W.2d 327 (Tenn. App. 1985) (The initial appeal did not establish the law of the case because the facts in the second appeal were not substantially the same as the facts in the prior appeal); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, n. 8 , 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, n. 8 , 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983) (The doctrine does not apply if the court is “convinced that [its prior decision] is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”); Sherley v. Commonwealth, 889 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Ky. 1994) (The law of the case doctrine does not apply where there has been an intervening change of controll | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Colorado v. Spring
green
1 sentence2021App. 1998) (citing Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
John Martin Co. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019Rather, the Ritter court held that Section 552’s language “obviously includes non-professionals involved in certain business activities or transactions” including construction managers, John Martin, 819 S.W.2d at 431 , accountants, Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d -7- 592, 595 (Tenn. 1991), the seller of a log home kit, Stamp v. Honest Abe Log Homes, Inc., 804 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), a landlord, Keller v. West-Morr Investors, Ltd., 770 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988), and a seller of real estate. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In Re Estate of Brevard
green
1 sentence2012DeLapp v. Pratt, 152 6 In Estate of Brevard, 213 S.W.3d at 302 n. 5, we addressed the contention that a presumption of undue influence can arise even in the absence of a confidential relationship. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Black
green
2 sentences1993In State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn.1991), in dissent, I agreed with the defendant’s contention that the instruction with regard to depravity of mind was unconstitutionally vague and inconsistent with a finding that the killing was committed to prevent lawful arrest. 1993In State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991), in dissent, I agreed with the defendant's contention that the instruction with regard to depravity of mind was unconstitutionally vague and inconsistent with a finding that the killing was committed to prevent lawful arrest. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Aikens v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co.
green
2 sentences1990In Aikens v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 348 Pa.Super. 17 , 501 A.2d 277 (1985), the Superior Court for the State of Pennsylvania justified denial of recovery for indirect economic loss on policy reasons. 1990In Aikens v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 348 Pa.Super. 17 , 501 A.2d 277 (1985), the Superior Court for the State of Pennsylvania justified denial of recovery for indirect economic loss on policy reasons. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1979Construing that exception, involving activities “ordinarily incident to a non-business pursuit,” the court said: “ . . . this exception seems to be intended to provide coverage for ordinary homeowner activities even though money may be earned from them.” 542 S.W.2d at 825 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1977Moreover, where in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated.” 86 S.Ct. at 1628 . 1977The clear mandate of Miranda is: “If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” 86 S.Ct. at 1628 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Bruton v. United States
green
2 sentences1969As to the contention that it was error under Bruton v. U. S., 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), for Johnny Box to be allowed to testify as to what Nash told him while both were in jail, we do not find that this happened at all. 1969As to the contention that it was error under Bruton v. U. S., 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), for Johnny Box to be allowed to testify as to what Nash told him while both were in jail, we do not find that this happened at all. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Moore v. Aderhold
green
1 sentence1966See also, McDonald v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 196, 199 , C.A. 10, cert. den., 317 U.S. 665 [ 63 S.Ct. 75 , 87 L.Ed. 535 ]; Moore v. Aderhold, 108 F.2d 729, 731 , C.A. 10. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
In Re Moore's Estate. No. 8
green
2 sentences1959Her secret marriage to the deceased was wholly foreign to the issue involved, and the alleged agreement between husband and wife that it “would not have anything to do with my holding in store or real estate” did not debar, or hinder, the widow in any way whatever to any legal action to have dower assigned to her, even if the widow’s testimony to that effect could be held competent under the “Dead man’s Statute.” This contention of error was discussed in the original opinion and the petition is a re-argument which is forbidden by the rules of the Court. [3] Contention is made that we misapplie 1959Her secret marriage to the deceased was wholly foreign to the issue involved, and the alleged agreement between husband and wife that it “would not have anything to do with my holding in store or real estate” did not debar, or hinder, the widow in any way whatever to any legal action to have dower assigned to her, even if the widow’s testimony to that effect could be held competent under the “Dead man’s Statute.” This contention of error was discussed in the original opinion and the petition is a re-argument which is forbidden by the rules of the Court. [3] Contention is made that we misapplie | 1 | 1959–1959 |
McBee v. Bowman
green
2 sentences1939In McBee v. Bowman, 89 Tenn., 132 , 14 S. W., 481 , two wills were offered for probate in the same proceeding. 1939In McBee v. Bowman, 89 Tenn., 132 , 14 S. W., 481 , two wills were offered for probate in the same proceeding. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Martinelli v. Bond
green
1 sentence1928App., 209, 183 Pac., 461 . | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Nesmith v. Martin neutral | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.