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15 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1955–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Salasgreen2 sentences2023See State v. Salas, 1999-NMCA-099, ¶ 13 , 127 N.M. 686 , 986 P.2d 482 (recognizing that it is for the fact-finder to resolve any conflict in the testimony of the witnesses and to determine where the weight and credibility lie). 2023See State v. Salas, 1999-NMCA-099, ¶ 13 , 127 N.M. 686 , 986 P.2d 482 (recognizing that it is for the fact-finder to resolve any conflict in the testimony of the witnesses and to determine where the weight and credibility lie). | 1 | 1 |
Seipert v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2019See Seipert, 2003-NMCA-119, ¶ 26 (“An unchallenged finding of the trial court is binding on appeal.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hudsongreen2 sentences2018See State v. Hudson, 1967-NMSC-164 , ¶ 18, 78 N.M. 228 , 430 P.2d 386 7 (stating that a fact that is not “so notorious that the production of evidence would be 8 unnecessary” cannot be the subject of judicial notice). 2018See State v. Hudson, 1967-NMSC-164 , ¶ 18, 78 N.M. 228 , 430 P.2d 386 7 (stating that a fact that is not “so notorious that the production of evidence would be 8 unnecessary” cannot be the subject of judicial notice). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen1 sentence1996See Hennessy, 114 N.M. at 288 , 887 P.2d at 1371 ; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-76 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (“[TJhere is no room for the contention that the privilege [against self-incrimination] is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on Ms own prior to invoicing Ms right to remain silent.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hennessygreen1 sentence1996See Hennessy, 114 N.M. at 288 , 887 P.2d at 1371 ; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-76 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (“[TJhere is no room for the contention that the privilege [against self-incrimination] is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on Ms own prior to invoicing Ms right to remain silent.”). | 1 | 1 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences1996See Hennessy, 114 N.M. at 288 , 887 P.2d at 1371 ; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-76 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (“[TJhere is no room for the contention that the privilege [against self-incrimination] is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on Ms own prior to invoicing Ms right to remain silent.”). 1996See Hennessy, 114 N.M. at 288 , 887 P.2d at 1371 ; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-76 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (“[TJhere is no room for the contention that the privilege [against self-incrimination] is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on Ms own prior to invoicing Ms right to remain silent.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Granado Ex Rel. Granado v. Granado
green
2 sentences1994Granado dealt with an order finding that the circumstances of that case were sufficient to give rise to the creation of an equitable trust, not an express trust. 107 N.M. at 459 , 760 P.2d at 151 . 1994Granado dealt with an order finding that the circumstances of that case were sufficient to give rise to the creation of an equitable trust, not an express trust. 107 N.M. at 459 , 760 P.2d at 151 . | 2 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Baldonado
green
2 sentences1977State v. Baldonado, 79 N.M. 175 , 441 P.2d 215 (Ct.App.1968). 1977State v. Baldonado, 79 N.M. 175 , 441 P.2d 215 (Ct.App.1968). | 2 | 1977–1977 |
Bernier v. Bernier
green
1 sentence2022Bernier, 2013-NMCA-074, ¶¶ 25-26 , 305 P.3d 978 (considering a Rule 1-011 sanction and explaining that “a court may impose sanctions, in the form of attorney fees”). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hennessy v. Duryea
green
2 sentences2018Worker revisits the issues 8 raised in his docketing statement. 9 {3} Worker contends that the Workers’ Compensation Administration committed 10 reversible error when the WCJ failed to take judicial notice of Worker’s award of 11 Social Security Disability Benefits (SSDB). [MIO 3; DS 2] Among the reasons we 12 offered in our calendar notice for proposing to reject this contention of error is that 13 Worker did not indicate when, how, or even if, Worker petitioned the court to take 14 judicial notice of the fact that he was granted SSDB. [CN 2] In his MIO, worker 15 indicates that he offered a 2018Worker revisits the issues 8 raised in his docketing statement. 9 {3} Worker contends that the Workers’ Compensation Administration committed 10 reversible error when the WCJ failed to take judicial notice of Worker’s award of 11 Social Security Disability Benefits (SSDB). [MIO 3; DS 2] Among the reasons we 12 offered in our calendar notice for proposing to reject this contention of error is that 13 Worker did not indicate when, how, or even if, Worker petitioned the court to take 14 judicial notice of the fact that he was granted SSDB. [CN 2] In his MIO, worker 15 indicates that he offered a | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Holt v. Atlantic Casualty Insurance
green
2 sentences2017Co. , 141 N.C.App. 139 , 539 S.E.2d 345 , 347-48 (2000) (holding that medical expenses for bodily injury cannot be recovered under policy's property damage coverage); Napier v. Banks , 9 Ohio App.2d 265 , 224 N.E.2d 158 , 160, 162 (1967) (holding that payment of the policy's $25,000 limit for bodily injury coverage exhausted the policy and rejecting the contention that claim for loss of consortium should have been paid from the policy's $10,000 property damage coverage limit); Va. Farm Bureau Mut. 2017Co. , 141 N.C.App. 139 , 539 S.E.2d 345 , 347-48 (2000) (holding that medical expenses for bodily injury cannot be recovered under policy's property damage coverage); Napier v. Banks , 9 Ohio App.2d 265 , 224 N.E.2d 158 , 160, 162 (1967) (holding that payment of the policy's $25,000 limit for bodily injury coverage exhausted the policy and rejecting the contention that claim for loss of consortium should have been paid from the policy's $10,000 property damage coverage limit); Va. Farm Bureau Mut. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Napier v. Banks
green
2 sentences2017Co. , 141 N.C.App. 139 , 539 S.E.2d 345 , 347-48 (2000) (holding that medical expenses for bodily injury cannot be recovered under policy's property damage coverage); Napier v. Banks , 9 Ohio App.2d 265 , 224 N.E.2d 158 , 160, 162 (1967) (holding that payment of the policy's $25,000 limit for bodily injury coverage exhausted the policy and rejecting the contention that claim for loss of consortium should have been paid from the policy's $10,000 property damage coverage limit); Va. Farm Bureau Mut. 2017Co. , 141 N.C.App. 139 , 539 S.E.2d 345 , 347-48 (2000) (holding that medical expenses for bodily injury cannot be recovered under policy's property damage coverage); Napier v. Banks , 9 Ohio App.2d 265 , 224 N.E.2d 158 , 160, 162 (1967) (holding that payment of the policy's $25,000 limit for bodily injury coverage exhausted the policy and rejecting the contention that claim for loss of consortium should have been paid from the policy's $10,000 property damage coverage limit); Va. Farm Bureau Mut. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Bernard
green
1 sentence2015State v. Bernard, 2015-NMCA-089, ¶ 35 , 355 P.3d 831 (“We 4 will not review unclear arguments[] or guess at what a party’s arguments might be.” 5 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Aguirre
green
2 sentences1985Defendant argues that State v. Aguirre, 84 N.M. 376 , 503 P.2d 1154 (1972) holds that the term “hold for service” is a readily understandable concept in need of no further definition. 1985Defendant argues that State v. Aguirre, 84 N.M. 376 , 503 P.2d 1154 (1972) holds that the term “hold for service” is a readily understandable concept in need of no further definition. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Paul
green
2 sentences1982State v. Smith, 92 N.M. 533 , 591 P.2d 664 (1979); State v. Silver, 83 N.M. 1 , 487 P.2d 910 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Paul, 82 N.M. 791 , 487 P.2d 493 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Ford, 81 N.M. 556 , 469 P.2d 535 (Ct.App. 1970). 1982State v. Smith, 92 N.M. 533 , 591 P.2d 664 (1979); State v. Silver, 83 N.M. 1 , 487 P.2d 910 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Paul, 82 N.M. 791 , 487 P.2d 493 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Ford, 81 N.M. 556 , 469 P.2d 535 (Ct.App. 1970). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Silver
green
2 sentences1982State v. Smith, 92 N.M. 533 , 591 P.2d 664 (1979); State v. Silver, 83 N.M. 1 , 487 P.2d 910 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Paul, 82 N.M. 791 , 487 P.2d 493 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Ford, 81 N.M. 556 , 469 P.2d 535 (Ct.App. 1970). 1982State v. Smith, 92 N.M. 533 , 591 P.2d 664 (1979); State v. Silver, 83 N.M. 1 , 487 P.2d 910 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Paul, 82 N.M. 791 , 487 P.2d 493 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Ford, 81 N.M. 556 , 469 P.2d 535 (Ct.App. 1970). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences1982State v. Smith, 92 N.M. 533 , 591 P.2d 664 (1979); State v. Silver, 83 N.M. 1 , 487 P.2d 910 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Paul, 82 N.M. 791 , 487 P.2d 493 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Ford, 81 N.M. 556 , 469 P.2d 535 (Ct.App. 1970). 1982State v. Smith, 92 N.M. 533 , 591 P.2d 664 (1979); State v. Silver, 83 N.M. 1 , 487 P.2d 910 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Paul, 82 N.M. 791 , 487 P.2d 493 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Ford, 81 N.M. 556 , 469 P.2d 535 (Ct.App. 1970). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Ford
green
2 sentences1982State v. Smith, 92 N.M. 533 , 591 P.2d 664 (1979); State v. Silver, 83 N.M. 1 , 487 P.2d 910 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Paul, 82 N.M. 791 , 487 P.2d 493 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Ford, 81 N.M. 556 , 469 P.2d 535 (Ct.App. 1970). 1982State v. Smith, 92 N.M. 533 , 591 P.2d 664 (1979); State v. Silver, 83 N.M. 1 , 487 P.2d 910 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Paul, 82 N.M. 791 , 487 P.2d 493 (Ct.App. 1971); State v. Ford, 81 N.M. 556 , 469 P.2d 535 (Ct.App. 1970). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Asplund v. Hannett
green
2 sentences1961As was said in Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N.M. 641 , 249 P. 1074, 1083 , 58 A.L.R. 573 , “ * * the objection here made is, in legal effect, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 1961As was said in Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N.M. 641 , 249 P. 1074, 1083 , 58 A.L.R. 573 , “ * * the objection here made is, in legal effect, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
McConnell v. Murphy Bros.
green
2 sentences1955He could recover for the temporary disability and for the permanent disability, provided that the time given for temporary disability is deducted from the time given for the permanent disability, as such would mean, in effect, just one award.’ ” Our disposition of defendant’s claim in this behalf is succinctly summarized in this language from the opinion, to-wit: “The trial court did not err in declining to deduct from the scheduled award for loss of one leg above the knee the amounts paid plaintiff for temporary total disability prior to amputation. 71 C.J. 830; 58 A.J. 786; Curtis v. Hayes W 1955He could recover for the temporary disability and for the permanent disability, provided that the time given for temporary disability is deducted from the time given for the permanent disability, as such would mean, in effect, just one award.’ ” Our disposition of defendant’s claim in this behalf is succinctly summarized in this language from the opinion, to-wit: “The trial court did not err in declining to deduct from the scheduled award for loss of one leg above the knee the amounts paid plaintiff for temporary total disability prior to amputation. 71 C.J. 830; 58 A.J. 786; Curtis v. Hayes W | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Curtis v. Hayes Wheel Co.
red
2 sentences1955He could recover for the temporary disability and for the permanent disability, provided that the time given for temporary disability is deducted from the time given for the permanent disability, as such would mean, in effect, just one award.’ ” Our disposition of defendant’s claim in this behalf is succinctly summarized in this language from the opinion, to-wit: “The trial court did not err in declining to deduct from the scheduled award for loss of one leg above the knee the amounts paid plaintiff for temporary total disability prior to amputation. 71 C.J. 830; 58 A.J. 786; Curtis v. Hayes W 1955He could recover for the temporary disability and for the permanent disability, provided that the time given for temporary disability is deducted from the time given for the permanent disability, as such would mean, in effect, just one award.’ ” Our disposition of defendant’s claim in this behalf is succinctly summarized in this language from the opinion, to-wit: “The trial court did not err in declining to deduct from the scheduled award for loss of one leg above the knee the amounts paid plaintiff for temporary total disability prior to amputation. 71 C.J. 830; 58 A.J. 786; Curtis v. Hayes W | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.