contention instruction in Nebraska

2020Violation of recognized ethical codes for a particular area of business activity 150 Lamar Co. v. City of Fremont, supra note 148 , 278 Neb. at 498, 771 N.W.2d at 906. 151 See Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483 (8th Cir. 1992). 152 Miller Chemical Co., Inc. v. Tams, supra note 148 . 153 See, 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767, comment on clause (a) (1979); Restatement of Torts, supra note 148, comment on clause (b). - 682 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 307 Nebraska Reports DICK v. KOSKI PROF.

2020Violation of recognized ethical codes for a particular area of business activity 150 Lamar Co. v. City of Fremont, supra note 148 , 278 Neb. at 498, 771 N.W.2d at 906. 151 See Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483 (8th Cir. 1992). 152 Miller Chemical Co., Inc. v. Tams, supra note 148 . 153 See, 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767, comment on clause (a) (1979); Restatement of Torts, supra note 148, comment on clause (b). - 682 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 307 Nebraska Reports DICK v. KOSKI PROF.

2020Dist. 8 As an initial matter, we observe that this court may con- sider the State’s contention that the exception set forth in § 81-8,219(4) is applicable. 9 We have held that “when a plain- tiff’s complaint shows on its face that a claim is barred by one of the exceptions [to the State’s waiver of immunity], the State’s inherent immunity from suit is a jurisdictional issue that an appellate court cannot ignore.” 10 [6,7] It is well settled that statutes that purport to waive the protection of sovereign immunity of the State or its subdivisions are strictly construed in favor of the sovereign

2017We acknowledge that the late amendment of Scherbarth’s assignments of error, - 904 - Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets 24 Nebraska A ppellate R eports STATE v. SCHERBARTH Cite as 24 Neb.

1944In Ballou v. Black, 17 Neb. 389 , 23 N. W. 3 , there was only one contract involved.

1940The degree of care to be exercised by the operator of a street car is expressed in Daly v. Publix Cars, 128 Neb. 403 , 259 N. W. 163 , which held: “Common carriers of passengers ‘are required to exercise the utmost skill, diligence and foresight consistent with the business in which they are engaged for the safety of the passengers, and they are liable for the slightest negligence.’ Griffen v. Lincoln Traction Co., 118 Neb. 459 .” The preceding instructions to instruction No. 6 given by the court define the issues, the burden of proof and the definition of “preponderance of the evidence.” Inst

1940The degree of care to be exercised by the operator of a street car is expressed in Daly v. Publix Cars, 128 Neb. 403 , 259 N. W. 163 , which held: “Common carriers of passengers ‘are required to exercise the utmost skill, diligence and foresight consistent with the business in which they are engaged for the safety of the passengers, and they are liable for the slightest negligence.’ Griffen v. Lincoln Traction Co., 118 Neb. 459 .” The preceding instructions to instruction No. 6 given by the court define the issues, the burden of proof and the definition of “preponderance of the evidence.” Inst

1940The degree of care to be exercised by the operator of a street car is expressed in Daly v. Publix Cars, 128 Neb. 403 , 259 N. W. 163 , which held: “Common carriers of passengers ‘are required to exercise the utmost skill, diligence and foresight consistent with the business in which they are engaged for the safety of the passengers, and they are liable for the slightest negligence.’ Griffen v. Lincoln Traction Co., 118 Neb. 459 .” The preceding instructions to instruction No. 6 given by the court define the issues, the burden of proof and the definition of “preponderance of the evidence.” Inst

1927Brown did * * * knowingly permit and allow to be set up and maintained gambling device and devices, composed of tables used for gaming and playing cards, the same being then and. there adapted, devised and designed for the purpose of playing a game and games of chance, commonly known as ‘poker’ and other games of chance for money and other property (description of premises),” was held “sufficient,” though a similar information was held defective in State v. Wade, supra. This was because, “though the exact language of the statute was not followed, it was substantially so.” We cannot accede to t

1922Kemmerling v. State, 89 Neb. 98 . ■ We find no reversible error in the record.

1915In that case the defense was insanity, and the court instructed the jury: “The jury is instructed that the law presumes that a person intends all the natural, probable and usual consequences of his acts; that when one person assaults another violently with a dangerous and deadly weapon, likely to kill, not in self-defense, or in defense of habitation or property, and not in a sudden heat of passion or sudden quarrel, and the life of the person thus assaulted is actually destroyed in consequence of such assault, then the legal and natural presumption is that death or great bodily injury was int

1915In that case the defense was insanity, and the court instructed the jury: “The jury is instructed that the law presumes that a person intends all the natural, probable and usual consequences of his acts; that when one person assaults another violently with a dangerous and deadly weapon, likely to kill, not in self-defense, or in defense of habitation or property, and not in a sudden heat of passion or sudden quarrel, and the life of the person thus assaulted is actually destroyed in consequence of such assault, then the legal and natural presumption is that death or great bodily injury was int

1915In that case the defense was insanity, and the court instructed the jury: “The jury is instructed that the law presumes that a person intends all the natural, probable and usual consequences of his acts; that when one person assaults another violently with a dangerous and deadly weapon, likely to kill, not in self-defense, or in defense of habitation or property, and not in a sudden heat of passion or sudden quarrel, and the life of the person thus assaulted is actually destroyed in consequence of such assault, then the legal and natural presumption is that death or great bodily injury was int

1904Arlington State Bank v. Paulsen, 57 Neb. 717, 729 ; Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Neb. 455 .

1904Arlington State Bank v. Paulsen, 57 Neb. 717, 729 ; Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Neb. 455 .

1901Co., 81 N. Y., 410 , it was held that an effective waiver need not be based on either a new agreement or an estoppel.

1899Co. v. Baker, 153 Ill. 240 .) The contention that a waiver must have the elements of an estoppel in cases of this kind cannot be sustained.

1896(Enyeart v. Davis, 17 Neb., 228 ; Richardson v. Doty, 25 Neb., 424 ; Ward v. Parlin, 30 Neb., 376 .) Excluding the evidence which is made the basis of this assignment, there yet remained sufficient competent evidence to sustain the order of the court.

1896(Enyeart v. Davis, 17 Neb., 228 ; Richardson v. Doty, 25 Neb., 424 ; Ward v. Parlin, 30 Neb., 376 .) Excluding the evidence which is made the basis of this assignment, there yet remained sufficient competent evidence to sustain the order of the court.