contention rule (Hawaii) · Go Syfert
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contention rule in Hawaii

11 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1897–2023 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Hoglundgreen
haw · 1990 · cited in 2 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2021–2023
2 sentences

2023See Hoglund, 71 Haw. at 150 , 785 P.2d at 1313 .

2023See Hoglund, 71 Haw. at 150 , 785 P.2d at 1313 .

12
State v. Mosesgreen
haw · 2003 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021See Moses, 102 Hawai#i at 456, 77 P.3d at 947 ; Hoglund, 71 Haw. at 150 , 785 P.2d at 1313 .

11
Susan J. Mayors v. Commissioner of Internal Revenuegreen
ca9 · 1986 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015Citing Mayors v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 785 F.2d 757, 761 (9th Cir.1986), Appellees submit: “Where a defendant has a good faith belief that an obligation must be paid—as opposed to the actual legal enforceability of the obligation being paid—the former is determinative.” This supposition is flawed on a number of levels.

11
Swanson v. McGrawgreen
iowa · 1989 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996As noted by the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Swanson v. McGraw, 447 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Iowa 1989), the above-delineated standard for wanton conduct is “difficult to prove.” In order to plead and prove a case based on wilful and wanton misconduct, therefore, allegations and proof are required for either an actual intent to injure on the part of the tortfeasor co-employee, or all three of the elements of “wanton” conduct, including a conscious failure to avoid the peril.

1996As noted by the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Swanson v. McGraw, 447 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Iowa 1989), the above-delineated standard for wanton conduct is "difficult to prove." In order to plead and prove a case based on wilful and wanton misconduct, therefore, allegations and proof are required for either an actual intent to injure on the part of the tortfeasor co-employee, or all three of the elements of "wanton" conduct, including a conscious failure to avoid the peril.

11
United States v. Gambinogreen
nysd · 1990 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
1 sentence

1991Ed. 306 (1932) — which provides that cumulative penalties, and thus successive prosecutions, should not be barred if each offense charged requires proof of an element which the other does not — constituted the full extent of double jeopardy protection.” United States v. Gambino, 742 F. Supp. 855, 857 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 923 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert green
scotus · 1892
2 sentences

1901“In Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339 , a special tax was laid upon express companies which did not own their own means of transportation and not upon other express companies, and the contention was that the rule of uniformity and equality was destroyed by arbitrary discrimination, but the court held that there was an essential difference between companies that owned their own means of transportation and those that did not, inasmuch as the former possessed property which was subject to other taxes and the latter .would escape taxation unless taxed specially, and hence the classific

1897In Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339 , a special tax was laid upon express companies which did not own their own means of transportation and not upon other express companies, and the contention was that the rule of uniformity and equality was destroyed by arbitrary discrimination, but the court held that there was an essential difference between companies that owned their own means of transportation and those that did not, inasmuch as the former possessed property which was subject to other taxes and the latter would escape taxation unless taxed specially, and hence the classificat

21897–1901
State v. Basque green
haw · 1983
2 sentences

2018In Basque , we addressed the State's contention that the rule in Lui , later codified as HRE Rule 404(a)(2), "allows only the use of character evidence-to be proved by reputation or opinion-and not evidence of 'other crimes, wrongs, or acts,' which is covered by Rule 404(b)." 66 Haw. at 513 -14 , 666 P.2d at 602 .

2018In Basque , we addressed the State's contention that the rule in Lui , later codified as HRE Rule 404(a)(2), "allows only the use of character evidence-to be proved by reputation or opinion-and not evidence of 'other crimes, wrongs, or acts,' which is covered by Rule 404(b)." 66 Haw. at 513 -14 , 666 P.2d at 602 .

12018–2018
Lawhead v. United Air Lines green
haw · 1978
2 sentences

2014The court rejected the employer’s contention that the claim should be denied because the claimant “failed to show that she was exposed to an increased risk attributable to work.” Id. at 560 , 584 P.2d at 125 .

2014The court rejected the employer’s contention that the claim should be denied because the claimant “failed to show that she was exposed to an increased risk attributable to work.” Id. at 560 , 584 P.2d at 125 .

12014–2014
Iddings v. Mee-Lee green
haw · 1996
1 sentence

1996Fourth, the dissent's contention that the immunity provisions of HRS chapter 386 may be "easily circumvented by simply claiming that a supervising employee allowed an employee to work in an unsafe environment," dissenting opinion at 19, 919 P.2d at 281 , is specious, and the dissent's fear that "almost any claim for an on-the-job injury may be framed as a claim under HRS § 386-8 against a supervising employee for `wantonly' allowing the employee to work in an unsafe environment," id., is based on an incomplete statement of the standard adopted by this opinion for "wilful and wanton misconduct.

11996–1996
Blockburger v. United States green
scotus · 1931
2 sentences

1991In reaching its holding in Grady , the Supreme Court “rejected the contention that the test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S. Ct. 180 , 76 L.

1991In reaching its holding in Grady , the Supreme Court “rejected the contention that the test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S. Ct. 180 , 76 L.

11991–1991
In Re Barth (Leslie) green
ca2 · 1990
1 sentence

1991Ed. 306 (1932) — which provides that cumulative penalties, and thus successive prosecutions, should not be barred if each offense charged requires proof of an element which the other does not — constituted the full extent of double jeopardy protection.” United States v. Gambino, 742 F. Supp. 855, 857 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 923 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

11991–1991
Slidell v. Grandjean green
scotus · 1884
2 sentences

1966The State cites Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U.S. 412 , 4 S.Ct. 475 , 28 L.Ed. 321 , and Coosaw Mining Co. v. State of South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550 , 12 S.Ct. 689 , 36 L.Ed. 537 , for the rule that where a statute operates as a grant of public property to an individual, the statute should be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign interest.

1966The State cites Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U.S. 412 , 4 S.Ct. 475 , 28 L.Ed. 321 , and Coosaw Mining Co. v. State of South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550 , 12 S.Ct. 689 , 36 L.Ed. 537 , for the rule that where a statute operates as a grant of public property to an individual, the statute should be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign interest.

11966–1966
Stellwagen v. Tucker green
scotus · 1892
1 sentence

1966The State cites Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U.S. 412 , 4 S.Ct. 475 , 28 L.Ed. 321 , and Coosaw Mining Co. v. State of South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550 , 12 S.Ct. 689 , 36 L.Ed. 537 , for the rule that where a statute operates as a grant of public property to an individual, the statute should be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign interest.

11966–1966
Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina green
scotus · 1892
2 sentences

1966The State cites Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U.S. 412 , 4 S.Ct. 475 , 28 L.Ed. 321 , and Coosaw Mining Co. v. State of South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550 , 12 S.Ct. 689 , 36 L.Ed. 537 , for the rule that where a statute operates as a grant of public property to an individual, the statute should be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign interest.

1966The State cites Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U.S. 412 , 4 S.Ct. 475 , 28 L.Ed. 321 , and Coosaw Mining Co. v. State of South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550 , 12 S.Ct. 689 , 36 L.Ed. 537 , for the rule that where a statute operates as a grant of public property to an individual, the statute should be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign interest.

11966–1966
Luka v. Poohina neutral
haw · 1876
1 sentence

1945(Okuu v. Kaiaikawaha, 7 Haw. 311 ; Luka v. Poohina, 3 Haw. 728 .) *59 Hence, the contention that a waiver arises from an omission in a motion after verdict is untenable in so far as it concerns alleged errors of trial in the appellant’s bill of exceptions.

11945–1945
Okuu v. Kaiaikawaha green
haw · 1888
1 sentence

1945(Okuu v. Kaiaikawaha, 7 Haw. 311 ; Luka v. Poohina, 3 Haw. 728 .) *59 Hence, the contention that a waiver arises from an omission in a motion after verdict is untenable in so far as it concerns alleged errors of trial in the appellant’s bill of exceptions.

11945–1945

Where else courts name it

NY 382 (1889–2026) CA 237 (1910–2026) IL 125 (1891–2026) TX 105 (1908–2025) MO 96 (1909–2025) GA 78 (1916–2026) FL 50 (1939–2018) MD 42 (1919–2022) AL 42 (1915–2025) LA 38 (1933–2015) PA 38 (1903–2021) CO 35 (1924–2026) IN 34 (1920–2018) OR 32 (1909–2024) NJ 30 (1907–2025) KS 28 (1891–2011) OK 28 (1903–2012) MI 28 (1909–2026) UT 25 (1915–2018) WA 24 (1909–2017) WI 24 (1892–2024) KY 23 (1917–2022) IA 22 (1905–2020) MA 22 (1938–2020) CT 20 (1926–2026) TN 18 (1923–2021) VA 16 (1911–2020) NM 15 (1955–2023) MS 15 (1902–2016) RI 14 (1897–2021) NE 14 (1896–2020) WV 14 (1893–2017) WY 13 (1926–2015) ID 12 (1917–2011) NC 12 (1889–2021) AZ 11 (1931–1997) HI 11 (1897–2023) DC 11 (1971–2024) AR 11 (1916–2014) OH 9 (1965–2018) SC 9 (1921–2017) ME 8 (1969–2025) MT 8 (1919–2011) ND 8 (1910–1988) DE 7 (1935–1992) VT 7 (1909–2021) NV 7 (1937–2022) MN 5 (1906–1998) NH 4 (1992–2019) AK 4 (1893–2013) SD 3 (1905–1928)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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