contention claim in Connecticut

2020The defendants principally rely on this court’s decision in Brycki v. Brycki, 91 Conn. App. 579, 594 , 881 A.2d 1056 (2005), for the proposition that we should decline to review the plaintiff’s claim because, after filing this appeal, he failed to file a motion for articulation pursuant to Practice Book § 66-5,13 specifically requesting that the trial court address the mitigation of damages issue, the denial of which would have been subject to appellate review upon the filing of a motion for review pursuant to Practice Book § 66-7.

2020The defendants principally rely on this court’s decision in Brycki v. Brycki, 91 Conn. App. 579, 594 , 881 A.2d 1056 (2005), for the proposition that we should decline to review the plaintiff’s claim because, after filing this appeal, he failed to file a motion for articulation pursuant to Practice Book § 66-5,13 specifically requesting that the trial court address the mitigation of damages issue, the denial of which would have been subject to appellate review upon the filing of a motion for review pursuant to Practice Book § 66-7.

2019As the court recognized in Doron Precision Systems, Inc. v. FAAC, Inc., supra 423 F. Supp. 2d 173 , ‘‘competitive bidding laws and antitrust laws are motivated by very different policies, and therefore a violation of the letter or spirit of a competitive bid statute, unaccompanied by anticompetitive factors bearing [on] the exercise of choice of product, does not create an antitrust problem.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 183.

2018We also reject the defendant's contention that his claim presents a pure question of law, reviewable on direct appeal pursuant to State v. Arroyo , 284 Conn. 597 , 643-45, 935 A.2d 975 (2007).

2018We also reject the defendant's contention that his claim presents a pure question of law, reviewable on direct appeal pursuant to State v. Arroyo , 284 Conn. 597 , 643-45, 935 A.2d 975 (2007).

2009The state refers to portions of the record that indicate that the defendant informed the court that she had discussed with her attorney the state’s evidence, her confession and the case generally, and that she was satisfied with his advice. 6 We are not persuaded. *201 We agree that “the constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by [the defendant’s] own, competent counsel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reid, 277 Conn. 764, 784 , 89

2009The state refers to portions of the record that indicate that the defendant informed the court that she had discussed with her attorney the state’s evidence, her confession and the case generally, and that she was satisfied with his advice. 6 We are not persuaded. *201 We agree that “the constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by [the defendant’s] own, competent counsel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reid, 277 Conn. 764, 784 , 89

2008The defendant concedes that she did not raise the claim at trial, but she seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 10 *156 Because she cannot satisfy the third Golding condition that a constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived her of a fair trial, we conclude that she cannot prevail.

2008The defendant concedes that she did not raise the claim at trial, but she seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 10 *156 Because she cannot satisfy the third Golding condition that a constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived her of a fair trial, we conclude that she cannot prevail.

2005Id., 384 .

1995Moore v. McNamara, 201 Conn. 16 , 20-21 (1986) In Caldor, the court, after approving the refusal of the arbitrators to consider the constitutional issue, proceeded to make a determination of that issue that resulted in overturning their decision.

1993The Supreme Court specifically found in the case of Malerba v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 210 Conn. 189 that comparative negligence allocation by a jury as part of its statutory responsibilities does "not bar a later determination of liability as between an indemnitee and an indemnitor".

1979Section 53a-91 (1) of the General Statutes defines "restrain" as "to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent." [4] People v. Cassidy, 40 N.Y.2d 763 , 390 N.Y.S.2d 45 ; People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266 , 282 N.Y.S.2d 519 ; see also 43 A.L.R.3d 699 for a discussion of the relationship of kidnapping to other crimes. [1] It was the contention of t

1979Section 53a-91 (1) of the General Statutes defines "restrain" as "to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent." [4] People v. Cassidy, 40 N.Y.2d 763 , 390 N.Y.S.2d 45 ; People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266 , 282 N.Y.S.2d 519 ; see also 43 A.L.R.3d 699 for a discussion of the relationship of kidnapping to other crimes. [1] It was the contention of t

1979Section 53a-91 (1) of the General Statutes defines "restrain" as "to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent." [4] People v. Cassidy, 40 N.Y.2d 763 , 390 N.Y.S.2d 45 ; People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266 , 282 N.Y.S.2d 519 ; see also 43 A.L.R.3d 699 for a discussion of the relationship of kidnapping to other crimes. [1] It was the contention of t

1979Section 53a-91 (1) of the General Statutes defines "restrain" as "to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent." [4] People v. Cassidy, 40 N.Y.2d 763 , 390 N.Y.S.2d 45 ; People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266 , 282 N.Y.S.2d 519 ; see also 43 A.L.R.3d 699 for a discussion of the relationship of kidnapping to other crimes. [1] It was the contention of t

1969Norwalk Teachers’ Assn. v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 276 . *208 This court cannot agree with the contention of the defense that the plaintiffs have no standing, that no irreparable harm has been demonstrated and, further, that even if the latter had been established, “the additional burden . . . upon plaintiffs would probably be the paltry sum of a few cents, an injury trifling and insignificant.” Our Supreme Court has held: “An injury is irreparable when there is no legal remedy furnishing full compensation or adequate redress because of the ineffectiveness of such legal remedy, or w

1969Norwalk Teachers’ Assn. v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 276 . *208 This court cannot agree with the contention of the defense that the plaintiffs have no standing, that no irreparable harm has been demonstrated and, further, that even if the latter had been established, “the additional burden . . . upon plaintiffs would probably be the paltry sum of a few cents, an injury trifling and insignificant.” Our Supreme Court has held: “An injury is irreparable when there is no legal remedy furnishing full compensation or adequate redress because of the ineffectiveness of such legal remedy, or w

1953The plaintiff’s contention that the principle adopted by this court in the above cases was overruled by Blakeman v. Sears, 74 Conn. 516 , 51 A. 517 , is unwarranted.

1953The plaintiff’s contention that the principle adopted by this court in the above cases was overruled by Blakeman v. Sears, 74 Conn. 516 , 51 A. 517 , is unwarranted.

1948The defense is not here allowed because the party raising it is entitled to any consideration, but upon principles of public policy and to conserve the public welfare.” Parish v. Schwartz, 344 Ill. 563, 572 , 176 N. E. 757 .

1948The defense is not here allowed because the party raising it is entitled to any consideration, but upon principles of public policy and to conserve the public welfare.” Parish v. Schwartz, 344 Ill. 563, 572 , 176 N. E. 757 .

1943Practice Book, § 363; Boardman v. Burlingame, 123 Conn. 646, 655 , 197 Atl. 761 ; Woodstock v. The Retreat, Inc., 125 Conn. 52, 59 , 3 Atl. (2d) 232.

1943Practice Book, § 363; Boardman v. Burlingame, 123 Conn. 646, 655 , 197 Atl. 761 ; Woodstock v. The Retreat, Inc., 125 Conn. 52, 59 , 3 Atl. (2d) 232.

1943Practice Book, § 363; Boardman v. Burlingame, 123 Conn. 646, 655 , 197 Atl. 761 ; Woodstock v. The Retreat, Inc., 125 Conn. 52, 59 , 3 Atl. (2d) 232.

1933Peck v. Botsford, 7 Conn. 172, 176 ; Matter of City of Rochester, 110 N. Y. 159 , 17 N. E. 740 ; 2 Page, Wills (2d Ed.) § 1299, p. 2160; 28 R.

1933Peck v. Botsford, 7 Conn. 172, 176 ; Matter of City of Rochester, 110 N. Y. 159 , 17 N. E. 740 ; 2 Page, Wills (2d Ed.) § 1299, p. 2160; 28 R.

1933Peck v. Botsford, 7 Conn. 172, 176 ; Matter of City of Rochester, 110 N. Y. 159 , 17 N. E. 740 ; 2 Page, Wills (2d Ed.) § 1299, p. 2160; 28 R.

1926The contention is that the principle announced in Miller v. American Steel & Wire Co., 90 Conn. 349 , 97 Atl. 345 , and in Linnane v. Aetna Brewing Co., 91 Conn. 158 , 99 Atl. 507 — that “personal injury within the meaning of the Act involves both an accident and a bodily injury, as distinguished from a disease” and a “bodily injury ... is always assignable to some definite part or organ of the body, and when caused by accident is always sustained at the time of the accident or at least during the time within which the accidental condition is operative” — was only made ineffective by the amend

1926The contention is that the principle announced in Miller v. American Steel & Wire Co., 90 Conn. 349 , 97 Atl. 345 , and in Linnane v. Aetna Brewing Co., 91 Conn. 158 , 99 Atl. 507 — that “personal injury within the meaning of the Act involves both an accident and a bodily injury, as distinguished from a disease” and a “bodily injury ... is always assignable to some definite part or organ of the body, and when caused by accident is always sustained at the time of the accident or at least during the time within which the accidental condition is operative” — was only made ineffective by the amend

1926The contention is that the principle announced in Miller v. American Steel & Wire Co., 90 Conn. 349 , 97 Atl. 345 , and in Linnane v. Aetna Brewing Co., 91 Conn. 158 , 99 Atl. 507 — that “personal injury within the meaning of the Act involves both an accident and a bodily injury, as distinguished from a disease” and a “bodily injury ... is always assignable to some definite part or organ of the body, and when caused by accident is always sustained at the time of the accident or at least during the time within which the accidental condition is operative” — was only made ineffective by the amend

1926The contention is that the principle announced in Miller v. American Steel & Wire Co., 90 Conn. 349 , 97 Atl. 345 , and in Linnane v. Aetna Brewing Co., 91 Conn. 158 , 99 Atl. 507 — that “personal injury within the meaning of the Act involves both an accident and a bodily injury, as distinguished from a disease” and a “bodily injury ... is always assignable to some definite part or organ of the body, and when caused by accident is always sustained at the time of the accident or at least during the time within which the accidental condition is operative” — was only made ineffective by the amend

1926We decided in Dupre v. Atlantic Refining Co., 98 Conn. 646 , 120 Atl. 288 , that this amendment applied to all forms of disease, whether occupational or otherwise.

1926We decided in Dupre v. Atlantic Refining Co., 98 Conn. 646 , 120 Atl. 288 , that this amendment applied to all forms of disease, whether occupational or otherwise.