contention error in Colorado

2025See In re Marriage of Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 27 (the appealing party bears the burden of providing authority to support a contention of error). ¶ 18 Still, wife argues that the premarital agreement governed more than just the transfer of ownership in the Ignacio home.

2025See In re Marriage of Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 27 (noting the appellant’s burden to provide legal authority to support a contention of error). ¶ 14 Second, wife argues that the court “struck 180 pages of properly submitted exhibits” that “included critical evidence related to ADA violations, financial abuse, guardianship rights, and domestic violence” “without notice, hearing, . . . justification,” “or any articulated legal basis” in violation of her due process rights. 6 However, wife doesn’t identify when she submitted the purported exhibits to the court or when the court purportedly struck t

2010See Erskine v. Beim, 197 P.3d 225, 282 (Colo.App.2008) (declining to address the defendants' contention of error in striking an expert, where the defendants made no argument and cited no authority as to why the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion).

2010Erskine v. Beim, 197 P.3d 225, 232 (Colo.App.2008) (declining to address the defendants' contention of error in striking an expert, where the defendants made no argument and cited no authority as to why the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion).

2011Moody, 843 P.2d at 1363 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ).

2011Moody, 843 P.2d at 1363 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ).

2026See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 21 (to preserve an issue for appeal, the party must lodge an objection “specific enough to draw the trial court’s attention to the asserted error” (citation omitted)). ¶ 27 Regardless, the argument fails on the merits.

2025Green Indus., Inc., 97-C-3188, pp. 5-6 (La. 7/8/98), 716 So. 2d 355, 356-57, 359 (holding that even though asymptomatic plaintiffs did not suffer “bodily harm” from exposure to asbestos, their medical-monitoring claim rested on the “legally protected interest” of avoiding “costly 18 medical bills”), superseded by statute, 1999 La.

2025See People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 40 (waiver extinguishes error and therefore appellate review).

2025Be that as it may, provisions in an agreement “that are not intended by the parties to be incorporated in the deed, or that are not necessarily satisfied by the execution and delivery of the deed, are collateral agreements and are preserved from merger.” Coe v. Crady Davis Corp., 60 P.3d 794, 796 (Colo. App. 2002); accord Bedard v. Martin, 100 P.3d 584, 593 (Colo. App. 2004).

2025See People v. Snider, 2021 COA 19, ¶ 31 ; see also People v. Alemayehu, 2021 COA 69, ¶ 101 (declining to consider a contention of error where the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection and counsel didn’t request any additional relief). ¶ 30 Accordingly, we reject Salinas’s argument that the district court reversibly erred by admitting improper vouching testimony from Peters, Mikow, and Griffith.

2025See People v. Snider, 2021 COA 19, ¶ 31 ; see also People v. Alemayehu, 2021 COA 69, ¶ 101 (declining to consider a contention of error where the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection and counsel didn’t request any additional relief). ¶ 30 Accordingly, we reject Salinas’s argument that the district court reversibly erred by admitting improper vouching testimony from Peters, Mikow, and Griffith.

2025Be that as it may, provisions in an agreement “that are not intended by the parties to be incorporated in the deed, or that are not necessarily satisfied by the execution and delivery of the deed, are collateral agreements and are preserved from merger.” Coe v. Crady Davis Corp., 60 P.3d 794, 796 (Colo. App. 2002); accord Bedard v. Martin, 100 P.3d 584, 593 (Colo. App. 2004).

2024See Dennis, 884 P.2d at 335-39 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting).

2017Whitham Farms, 97 P.3d at 138 (declining to adopt the burden-shifting approach); Gillette, 694 P.2d at 372 (noting that the burden is on the lessor); IB Stephen A. Hess, Colorado Practice, Methods of Practice § 25:3 (6th ed. 2016) (noting that "[s]tare decisis is the broad doctrine that the decisions of appellate courts should be given effect in subsequent cases in similar circumstances and that the legal principles adopted by appellate courts should not be examined anew each time a dispute arises, even in the face of a contention that the rule at issue has wrongly been decided by prior courts

2017See In re Foster, 253 P.3d 1244, 1258 (Colo. 2011) (finding that a lawyer’s reassertion of judicial bias without any reason to expect a different result was the very definition of an objectively baseless claim). . 660 F.2dat21. .

2017Whitham Farms, 97 P.3d at 138 (declining to adopt the burden-shifting approach); Gillette, 694 P.2d at 372 (noting that the burden is on the lessor); IB Stephen A. Hess, Colorado Practice, Methods of Practice § 25:3 (6th ed. 2016) (noting that "[s]tare decisis is the broad doctrine that the decisions of appellate courts should be given effect in subsequent cases in similar circumstances and that the legal principles adopted by appellate courts should not be examined anew each time a dispute arises, even in the face of a contention that the rule at issue has wrongly been decided by prior courts

2011See Moody, 843 P.2d at 1364 (delays attributable to a defendant are not to be considered in evaluating a contention of violation of speedy trial rights); Barela v. People, 826 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Colo.1992) (defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated where reason for delay in sentencing was to permit the prosecution to obtain interlocutory appellate review of a suppression ruling prior to the attachment of jeopardy); People v. Jamerson, 198 Colo. 92, 97 , 596 P.2d 764, 768 (1979) (defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated where sentencing delay w

2011See Moody, 843 P.2d at 1364 (delays attributable to a defendant are not to be considered in evaluating a contention of violation of speedy trial rights); Barela v. People, 826 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Colo.1992) (defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated where reason for delay in sentencing was to permit the prosecution to obtain interlocutory appellate review of a suppression ruling prior to the attachment of jeopardy); People v. Jamerson, 198 Colo. 92, 97 , 596 P.2d 764, 768 (1979) (defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated where sentencing delay w

2011See Moody, 843 P.2d at 1364 (delays attributable to a defendant are not to be considered in evaluating a contention of violation of speedy trial rights); Barela v. People, 826 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Colo.1992) (defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated where reason for delay in sentencing was to permit the prosecution to obtain interlocutory appellate review of a suppression ruling prior to the attachment of jeopardy); People v. Jamerson, 198 Colo. 92, 97 , 596 P.2d 764, 768 (1979) (defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated where sentencing delay w

2011See Moody, 843 P.2d at 1364 (delays attributable to a defendant are not to be considered in evaluating a contention of violation of speedy trial rights); Barela v. People, 826 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Colo.1992) (defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated where reason for delay in sentencing was to permit the prosecution to obtain interlocutory appellate review of a suppression ruling prior to the attachment of jeopardy); People v. Jamerson, 198 Colo. 92, 97 , 596 P.2d 764, 768 (1979) (defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated where sentencing delay w

2011Moody, 843 P.2d at 1363 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ).

2011See Moody, 843 P.2d at 1364 (delays attributable to a defendant are not to be considered in evaluating a contention of violation of speedy trial rights); Barela v. People, 826 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Colo.1992) (defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated where reason for delay in sentencing was to permit the prosecution to obtain interlocutory appellate review of a suppression ruling prior to the attachment of jeopardy); People v. Jamerson, 198 Colo. 92, 97 , 596 P.2d 764, 768 (1979) (defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated where sentencing delay w

2009Hawkins rejected the officer's contention that this standard was "so ambiguous and uncertain as to amount in practice to a nullity." Id. at 475 , 160 P.2d at 360 ; see also Cain v. Civil Service Commission, 159 Colo. 360 , 411 P.2d 778 (1966) (upholding discharge of Denver police officer for violating this rule).

2009Hawkins rejected the officer's contention that this standard was "so ambiguous and uncertain as to amount in practice to a nullity." Id. at 475 , 160 P.2d at 860 ; see also Cain v. Civil Service Commission, 159 Colo. 360 , 411 P.2d 778 (1966) (upholding discharge of Denver police officer for violating this rule).

2009Hawkins rejected the officer's contention that this standard was "so ambiguous and uncertain as to amount in practice to a nullity." Id. at 475 , 160 P.2d at 360 ; see also Cain v. Civil Service Commission, 159 Colo. 360 , 411 P.2d 778 (1966) (upholding discharge of Denver police officer for violating this rule).

2009Hawkins rejected the officer's contention that this standard was "so ambiguous and uncertain as to amount in practice to a nullity." Id. at 475 , 160 P.2d at 860 ; see also Cain v. Civil Service Commission, 159 Colo. 360 , 411 P.2d 778 (1966) (upholding discharge of Denver police officer for violating this rule).

2008Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1, 8 (Colo.2001); People v. Dunlap, 124 P.3d 780, 793 (Colo.App.2004); People v. Kyle, 111 P.3d 491, 500 (Colo.App.2004); see People v. Ramirez, 56 P.3d 89, 93 (Colo.2002).

2008Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1, 8 (Colo.2001); People v. Dunlap, 124 P.3d 780, 793 (Colo.App.2004); People v. Kyle, 111 P.3d 491, 500 (Colo.App.2004); see People v. Ramirez, 56 P.3d 89, 93 (Colo.2002).

2008See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 528 U.S. 224, 287-38 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (doctrine of constitutional doubt requires that a statute "be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score" (quoting United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 , 36 S.Ct. 658 , 60 L.Ed. 1061 (1916))); Fields v. Suthers, 984 P.2d 1167, 1172 (Colo.1999) (recognizing the "duty to construe statutes in a way that does not raise constitutional concerns").

2008See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 528 U.S. 224, 287-38 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (doctrine of constitutional doubt requires that a statute "be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score" (quoting United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 , 36 S.Ct. 658 , 60 L.Ed. 1061 (1916))); Fields v. Suthers, 984 P.2d 1167, 1172 (Colo.1999) (recognizing the "duty to construe statutes in a way that does not raise constitutional concerns").

2008Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1, 8 (Colo.2001); People v. Dunlap, 124 P.3d 780, 793 (Colo.App.2004); People v. Kyle, 111 P.3d 491, 500 (Colo.App.2004); see People v. Ramirez, 56 P.3d 89, 93 (Colo.2002).