contention error in Texas

2015But waiver, in this context, does not always end the inquiry regarding whether the defendant’s constitutional rights were violated.- As the Supreme Court noted in Miranda , “where in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived ..if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated.” 384 U.S. at 475-76 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 .

2015But waiver, in this context, does not always end the inquiry regarding whether the defendant’s constitutional rights were violated.- As the Supreme Court noted in Miranda , “where in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived ..if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated.” 384 U.S. at 475-76 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 .

2013The plurality also rejected the State’s contention that the defense should be limited to “medical treatment.” Id.

2013The plurality also rejected the State’s contention that the defense should be limited to “medical treatment.” Id.

2009In Saatoff, the court of appeals addressed the issue of timeliness only in response to the State’s contention that error had not been preserved for appellate review. 908 S.W.2d at 525 .

2009In Saatoff , the court of appeals addressed the issue of timeliness only in response to the State's contention that error had not been preserved for appellate review. 908 S.W.2d at 525 .

2006That argument is based on the principle that, while a court of appeals can affirm a trial court's decision on a legal theory not presented to the trial court without violating "ordinary notions of procedural default" ( see State v. Mercado , 972 S.W.2d 75 , 77–78 (Tex. Crim.

2005That argument is based on the principle that, while a court of appeals can affirm a trial court's decision on a legal theory not presented to the trial court without violating "ordinary notions of procedural default" ( see State v. Mercado , 972 S.W.2d 75 , 77–78 (Tex. Crim.

2004See Green Int’l, Inc. , 951 S.W.2d at 389 ; Hruska , 747 S.W.2d at 785 ; Paramount Nat’l Life Ins.

2004See Green Int’l, Inc., 951 S.W.2d at 389 ; Hruska, 747 S.W.2d at 785 ; Paramount Nat’l Life Ins.

2003Relying on Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123 , 79 S.Ct. 676 , 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959), appellant argues that because of the interaction that occurred between the federal and state governments, “the contention that the doctrine of dual sovereignty trumps the application of collateral es-toppel must fail.” We have located no reported Texas cases supporting the proposition that the doctrine of dual sovereignty “trumps” the application of collateral estoppel.

2003Relying on Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123 , 79 S.Ct. 676 , 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959), appellant argues that because of the interaction that occurred between the federal and state governments, “the contention that the doctrine of dual sovereignty trumps the application of collateral es-toppel must fail.” We have located no reported Texas cases supporting the proposition that the doctrine of dual sovereignty “trumps” the application of collateral estoppel.

1991For example in Maryland the test for sufficiency is stated in Metz v. State, 9 Md.App. 15 , 262 A.2d 331 [ (1970) ], as follows: ‘To be sufficient in law to justify a conviction, the admissible evidence adduced must show directly, or circumstantially, or support a rational inference of, the facts to be proved from which the trier of fact could fairly be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt of the offense charged.’ The court specifically rejected the contention that the test to be applied is whether the circumstances are consistent with, or are such as to exclude every

1991For example in Maryland the test for sufficiency is stated in Metz v. State, 9 Md.App. 15 , 262 A.2d 331 [ (1970) ], as follows: ‘To be sufficient in law to justify a conviction, the admissible evidence adduced must show directly, or circumstantially, or support a rational inference of, the facts to be proved from which the trier of fact could fairly be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt of the offense charged.’ The court specifically rejected the contention that the test to be applied is whether the circumstances are consistent with, or are such as to exclude every

1978In Coulter, supra, we agreed with the reasoning in United States v. Brown, 451 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1971) wherein the court stated: “[E]ven though ‘the persons who made the memoranda were present at the trial and were tendered for cross-examination (and) that the memoranda were merely cumulative of other evidence properly in the record and that there was overwhelming evidence properly received of the defendant’s guilt’, we cannot say that the error did not influence the jury, to the defendant’s detriment, or even that it had but very slight effect.” In Brown, supra, quoting from United States v

1978In Coulter, supra, we agreed with the reasoning in United States v. Brown, 451 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1971) wherein the court stated: ‘[E]ven though “the persons who made the memoranda were present at the trial and were tendered for cross examination (and) that the memoranda were merely cumulative of other evidence properly in the record and that there was overwhelming evidence properly received of the defendant’s guilt”, we cannot say that the error did not influence the jury, to the defendant’s detriment, or even that it had but very slight effect.’ ” The judgment is reversed and the cause rema

1978App. 313 , 501 P.2d 1011 , rejecting the contention that a waiver hearing should be considered adjudicatory in nature....

1978App. 313 , 501 P.2d 1011 , rejecting the contention that a waiver hearing should be considered adjudicatory in nature. . . .

1978In Coulter, supra, we agreed with the reasoning in United States v. Brown, 451 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1971) wherein the court stated: “[E]ven though ‘the persons who made the memoranda were present at the trial and were tendered for cross-examination (and) that the memoranda were merely cumulative of other evidence properly in the record and that there was overwhelming evidence properly received of the defendant’s guilt’, we cannot say that the error did not influence the jury, to the defendant’s detriment, or even that it had but very slight effect.” In Brown, supra, quoting from United States v

1978In Coulter, supra, we agreed with the reasoning in United States v. Brown, 451 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1971) wherein the court stated: ‘[E]ven though “the persons who made the memoranda were present at the trial and were tendered for cross examination (and) that the memoranda were merely cumulative of other evidence properly in the record and that there was overwhelming evidence properly received of the defendant’s guilt”, we cannot say that the error did not influence the jury, to the defendant’s detriment, or even that it had but very slight effect.’ ” The judgment is reversed and the cause rema

1974The case of Buvens v. Brown, 118 Tex. 551 , 18 S.W.2d 1057 , is relied on as sustaining this contention on principle.

1974The case of Buvens v. Brown, 118 Tex. 551 , 18 S.W.2d 1057 , is relied on as sustaining this contention on principle.

1973As in Scott, supra, we again adopt the reasoning in Bradley, supra, and overrule the contention that the principle of collateral estoppel has application to the second conviction, the robbery by assault.

1973Likewise, as in Bradley, supra, we hold that since there were two separate acts and two separate murders committed the doctrine of carving is not applicable.

1936Provision that public construction contracts, when required either by general statute or city charter, be under competitive bids, is mandatory, has been held in Breath v. City of Galveston, 92 Texas, 454 , 49 S. W., 575 ; Kelly v. Cochran County (Com.

1936Provision that public construction contracts, when required either by general statute or city charter, be under competitive bids, is mandatory, has been held in Breath v. City of Galveston, 92 Texas, 454 , 49 S. W., 575 ; Kelly v. Cochran County (Com.

2023See Leach, 645 S.W.3d at 909; Grubbs, 544 S.W.3d at 425 .