contention error in Rhode Island

2016Rather, the requester must produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 174 , 124 S.Ct. 1570 . •Before assessing whether the Journal presented any such evidence in this case, *1176 we pause to address the Journal’s contention that the standard presented in Favish, 541 U.S. at 174 , 124 S.Ct. 1570 , is inapplicable to the case at hand.

2016Rather, the requester must produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 174 , 124 S.Ct. 1570 . •Before assessing whether the Journal presented any such evidence in this case, *1176 we pause to address the Journal’s contention that the standard presented in Favish, 541 U.S. at 174 , 124 S.Ct. 1570 , is inapplicable to the case at hand.

2008Swierk believed that William was authorized to provide a valid third-party consent, such a belief would not pass the reasonableness test as set forth in Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186 , 110 S.Ct. 2793 .

2008Swierk believed that William was authorized to provide a valid third-party consent, such a belief would not pass the reasonableness test as set forth in Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186 , 110 S.Ct. 2793 .

2008The plaintiffs rely upon In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 492 A.2d 133 (R.I.1985), in support of the contention that the rule of lenity applies here.

1998In support of this contention the hearing justice relied upon the ease Town of Glocester v. Olivo’s Mobile Home Court, Inc., 111 R.I.120, 300 A.2d 465 (1973).

1972The Court said at 302, 87 S.Ct. at 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1206 : “This is a recognized ground of attack upon a conviction independent of any right to counsel claim.” It is important to note, however, that whether the identification circumstances amount to a denial of due process of law in the conduct thereof is dependent upon the “totality of the circumstances surrounding it.” The defendants’ challenge to the admissibility of the in-court identification, as we understand it, rests upon the contention that the violation of the constitutional right to due process in the course of the identification

1963As was said in Ball v. Evans : “No one is compelled to- accept the conditions and become an inmate of the home. -One may decline, and remain outside.” In Brooks v. Hastings, supra, the Pennsylvania court passed on the principal constitutional issues here raised, and in upholding the regulation therein in issue said at page 387: “The contention that the requirement in question is contrary to that provision of the state and federal constitutions which prohibits the taking of property of the citizen without due process of law, and without making just compensation, has no application.

1942After stating that “the court generally in his charge instructed the jury very carefully about the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt being upon the state”, and quoting specific parts of the charge in support of such statement, the state argues as follows : “As a matter of logic and sound common sense everything the trial justice said relating to the burden of proof, including his statement in amplification of the defendant’s request numbered 4, contains a clear statement of the law and must work out mathematically correct.” It supports this contention with a long but incomplete quotati

1909Be that as it may, we cannot interfere upon a bill of exceptions; and the motion for a new trial must be denied.” Meier v. Morgan, 82 Wis. 289 , also cited in the majority opinion, is authority also for the contention that exception must be taken “when the original ruling is made,” and not afterwards; and this position is re-enforced by the case therein cited.

1897As to the defendant’s contention that the rule of caveat emptor applies as to the fitness of the leased premises for the use to which the tenant puts them — that is, that there is no implied warranty in the lease of a store or warehouse that the building is well built or fit for any particular use, we reply that, admitting this to be the law — and the cases are substantially to that effect — see Dutton v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. 89 ; McGlashan v. Tallmadge, 37 Barb. 313 ; Libbey v. Tolford, 48 Me. 316 ; Lucas v. Coulter, 104 Ind. 81 ; Tayl.

1897As to the defendant’s contention that the rule of caveat emptor applies as to the fitness of the leased premises for the use to which the tenant puts them — that is, that there is no implied warranty in the lease of a store or warehouse that the building is well built or fit for any particular use, we reply that, admitting this to be the law — and the cases are substantially to that effect — see Dutton v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. 89 ; McGlashan v. Tallmadge, 37 Barb. 313 ; Libbey v. Tolford, 48 Me. 316 ; Lucas v. Coulter, 104 Ind. 81 ; Tayl.

1897As to the defendant’s contention that the rule of caveat emptor applies as to the fitness of the leased premises for the use to which the tenant puts them — that is, that there is no implied warranty in the lease of a store or warehouse that the building is well built or fit for any particular use, we reply that, admitting this to be the law — and the cases are substantially to that effect — see Dutton v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. 89 ; McGlashan v. Tallmadge, 37 Barb. 313 ; Libbey v. Tolford, 48 Me. 316 ; Lucas v. Coulter, 104 Ind. 81 ; Tayl.