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23 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1917–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Charash v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2022See Charash v. Johnson, 43 S.W.3d 274, 281 (Ky. App. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Board of Trustees v. Grantgreen1 sentence2011On the other hand, an example of an exception that adequately preserved a contention of error and provided a basis for remand can be found in Grant, 257 S.W.3d at 596. | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Flickgreen2 sentences2004Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 188 Ky. 161, 168 , 221 S.W. 503, 506 (1920) ("It is equally as thoroughly established that, when the owner of an easement acquires the fee-simple title to the land in which he had the easement, the easement is thereby extinguished. ...”); Rogers v. Flick, 144 Ky. 844 , 139 S.W. 1098, 1099 (1911) (citing 2 Wash-burn on Real Property, 373) (”[A]n easement is not destroyed or extinguished by the union of the dominant and servient estates, unless the fee in both is acquired and united in the same person." (emphasis added)); 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 1 (200 2004Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 188 Ky. 161, 168 , 221 S.W. 503, 506 (1920) ("It is equally as thoroughly established that, when the owner of an easement acquires the fee-simple title to the land in which he had the easement, the easement is thereby extinguished. ...”); Rogers v. Flick, 144 Ky. 844 , 139 S.W. 1098, 1099 (1911) (citing 2 Wash-burn on Real Property, 373) (”[A]n easement is not destroyed or extinguished by the union of the dominant and servient estates, unless the fee in both is acquired and united in the same person." (emphasis added)); 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 1 (200 | 1 | 1 |
City of Franklin v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic Churchgreen2 sentences2004Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 188 Ky. 161, 168 , 221 S.W. 503, 506 (1920) ("It is equally as thoroughly established that, when the owner of an easement acquires the fee-simple title to the land in which he had the easement, the easement is thereby extinguished. ...”); Rogers v. Flick, 144 Ky. 844 , 139 S.W. 1098, 1099 (1911) (citing 2 Wash-burn on Real Property, 373) (”[A]n easement is not destroyed or extinguished by the union of the dominant and servient estates, unless the fee in both is acquired and united in the same person." (emphasis added)); 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 1 (200 2004Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 188 Ky. 161, 168 , 221 S.W. 503, 506 (1920) ("It is equally as thoroughly established that, when the owner of an easement acquires the fee-simple title to the land in which he had the easement, the easement is thereby extinguished. ...”); Rogers v. Flick, 144 Ky. 844 , 139 S.W. 1098, 1099 (1911) (citing 2 Wash-burn on Real Property, 373) (”[A]n easement is not destroyed or extinguished by the union of the dominant and servient estates, unless the fee in both is acquired and united in the same person." (emphasis added)); 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 1 (200 | 1 | 1 |
Holbrook v. Hammondgreen2 sentences2004Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 188 Ky. 161, 168 , 221 S.W. 503, 506 (1920) ("It is equally as thoroughly established that, when the owner of an easement acquires the fee-simple title to the land in which he had the easement, the easement is thereby extinguished...."); Rogers v. Flick, 144 Ky. 844 , 139 S.W. 1098, 1099 (1911) (citing 2 Washburn on Real Property, 373) ("[A]n easement is not destroyed or extinguished by the union of the dominant and servient estates, unless the fee in both is acquired and united in the same person. " (emphasis added)); 25 AM.JUR.2D Easements and Licenses § 1 (2004 2004Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 188 Ky. 161, 168 , 221 S.W. 503, 506 (1920) ("It is equally as thoroughly established that, when the owner of an easement acquires the fee-simple title to the land in which he had the easement, the easement is thereby extinguished...."); Rogers v. Flick, 144 Ky. 844 , 139 S.W. 1098, 1099 (1911) (citing 2 Washburn on Real Property, 373) ("[A]n easement is not destroyed or extinguished by the union of the dominant and servient estates, unless the fee in both is acquired and united in the same person. " (emphasis added)); 25 AM.JUR.2D Easements and Licenses § 1 (2004 | 1 | 1 |
Goins v. Meadegreen1 sentence1988Goins v.' Meade, Ky., 528 S.W.2d 680, 683 (1975): There is not even the contention of error. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1987The report contained information bearing on the credibility of the victim of the alleged crime and as such could have “created a reasonable doubt as to guilt which would not otherwise have existed_” Williams v. Commonwealth, Ky., 569 S.W.2d 139, 144 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Tarrence v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1964See Tarrence v. Commonwealth, Ky., 265 S.W.2d 40 ; Vance v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 686 , 202 S.W.2d 163 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Whitworth
green
1 sentence2013In Commonwealth v. Whitworth, 74 S.W.3d 695 (Ky.2002), the Court rejected a contention that the waiver of immunity for written contracts in KRS 45A.245(1) includes a waiver of immunity for suing on an oral contract. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Maxwell v. McAtee
neutral
1 sentence2004Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 188 Ky. 161, 168 , 221 S.W. 503, 506 (1920) ("It is equally as thoroughly established that, when the owner of an easement acquires the fee-simple title to the land in which he had the easement, the easement is thereby extinguished...."); Rogers v. Flick, 144 Ky. 844 , 139 S.W. 1098, 1099 (1911) (citing 2 Washburn on Real Property, 373) ("[A]n easement is not destroyed or extinguished by the union of the dominant and servient estates, unless the fee in both is acquired and united in the same person. " (emphasis added)); 25 AM.JUR.2D Easements and Licenses § 1 (2004 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Sievers v. Flynn
green
2 sentences2004The answer to this contention is that the doctrine of merger could not apply because the former owner of the dominant estate did not acquire the ser-vient estate." (emphasis added)); Sievers v. Flynn, 305 Ky. 325 , 204 S.W.2d 364 (1947) (holding that an easement is not a separate estate when dominant and servient tracts are under the same ownership); City of Franklin v. St. 2004The answer to this contention is that the doctrine of merger could not apply because the former owner of the dominant estate did not acquire the ser-vient estate." (emphasis added)); Sievers v. Flynn, 305 Ky. 325 , 204 S.W.2d 364 (1947) (holding that an easement is not a separate estate when dominant and servient tracts are under the same ownership); City of Franklin v. St. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Brewer v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1978Ill The final contention of error made by Kotas is that he was not sentenced in accord with the mandate of KRS 532.050 and 533.010 as applied by this court in Brewer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 474 (1977). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Mullins v. Bullens
green
1 sentence1967It is the view of the majority of this court that as concerns the issue of last clear chance the facts of this case are not distinguishable from those in Mullins v. Bullens, Ky., 383 S.W.2d 130 , where the plaintiff was held entitled to a last clear chance instruction. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Holt v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1967The third and fourth instructions were on reasonable doubt and defined “willfully” and “feloniously.” *106 The four instructions given were proper and were in the approved form. 3 Stanley’s Instructions to Juries, Sections 968 and 969; Bowles v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 591 , 221 S.W.2d 459 ; Holt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 259 S.W.2d 463 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Bullens v. Mullins
neutral
1 sentence1967Bullens v. Mullins, Ky., 409 S.W.2d 161 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Bowles v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1967The third and fourth instructions were on reasonable doubt and defined “willfully” and “feloniously.” *106 The four instructions given were proper and were in the approved form. 3 Stanley’s Instructions to Juries, Sections 968 and 969; Bowles v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 591 , 221 S.W.2d 459 ; Holt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 259 S.W.2d 463 . 1967The third and fourth instructions were on reasonable doubt and defined “willfully” and “feloniously.” *106 The four instructions given were proper and were in the approved form. 3 Stanley’s Instructions to Juries, Sections 968 and 969; Bowles v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 591 , 221 S.W.2d 459 ; Holt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 259 S.W.2d 463 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Lee v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1965Based upon the reasoning of that rule and Lee v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 734 , 205 S.W.2d 509 , and cases collated in 6 Ky.Dig. 2, Criminal Law, we are impelled to the conclusion that there is no merit in this contention of error. 1965Based upon the reasoning of that rule and Lee v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 734 , 205 S.W.2d 509 , and cases collated in 6 Ky.Dig. 2, Criminal Law, we are impelled to the conclusion that there is no merit in this contention of error. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Vance v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1964See Tarrence v. Commonwealth, Ky., 265 S.W.2d 40 ; Vance v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 686 , 202 S.W.2d 163 . 1964See Tarrence v. Commonwealth, Ky., 265 S.W.2d 40 ; Vance v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 686 , 202 S.W.2d 163 . | 1 | 1964–1964 |
United States v. Donald Kenneth Currens
green
2 sentences1963Section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code approved by the American Law Institute in 1962 proposes the following definition: "(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality * * * of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. "(2) As used in this Article, the terms `mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct." In United States v. Currens, CA 3, 290 F.2 1963Section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code approved by the American Law Institute in 1962 proposes the following definition: “(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality * * * of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. “(2) As used in this Article, the terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.” In United States v. Currens, CA 3, 290 F.2 | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Thompson v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1963To illustrate, in Thompson v. Com., 1913, 155 Ky. 333 , 159 S.W. 829 , this court itself seems to have misconstrued the M’Naghten rule when it rejected the contention that the instruction should be extended so as to submit “the question of whether the defendant knew right from wrong with reference to the particular offense charged * * (Emphasis added.) It may be that the case was argued from the viewpoint that “right and wrong” should be defined in a moral rather than a legal sense, and in this respect the court did follow the orthodox construction of M’Naghten to the effect that the defendant 1963To illustrate, in Thompson v. Com., 1913, 155 Ky. 333 , 159 S.W. 829 , this court itself seems to have misconstrued the M’Naghten rule when it rejected the contention that the instruction should be extended so as to submit “the question of whether the defendant knew right from wrong with reference to the particular offense charged * * (Emphasis added.) It may be that the case was argued from the viewpoint that “right and wrong” should be defined in a moral rather than a legal sense, and in this respect the court did follow the orthodox construction of M’Naghten to the effect that the defendant | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Mink v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1944In Mink v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 674 , 15 S. W. 2d 463 , we held that the usual instruction on reasonable doubt was sufficient and that an instruction of this character is not required. 1944In Mink v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 674 , 15 S. W. 2d 463 , we held that the usual instruction on reasonable doubt was sufficient and that an instruction of this character is not required. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
E. L. Martin & Co. v. Davis' Administator
green
2 sentences1944Martin & Co. v. Davis’ Adm’r, 226 Ky. 722 , 11 S. W. (2d) 912 . . 1944Martin & Co. v. Davis’ Adm’r, 226 Ky. 722 , 11 S. W. (2d) 912 . . | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Schrodt's v. Schrodt
green
2 sentences1941Upon this amended pleading the matter was submitted to the chancellor, who rendered a judgment following the one which had been rendered on the first trial, omitting the former provision that appellant should be required to execute a new lease to Carran, and it is from this judgment reversal is sought on motion for appeal. *112 In allowing the pleadings to be filed, the chancellor ■followed certain language in the case of Schrodt’s Ex’r v. Schrodt, 189 Ky. 457 , 225 S. W. 151, 154 , quoting: “If a new trial is granted in the lower court to the unsuccessful party there, or he obtains a reversal 1941Upon this amended pleading the matter was submitted to the chancellor, who rendered a judgment following the one which had been rendered on the first trial, omitting the former provision that appellant should be required to execute a new lease to Carran, and it is from this judgment reversal is sought on motion for appeal. *112 In allowing the pleadings to be filed, the chancellor ■followed certain language in the case of Schrodt’s Ex’r v. Schrodt, 189 Ky. 457 , 225 S. W. 151, 154 , quoting: “If a new trial is granted in the lower court to the unsuccessful party there, or he obtains a reversal | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Cornelison v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1937Counsel relies on Mounts v. Com., 89 Ky. 274, 275 , 12 S. W. 311 , 11 Ky Law Rep. 474; Cornelison v. Com., 84 Ky. 583 , 2 S. W. 235 , 8 Ky. *580 Law Rep. 793; Williams v. Com., 80 S. W. 173 , 25 Ky. Law Rep. 2041 . 1937Counsel relies on Mounts v. Com., 89 Ky. 274, 275 , 12 S. W. 311 , 11 Ky Law Rep. 474; Cornelison v. Com., 84 Ky. 583 , 2 S. W. 235 , 8 Ky. *580 Law Rep. 793; Williams v. Com., 80 S. W. 173 , 25 Ky. Law Rep. 2041 . | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Mounts v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1937Counsel relies on Mounts v. Com., 89 Ky. 274, 275 , 12 S. W. 311 , 11 Ky Law Rep. 474; Cornelison v. Com., 84 Ky. 583 , 2 S. W. 235 , 8 Ky. *580 Law Rep. 793; Williams v. Com., 80 S. W. 173 , 25 Ky. Law Rep. 2041 . 1937Counsel relies on Mounts v. Com., 89 Ky. 274, 275 , 12 S. W. 311 , 11 Ky Law Rep. 474; Cornelison v. Com., 84 Ky. 583 , 2 S. W. 235 , 8 Ky. *580 Law Rep. 793; Williams v. Com., 80 S. W. 173 , 25 Ky. Law Rep. 2041 . | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Le Moyne v. Meadors
neutral
2 sentences1937Counsel relies on Hembree v. Com., 210 Ky. 333 , 275 S. W. 812 ; Traughber v. Com., 198 Ky. 596 , 249 S. W. 770 ; Dukes v. Com., 196 Ky. 60 , 244 S. W. 74 ; Waters v. Com., 221 Ky. 433 , 298 S. W. 1078 ; Le Moyne et al. v. Meadors, 156 Ky. 832 , 162 S. W. 526 , as authority for the contention of waiver. 1937Counsel relies on Hembree v. Com., 210 Ky. 333 , 275 S. W. 812 ; Traughber v. Com., 198 Ky. 596 , 249 S. W. 770 ; Dukes v. Com., 196 Ky. 60 , 244 S. W. 74 ; Waters v. Com., 221 Ky. 433 , 298 S. W. 1078 ; Le Moyne et al. v. Meadors, 156 Ky. 832 , 162 S. W. 526 , as authority for the contention of waiver. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Dukes v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1937Counsel relies on Hembree v. Com., 210 Ky. 333 , 275 S. W. 812 ; Traughber v. Com., 198 Ky. 596 , 249 S. W. 770 ; Dukes v. Com., 196 Ky. 60 , 244 S. W. 74 ; Waters v. Com., 221 Ky. 433 , 298 S. W. 1078 ; Le Moyne et al. v. Meadors, 156 Ky. 832 , 162 S. W. 526 , as authority for the contention of waiver. 1937Counsel relies on Hembree v. Com., 210 Ky. 333 , 275 S. W. 812 ; Traughber v. Com., 198 Ky. 596 , 249 S. W. 770 ; Dukes v. Com., 196 Ky. 60 , 244 S. W. 74 ; Waters v. Com., 221 Ky. 433 , 298 S. W. 1078 ; Le Moyne et al. v. Meadors, 156 Ky. 832 , 162 S. W. 526 , as authority for the contention of waiver. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Traughber v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1937Counsel relies on Hembree v. Com., 210 Ky. 333 , 275 S. W. 812 ; Traughber v. Com., 198 Ky. 596 , 249 S. W. 770 ; Dukes v. Com., 196 Ky. 60 , 244 S. W. 74 ; Waters v. Com., 221 Ky. 433 , 298 S. W. 1078 ; Le Moyne et al. v. Meadors, 156 Ky. 832 , 162 S. W. 526 , as authority for the contention of waiver. 1937Counsel relies on Hembree v. Com., 210 Ky. 333 , 275 S. W. 812 ; Traughber v. Com., 198 Ky. 596 , 249 S. W. 770 ; Dukes v. Com., 196 Ky. 60 , 244 S. W. 74 ; Waters v. Com., 221 Ky. 433 , 298 S. W. 1078 ; Le Moyne et al. v. Meadors, 156 Ky. 832 , 162 S. W. 526 , as authority for the contention of waiver. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Hembree v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1937Counsel relies on Hembree v. Com., 210 Ky. 333 , 275 S. W. 812 ; Traughber v. Com., 198 Ky. 596 , 249 S. W. 770 ; Dukes v. Com., 196 Ky. 60 , 244 S. W. 74 ; Waters v. Com., 221 Ky. 433 , 298 S. W. 1078 ; Le Moyne et al. v. Meadors, 156 Ky. 832 , 162 S. W. 526 , as authority for the contention of waiver. 1937Counsel relies on Hembree v. Com., 210 Ky. 333 , 275 S. W. 812 ; Traughber v. Com., 198 Ky. 596 , 249 S. W. 770 ; Dukes v. Com., 196 Ky. 60 , 244 S. W. 74 ; Waters v. Com., 221 Ky. 433 , 298 S. W. 1078 ; Le Moyne et al. v. Meadors, 156 Ky. 832 , 162 S. W. 526 , as authority for the contention of waiver. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Waters v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1937Counsel relies on Hembree v. Com., 210 Ky. 333 , 275 S. W. 812 ; Traughber v. Com., 198 Ky. 596 , 249 S. W. 770 ; Dukes v. Com., 196 Ky. 60 , 244 S. W. 74 ; Waters v. Com., 221 Ky. 433 , 298 S. W. 1078 ; Le Moyne et al. v. Meadors, 156 Ky. 832 , 162 S. W. 526 , as authority for the contention of waiver. 1937Counsel relies on Hembree v. Com., 210 Ky. 333 , 275 S. W. 812 ; Traughber v. Com., 198 Ky. 596 , 249 S. W. 770 ; Dukes v. Com., 196 Ky. 60 , 244 S. W. 74 ; Waters v. Com., 221 Ky. 433 , 298 S. W. 1078 ; Le Moyne et al. v. Meadors, 156 Ky. 832 , 162 S. W. 526 , as authority for the contention of waiver. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Nehi Bottling Company v. Thomas green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| First National Bank v. Hopkinsville neutral | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Clark County National Bank v. City of Winchester neutral | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Lowther v. Moore neutral | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Sanford v. Roberts neutral | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| County Board of Education v. Hensley neutral | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Rutherford v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Farris v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Bush v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Bess v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Greer v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Bast v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.