11 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1971–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Calhoun v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1977See Calhoun v. United States, D.C.App., 369 A.2d 605 (1977); Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11 , 331 F.2d 85 (1964). 1977See Calhoun v. United States, D.C.App., 369 A.2d 605 (1977); Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11 , 331 F.2d 85 (1964). | 2 | 2 |
Randy E. Daniels v. Potomac Electric Power Companygreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Daniels v. Pepco, 100 A.3d 139, 143 (D.C. 2014). 2017See, e.g., Daniels v. Pepco, 100 A.3d 139, 143 (D.C. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Golding-Alleyne v. Department of Employment Servicesgreen1 sentence2010See id. at 1216 (applying the rule that “[w]hen an agency concludes that the party with the burden of proof failed to meet that burden, we will reverse that determination only if the record compels a contrary conclusion to the exclusion of any other inference”) (quoting Douglas v. Board ofTrs. of the Me. | 1 | 1 |
Ramonas v. Kerelisgreen2 sentences1985See Koch v. Waller & Co., 439 So.2d 1041, 1043-44 (Fla.App.1983) (where respondent signed contract in official capacity but demand for arbitration named him and was served upon him personally and he did not raise the issue of his status as an individual defendant, court rejects his contention that "he had no reason to suspect that the arbitration proceeding had anything to do with his personal liability” and that "the proceedings in the circuit court presented the first opportunity to raise the defense of a lack of personal liability," holding that he is now "foreclosed from contesting persona 1985See Koch v. Waller & Co., 439 So.2d 1041, 1043-44 (Fla.App.1983) (where respondent signed contract in official capacity but demand for arbitration named him and was served upon him personally and he did not raise the issue of his status as an individual defendant, court rejects his contention that "he had no reason to suspect that the arbitration proceeding had anything to do with his personal liability” and that "the proceedings in the circuit court presented the first opportunity to raise the defense of a lack of personal liability," holding that he is now "foreclosed from contesting persona | 1 | 1 |
Koch v. WALLER & CO., INC.green1 sentence1985See Koch v. Waller & Co., 439 So.2d 1041, 1043-44 (Fla.App.1983) (where respondent signed contract in official capacity but demand for arbitration named him and was served upon him personally and he did not raise the issue of his status as an individual defendant, court rejects his contention that "he had no reason to suspect that the arbitration proceeding had anything to do with his personal liability” and that "the proceedings in the circuit court presented the first opportunity to raise the defense of a lack of personal liability," holding that he is now "foreclosed from contesting persona | 1 | 1 |
Himco System, Inc. v. Marquette Electronics, Inc.green2 sentences1985See Koch v. Waller & Co., 439 So.2d 1041, 1043-44 (Fla.App.1983) (where respondent signed contract in official capacity but demand for arbitration named him and was served upon him personally and he did not raise the issue of his status as an individual defendant, court rejects his contention that "he had no reason to suspect that the arbitration proceeding had anything to do with his personal liability” and that "the proceedings in the circuit court presented the first opportunity to raise the defense of a lack of personal liability," holding that he is now "foreclosed from contesting persona 1985See Koch v. Waller & Co., 439 So.2d 1041, 1043-44 (Fla.App.1983) (where respondent signed contract in official capacity but demand for arbitration named him and was served upon him personally and he did not raise the issue of his status as an individual defendant, court rejects his contention that "he had no reason to suspect that the arbitration proceeding had anything to do with his personal liability” and that "the proceedings in the circuit court presented the first opportunity to raise the defense of a lack of personal liability," holding that he is now "foreclosed from contesting persona | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Arbitration Between Boyte and Dicksongreen2 sentences1985See Koch v. Waller & Co., 439 So.2d 1041, 1043-44 (Fla.App.1983) (where respondent signed contract in official capacity but demand for arbitration named him and was served upon him personally and he did not raise the issue of his status as an individual defendant, court rejects his contention that "he had no reason to suspect that the arbitration proceeding had anything to do with his personal liability” and that "the proceedings in the circuit court presented the first opportunity to raise the defense of a lack of personal liability," holding that he is now "foreclosed from contesting persona 1985See Koch v. Waller & Co., 439 So.2d 1041, 1043-44 (Fla.App.1983) (where respondent signed contract in official capacity but demand for arbitration named him and was served upon him personally and he did not raise the issue of his status as an individual defendant, court rejects his contention that "he had no reason to suspect that the arbitration proceeding had anything to do with his personal liability” and that "the proceedings in the circuit court presented the first opportunity to raise the defense of a lack of personal liability," holding that he is now "foreclosed from contesting persona | 1 | 1 |
Salsbery v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustmentgreen1 sentence1978See Salsbery v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 357 A.2d 402, 404 (1976); A.L.W., Inc. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, supra at 431 (emphasis in original).][ 13 ] Regardless of the impact of A.L.W., Inc. supra, and Association for Preservation of 1700 Block of N Street, N.W., supra, on the applicability of the self-created hardship rule in area variance cases, we think petitioners’ argument founders for yet another reason; viz., the particular facts of this case. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Paul Louis Birnstihlgreen1 sentence1974See, e. g., United States v. Birnstihl, 441 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 , 90 S.Ct. 97 , 24 L.Ed.2d 88 (1969). . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Edward Hursegreen2 sentences1974See also United States v. Hurse, 477 F.2d 31, 33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 , 94 S.Ct. 245 , 38 L.Ed.2d 146 (1973), where the appellate court entertained the contention of error due to absence from a supplemental suppression hearing raised for the first time on appeal. .Henry v. Mississippi, supra, deals with the preservation of a federal constitutional claim, that of an illegal search, in a state court where it was subject to a state requirement that an objection be raised at the time of the introduction of the evidence. 1974United States v. McPherson, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 192 , 194-195 n. 6, 421 F.2d 1127 , 1129-1130 n. 6 (1969). [8] See also United States v. Hurse, 477 F.2d 31, 33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 , 94 S.Ct. 245 , 38 L.Ed.2d 146 (1973), where the appellate court entertained the contention of error due to absence from a supplemental suppression hearing raised for the first time on appeal. [9] Henry v. Mississippi, supra , deals with the preservation of a federal constitutional claim, that of an illegal search, in a state court where it was subject to a state requirement that an objection be rais | 1 | 1 |
Hurse v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1974See also United States v. Hurse, 477 F.2d 31, 33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 , 94 S.Ct. 245 , 38 L.Ed.2d 146 (1973), where the appellate court entertained the contention of error due to absence from a supplemental suppression hearing raised for the first time on appeal. .Henry v. Mississippi, supra, deals with the preservation of a federal constitutional claim, that of an illegal search, in a state court where it was subject to a state requirement that an objection be raised at the time of the introduction of the evidence. 1974United States v. McPherson, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 192 , 194-195 n. 6, 421 F.2d 1127 , 1129-1130 n. 6 (1969). [8] See also United States v. Hurse, 477 F.2d 31, 33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 , 94 S.Ct. 245 , 38 L.Ed.2d 146 (1973), where the appellate court entertained the contention of error due to absence from a supplemental suppression hearing raised for the first time on appeal. [9] Henry v. Mississippi, supra , deals with the preservation of a federal constitutional claim, that of an illegal search, in a state court where it was subject to a state requirement that an objection be rais | 1 | 1 |
Wheeler v. Barreragreen2 sentences1974See also United States v. Hurse, 477 F.2d 31, 33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 , 94 S.Ct. 245 , 38 L.Ed.2d 146 (1973), where the appellate court entertained the contention of error due to absence from a supplemental suppression hearing raised for the first time on appeal. .Henry v. Mississippi, supra, deals with the preservation of a federal constitutional claim, that of an illegal search, in a state court where it was subject to a state requirement that an objection be raised at the time of the introduction of the evidence. 1974United States v. McPherson, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 192 , 194-195 n. 6, 421 F.2d 1127 , 1129-1130 n. 6 (1969). [8] See also United States v. Hurse, 477 F.2d 31, 33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 , 94 S.Ct. 245 , 38 L.Ed.2d 146 (1973), where the appellate court entertained the contention of error due to absence from a supplemental suppression hearing raised for the first time on appeal. [9] Henry v. Mississippi, supra , deals with the preservation of a federal constitutional claim, that of an illegal search, in a state court where it was subject to a state requirement that an objection be rais | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2024But see People v. Williams, 981 P.2d 42, 44 (Cal. 1999) (declining to rule on whether the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, but rejecting the government’s contention that the defense would be automatically waived if not raised); Chew v. United States, 314 A.3d 80 , 91 (D.C. 2024) (unlawful possession of a firearm) (Easterly, J., concurring) (explaining that in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), the Supreme Court “clarified that ‘[w]aiver is different from forfeiture. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nathan L. Drew v. United States
green
2 sentences1977See Calhoun v. United States, D.C.App., 369 A.2d 605 (1977); Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11 , 331 F.2d 85 (1964). 1977See Calhoun v. United States, D.C.App., 369 A.2d 605 (1977); Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11 , 331 F.2d 85 (1964). | 2 | 1977–1977 |
United States v. Olano
green
1 sentence2024But see People v. Williams, 981 P.2d 42, 44 (Cal. 1999) (declining to rule on whether the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, but rejecting the government’s contention that the defense would be automatically waived if not raised); Chew v. United States, 314 A.3d 80 , 91 (D.C. 2024) (unlawful possession of a firearm) (Easterly, J., concurring) (explaining that in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), the Supreme Court “clarified that ‘[w]aiver is different from forfeiture. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Rhode Island v. Innis
green
2 sentences1995We think that the government's proffer is immaterial. "[W]here in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated." Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 475-76 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 . [7] The Court in Innis noted that the term "incriminating response" means any response that the prosecution seeks to introduce at trial. 446 U.S. at 302 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. at 1690 n. 5. [8] Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 1995We think that the government's proffer is immaterial. "[W]here in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated." Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 475-76 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 . [7] The Court in Innis noted that the term "incriminating response" means any response that the prosecution seeks to introduce at trial. 446 U.S. at 302 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. at 1690 n. 5. [8] Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1995We think that the government’s proffer is immaterial. “[W]here in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated." Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 475-76 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 . . 1995We think that the government’s proffer is immaterial. “[W]here in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated." Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 475-76 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 . . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Brewer v. Williams
green
2 sentences1995We think that the government's proffer is immaterial. "[W]here in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated." Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 475-76 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 . [7] The Court in Innis noted that the term "incriminating response" means any response that the prosecution seeks to introduce at trial. 446 U.S. at 302 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. at 1690 n. 5. [8] Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 1995We think that the government's proffer is immaterial. "[W]here in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated." Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 475-76 , 86 S.Ct. at 1628 . [7] The Court in Innis noted that the term "incriminating response" means any response that the prosecution seeks to introduce at trial. 446 U.S. at 302 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. at 1690 n. 5. [8] Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 | 1 | 1995–1995 |
In re Boyte
green
1 sentence1985See Koch v. Waller & Co., 439 So.2d 1041, 1043-44 (Fla.App.1983) (where respondent signed contract in official capacity but demand for arbitration named him and was served upon him personally and he did not raise the issue of his status as an individual defendant, court rejects his contention that "he had no reason to suspect that the arbitration proceeding had anything to do with his personal liability” and that "the proceedings in the circuit court presented the first opportunity to raise the defense of a lack of personal liability," holding that he is now "foreclosed from contesting persona | 1 | 1985–1985 |
FOUR SEASONS HOMEOWNERS ASS'N INC. v. Sellers
green
1 sentence1985See Koch v. Waller & Co., 439 So.2d 1041, 1043-44 (Fla.App.1983) (where respondent signed contract in official capacity but demand for arbitration named him and was served upon him personally and he did not raise the issue of his status as an individual defendant, court rejects his contention that "he had no reason to suspect that the arbitration proceeding had anything to do with his personal liability” and that "the proceedings in the circuit court presented the first opportunity to raise the defense of a lack of personal liability," holding that he is now "foreclosed from contesting persona | 1 | 1985–1985 |
United States v. John Fioravanti, Nicholas Panaccione, and Angelo Pepe, Nicholas Panaccione
green
1 sentence1974See, e. g., United States v. Birnstihl, 441 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 , 90 S.Ct. 97 , 24 L.Ed.2d 88 (1969). . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
United States v. William B. McPherson
green
2 sentences1974United States v. McPherson, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 192 , 194-195 n. 6, 421 F.2d 1127 , 1129-1130 n. 6 (1969). [8] See also United States v. Hurse, 477 F.2d 31, 33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 , 94 S.Ct. 245 , 38 L.Ed.2d 146 (1973), where the appellate court entertained the contention of error due to absence from a supplemental suppression hearing raised for the first time on appeal. [9] Henry v. Mississippi, supra , deals with the preservation of a federal constitutional claim, that of an illegal search, in a state court where it was subject to a state requirement that an objection be rais 1974United States v. McPherson, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 192 , 194-195 n. 6, 421 F.2d 1127 , 1129-1130 n. 6 (1969). [8] See also United States v. Hurse, 477 F.2d 31, 33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 , 94 S.Ct. 245 , 38 L.Ed.2d 146 (1973), where the appellate court entertained the contention of error due to absence from a supplemental suppression hearing raised for the first time on appeal. [9] Henry v. Mississippi, supra , deals with the preservation of a federal constitutional claim, that of an illegal search, in a state court where it was subject to a state requirement that an objection be rais | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Panaccione v. United States
green
1 sentence1974See, e. g., United States v. Birnstihl, 441 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 , 90 S.Ct. 97 , 24 L.Ed.2d 88 (1969). . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Sher v. New York
green
1 sentence1974See, e. g., United States v. Birnstihl, 441 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 , 90 S.Ct. 97 , 24 L.Ed.2d 88 (1969). . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Higgins v. United States
green
2 sentences1971Taking account of the fact that the police version of the incident indicated that appellant’s production of the bag’s contents was voluntary, appellant, relying on Kelley v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 396 , 298 F.2d 310 (1961), Higgins v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 340 , 209 F.2d 819 (1954), and Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965), argues that the disclosure was really coerced. 1971Taking account of the fact that the police version of the incident indicated that appellant’s production of the bag’s contents was voluntary, appellant, relying on Kelley v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 396 , 298 F.2d 310 (1961), Higgins v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 340 , 209 F.2d 819 (1954), and Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965), argues that the disclosure was really coerced. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Charles H. Kelley v. United States
green
2 sentences1971Taking account of the fact that the police version of the incident indicated that appellant’s production of the bag’s contents was voluntary, appellant, relying on Kelley v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 396 , 298 F.2d 310 (1961), Higgins v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 340 , 209 F.2d 819 (1954), and Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965), argues that the disclosure was really coerced. 1971Taking account of the fact that the police version of the incident indicated that appellant’s production of the bag’s contents was voluntary, appellant, relying on Kelley v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 396 , 298 F.2d 310 (1961), Higgins v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 340 , 209 F.2d 819 (1954), and Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965), argues that the disclosure was really coerced. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Ramona Cipres and Juan Montes Deoca v. United States
green
1 sentence1971Taking account of the fact that the police version of the incident indicated that appellant’s production of the bag’s contents was voluntary, appellant, relying on Kelley v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 396 , 298 F.2d 310 (1961), Higgins v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 340 , 209 F.2d 819 (1954), and Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965), argues that the disclosure was really coerced. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.