contention instruction in Mississippi

2013The Sandstrom Court addressed the contention that the instruction merely created a permissible inference and stated, “[this] argument[ ] need not detain us long ... [,]” for “Sandstrom’s jurors ... were not told that they had a choice, or that they might infer that conclusion; they were told only that the law presumed it.” Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514-15 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 ; see Francis, 471 U.S. at 316 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 (“The challenged [instruction is] cast in the language of command.”) “It is clear that a reasonable juror could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory.” Sandstrom, 442

2013The Sandstrom Court addressed the contention that the instruction merely created a permissible inference and stated, “[this] argument[ ] need not detain us long ... [,]” for “Sandstrom’s jurors ... were not told that they had a choice, or that they might infer that conclusion; they were told only that the law presumed it.” Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514-15 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 ; see Francis, 471 U.S. at 316 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 (“The challenged [instruction is] cast in the language of command.”) “It is clear that a reasonable juror could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory.” Sandstrom, 442

2013The Sandstrom Court addressed the contention that the instruction merely created a permissible inference and stated, “[this] argument[ ] need not detain us long ... [,]” for “Sandstrom’s jurors ... were not told that they had a choice, or that they might infer that conclusion; they were told only that the law presumed it.” Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514-15 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 ; see Francis, 471 U.S. at 316 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 (“The challenged [instruction is] cast in the language of command.”) “It is clear that a reasonable juror could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory.” Sandstrom, 442

2013The Sandstrom Court addressed the contention that the instruction merely created a permissible inference and stated, “[this] argument[ ] need not detain us long ... [,]” for “Sandstrom’s jurors ... were not told that they had a choice, or that they might infer that conclusion; they were told only that the law presumed it.” Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514-15 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 ; see Francis, 471 U.S. at 316 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 (“The challenged [instruction is] cast in the language of command.”) “It is clear that a reasonable juror could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory.” Sandstrom, 442

2011See Smith v. Dorsey, 599 So.2d 529, 532 (Miss.1992) (“The failure to cite any authority can be treated as a procedural bar, and this Court is under no obligation to consider the assignments.”). ¶ 24.

2009See Smith v. Dorsey, 599 So. 2d 529, 532 (Miss. 1992) (“The failure to cite any authority can be treated as a procedural bar, and this Court is under no obligation to consider the assignments.”). ¶24.

2001In an effort to address the nature of the instruction, if not the exact language itself, the State cites Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36, 71 (Miss.1998) (holding that where evidence is sufficient to support both phrases of a disjunctive statement, the use of the disjunctive term is of no consequence).

1997In an effort to address the nature of the instruction, if not the exact language itself, the State cites Gray v. State, 728 So. 2d 36, 71 (Miss. 1998) (holding that where evidence is sufficient to support both phrases of a disjunctive statement, the use of the disjunctive term is of no consequence).

2016To support this proposition, Swaim relies on Page v. State, 607 So.2d 1163, 1168 (Miss. 1992), and Ashcraft v. City of Richland, 620 So.2d 1210, 1211 (Miss. 1993).

2016To support this proposition, Swaim relies on Page v. State, 607 So.2d 1163, 1168 (Miss. 1992), and Ashcraft v. City of Richland, 620 So.2d 1210, 1211 (Miss. 1993).

2007When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we review the record in "a light most favorable to the State." Dixon v. State, 953 So.2d 1108 , *241 1111(¶ 4) (Miss.2007) (citing Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 162, 166 (¶ 7) (Miss.2005)).

2007Byrom, 863 So.2d at 847 (¶ 13). ¶ 46.

1967Thus, in Weller v. Worstall (1934) 50 Ohio App 11, 3 Ohio Ops 414, 19 Ohio L Abs 479, 197 NE 410 , affd 129 Ohio St 596, 3 Ohio Ops 12, 196 NE 637 , the court expressly rejected the contention that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not be invoked against the estate of one who died as a result of the accident, by saying: `It is stated that the real reason for the rule lies in the fact that the cause of injury is usually known by the defendant and unknown to the plaintiff, and that when the reason for the rule fails the rule becomes inoperative.