contention error in Arkansas

1989Turning to the contention that defense counsel was ineffective because there was a conflict of interest between Humphrey and appellant, in Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) , it was held that one attorney may be appointed to represent two or more defendants without such representation constituting a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.

1987Relying upon State v. Nelson, Berry Petroleum Co., 246 Ark. 210 , 438 S.W.2d 33 (1969), we held that certiorari was available in the exercise of this court’s superintending control over inferior courts which are proceeding illegally where there is no other adequate mode of review.

1987Relying upon State v. Nelson, Berry Petroleum Co., 246 Ark. 210 , 438 S.W.2d 33 (1969), we held that certiorari was available in the exercise of this court’s superintending control over inferior courts which are proceeding illegally where there is no other adequate mode of review.

1986Entrapment, however, is ordinarily a fact question, Walls v. State, 280 Ark. 291 , 658 S.W.2d 362 (1983), and we think the evidence in the first trial presented a factual question on that issue.

1986Entrapment, however, is ordinarily a fact question, Walls v. State, 280 Ark. 291 , 658 S.W.2d 362 (1983), and we think the evidence in the first trial presented a factual question on that issue.

1985Dixon v. State, 260 Ark. 857 , 545 S.W.2d 606 (1977).

1985Dixon v. State, 260 Ark. 857 , 545 S.W.2d 606 (1977).

1970In arguing the first enumerated aspect of this contention of error, appellant invites our attention to Batesville v. Ball, 100 Ark. 496 , 140 S. W. 712 (1911).

1970In arguing the first enumerated aspect of this contention of error, appellant invites our attention to Batesville v. Ball, 100 Ark. 496 , 140 S. W. 712 (1911).

1967Apparently they seek to come within the rule announced in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 16 L.

1967Apparently they seek to come within the rule announced in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 16 L.

1966Paul Mercury Indemnity Company, 153 Pa. Super. 59 [ 33 A. 2d 449 .]” We also quote an interesting footnote from the Pennsylvania case: “Followed to its logical conclusion, this contention would claim coverage under one policy of all automobiles regularly used by the named insured and a family -with four automobiles would require only one policy for which a one-automobile policy premium was paid, an absurd conclusion.” There is no dispute as to appellants being brothers and members of the same household; nor is there any dispute as to the fact that the insured appellant did not own the Volkswag

1966Paul Mercury Indemnity Company, 153 Pa. Super. 59 [ 33 A. 2d 449 .]” We also quote an interesting footnote from the Pennsylvania case: “Followed to its logical conclusion, this contention would claim coverage under one policy of all automobiles regularly used by the named insured and a family -with four automobiles would require only one policy for which a one-automobile policy premium was paid, an absurd conclusion.” There is no dispute as to appellants being brothers and members of the same household; nor is there any dispute as to the fact that the insured appellant did not own the Volkswag

1935If you find from the evidence in this case that the defendant, Otto Lockhart, at the time of the alleged injury, failed to observe any of the duties required of a driver of an automobile, and the plaintiff Ada Jean Eoss was injured thereby, this would constitute negligence.” It is argued that the language above quoted offends against the rule announced in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Doud, 189 Ark. 986 , 76 S. W. (2d) 87 : “That the driver must have his car under such reasonable control as would enable -him to avoid accidents which might be foreseen by the exercise of ordinary care.” The contenti

1935If you find from the evidence in this case that the defendant, Otto Lockhart, at the time of the alleged injury, failed to observe any of the duties required of a driver of an automobile, and the plaintiff Ada Jean Eoss was injured thereby, this would constitute negligence.” It is argued that the language above quoted offends against the rule announced in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Doud, 189 Ark. 986 , 76 S. W. (2d) 87 : “That the driver must have his car under such reasonable control as would enable -him to avoid accidents which might be foreseen by the exercise of ordinary care.” The contenti

1933Co. v. Sanford, 182 Ark. 484 , 31 S. W. (2d) 963 , it was said, after approving the rule in the Wilcox case: “'But the instant case is a suit at law and the allegation of fraud or mistake is defensive only, no cancellation of the written instrument being asked, but its consequence merely sought to be avoided.” Little contention is made that the verdict is excessive, and under the circumstances of the case and the nature of the extended injury it does not appear to us to be so; Several of the instructions given for appellee • are objected to, but there were nine instructions declaring the law g

1933Co. v. Sanford, 182 Ark. 484 , 31 S. W. (2d) 963 , it was said, after approving the rule in the Wilcox case: “'But the instant case is a suit at law and the allegation of fraud or mistake is defensive only, no cancellation of the written instrument being asked, but its consequence merely sought to be avoided.” Little contention is made that the verdict is excessive, and under the circumstances of the case and the nature of the extended injury it does not appear to us to be so; Several of the instructions given for appellee • are objected to, but there were nine instructions declaring the law g

1916In Little Rock v. Reinman, 107 Ark. 174 , the court in discussing the term “regulate” said: “The State in the exercise of its police power has given to the city the power to regulate certain callings, pursuits, trades and business, as specified in said section of the statutes.