contention claim in Maryland

1999In State v. Taylor, 347 Md. 363, 372-73 , 701 A.2d 389 (1997), Judge Chasanow observed: Lack of intent or malice was a contention of the defense in the instant case.

1999In State v. Taylor, 347 Md. 363, 372-73 , 701 A.2d 389 (1997), Judge Chasanow observed: Lack of intent or malice was a contention of the defense in the instant case.

1975Nor do we find merit in the State’s contention that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 21 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967).

1975Nor do we find merit in the State’s contention that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 21 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967).

2022In Peña-Rodriguez, id. at 866 , the Supreme Court discussed Warger, 574 U.S. at 42-43, a civil case in which the Court rejected a plaintiff’s contention that an exception to the no-impeachment rule was warranted because, during the jury’s deliberations, a juror allegedly made statements indicating that the juror had a pro-defendant bias and, after the verdict in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff moved for a new trial, contending that the juror had lied during voir dire about her impartiality and ability to award damages.

2012Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 338 Md. 227, 234-37 , 657 A.2d 1170 (1995), for the contention that the doctrine of equitable subrogation bars dismissal of the foreclosure action. 11 In Levenson, id. at 231-32 , 657 A.2d 1170 , the Court of Appeals stated: Where a lender has advanced money for the purpose of discharging a prior encumbrance in reliance upon obtaining security equivalent to the discharged lien, and his money is so used, the majority and preferable rule is that if he did so in ignorance of junior liens or other interests he will be subrogated to the prior lien.

2012Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 338 Md. 227, 234-37 , 657 A.2d 1170 (1995), for the contention that the doctrine of equitable subrogation bars dismissal of the foreclosure action. 11 In Levenson, id. at 231-32 , 657 A.2d 1170 , the Court of Appeals stated: Where a lender has advanced money for the purpose of discharging a prior encumbrance in reliance upon obtaining security equivalent to the discharged lien, and his money is so used, the majority and preferable rule is that if he did so in ignorance of junior liens or other interests he will be subrogated to the prior lien.

2010We also cited to the “Good Samaritan” statute, however, with respect to the level of force the defendant would be entitled to use in defense of his friend. *64 Lastly, in Dishman, supra, 118 Md.App. at 378 , 702 A.2d 949 , we rejected a defendant’s contention of error premised on the trial court’s failure to instruct on defense of others when the only evidence supporting the instruction was a statement the defendant made to the police that his friend and the victim had quarreled, “they both ‘threw a couple of punches,’ ” and the victim grabbed his friend by the hair. 12 We concluded that the d

2010We also cited to the “Good Samaritan” statute, however, with respect to the level of force the defendant would be entitled to use in defense of his friend. *64 Lastly, in Dishman, supra, 118 Md.App. at 378 , 702 A.2d 949 , we rejected a defendant’s contention of error premised on the trial court’s failure to instruct on defense of others when the only evidence supporting the instruction was a statement the defendant made to the police that his friend and the victim had quarreled, “they both ‘threw a couple of punches,’ ” and the victim grabbed his friend by the hair. 12 We concluded that the d

2007See Maryland Rule 8 — 131(b) (“Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals or by a circuit court acting in an appellate capacity, the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition ...”); Rhaney v. UMES, 388 Md. 585 , 596 n. 7, 880 A.2d 357 , 363 n. 7 (2005); Renbaum v. Custom Holding, 386 Md. 28 , 33 n. 2, 871 A.2d 554 , 557 n. 2 (2005); Edwards v. Corbin, 379 Md. 278 , 284 n. 3, 841 A.2d 845 , 849 n. 3 (2004) (“As this

2007See Maryland Rule 8 — 131(b) (“Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals or by a circuit court acting in an appellate capacity, the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition ...”); Rhaney v. UMES, 388 Md. 585 , 596 n. 7, 880 A.2d 357 , 363 n. 7 (2005); Renbaum v. Custom Holding, 386 Md. 28 , 33 n. 2, 871 A.2d 554 , 557 n. 2 (2005); Edwards v. Corbin, 379 Md. 278 , 284 n. 3, 841 A.2d 845 , 849 n. 3 (2004) (“As this

2007In Harrison, 276 Md. at 152 , 345 A.2d 830 , the Court of Appeals declined to draw a distinction between the disclosure of the contents and the fact that no such communication was ever made between the client and the attorney.” Haley’s communications to his lawyer, and the timing of when he told the attorney the critical information, fall within the attorney-client privilege.

2007In Harrison, 276 Md. at 152 , 345 A.2d 830 , the Court of Appeals declined to draw a distinction between the disclosure of the contents and the fact that no such communication was ever made between the client and the attorney.” Haley’s communications to his lawyer, and the timing of when he told the attorney the critical information, fall within the attorney-client privilege.

2007See Maryland Rule 8 — 131(b) (“Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals or by a circuit court acting in an appellate capacity, the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition ...”); Rhaney v. UMES, 388 Md. 585 , 596 n. 7, 880 A.2d 357 , 363 n. 7 (2005); Renbaum v. Custom Holding, 386 Md. 28 , 33 n. 2, 871 A.2d 554 , 557 n. 2 (2005); Edwards v. Corbin, 379 Md. 278 , 284 n. 3, 841 A.2d 845 , 849 n. 3 (2004) (“As this

2007See Maryland Rule 8 — 131(b) (“Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals or by a circuit court acting in an appellate capacity, the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition ...”); Rhaney v. UMES, 388 Md. 585 , 596 n. 7, 880 A.2d 357 , 363 n. 7 (2005); Renbaum v. Custom Holding, 386 Md. 28 , 33 n. 2, 871 A.2d 554 , 557 n. 2 (2005); Edwards v. Corbin, 379 Md. 278 , 284 n. 3, 841 A.2d 845 , 849 n. 3 (2004) (“As this

2006Id. at 293 .

2002That section provided that “the deputy commissioner may, at anytime prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case....” Id. at 6, 95 S.Ct. 2016 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 922 (1970)).

2002“However, the hardship at issue here ... cannot be accurately described as the direct consequence of the intervenors’ sole and affirmative acts; here tire zoning department employees played a significant part by approving three separate applications during the original subdivision of Lot 13.” Id. at 1235-39 . [Citations omitted.] [Footnotes omitted.] See also Association for Preservation of 1700 Block of N Street, N.W., and Vicinity v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 384 A.2d 674, 677-78 (D.C.App.1978), A.L.W., Inc. v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 338 A.2d

2002"However, the hardship at issue here ... cannot be accurately described as the direct consequence of the intervenors' sole and affirmative acts; here the zoning department employees played a significant part by approving three separate applications during the original subdivision of Lot 13." Id. at 1235-39 . [Citations omitted.] [Footnotes omitted.] See also Association for Preservation of 1700 Block of N Street, N.W., and Vicinity v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 384 A.2d 674, 677-78 (D.C.App.1978), A.L.W., Inc. v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 338 A.2d 4

1997In Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976), the Court reversed Dorsey’s conviction for armed robbery and assault because the trial judge admitted into evidence, over defense objection, a police officer’s testimony that a high percentage of that officer’s arrests resulted in convictions.

1997In Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976), the Court reversed Dorsey’s conviction for armed robbery and assault because the trial judge admitted into evidence, over defense objection, a police officer’s testimony that a high percentage of that officer’s arrests resulted in convictions.

1997We stated in Parker v. State, 4 Md.App. 62, 67, 241 A.2d 185 (1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 , 91 S.Ct. 1670 , 29 L.Ed.2d 150 (1971), with respect to a predecessor rule to Maryland Rule 4-325, that [ojrdinarily, where no objection is made to the court’s instructions, a contention that there was error therein is not reviewable on appeal.

1997We stated in Parker v. State, 4 Md.App. 62, 67, 241 A.2d 185 (1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 , 91 S.Ct. 1670 , 29 L.Ed.2d 150 (1971), with respect to a predecessor rule to Maryland Rule 4-325, that [ojrdinarily, where no objection is made to the court’s instructions, a contention that there was error therein is not reviewable on appeal.

1995Under the circumstances presented here, we are convinced that defense counsel’s acceptance of the jury “was merely obedient to the court’s ruling and obviously [was] not a withdrawal of the prior objection, timely made.” Miles v. State, 88 Md.App. 360, 377 , 594 A.2d 1208 , cert. denied, 325 Md. 94 , 599 A.2d 447 (1991) (where defense counsel’s acceptance of the jury did not constitute a withdrawal of his prior objection to the court’s refusal to ask certain voir dire questions).

1995Under the circumstances presented here, we are convinced that defense counsel’s acceptance of the jury “was merely obedient to the court’s ruling and obviously [was] not a withdrawal of the prior objection, timely made.” Miles v. State, 88 Md.App. 360, 377 , 594 A.2d 1208 , cert. denied, 325 Md. 94 , 599 A.2d 447 (1991) (where defense counsel’s acceptance of the jury did not constitute a withdrawal of his prior objection to the court’s refusal to ask certain voir dire questions).

1992The case of Van Meter v. State, 30 Md.App. 406 , 352 A.2d 850 , cert. denied, 278 Md. 737 (1976), is analogous to the case sub judice in that there, as here, the appellant failed to make certain transcripts part of the record on appeal.

1992The case of Van Meter v. State, 30 Md.App. 406 , 352 A.2d 850 , cert. denied, 278 Md. 737 (1976), is analogous to the case sub judice in that there, as here, the appellant failed to make certain transcripts part of the record on appeal.

1989The first is that there was no deliberate misrepresentation in this regard: The trial court found that until the day of trial Weatherford did not expect to be called as a witness; until then he did not know that he would testify.” 429 U.S. at 560 , 97 S.Ct. at 846 .

1989The first is that there was no deliberate misrepresentation in this regard: The trial court found that until the day of trial Weatherford did not expect to be called as a witness; until then he did not know that he would testify.” 429 U.S. at 560 , 97 S.Ct. at 846 .