case-by-case analysis in Michigan

2024Loutts v Loutts, 298 Mich App 21, 29-30 ; 826 NW2d 152 (2012).

2023Loutts, 298 Mich App at 29 .

2021A. PRINCIPLES THAT UNDERPIN AN EQUITABLE-SUBROGATION CLAIM “Equitable subrogation is a flexible, elastic doctrine of equity.” 19 Thus, “[i]ts application ‘should and must proceed on the case-by-case analysis characteristic of equity jurisprudence.’ ” 20 Equitable subrogation is the “mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice, equity, and good conscience ought to pay it.” 21 Equitable subrogation has been invoked successfully in a variety of circumstances, 22 but “the mere fact that [it] has not been previously invoked in a particular situation is no

2021A. PRINCIPLES THAT UNDERPIN AN EQUITABLE-SUBROGATION CLAIM “Equitable subrogation is a flexible, elastic doctrine of equity.” 19 Thus, “[i]ts application ‘should and must proceed on the case-by-case analysis characteristic of equity jurisprudence.’ ” 20 Equitable subrogation is the “mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice, equity, and good conscience ought to pay it.” 21 Equitable subrogation has been invoked successfully in a variety of circumstances, 22 but “the mere fact that [it] has not been previously invoked in a particular situation is no

2021A payment is not voluntary when made under compulsion, . . . in ignorance of the real state of facts, or under an erroneous impression of one’s legal duty.” 27 When an insurer pays expenses on behalf of its insured pursuant to an insurance contract, it is not doing so as a volunteer. 28 And when an insurer pays a claim that another insurer may be liable for, it is “protecting its own interests and not acting as a volunteer,” and in that instance, the insurer is “entitled to invoke the doctrine of equitable 24 Auto-Owners Ins Co v Amoco Prod Co, 468 Mich 53, 59 ; 658 NW2d 460 (2003), quoting Co

2021A payment is not voluntary when made under compulsion, . . . in ignorance of the real state of facts, or under an erroneous impression of one’s legal duty.” 27 When an insurer pays expenses on behalf of its insured pursuant to an insurance contract, it is not doing so as a volunteer. 28 And when an insurer pays a claim that another insurer may be liable for, it is “protecting its own interests and not acting as a volunteer,” and in that instance, the insurer is “entitled to invoke the doctrine of equitable 24 Auto-Owners Ins Co v Amoco Prod Co, 468 Mich 53, 59 ; 658 NW2d 460 (2003), quoting Co

2021A payment is not voluntary when made under compulsion, . . . in ignorance of the real state of facts, or under an erroneous impression of one’s legal duty.” 27 When an insurer pays expenses on behalf of its insured pursuant to an insurance contract, it is not doing so as a volunteer. 28 And when an insurer pays a claim that another insurer may be liable for, it is “protecting its own interests and not acting as a volunteer,” and in that instance, the insurer is “entitled to invoke the doctrine of equitable 24 Auto-Owners Ins Co v Amoco Prod Co, 468 Mich 53, 59 ; 658 NW2d 460 (2003), quoting Co

2021A payment is not voluntary when made under compulsion, . . . in ignorance of the real state of facts, or under an erroneous impression of one’s legal duty.” 27 When an insurer pays expenses on behalf of its insured pursuant to an insurance contract, it is not doing so as a volunteer. 28 And when an insurer pays a claim that another insurer may be liable for, it is “protecting its own interests and not acting as a volunteer,” and in that instance, the insurer is “entitled to invoke the doctrine of equitable 24 Auto-Owners Ins Co v Amoco Prod Co, 468 Mich 53, 59 ; 658 NW2d 460 (2003), quoting Co

1985The majority based its conclusion on prior decisions of that Court which had interpreted Sullivan as an *328 nouncing a prophylactic rule requiring adherence to the uniform ABA standard thereby eliminating the need of future appellate inquiry into the coercive effect of any number of variations of an Allen-type charge in trials occurring after Sullivan and that "the only case-by-case inquiry necessary . . . involves whether the instruction given is a 'substantial departure’ from the ABA charge.” 121 Mich App 361 , quoting People v Allen, 102 Mich App 655, 659 ; 302 NW2d 268 (1981), lv den 411

1985The majority based its conclusion on prior decisions of that Court which had interpreted Sullivan as an *328 nouncing a prophylactic rule requiring adherence to the uniform ABA standard thereby eliminating the need of future appellate inquiry into the coercive effect of any number of variations of an Allen-type charge in trials occurring after Sullivan and that "the only case-by-case inquiry necessary . . . involves whether the instruction given is a 'substantial departure’ from the ABA charge.” 121 Mich App 361 , quoting People v Allen, 102 Mich App 655, 659 ; 302 NW2d 268 (1981), lv den 411

2024In reaching this objective, “[a]ll relevant aspects of a parent’s financial status are open for consideration when determining support.” Id. -8- In Michigan, spousal support is governed by MCL 552.23(1) and requires a case-by-case analysis.

2016This doctrine is sometimes spoken of as ‘legal subrogation,’ and has long been applied by courts of equity. [French v Grand Beach Co, 239 Mich 575, 580 ; 215 NW 13 (1927), citing Stroh v O’Hearn, 176 Mich 164, 177 ; 142 NW 865 (1913).] More recently, our Supreme Court emphasized that “[e]quitable subrogation is a flexible, elastic doctrine of equity,” the application of which “should and must proceed on the case-by-case analysis characteristic of equity jurisprudence.” Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co, 461 Mich at 215 (citation omitted).

2016This doctrine is sometimes spoken of as ‘legal subrogation,’ and has long been applied by courts of equity. [French v Grand Beach Co, 239 Mich 575, 580 ; 215 NW 13 (1927), citing Stroh v O’Hearn, 176 Mich 164, 177 ; 142 NW 865 (1913).] More recently, our Supreme Court emphasized that “[e]quitable subrogation is a flexible, elastic doctrine of equity,” the application of which “should and must proceed on the case-by-case analysis characteristic of equity jurisprudence.” Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co, 461 Mich at 215 (citation omitted).

2016This doctrine is sometimes spoken of as ‘legal subrogation,’ and has long been applied by courts of equity. [French v Grand Beach Co, 239 Mich 575, 580 ; 215 NW 13 (1927), citing Stroh v O’Hearn, 176 Mich 164, 177 ; 142 NW 865 (1913).] More recently, our Supreme Court emphasized that “[e]quitable subrogation is a flexible, elastic doctrine of equity,” the application of which “should and must proceed on the case-by-case analysis characteristic of equity jurisprudence.” Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co, 461 Mich at 215 (citation omitted).

2016This doctrine is sometimes spoken of as ‘legal subrogation,’ and has long been applied by courts of equity. [French v Grand Beach Co, 239 Mich 575, 580 ; 215 NW 13 (1927), citing Stroh v O’Hearn, 176 Mich 164, 177 ; 142 NW 865 (1913).] More recently, our Supreme Court emphasized that “[e]quitable subrogation is a flexible, elastic doctrine of equity,” the application of which “should and must proceed on the case-by-case analysis characteristic of equity jurisprudence.” Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co, 461 Mich at 215 (citation omitted).

2010Absent those changes or compelling evidence bearing on Congress `original intent . . . our system demands that we adhere to our prior interpretations of statutes."), quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 , 109 S.Ct. 2363 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) and Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 , 116 S.Ct. 763 , 133 L.Ed.2d 709 (1996); Rowland v. Washtenaw Co. Rd.

2010Absent those changes or compelling evidence bearing on Congress `original intent . . . our system demands that we adhere to our prior interpretations of statutes."), quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 , 109 S.Ct. 2363 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) and Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 , 116 S.Ct. 763 , 133 L.Ed.2d 709 (1996); Rowland v. Washtenaw Co. Rd.

2010Absent those changes or compelling evidence bearing on Congress `original intent . . . our system demands that we adhere to our prior interpretations of statutes."), quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 , 109 S.Ct. 2363 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) and Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 , 116 S.Ct. 763 , 133 L.Ed.2d 709 (1996); Rowland v. Washtenaw Co. Rd.

2010Absent those changes or compelling evidence bearing on Congress `original intent . . . our system demands that we adhere to our prior interpretations of statutes."), quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 , 109 S.Ct. 2363 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) and Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 , 116 S.Ct. 763 , 133 L.Ed.2d 709 (1996); Rowland v. Washtenaw Co. Rd.

2010Co., 483 Mich. 1032 , 1035, 766 N.W.2d 273 (2009) (KELLY, C.J., concurring) (undertaking a case-by-case analysis to refute the dissent's accusation that this Court was ignoring precedent). [2] 473 Mich. 457 , 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). [3] See, e.g., Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 465 Mich. 675, 712 , 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002) (KELLY, J., dissenting) ("[I]f each successive Court, believing its reading is correct and past readings wrong, rejects precedent, then the law will fluctuate from year to year, rendering our jurisprudence dangerously unstable."); People v. Hawkins, 468 Mich. 488, 517-518 , 668

2010Co., 483 Mich. 1032 , 1035, 766 N.W.2d 273 (2009) (KELLY, C.J., concurring) (undertaking a case-by-case analysis to refute the dissent's accusation that this Court was ignoring precedent). [2] 473 Mich. 457 , 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). [3] See, e.g., Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 465 Mich. 675, 712 , 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002) (KELLY, J., dissenting) ("[I]f each successive Court, believing its reading is correct and past readings wrong, rejects precedent, then the law will fluctuate from year to year, rendering our jurisprudence dangerously unstable."); People v. Hawkins, 468 Mich. 488, 517-518 , 668

2010Co., 483 Mich. 1032 , 1035, 766 N.W.2d 273 (2009) (KELLY, C.J., concurring) (undertaking a case-by-case analysis to refute the dissent's accusation that this Court was ignoring precedent). [2] 473 Mich. 457 , 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). [3] See, e.g., Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 465 Mich. 675, 712 , 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002) (KELLY, J., dissenting) ("[I]f each successive Court, believing its reading is correct and past readings wrong, rejects precedent, then the law will fluctuate from year to year, rendering our jurisprudence dangerously unstable."); People v. Hawkins, 468 Mich. 488, 517-518 , 668

2010Co., 483 Mich. 1032 , 1035, 766 N.W.2d 273 (2009) (KELLY, C.J., concurring) (undertaking a case-by-case analysis to refute the dissent's accusation that this Court was ignoring precedent). [2] 473 Mich. 457 , 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). [3] See, e.g., Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 465 Mich. 675, 712 , 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002) (KELLY, J., dissenting) ("[I]f each successive Court, believing its reading is correct and past readings wrong, rejects precedent, then the law will fluctuate from year to year, rendering our jurisprudence dangerously unstable."); People v. Hawkins, 468 Mich. 488, 517-518 , 668

2010Co., 483 Mich. 1032 , 1035, 766 N.W.2d 273 (2009) (KELLY, C.J., concurring) (undertaking a case-by-case analysis to refute the dissent's accusation that this Court was ignoring precedent). [2] 473 Mich. 457 , 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). [3] See, e.g., Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 465 Mich. 675, 712 , 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002) (KELLY, J., dissenting) ("[I]f each successive Court, believing its reading is correct and past readings wrong, rejects precedent, then the law will fluctuate from year to year, rendering our jurisprudence dangerously unstable."); People v. Hawkins, 468 Mich. 488, 517-518 , 668

2010Co., 483 Mich. 1032 , 1035, 766 N.W.2d 273 (2009) (KELLY, C.J., concurring) (undertaking a case-by-case analysis to refute the dissent's accusation that this Court was ignoring precedent). [2] 473 Mich. 457 , 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). [3] See, e.g., Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 465 Mich. 675, 712 , 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002) (KELLY, J., dissenting) ("[I]f each successive Court, believing its reading is correct and past readings wrong, rejects precedent, then the law will fluctuate from year to year, rendering our jurisprudence dangerously unstable."); People v. Hawkins, 468 Mich. 488, 517-518 , 668

2010Co., 483 Mich. 1032 , 1035, 766 N.W.2d 273 (2009) (KELLY, C.J., concurring) (undertaking a case-by-case analysis to refute the dissent's accusation that this Court was ignoring precedent). [2] 473 Mich. 457 , 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). [3] See, e.g., Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 465 Mich. 675, 712 , 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002) (KELLY, J., dissenting) ("[I]f each successive Court, believing its reading is correct and past readings wrong, rejects precedent, then the law will fluctuate from year to year, rendering our jurisprudence dangerously unstable."); People v. Hawkins, 468 Mich. 488, 517-518 , 668

2010Co., 483 Mich. 1032 , 1035, 766 N.W.2d 273 (2009) (KELLY, C.J., concurring) (undertaking a case-by-case analysis to refute the dissent's accusation that this Court was ignoring precedent). [2] 473 Mich. 457 , 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). [3] See, e.g., Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 465 Mich. 675, 712 , 641 N.W.2d 219 (2002) (KELLY, J., dissenting) ("[I]f each successive Court, believing its reading is correct and past readings wrong, rejects precedent, then the law will fluctuate from year to year, rendering our jurisprudence dangerously unstable."); People v. Hawkins, 468 Mich. 488, 517-518 , 668

2008Simply comparing a previous plaintiff's injuries to a subsequent plaintiff's injuries is not consistent with Kreiner 's requirement of a case-by-case analysis, Kreiner, supra at 134 , 683 N.W.2d 611 : [I]n order to determine whether one has suffered a "serious impairment of body function," the totality of the circumstances must be considered, and the ultimate question that must be answered is whether the impairment "affects the person's general ability to conduct the course of his or her normal life."19 19 We agree with the dissent that the "serious impairment of body function" inquiry must "p

2006This Court in Mullins reasoned that Waltz should not apply retroactively to deprive this plaintiff of a cause of action because “[t]he time limits provided in Omelenchuk reflected the current state of the law when the original personal representative, plaintiffs father, filed suit.” Mullins, supra at 591 .

2006This Court in Mullins reasoned that Waltz should not apply retroactively to deprive this plaintiff of a cause of action because “[t]he time limits provided in Omelenchuk reflected the current state of the law when the original personal representative, plaintiffs father, filed suit.” Mullins, supra at 591 .

2006A proviso exists that equitable subrogation “will not be enforced where it will work injustice to the rights of those having equal equities.” Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs of Calhoun Co v Southern Surety Co, 216 Mich 528, 533 ; 185 NW 755 (1921) (quotation and citation omitted).

2006A proviso exists that equitable subrogation “will not be enforced where it will work injustice to the rights of those having equal equities.” Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs of Calhoun Co v Southern Surety Co, 216 Mich 528, 533 ; 185 NW 755 (1921) (quotation and citation omitted).

2005Cooper, supra at 461 , 247 N.W.2d 866 .

2001While it is true that the Guilty Plea Cases established that the determination whether MCR 6.302 was “substantially complied with” was to be part of a case-by-case inquiry, this Court also made clear at the time that the rule requires that a defendant be advised of his right to be presumed innocent, because such right is “at the core of our criminal process and fundamental to defendant’s understanding of a trial.” Id. at 125 .

2000Hagerman, supra at 732 , 579 N.W.2d 347 .

1998The dissent contends that Stoll v Laubengayer, 174 Mich 701, 706 ; 140 NW 532 (1913), established the general rule of the day that proximate cause was defined as “the immediate efficient, direct cause preceding the injury.” However, as noted below, that was merely one of several definitions considered in Stoll , and the rule to be gleaned from that case is that proximate cause is a case-by-case analysis.

1998The dissent contends that Stoll v Laubengayer, 174 Mich 701, 706 ; 140 NW 532 (1913), established the general rule of the day that proximate cause was defined as “the immediate efficient, direct cause preceding the injury.” However, as noted below, that was merely one of several definitions considered in Stoll , and the rule to be gleaned from that case is that proximate cause is a case-by-case analysis.

1996However, where the defendant has voluntarily exited the automobile and begun walking away from the automobile before the officer has initiated contact with him, the case does not fall within Belton’s bright-line rule, and a case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of the search under Chimel [v California, 395 US 752 ; 89 S Ct 2034 ; 23 L Ed 2d 685 (1969)] becomes necessaiy. [Citations omitted.] In its discussion in Hudgins, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals cited, its decision in United States v Strahan, 984 F2d 155 (CA 6, 1993), a case presenting facts similar to the present case.

1996However, where the defendant has voluntarily exited the automobile and begun walking away from the automobile before the officer has initiated contact with him, the case does not fall within Belton’s bright-line rule, and a case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of the search under Chimel [v California, 395 US 752 ; 89 S Ct 2034 ; 23 L Ed 2d 685 (1969)] becomes necessaiy. [Citations omitted.] In its discussion in Hudgins, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals cited, its decision in United States v Strahan, 984 F2d 155 (CA 6, 1993), a case presenting facts similar to the present case.

1996However, where the defendant has voluntarily exited the automobile and begun walking away from the automobile before the officer has initiated contact *363 with him, the case does not fall within Belton's bright-line rule, and a case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of the search under Chimel [v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)] becomes necessary. [Citations omitted.] In its discussion in Hudgins, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals cited its decision in United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (C.A.6, 1993), a case presenting facts similar to the present ca