case-by-case analysis in Iowa

2021See State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Iowa 2009) (“Only through a case-by-case analysis will a court be able to determine whether counsel in a particular case breached a duty in advance of a guilty plea, and whether any such breach rendered the defendant’s plea unintelligent or involuntary.”).

2020See State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Iowa 2009) (“Only through a case-by-case analysis will a court be able to determine whether counsel in a particular case breached a duty in advance of a guilty plea, and whether any such breach rendered the defendant's plea unintelligent or involuntary.”).

2017Our supreme court has stated, “[W]hen a postconviction relief claim following a guilty plea is properly alleged, a case-by-case analysis is necessary ‘to determine whether counsel in a particular case breached a duty in advance of a guilty plea, and whether any such breach rendered the defendant’s plea unintelligent or involuntary.’” 4 Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 2011) (quoting State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Iowa 2009)).

2015If a guilty plea is properly challenged, “a case-by-case analysis is necessary to determine whether counsel in a particular case breached a duty in advance of a guilty plea, and whether any such breach rendered the defendant’s plea unintelligent or involuntary.” Castro, 795 N.W.2d at 793 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

2020Determining whether opinion testimony is lay or expert “requires a case-by-case analysis of both the witness and the witness[]’s 13 opinion.” United States v. Smith, 591 F.3d 974, 983 (8th Cir. 2010).

2020Determining whether opinion testimony is lay or expert “requires a case-by-case analysis of both the witness and the witness[]’s 13 opinion.” United States v. Smith, 591 F.3d 974, 983 (8th Cir. 2010).

2015As noted by the Illinois Supreme Court, “[i]n many instances the application of such a per se rule would require the appointment of counsel with virtually no experience in the trial of criminal matters, thus raising, with justification, the question of competency of counsel.” Id. at 953 (quoting People v. Robinson, 402 N.E.2d 157, 162 (Ill. 1979)). 30 These decisions are persuasive and should be followed.

2015As noted by the Illinois Supreme Court, “[i]n many instances the application of such a per se rule would require the appointment of counsel with virtually no experience in' the trial of criminal matters, thus raising, with justification, the question of competency of counsel.” Id. at 953 (quoting People v. Robinson, 79 Ill.2d 147 , 37 Ill.Dec. 267 , 402 N.E.2d 157, 162 (1979)).

2014See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (r) (2013) (“The determination that an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to perform the essential functions of the job.” (Emphasis added.)); Kapche, 304 F.3d at 494, 500 (vacating grant of summary judgment and holding plaintiff with insulin-treated diabetes mellitus required individualized assessment of his “ability to safely perform the essential functions” of a police officer position, which included driving).

2014See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (r) (2013) (“The determination that an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to perform the essential functions of the job.” (Emphasis added.)); Kapche, 304 F.3d at 494, 500 (vacating grant of summary judgment and holding plaintiff with insulin-treated diabetes mellitus required individualized assessment of his “ability to safely perform the essential functions” of a police officer position, which included driving).

2012Employing a case-by-case analysis, we must determine whether the trial information and minutes of testimony are specific enough to afford the defendant a “full and fair statement” of a witness’ expected testimony; the State “need not detail each circumstance ' of the testimony.” See Lord, 341 N.W.2d at 742 ; see also State v. McConnell, 178 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Iowa 1970) (taking into consideration minutes of testimony in order to remedy supposed defect in trial information); Grice, 515 N.W.2d at 23 (minutes of evidence must also be considered to determine whether defendant is adequately apprised

2004Employing a case-by-case analysis, we must determine whether the trial information and minutes of testimony are specific enough to afford the defendant a “full and fair statement” of a witness’ expected testimony; the State “need not detail each circumstance of the testimony.” See Lord, 341 N.W.2d at 742 ; see also State v. McConnell, 178 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Iowa 1970) (taking into consideration minutes of testimony in order to remedy supposed defect in trial information); Grice, 515 N.W.2d at 23 (minutes of evidence must also be considered to determine whether defendant is adequately apprised of

2012Employing a case-by-case analysis, we must determine whether the trial information and minutes of testimony are specific enough to afford the defendant a “full and fair statement” of a witness’ expected testimony; the State “need not detail each circumstance ' of the testimony.” See Lord, 341 N.W.2d at 742 ; see also State v. McConnell, 178 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Iowa 1970) (taking into consideration minutes of testimony in order to remedy supposed defect in trial information); Grice, 515 N.W.2d at 23 (minutes of evidence must also be considered to determine whether defendant is adequately apprised

2004Employing a case-by-case analysis, we must determine whether the trial information and minutes of testimony are specific enough to afford the defendant a “full and fair statement” of a witness’ expected testimony; the State “need not detail each circumstance of the testimony.” See Lord, 341 N.W.2d at 742 ; see also State v. McConnell, 178 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Iowa 1970) (taking into consideration minutes of testimony in order to remedy supposed defect in trial information); Grice, 515 N.W.2d at 23 (minutes of evidence must also be considered to determine whether defendant is adequately apprised of

2023Id. at 144 (“It is axiomatic that a statutory scheme which calls for a case-by-case analysis would be rendered meaningless by an application of rigid rules based solely on prior decisions.

2021See Mitchell, 588 U.S. at ___ , 139 S. Ct. at 2537– 39 (plurality rejecting Justice Thomas’s lone view for a per se exception to the warrant requirement for drunk-driving cases and maintaining the case-by-case analysis recently espoused in McNeely). 94 On the facts presented at the suppression hearing, the State failed to establish the exigent circumstances necessary to avoid procuring a warrant, and I would hold that McGee’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

2016In Wing, our supreme court set forth the following formulation of the case-by-case analysis to be applied in determining whether an arrest has occurred for purposes of triggering the speedy-indictment rule: When an arresting officer does not follow the protocol for arrest outlined in section 804.14 and does not provide any explicit statements indicating that he or she is or is not attempting to effect an arrest, we think the soundest approach is to determine whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed an arrest occurred, including whether the arresting officer m

1996Whether a matter involves a political question requires a case-by-case inquiry and constitutes a "delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation." Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-11 , 82 S.Ct. at 706 , 7 L.Ed.2d at 681-82 ; see League of Women Voters, 743 P.2d at 336 .

1996Whether a matter involves a political question requires a case-by-case inquiry and constitutes a “delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-11 , 82 S.Ct. at 706 , 7 L.Ed.2d at 681-82 ; see League of Women Voters, 743 P.2d at 336 .