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55 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1958–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cahillgreen2 sentences2025Moreover, our Supreme Court has "decline[d] to adopt a rigid bright-line try-or-dismiss rule," instead continuing its commitment to "a case-by-case analysis" under the Barker balancing test; it has acknowledged "that facts of an individual case are the best indicators of whether a right to a speedy trial has been violated." State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253, 270-71 (2013). 2020Each application for dismissal based on speedy trial principles is fact-sensitive and requires "a case-by-case analysis rather than a bright-line time limitation." Cahill, 213 N.J. at 270 . | 3 | 8 |
State v. McCabegreen2 sentences2026"Motions for recusal ordinarily require a case-by-case analysis of the particular facts presented." McCabe, 201 N.J. at 46 . 2025"Motions for recusal ordinarily require a case-by-case analysis of the particular facts presented." McCabe, 201 N.J. at 46 . | 2 | 7 |
Voorhees v. Preferred Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences1998Rather, we concluded that a case-by-case analysis would be necessary to determine whether “exceptional circumstances [exist] that objectively establish the insured’s intent to injure.” Ibid, (quoting Voorhees, supra, 128 N.J. at 185 , 607 A.2d 1255 ). 1998Rather, we concluded that a case-by-case analysis would be necessary to determine whether “exceptional circumstances [exist] that objectively establish the insured’s intent to injure.” Ibid, (quoting Voorhees, supra, 128 N.J. at 185 , 607 A.2d 1255 ). | 1 | 4 |
Morton International, Inc. v. General Accident Insurancegreen2 sentences1998Instead, the Court held that "in environmental-coverage litigation a case-by-case analysis is required in order to determine whether, in the context of all the available evidence, `exceptional circumstances [exist] that objectively establish the insured's intent to injure.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. 1996Morton held that in environmental litigation whether there has been a covered occurrence requires a case-by-case analysis to determine the existence of "exceptional circumstances that objectively establish the insured's intent to injure [the environment]." Morton, 134 N.J. at 86 , 629 A. 2d 831 , (quoting Voorhees v. Preferred Mutual Ins. | 1 | 4 |
In Re Opinion No. 24green1 sentence2022It also involves a determination of whether non-lawyers should be allowed, in the public interest, to engage in activities that may constitute the practice of law. [Ibid.] That inquiry demands a case-by-case analysis, because “[n]o satisfactory, all-inclusive definition of what constitutes the practice of law has ever been devised.” In re Op. No. 24 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Prac. of L., 128 N.J. 114, 122 (1992). “[I]n cases involving an overlap of professional disciplines we must try to avoid arbitrary classifications and focus instead on the public’s realistic need for protection and | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Katzgreen1 sentence2021Such a case-by-case analysis may include where the children appear to fit along the spectrum of ages: "Like any other fact, age is, of course, for the determination of the jury." State v. Carlone, 109 N.J.L. 208, 211 , 160 A. 551, 552 (Sup. Ct. 1932). "[W]hether the age of a model in a child pornography prosecution can be determined by a lay jury without the assistance of expert testimony . . . must be determined on a case by case basis." United States v. Katz, 178 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carlonegreen2 sentences2021Such a case-by-case analysis may include where the children appear to fit along the spectrum of ages: "Like any other fact, age is, of course, for the determination of the jury." State v. Carlone, 109 N.J.L. 208, 211 , 160 A. 551, 552 (Sup. Ct. 1932). "[W]hether the age of a model in a child pornography prosecution can be determined by a lay jury without the assistance of expert testimony . . . must be determined on a case by case basis." United States v. Katz, 178 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1999). 2021Such a case-by-case analysis may include where the children appear to fit along the spectrum of ages: "Like any other fact, age is, of course, for the determination of the jury." State v. Carlone, 109 N.J.L. 208, 211 , 160 A. 551, 552 (Sup. Ct. 1932). "[W]hether the age of a model in a child pornography prosecution can be determined by a lay jury without the assistance of expert testimony . . . must be determined on a case by case basis." United States v. Katz, 178 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
DeNike v. Cupogreen1 sentence2021A-2083-19 31 The standard to assess plaintiffs' request for recusal is: "Would a reasonable, fully informed person have doubts about the judge's impartiality?" DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gillispiegreen2 sentences2021"Admission of evidence as supportive of a signature crime must remain a case- by-case analysis, assessing what it is about the method of a crime's commission that might make it a signature crime." Sterling, 215 N.J. at 97 . "[C]ircumstantial evidence is key, and the unique common features among the crimes must be nearly identical." State v. Gillispie, 208 N.J. 59, 88 (2011). 2021Other-crime evidence admitted for the purpose of identity under N.J.R.E. 404(b) is not "limited to testimony of the defendant's participation in a similar or 'signature' crime." Id. at 86 . | 1 | 1 |
Irval Realty Inc. v. Board of Public Utility Commissionersgreen2 sentences2015Cf. Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 375-76 (rejecting, under common law analysis, after (continued) government record. 2015Cf. Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 375-76 (rejecting, under common law analysis, after (continued) government record. | 1 | 1 |
Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc.green2 sentences2013See Meshinsky, supra, 110 N.J. at 472 , 541 A.2d 1063 (noting that courts considering alleged CFA violations should ‘“pour content’ into the concept” of unconscionable commercial practices under the CFA “on a case-by-case basis” (quoting Kugler, supra, 58 N.J. at 543 , 279 A.2d 640 )); Papergraphics Int’l, Inc. v. Correa, 389 N.J.Super. 8, 13 , 910 A.2d 625 (App.Div.2006) (noting that “CFA applicability hinges on the nature of a transaction, requiring a case by case analysis”); accord Assocs. 2013See Meshinsky, supra, 110 N.J. at 472 , 541 A.2d 1063 (noting that courts considering alleged CFA violations should ‘“pour content’ into the concept” of unconscionable commercial practices under the CFA “on a case-by-case basis” (quoting Kugler, supra, 58 N.J. at 543 , 279 A.2d 640 )); Papergraphics Int’l, Inc. v. Correa, 389 N.J.Super. 8, 13 , 910 A.2d 625 (App.Div.2006) (noting that “CFA applicability hinges on the nature of a transaction, requiring a case by case analysis”); accord Assocs. | 1 | 1 |
Kugler v. Romaingreen2 sentences2013See Meshinsky, supra, 110 N.J. at 472 , 541 A.2d 1063 (noting that courts considering alleged CFA violations should ‘“pour content’ into the concept” of unconscionable commercial practices under the CFA “on a case-by-case basis” (quoting Kugler, supra, 58 N.J. at 543 , 279 A.2d 640 )); Papergraphics Int’l, Inc. v. Correa, 389 N.J.Super. 8, 13 , 910 A.2d 625 (App.Div.2006) (noting that “CFA applicability hinges on the nature of a transaction, requiring a case by case analysis”); accord Assocs. 2013See Meshinsky, supra, 110 N.J. at 472 , 541 A.2d 1063 (noting that courts considering alleged CFA violations should ‘“pour content’ into the concept” of unconscionable commercial practices under the CFA “on a case-by-case basis” (quoting Kugler, supra, 58 N.J. at 543 , 279 A.2d 640 )); Papergraphics Int’l, Inc. v. Correa, 389 N.J.Super. 8, 13 , 910 A.2d 625 (App.Div.2006) (noting that “CFA applicability hinges on the nature of a transaction, requiring a case by case analysis”); accord Assocs. | 1 | 1 |
Associates Home Eq. Servs. v. Troupgreen2 sentences2013Home Equity Servs., Inc. v. Troup, 343 N.J.Super. 254, 278 , 778 A.2d 529 (App.Div.2001). 2013Home Equity Servs., Inc. v. Troup, 343 N.J.Super. 254, 278 , 778 A.2d 529 (App.Div.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Dreier Co., Inc. v. Unitronix Corp.green2 sentences2011Compare Dreier Co., supra, 218 N.J.Super. at 273 , 527 A. 2d 875 ; Hundred E. 2011Compare Dreier Co., supra, 218 N.J.Super. at 273 , 527 A. 2d 875 ; Hundred E. | 1 | 1 |
Hundred East Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp.green2 sentences2006See Hundred East Credit Corp., supra, 212 N.J.Super. at 356-57 , 515 A. 2d 246 . 2006See Hundred East Credit Corp., supra, 212 N.J.Super. at 356-57 , 515 A. 2d 246 . | 1 | 1 |
Lopez v. Stategreen1 sentence2004See Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 225 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (declining “to create a per se exception to the Rule 608(b) for sexual offenses” because “[i]t makes no sense to say that certain factors will always be present in a case involving a sexual offense”). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sullivangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ravottogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Universal-Rundle v. Commercial Ins.green | 1 | 1 |
| Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. American Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mondelli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| State v. Boltegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Papergraphics Intern., Inc. v. Correa
green
2 sentences2013See Meshinsky, supra, 110 N.J. at 472 , 541 A.2d 1063 (noting that courts considering alleged CFA violations should ‘“pour content’ into the concept” of unconscionable commercial practices under the CFA “on a case-by-case basis” (quoting Kugler, supra, 58 N.J. at 543 , 279 A.2d 640 )); Papergraphics Int’l, Inc. v. Correa, 389 N.J.Super. 8, 13 , 910 A.2d 625 (App.Div.2006) (noting that “CFA applicability hinges on the nature of a transaction, requiring a case by case analysis”); accord Assocs. 2013See Meshinsky, supra, 110 N.J. at 472 , 541 A.2d 1063 (noting that courts considering alleged CFA violations should ‘“pour content’ into the concept” of unconscionable commercial practices under the CFA “on a case-by-case basis” (quoting Kugler, supra, 58 N.J. at 543 , 279 A.2d 640 )); Papergraphics Int’l, Inc. v. Correa, 389 N.J.Super. 8, 13 , 910 A.2d 625 (App.Div.2006) (noting that “CFA applicability hinges on the nature of a transaction, requiring a case by case analysis”); accord Assocs. | 5 | 2008–2013 |
Pfender v. Torres
green
2 sentences2019In Pfender , the plaintiff "was injured at a gas station when defendant Joseph A. Torres drove his employer's car over her foot." 336 N.J. 2019In Pfender, the plaintiff "was injured at a gas station when defendant Joseph A. Torres drove his employer's car over her foot." 336 N.J. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Painter v. Painter
green
2 sentences2011Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 213-214 , 320 A. 2d 484 (1974). 1982Acknowledging that this would not provide "certain and ready answers to all questions," it was nevertheless chosen as a preferable alternative to a case by case inquiry as to "when a breakdown of the marital relationship has become irretrievable." Id. at 217-18 . | 2 | 1982–2011 |
State v. Martini
green
2 sentences1999In precedent-seeking review, we engage in a traditional case-by-case analysis and "compare the defendant's case to factually-similar cases to determine whether the defendant is deathworthy in light of similarly-situated defendants." Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 28 , 651 A. 2d 949 . 1999In precedent-seeking review, we engage in a traditional case-by-case analysis and "compare the defendant's case to factually-similar cases to determine whether the defendant is deathworthy in light of similarly-situated defendants." Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 28 , 651 A. 2d 949 . | 2 | 1999–1999 |
New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. New Jersey Ass'n of Realtor Boards
green
1 sentence2022State Bar Ass’n, 94 N.J. at 449-50 . 25 notice to the buyer and seller about the role of counsel and practical considerations related to the transaction. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Sterling
green
1 sentence2021"Admission of evidence as supportive of a signature crime must remain a case- by-case analysis, assessing what it is about the method of a crime's commission that might make it a signature crime." Sterling, 215 N.J. at 97 . "[C]ircumstantial evidence is key, and the unique common features among the crimes must be nearly identical." State v. Gillispie, 208 N.J. 59, 88 (2011). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Brown v. Brown
green
1 sentence2019A case- by-case analysis is required, "with sensitivity and adjustment for the particular A-2453-16T1 17 circumstances and the flexibility to deal with extraordinary circumstances." Brown, 348 N.J. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Smith v. Young
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 92-100 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst
green
2 sentences2017The panel also correctly noted that “when an officer turns on a mobile video recorder to document a traffic stop or pursuit of a suspected criminal violation of law, that recording may pertain to a ‘criminal investigation,’ albeit in its earliest stages.” NJMG, supra, 441 N.J.Super. at 104-05 , 116 A.3d 570 . 2017The panel also correctly noted that “when an officer turns on a mobile video recorder to document a traffic stop or pursuit of a suspected criminal violation of law, that recording may pertain to a ‘criminal investigation,’ albeit in its earliest stages.” NJMG, supra, 441 N.J.Super. at 104-05 , 116 A.3d 570 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Perkins
green
2 sentences2013For example, in State v. Perkins, 219 N.J.Super. 121, 125-26 , 529 A.2d 1056 (Law Div.1987), a judge dismissed a driving-while-intoxicated charge when the State was not prepared to proceed at a peremptory trial date three months after the underlying incident. 2013For example, in State v. Perkins, 219 N.J.Super. 121, 125-26 , 529 A.2d 1056 (Law Div.1987), a judge dismissed a driving-while-intoxicated charge when the State was not prepared to proceed at a peremptory trial date three months after the underlying incident. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Birkenmeier
green
1 sentence2010The Court stated that in "[a]pplying the case-by-case analysis required by [ State v. ] Dunlap[,] [ 185 N.J. 543 , 888 A. 2d 1278 (2006)] and Cooke here, there is no doubt that [the officer's] observation of the laundry tote bag on the front passenger's seat of defendant's car and detection of `a very strong odor of marijuana' sufficed to provide the probable cause and exigent circumstances needed. . . ." Id. at 563 , 888 A. 2d 1283 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Dunlap
green
2 sentences2010The Court stated that in "[a]pplying the case-by-case analysis required by [ State v. ] Dunlap[,] [ 185 N.J. 543 , 888 A. 2d 1278 (2006)] and Cooke here, there is no doubt that [the officer's] observation of the laundry tote bag on the front passenger's seat of defendant's car and detection of `a very strong odor of marijuana' sufficed to provide the probable cause and exigent circumstances needed. . . ." Id. at 563 , 888 A. 2d 1283 . 2010The Court stated that in "[a]pplying the case-by-case analysis required by [ State v. ] Dunlap[,] [ 185 N.J. 543 , 888 A. 2d 1278 (2006)] and Cooke here, there is no doubt that [the officer's] observation of the laundry tote bag on the front passenger's seat of defendant's car and detection of `a very strong odor of marijuana' sufficed to provide the probable cause and exigent circumstances needed. . . ." Id. at 563 , 888 A. 2d 1283 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
BOC GROUP v. Lummus Crest
green
2 sentences2009In BOC Group, Inc. v. Lummus Crest, Inc., 251 N.J.Super. 271, 277-78 , 597 A. 2d 1109 (Law Div.1990), the court had to decide whether "merchandise" under the CFA encompassed a licensing agreement for a complex petroleum refining process. *867 In concluding that such a licensing agreement was not a "service" within the definition of "merchandise" in N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c), the court held that what had been sold was an idea or a design. 2009In BOC Group, Inc. v. Lummus Crest, Inc., 251 N.J.Super. 271, 277-78 , 597 A. 2d 1109 (Law Div.1990), the court had to decide whether "merchandise" under the CFA encompassed a licensing agreement for a complex petroleum refining process. *867 In concluding that such a licensing agreement was not a "service" within the definition of "merchandise" in N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c), the court held that what had been sold was an idea or a design. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America
green
2 sentences2008When analyzing whether a transaction is covered by the CFA, "it should ordinarily be assumed that the CFA applies to the covered practice." Lemelledo, supra, 150 N.J. at 268 , 696 A. 2d 546 . 2008When analyzing whether a transaction is covered by the CFA, "it should ordinarily be assumed that the CFA applies to the covered practice." Lemelledo, supra, 150 N.J. at 268 , 696 A. 2d 546 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Loftin green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Matter of Imbrriani green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Free green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus, Inc. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Medici v. BPR Co. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Nemchick v. Thatcher Glass Mfg. Co. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| United States v. Yazell green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Di Giacomo v. Di Giacomo green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Carlsen v. Carlsen green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Solari Industries, Inc. v. Malady green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Gnapinsky v. Goldyn green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.