63 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Willisgreen2 sentences2017"The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by [our Rules of Evidence] and requires a case by case inquiry." State v. Willis, 151 Wn.2d 255, 262 , 87 P.3d 1164 (2004). 13 }rausto v. Yakima HMA, No. 93312-0 Accordingly, our Rules of Evidence detail the circumstances under which a witness may offer testimony in the form of an expert opinion. 2013Jensen, 158 Wn.2d at 398-99 ; State v. Willis, 151 Wn.2d 255, 262 , 87 P.3d 1164 (2004) (“The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by ER 702 and requires a case by case inquiry.”). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Willisgreen2 sentences2017"The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by [our Rules of Evidence] and requires a case by case inquiry." State v. Willis, 151 Wn.2d 255, 262 , 87 P.3d 1164 (2004). 13 }rausto v. Yakima HMA, No. 93312-0 Accordingly, our Rules of Evidence detail the circumstances under which a witness may offer testimony in the form of an expert opinion. 2013Jensen, 158 Wn.2d at 398-99 ; State v. Willis, 151 Wn.2d 255, 262 , 87 P.3d 1164 (2004) (“The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by ER 702 and requires a case by case inquiry.”). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Ringerred2 sentences2009See Ringer, 100 Wash.2d at 700 , 674 P.2d 1240 ("The question remains whether the search of Ringer's van could be justified under the so-called `exigent circumstances' exception."). 2009See Ringer, 100 Wn.2d at 700 (“The question remains whether the search of Ringer’s van could be justified under the so-called ‘exigent circumstances’ exception.”). | 2 | 3 |
Tisdale v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Tisdale, 498 So. 2d at 1282 (“the congressional dichotomy between House and Senate and the ultimate compromise giving rise to federal rule 801(d)(l)(A)[ ] seem to dictate a ‘bright line’ construction rather than a case-by-case analysis of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement to determine reliability and thus admissibility”). ¶51 Because Smith is inconsistent with ER 801(d)(l)(i)’s plain language and the overwhelming majority of precedent interpreting equivalent rules, I would hold that it was incorrectly decided. 2016See Tisdale, 498 So. 2d at 1282 ("the congressional dichotomy between House and Senate and the ultimate compromise giving rise to federal rule 80 1(d)(1 )(A)[] seem to dictate a 'bright line' construction rather than a case-by-case analysis of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement to determine reliability and thus admissibility"). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Stegallgreen2 sentences2016See Stegall, 124 Wn.2d at 725 (requiring a case-by-case analysis). 2016See Stegall, 124 Wn.2d at 725 (requiring a case-by-case analysis). ¶12 We stress that defense counsel did not object on the record to finishing individual voir dire out of Black’s presence. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Brewtongreen2 sentences2014App. 821 ,] 824[, 515 P.2d 172 (1973)]; see also State v. Brewton, 49 Wn. 2014App. [821, 824, 515 P.2d 172 (1973)]; see also State v. Brewton, 49 Wn. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Dennis R. Josleyn, United States of America v. John W. Billmyer, United States of America v. Dennis R. Josleyn and John W. Billmyergreen2 sentences2011See Avila v. Quarterman, 560 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir.2009) (adopting a case-by-case analysis for determining whether an expert witness is a state actor for Brady purposes); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 297-99 (2d Cir.2006) (rejecting categorical approach for determining whether a person is a state actor for Brady purposes and adopting a fact-specific approach and stating that "the relevant inquiry is what the person did, not who the person is. "); see also Josleyn, 206 F.3d at 152-54 . 2011See Avila v. Quarterman, 560 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir. 2009) (adopting a case-by-case analysis for determining whether an expert witness is a state actor for Brady purposes); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 297-99 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting categorical approach for determining whether a person is a state actor for Brady purposes and adopting a fact-specific approach and stating that “the relevant inquiry is what the person did, not who the person is”); see also Josleyn, 206 F.3d at 152-54 . | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovicgreen2 sentences2011See Avila v. Quarterman, 560 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir.2009) (adopting a case-by-case analysis for determining whether an expert witness is a state actor for Brady purposes); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 297-99 (2d Cir.2006) (rejecting categorical approach for determining whether a person is a state actor for Brady purposes and adopting a fact-specific approach and stating that "the relevant inquiry is what the person did, not who the person is. "); see also Josleyn, 206 F.3d at 152-54 . 2011See Avila v. Quarterman, 560 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir. 2009) (adopting a case-by-case analysis for determining whether an expert witness is a state actor for Brady purposes); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 297-99 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting categorical approach for determining whether a person is a state actor for Brady purposes and adopting a fact-specific approach and stating that “the relevant inquiry is what the person did, not who the person is”); see also Josleyn, 206 F.3d at 152-54 . | 2 | 2 |
Avila v. Quartermangreen2 sentences2011See Avila v. Quarterman, 560 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir.2009) (adopting a case-by-case analysis for determining whether an expert witness is a state actor for Brady purposes); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 297-99 (2d Cir.2006) (rejecting categorical approach for determining whether a person is a state actor for Brady purposes and adopting a fact-specific approach and stating that "the relevant inquiry is what the person did, not who the person is. "); see also Josleyn, 206 F.3d at 152-54 . 2011See Avila v. Quarterman, 560 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir. 2009) (adopting a case-by-case analysis for determining whether an expert witness is a state actor for Brady purposes); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 297-99 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting categorical approach for determining whether a person is a state actor for Brady purposes and adopting a fact-specific approach and stating that “the relevant inquiry is what the person did, not who the person is”); see also Josleyn, 206 F.3d at 152-54 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Adelgreen2 sentences2007See Adel, 136 Wash.2d at 640-41 , 965 P.2d 1072 (Talmadge, J. concurring) (noting that, despite the majority's holding that misdemeanor possession of marijuana was one unit of prosecution even though two quantities were found in the defendant's contemporaneous possession, a case-by-case analysis is required to determine whether, for instance, one quantity was in Seattle and another in Spokane or one quantity was consumed before another was possessed). [5] Sutherby also asserts that the trial court violated his right to a jury trial by finding the fact of the child victims' identity in order to 2007See Adel, 136 Wn.2d at 640-41 (Talmadge, J., concurring) (noting that, despite the majority’s holding that misdemeanor possession of marijuana was one unit of prosecution even though two quantities were found in the defendant’s contemporaneous possession, a case-by-case analysis is required to determine whether, for instance, one quantity was in Seattle and another in Spokane or one quantity was consumed before another was possessed). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Blazinagreen2 sentences2021See 182 Wn.2d at 831-32 . 6 This practice was deemed improper because the legislature “intended each judge to conduct a case-by-case analysis” to determine which discretionary costs are “appropriate to the individual defendant’s circumstances.” Blazina, 182 Wn.2d at 834 . 2021See 182 Wn.2d at 831-32 . 6 This practice was deemed improper because the legislature “intended each judge to conduct a case-by-case analysis” to determine which discretionary costs are “appropriate to the individual defendant’s circumstances.” Blazina, 182 Wn.2d at 834 . | 1 | 10 |
State v. Ellergreen2 sentences2025Eller, 84 Wn.2d at 96 . 2019“Whether the denial of a continuance rises to the level of a constitutional violation requires a case by case inquiry.” Downing, 151 Wn.2d at 275 (citing Eller, 84 Wn.2d at 96 ). | 1 | 7 |
State v. O'Haragreen2 sentences2014O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 101-04 (whether error in a self-defense jury instruction is constitutional requires a case by case analysis). 2014O' Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 101 - 04 ( whether error in a self - defense jury instruction is constitutional requires a case by case analysis). | 1 | 2 |
Heidebrink v. Moriwakigreen2 sentences2011With these parties in mind, the scope of CR 26(b)(3) should provide protection when such protection comports with the underlying rationale of the rule to allow broad discovery, while maintaining certain restraints on bad faith, irrelevant and privileged inquiries in order to ensure just and fair resolutions of disputes." Heidebrink, 104 Wash.2d at 400 , 706 P.2d 212 (what was formerly CR 26(b)(3) is now (b)(4)). [11] An SVP evaluation report contains, at a minimum, a complete social and sexual history, complex judgments regarding volitional impairment, predictive statements focused specificall 2011With these parties in mind, the scope of CR 26(b)(3) should provide protection when such protection comports with the underlying rationale of the rule to allow broad discovery, while maintaining certain restraints on bad faith, irrelevant and privileged inquiries in order to ensure just and fair resolutions of disputes." Heidebrink, 104 Wash.2d at 400 , 706 P.2d 212 (what was formerly CR 26(b)(3) is now (b)(4)). [11] An SVP evaluation report contains, at a minimum, a complete social and sexual history, complex judgments regarding volitional impairment, predictive statements focused specificall | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wingategreen1 sentence2020See Wingate, 155 Wn.2d at 823 n.l; Riley, 137 Wn.2d at 909-10 . | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Adelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Terhune v. A. H. Robins Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Downing
green
2 sentences2019“Whether the denial of a continuance rises to the level of a constitutional violation requires a case-by-case inquiry.” Downing, 151 Wn.2d at 275 . 2019“Whether the denial of a continuance rises to the level of a constitutional violation requires a case by case inquiry.” Downing, 151 Wn.2d at 275 (citing Eller, 84 Wn.2d at 96 ). | 7 | 2015–2025 |
State v. Downing
green
2 sentences2025State v. Downing, 151 Wn.2d 265, 275 , 87 P.3d 1169 (2004). 2017Whether denial of the request to issue a material witness warrant 1 "rises to the level of a constitutional violation requires a case-by-case inquiry." State v. Downing, 151 Wn.2d 265, 275-76 , 87 P.3d 1169 (2004). | 3 | 2017–2025 |
State v. Grott
green
2 sentences2026Jury instructions are reviewed on “a case-by-case inquiry.” State v. Grott, 195 Wn.2d 256, 271 , 458 P.3d 750 (2020). 2026Jury instructions are reviewed on “a case-by-case inquiry.” State v. Grott, 195 Wn.2d 256, 271 , 458 P.3d 750 (2020). | 2 | 2022–2026 |
State v. Tradewell
green
2 sentences2014The 1986 amendment codified a rule that prevented physician witness-shopping, while the 1987 amendment did away with the case-by-case waiver analysis, instituting the blanket 90-day waiver rule: A patient who could select among various physicians’ opinions, and claim privilege as to the remainder, would make a mockery of justice. [State v.] Tradewell, [ 9 Wn. 2014App. 821 ,] 824[, 515 P.2d 172 (1973)]; see also State v. Brewton, 49 Wn. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
City of Fircrest v. Jensen
green
2 sentences2013Jensen, 158 Wn.2d at 398-99 ; State v. Willis, 151 Wn.2d 255, 262 , 87 P.3d 1164 (2004) ("The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by ER 702 and requires a case by case inquiry."). 2013Jensen, 158 Wn.2d at 398-99 ; State v. Willis, 151 Wn.2d 255, 262 , 87 P.3d 1164 (2004) (“The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by ER 702 and requires a case by case inquiry.”). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Bay v. Jensen
green
2 sentences2009In Bay v. Jensen, 147 Wash.App. 641, 652-53 , 196 P.3d 753 (2008), Division Two of this court determined that the trial court failed to meet the requirements of RCW 26.09.510(2) where one party did not meet the notice requirements and the court did not meet the requirements for granting a temporary order. ¶ 34 Reading RCW 26.09.470 and .510(2) together, there is no statutory authority for the trial court's decision to grant Ms. Chua a blanket waiver of RCW 26.09.430-.480 thereby negating the case-by-case analysis required under RCW 26.09.460 and RCW 26.09.510. ¶ 35 Ms. Chua points out that RCW 2009App. 641, 652-53 , 196 P.3d 753 (2008), Division Two of this court determined that the trial court failed to meet the requirements of RCW 26.09.510(2) where one party did not meet the notice requirements and the court did not meet the requirements for granting a temporary order. ¶34 When read together, RCW 26.09.470 and .510(2) provide no statutory authority for the trial court’s decision to grant Ms. Chua a blanket waiver of RCW 26.09.430-.480 thereby negating the case-by-case analysis required under RCW 26.09.460 and RCW 26.09.510. ¶35 Ms. Chua points out that RCW 26.09.490 states that “[u]n | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Mason
green
2 sentences2007Id. ¶ 16 If statements are taken when there is no ongoing emergency, and the statements are for the primary purpose of establishing past events that are potentially relevant to a future prosecution, the statements are testimonial. 2007Id. ¶16 If statements are taken when there is no ongoing emergency, and the statements are for the primary purpose of establishing past events that are potentially relevant to a future prosecution, the statements are testimonial. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Ungar v. Sarafite
green
2 sentences2004Id. at 96 (citing Cadena, 74 Wn.2d 185 ); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 , 84 S. Ct. 841 , 11 L. 2004Id. at 96 (citing Cadena, 74 Wn.2d 185 ); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 , 84 S. Ct. 841 , 11 L. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Cadena
green
2 sentences2004Id. at 96 (citing Cadena, 74 Wn.2d 185 ); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 , 84 S. Ct. 841 , 11 L. 2004Id. at 96 , 524 P.2d 242 (citing Cadena, 74 Wash.2d 185 , 443 P.2d 826 ); ( Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 , 84 S.Ct. 841 , 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)). [7] The existence of due diligence alone does not determine whether a constitutional right has been violated by the denial of a continuance. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Hartzog
green
2 sentences2002Hartzog, Wash.2d at 400, 635 P.2d 694 . 2002Hartzog, 96 Wn.2d at 400 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
green
2 sentences1997We cited in Maple Leaf to the well-known opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 , 43 S. Ct. 158 , 67 L. 1997We cited in Maple Leaf to the well-known opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 , 43 S. Ct. 158 , 67 L. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology
green
2 sentences1997Subsequent cases refined this approach by requiring a case-by-case analysis "balancing of the public interest in regulating the use of private property against the interests of private landowners not to be encumbered by restrictions on the use of their property.” Maple Leaf Inv., Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wn.2d 726, 731 , 565 P.2d 1162 (1977). 1997Subsequent cases refined this approach by requiring a case-by-case analysis "balancing of the public interest in regulating the use of private property against the interests of private landowners not to be encumbered by restrictions on the use of their property.” Maple Leaf Inv., Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wn.2d 726, 731 , 565 P.2d 1162 (1977). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Spain v. Employment Security Department
neutral
1 sentence2021Spain, 164 Wn.2d at 258 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Riley
green
1 sentence2020See Wingate, 155 Wn.2d at 823 n.l; Riley, 137 Wn.2d at 909-10 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In re the Welfare of R.H.
green
1 sentence2019In arguing that denial of his request for a continuance amounted to a due process violation, the father likens his request for a continuance to the facts of In re Welfare of R.H., 176 Wn. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Department of Social & Health Services v. Luak green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Taylor v. Illinois green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Groth green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Edwards green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Cienfuegos green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Thomas green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Schaffer green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Bay v. Jensen green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Glover green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Carter green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Carter green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| cluster 398778 green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Edwards green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Gagnon v. Scarpelli red | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| State v. Harp green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.