case-by-case analysis in New York

2025Any identification of the Defendant made by the complainant was confirmatory ( see People v Rodriguez, 79 NY2d 445 [1992]; People v Waring , 183 AD2d 271, 274 [2d Dept 1992][The confirmatory identification exception requires a case-by-case analysis which "rests on the length [*5]and quality of prior contacts between the witness and the defendant, but always requires a relationship which is more than fleeting or distant."]).

2025Any identification of the Defendant made by the complainant was confirmatory ( see People v Rodriguez, 79 NY2d 445 [1992]; People v Waring , 183 AD2d 271, 274 [2d Dept 1992][The confirmatory identification exception requires a case-by-case analysis which "rests on the length [*5]and quality of prior contacts between the witness and the defendant, but always requires a relationship which is more than fleeting or distant."]).

2026Critically, the United States Supreme Court found that Penal Law § 263.15 required a case-by-case analysis to ensure its application would not run afoul with a defendant's First Amendment rights ( Ferber , 458 US at 773-774).

2026Critically, the United States Supreme Court found that Penal Law § 263.15 required a case-by-case analysis to ensure its application would not run afoul with a defendant's First Amendment rights ( Ferber , 458 US at 773-774 ).

2012“Due process is a flexible concept, requiring a case-by-case analysis that measures the reasonableness of a municipality’s actions in seeking to provide adequate notice” (Matter of Harner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d 136, 140 ; see Walker v City of Hutchinson, 352 US 112, 115 ; Matter of County of Clinton [Bouchard], 29 AD3d 79, 83 ).

2012“Due process is a flexible concept, requiring a case-by-case analysis that measures the reasonableness of a municipality’s actions in seeking to provide adequate notice” (Matter of Harner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d 136, 140 [2005]; see Walker v City of Hutchinson, 352 US 112, 115 [1956]; Matter of County of Clinton [Bouchard], 29 AD3d 79, 83 [2006]).

2012Due process is satisfied by “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” (Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 314 [1950]; see also Jones v Flowers, 547 US 220, 223 [2006]; Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v Madison County, 665 F3d 408 [2d Cir 2011]; Matter of Orange County Commr. of Fin. [Helseth], 18 NY3d 634, 639 [2012]; Matter of County of Clinton [Bouchard], 29 AD3d 79, 82 [3d Dept 2006].) Due process is a flexible concept and requires a ca

2012“Due process is a flexible concept, requiring a case-by-case analysis that measures the reasonableness of a municipality’s actions in seeking to provide adequate notice” (Matter of Harner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d 136, 140 [2005]; see Walker v City of Hutchinson, 352 US 112, 115 [1956]; Matter of County of Clinton [Bouchard], 29 AD3d 79, 83 [2006]).

2023A balance must be struck between the State’s interest in collecting delinquent property taxes and those of the property owner in receiving notice (see Kennedy, 110 NY2d at 9; see also Matter of Zaccaro v Cahill, 100 NY2d 884, 890 [2003]).

2007Due process, however, “is a flexible concept, and the reasonableness of a municipality’s actions requires a case-by-case analysis” (Matter of County of Clinton [Bouchard], 29 AD3d 79, 83 [2006]; see Matter of Harner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d 136, 140 [2005]; Matter of Zaccaro v Cahill, 100 NY2d 884, 890 [2003]).

2014The issue of whether a defendant possessed a state of mind evincing depraved indifference to human life is highly fact-sensitive, requiring a case-by-case analysis (see People v Hurdle, 106 AD3d 1100, 1102 [2013]; see also People v McPherson, 89 AD3d 752 , 757 [2011], affd 22 NY3d 259 [2013]).

2013“The question of whether the defendant possessed the mens rea of depraved indifference to human life is highly fact-sensitive, requiring a case-by-case analysis” (People v Heidgen, 87 AD3d at 1020 ; see People v McPherson, 89 AD3d 752 , 757 [2011], lv granted 19 NY3d 969 [2012]; People v Taylor, 79 AD3d 944, 948 [2010]).

2026However, since there is no absolute definition, good cause, in essence, 'boils down to ... the prudent exercise of the court's discretion' ( Coopersmith v. Gold, supra ), and thus a case-by-case analysis is warranted ( see Matter of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., supra )" ( Mancheski v. Gabelli Group Capital Partners , 39 AD3d 499 [2d Dept 2007]).

2016In determining whether good cause has been shown, the court shall consider the interests of the public as well as of the parties.” Courts “must make an independent determination of whether to seal court records in whole or in part for ‘good cause.’ ” (Mancheski v Gabelli Group Capital Partners, 39 AD3d 499, 502 [2d Dept 2007].) “However, since there is no absolute definition, good cause, in essence, ‘boils down to the prudent exercise of the court’s discretion,’ and thus a case-by-case analysis is warranted.” (I d. [ellipsis and citation omitted], quoting Coopersmith v Gold, 156 Misc 2d 594, 6

2026However, since there is no absolute definition, good cause, in essence, 'boils down to ... the prudent exercise of the court's discretion' ( Coopersmith v. Gold, supra ), and thus a case-by-case analysis is warranted ( see Matter of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., supra )" ( Mancheski v. Gabelli Group Capital Partners , 39 AD3d 499 [2d Dept 2007]).

2024The determination of good cause requires a case-by-case analysis, to be performed in the prudent exercise of the trial court's discretion ( see Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v Client Server Direct, Inc. , 156 AD3d at 1366 ; Mancheski v Gabelli Group Capital Partners , 39 AD3d 499, 502 [2d Dept 2007]).

2012“A balance must be struck between the [municipality’s] interest in collecting delinquent property taxes and [that] of the property owner in receiving notice” (Harner, 5 NY3d at 140 ; see Kennedy, 100 NY2d at 10-11 ).

2012“A balance must be struck between the [municipality’s] interest in collecting delinquent property taxes and [that] of the property owner in receiving notice” (Harner, 5 NY3d at 140 ; see Kennedy, 100 NY2d at 10-11 ).

2024Plaintiff was therefore required to exercise the option within a reasonable time. ( See Savasta v 470 Newport Assocs. , 82 NY2d 763, 765 [1993].) What constitutes a reasonable time for performance is a case-by-case inquiry based on the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the parties' intent at the time of contracting. ( See Zev v Merman , 73 NY2d 781, 783 [1988]; Charles Schwab Corp. v Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. , 186 AD3d 431, 435 [1st Dept 2020].) Defendants argue that the delay of eight years before plaintiff exercised the option is unreasonably long.

2024Plaintiff was therefore required to exercise the option within a reasonable time. ( See Savasta v 470 Newport Assocs. , 82 NY2d 763, 765 [1993].) What constitutes a reasonable time for performance is a case-by-case inquiry based on the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the parties' intent at the time of contracting. ( See Zev v Merman , 73 NY2d 781, 783 [1988]; Charles Schwab Corp. v Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. , 186 AD3d 431, 435 [1st Dept 2020].) Defendants argue that the delay of eight years before plaintiff exercised the option is unreasonably long.

2024Plaintiff was therefore required to exercise the option within a reasonable time. ( See Savasta v 470 Newport Assocs. , 82 NY2d 763, 765 [1993].) What constitutes a reasonable time for performance is a case-by-case inquiry based on the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the parties' intent at the time of contracting. ( See Zev v Merman , 73 NY2d 781, 783 [1988]; Charles Schwab Corp. v Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. , 186 AD3d 431, 435 [1st Dept 2020].) Defendants argue that the delay of eight years before plaintiff exercised the option is unreasonably long.

2024Plaintiff was therefore required to exercise the option within a reasonable time. ( See Savasta v 470 Newport Assocs. , 82 NY2d 763, 765 [1993].) What constitutes a reasonable time for performance is a case-by-case inquiry based on the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the parties' intent at the time of contracting. ( See Zev v Merman , 73 NY2d 781, 783 [1988]; Charles Schwab Corp. v Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. , 186 AD3d 431, 435 [1st Dept 2020].) Defendants argue that the delay of eight years before plaintiff exercised the option is unreasonably long.

2024Plaintiff was therefore required to exercise the option within a reasonable time. ( See Savasta v 470 Newport Assocs. , 82 NY2d 763, 765 [1993].) What constitutes a reasonable time for performance is a case-by-case inquiry based on the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the parties' intent at the time of contracting. ( See Zev v Merman , 73 NY2d 781, 783 [1988]; Charles Schwab Corp. v Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. , 186 AD3d 431, 435 [1st Dept 2020].) Defendants argue that the delay of eight years before plaintiff exercised the option is unreasonably long.

2024Plaintiff was therefore required to exercise the option within a reasonable time. ( See Savasta v 470 Newport Assocs. , 82 NY2d 763, 765 [1993].) What constitutes a reasonable time for performance is a case-by-case inquiry based on the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the parties' intent at the time of contracting. ( See Zev v Merman , 73 NY2d 781, 783 [1988]; Charles Schwab Corp. v Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. , 186 AD3d 431, 435 [1st Dept 2020].) Defendants argue that the delay of eight years before plaintiff exercised the option is unreasonably long.

2013“The question of whether the defendant possessed the mens rea of depraved indifference to human life is highly fact-sensitive, requiring a case-by-case analysis” (People v Heidgen, 87 AD3d at 1020 ; see People v McPherson, 89 AD3d 752 , 757 [2011], lv granted 19 NY3d 969 [2012]; People v Taylor, 79 AD3d 944, 948 [2010]).

2013“The question of whether the defendant possessed the mens rea of depraved indifference to human life is highly fact-sensitive, requiring a case-by-case analysis” (People v Heidgen, 87 AD3d at 1020 ; see People v McPherson, 89 AD3d 752 , 757 [2011], lv granted 19 NY3d 969 [2012]; People v Taylor, 79 AD3d 944, 948 [2010]).

2012“Due process is a flexible concept, requiring a case-by-case analysis that measures the reasonableness of a municipality’s actions in seeking to provide adequate notice” (Matter of Harner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d 136, 140 ; see Walker v City of Hutchinson, 352 US 112, 115 ; Matter of County of Clinton [Bouchard], 29 AD3d 79, 83 ).

2012“Due process is a flexible concept, requiring a case-by-case analysis that measures the reasonableness of a municipality’s actions in seeking to provide adequate notice” (Matter of Harner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d 136, 140 [2005]; see Walker v City of Hutchinson, 352 US 112, 115 [1956]; Matter of County of Clinton [Bouchard], 29 AD3d 79, 83 [2006]).

2012Thus, under the federal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, where a defendant has been completely denied an attorney at a critical stage of the proceedings, courts have not required a defendant to show that such denial had a probable effect upon the outcome of his or her case (see Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 [1963]; Hamilton v Alabama, 368 US 52, 55 [1961]).

2012Thus, under the federal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, where a defendant has been completely denied an attorney at a critical stage of the proceedings, courts have not required a defendant to show that such denial had a probable effect upon the outcome of his or her case (see Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 [1963]; Hamilton v Alabama, 368 US 52, 55 [1961]).

2012However, federal courts interpreting the Sixth Amendment “have spared the defendant the need of showing probable effect upon the outcome, and have simply presumed such effect” where “the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary” (Mickens v Taylor, 535 US 162, 166 [2002]; cf. Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 43 [1967, Stewart, J., concurring] [outlining instances where constitutional violations result in reversal “even if no particular prejudice is shown and even if the defendant was clearly guilty”]).

2012However, federal courts interpreting the Sixth Amendment “have spared the defendant the need of showing probable effect upon the outcome, and have simply presumed such effect” where “the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary” (Mickens v Taylor, 535 US 162, 166 [2002]; cf. Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 43 [1967, Stewart, J., concurring] [outlining instances where constitutional violations result in reversal “even if no particular prejudice is shown and even if the defendant was clearly guilty”]).

2012However, federal courts interpreting the Sixth Amendment “have spared the defendant the need of showing probable effect upon the outcome, and have simply presumed such effect” where “the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary” (Mickens v Taylor, 535 US 162, 166 [2002]; cf. Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 43 [1967, Stewart, J., concurring] [outlining instances where constitutional violations result in reversal “even if no particular prejudice is shown and even if the defendant was clearly guilty”]).

2012However, federal courts interpreting the Sixth Amendment “have spared the defendant the need of showing probable effect upon the outcome, and have simply presumed such effect” where “the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary” (Mickens v Taylor, 535 US 162, 166 [2002]; cf. Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 43 [1967, Stewart, J., concurring] [outlining instances where constitutional violations result in reversal “even if no particular prejudice is shown and even if the defendant was clearly guilty”]).

2006Even if we were to consider the merits of plaintiffs motion, we would note that collateral estoppel is a flexible, equitable doctrine that requires a case-by-case analysis of the facts and realities of a particular litigation, and should not be rigidly or mechanically applied (see Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 303-304 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]; Kerins v Prudential Prop. & Cas., 185 AD2d 403, 404 [1992]).

2005Co., supra at 501, quoting People v Plevy, 52 NY2d 58, 65 [1980]; see Buechel v Bain, supra at 304).

2003Thus, while some courts concluded that a case-by-case analysis was necessary to determine whether a prescription drug was unavoidably unsafe, i.e., that it could have been made safer by a better design (see e.g., Kearl v Lederle Labs., 172 Cal App 3d 812, 829-831, 218 Cal Rptr 453, 463-465 [1985], disapproved by Brown v Superior Ct., 44 Cal 3d 1049, 1060-1065, 751 P2d 470, 481-483 [1988]; Feldman v Lederle Labs., 97 NJ 429, 446-447, 479 A2d 374, 383 [1984]), others concluded that prescription drug manufacturers were generally not liable for design defect claims (see e.g.

2003Thus, while some courts concluded that a case-by-case analysis was necessary to determine whether a prescription drug was unavoidably unsafe, i.e., that it could have been made safer by a better design ( see e.g., Kearl v Lederle Labs. , 172 Cal App 3d 812, 829-831, 218 Cal Rptr 453, 463-465 [1985], disapproved by Brown v Superior Ct. , 44 Cal 3d 1049, 1060-1065, 751 P2d 470, 481-483 [1988]; Feldman v Lederle Labs. , 97 NJ 429, 446-447, 479 A2d 374, 383 [1984]), others concluded that prescription drug manufacturers were generally not liable for design defect claims ( see e.g.

2003Thus, while some courts concluded that a case-by-case analysis was necessary to determine whether a prescription drug was unavoidably unsafe, i.e., that it could have been made safer by a better design (see e.g., Kearl v Lederle Labs., 172 Cal App 3d 812, 829-831, 218 Cal Rptr 453, 463-465 [1985], disapproved by Brown v Superior Ct., 44 Cal 3d 1049, 1060-1065, 751 P2d 470, 481-483 [1988]; Feldman v Lederle Labs., 97 NJ 429, 446-447, 479 A2d 374, 383 [1984]), others concluded that prescription drug manufacturers were generally not liable for design defect claims (see e.g.

2003Thus, while some courts concluded that a case-by-case analysis was necessary to determine whether a prescription drug was unavoidably unsafe, i.e., that it could have been made safer by a better design ( see e.g., Kearl v Lederle Labs. , 172 Cal App 3d 812, 829-831, 218 Cal Rptr 453, 463-465 [1985], disapproved by Brown v Superior Ct. , 44 Cal 3d 1049, 1060-1065, 751 P2d 470, 481-483 [1988]; Feldman v Lederle Labs. , 97 NJ 429, 446-447, 479 A2d 374, 383 [1984]), others concluded that prescription drug manufacturers were generally not liable for design defect claims ( see e.g.

1999Any impermissible applications of the statute would represent only a tiny fraction of the conduct within the statute’s reach and thus the overbreadth is not substantial (see, People v Hollman, supra, at 209; see also, New York v Ferber, supra, at 773-774).

1999Any impermissible applications of the statute would represent only a tiny fraction of the conduct within the statute’s reach and thus the overbreadth is not substantial (see, People v Hollman, supra, at 209; see also, New York v Ferber, supra, at 773-774).

2005Co., supra at 501, quoting People v Plevy, 52 NY2d 58, 65 [1980]; see Buechel v Bain, supra at 304).

1984Whatever the validity of this statement in Matter of Cumberland Pharmacy (supra), the point which must always be emphasized is that, in deciding the applicability of collateral estoppel, a case-by-case analysis is necessary, with attention being paid to the “ ‘realities of the [prior] litigation’ ” (People v Plevy, 52 NY2d 58, 65 , quoting from Schwartz v Public Administrator of County of Bronx, 24 NY2d 65, 72 ; see Haring v Prosise, 462 US_, 103 S Ct 2368 ; Gilberg v Barbieri, supra, p 292 ; Kossover v Trattler, 82 AD2d 610, 622-624 [concurring opn, Gibbons, J.]).