case-by-case analysis in Ohio

2020State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 345 , 744 N.E.2d 1163 (2001).

2006State v. Jones (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335 , 345 . {¶ 81} Instead, the existence of prior calculation and design is determined on a case-by-case analysis of the facts and evidence.

2017“The issue of what constitutes reasonable notice is left for a case-by-case analysis.” Zashin, Rich, Sutula & Monastra Co., L.P.A. v. Offenberg, 90 Ohio App.3d 436, 443 , 629 N.E.2d 1057 (8th Dist.1993). {¶ 11} Civ.R. 75 applies to divorce proceedings and section (L) of that rule provides the following with regard to notice: Notice of Trial.

2017“The issue of what constitutes reasonable notice is left for a case-by-case analysis.” Zashin, Rich, Sutula & Monastra Co., L.P.A. v. Offenberg, 90 Ohio App.3d 436, 443 , 629 N.E.2d 1057 (8th Dist.1993). {¶ 11} Civ.R. 75 applies to divorce proceedings and section (L) of that rule provides the following with regard to notice: Notice of Trial.

2007"For the above reasons the Court granted a new trial, however, it did not so state at the time of it granting Appellee's motion for new trial." {¶ 13} Our conclusion to reverse the judgment entered below is guided by the Antal Court which continued as follows: "While the determination of whether a trial court's statement of reasons is sufficient should be left to a case-by-case analysis, we can say with a reasonable degree of certainty that such reasons will be deemed insufficient if simply couched in the form of conclusions or statements of ultimate fact." Antal , 9 Ohio St.3d at 147 . {¶ 14}

2006The record of the case at bar reveals that the trial court articulated no reasons whatsoever, other than stating generally that the jury’s verdict was not *375 ‘sustained by the weight of the evidence.’ While the determination of whether a trial court’s statement of reasons is sufficient should be left to a case-by-case analysis, we can say with a reasonable degree of certainty that such reasons will be deemed insufficient if simply couched in the form of conclusions or statements of ultimate fact.” Id. at 147 , 9 OBR 892, 459 N.E.2d 223 . {¶ 20} The court revisited the issue and reaffirmed An

2020In Longo, this Court held that “[a]lthough the court may choose to extrapolate a child support figure using the worksheet, it is not bound by statute to do so.” Id. at ¶40. {¶62} The Eighth District Court of Appeals has suggested this method would be most helpful in cases in which the combined income of the parents only marginally exceeds the $150,000 base requirement and expressed doubt as to “whether the court fulfills its statutory duty to determine child support on a case-by-case analysis as required by RC. 3119.04(B) when it by rote extrapolates a percentage of income to determine child s

2018Cuyahoga No. 88310, 2007-Ohio-2643 , in which the court expressed “significant doubts whether the court fulfills its statutory duty to 9. determine child support on a case-by-case analysis as required by R.C. 3119.04(B) when it by rote extrapolates a percentage of income to determine child support.” Id. at ¶ 34.

2025State v. Shine, 2018-Ohio- 1972, ¶ 149 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Walker, 2016-Ohio-8295, ¶ 19 .

2019State v. Shine, 2018-Ohio-1972 , 113 N.E.3d 160, ¶ 149 (8th Dist.), citing Walker, 150 Ohio St.3d 409 , 2016-Ohio-8295, at ¶ 19 .

2014State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 345 , 2001-Ohio-57 , 744 N.E.2d 1163 .

2013State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 345 , 2001-Ohio-57 , 744 N.E.2d 1163 .

2012Generally, the notice satisfies due process requirements as long as it is “ ‘reasonably calculated to give actual notice.’ ” Id.; citing Mitchell v. Mitchell (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 49 , 413 N.E.2d 1182 , paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶8} As stated, Appellant did receive notice in accordance with the Civil Rules of Procedure of the May 12, 2011, hearing.

2012Generally, the notice satisfies due process requirements as long as it is “ ‘reasonably calculated to give actual notice.’ ” Id.; citing Mitchell v. Mitchell (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 49 , 413 N.E.2d 1182 , paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶8} As stated, Appellant did receive notice in accordance with the Civil Rules of Procedure of the May 12, 2011, hearing.

2012No. 95169, 2011-Ohio-2780 , 2011 WL 2376467 , ¶ 10; State v. Snuffer, 8th Dist.

2012No. 95169, 2011-Ohio-2780, ¶ 10 . {¶13} The record here demonstrates that the attempted kidnapping was part and parcel of the rape.

2001Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 , 112 S.Ct. at 2893 , 120 L.Ed.2d at 812-813 .

2001Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 , 112 S.Ct. at 2893 , 120 L.Ed.2d at 812-813 .

2001The Misrach court also advocated this case-by-case analysis, noting that the municipality could determine in each ease “whether a distribution of a Subchapter S corporation which is nominally classified as a dividend is actually wages and thus subject to taxation.” Misrach, 90 Ohio App.3d at 189 , 628 N.E.2d at 127 .

2001The Misrach court also advocated this case-by-case analysis, noting that the municipality could determine in each ease “whether a distribution of a Subchapter S corporation which is nominally classified as a dividend is actually wages and thus subject to taxation.” Misrach, 90 Ohio App.3d at 189 , 628 N.E.2d at 127 .

1996“Such a *783 determination requires a case-by-case analysis and an ‘inquiry into the intent of the employer and the reasonably foreseeable impact of the employer’s conduct on the employee.’ ” Scandinavian Health Spa, Inc., 64 Ohio App.3d at 487 , 581 N.E.2d at 1173 ; Sutherland, 96 Ohio App.3d at 806 , 645 N.E.2d at 1347-1348 ; Neal, 87 Ohio App.3d at 676 , 622 N.E.2d at 1134-1135 .

1996“Such a *783 determination requires a case-by-case analysis and an ‘inquiry into the intent of the employer and the reasonably foreseeable impact of the employer’s conduct on the employee.’ ” Scandinavian Health Spa, Inc., 64 Ohio App.3d at 487 , 581 N.E.2d at 1173 ; Sutherland, 96 Ohio App.3d at 806 , 645 N.E.2d at 1347-1348 ; Neal, 87 Ohio App.3d at 676 , 622 N.E.2d at 1134-1135 .

2024On appeal, Vargas cites State v. Nelson, 162 Ohio St.3d 338 , 2020-Ohio-3690 , 165 N.E.3d 1110 , for the proposition that determining whether a violation is technical requires a case-by-case analysis without overreliance on any one factor.

2024On appeal, Vargas cites State v. Nelson, 162 Ohio St.3d 338 , 2020-Ohio-3690 , 165 N.E.3d 1110 , for the proposition that determining whether a violation is technical requires a case-by-case analysis without overreliance on any one factor.

2023Weighing of the Factors {¶ 32} “Applying the functional-equivalency test requires a case-by-case analysis, examining all pertinent factors with no single factor being dispositive.” Id., 110 Ohio St.3d 456 , 2006-Ohio-4854 , 854 N.E.2d 193 , at ¶ 23.

2022We conclude that the trial court relied primarily on [its No. 21AP-276 32 version of] the child support calculation worksheet and abused its discretion by failing to conduct a case-by-case analysis of the needs and standard of living of the child and the parties." 2014-Ohio-1252, ¶ 17 . {¶ 92} Further, the trial court's ultimate order with regard to "Child Support" stated: "The effective date of the support order is January 1, 2020." Judgment Entry at 116.

2021Berk, 53 Ohio St.3d at 169 .

2020As a result, courts apply “a case-by-case analysis to determine whether an offense is part of an organized criminal activity, keeping in mind that the absence of a definition of ‘organized criminal activity’ is to be construed against the State, not the defendant.” State v. Castle, 2016-Ohio-4974 , 67 N.E.3d 1283 , ¶ 14, citing State v. Lyles, 8th Dist.

2020Cuyahoga No. 97524, 2012-Ohio-3362 , ¶ 13 and R.C. 2901.04(A).

2019The scheme must be “designed to implement the calculated decision to kill.” State v. Cotton, 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 11 , 381 N.E.2d 190 (1978). {¶62} There is no bright-line rule to establish the existence of prior calculation and design; rather, the presence or absence of this element is determined on a case-by-case analysis of the facts and the evidence.

2019The scheme must be “designed to implement the calculated decision to kill.” State v. Cotton, 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 11 , 381 N.E.2d 190 (1978). {¶62} There is no bright-line rule to establish the existence of prior calculation and design; rather, the presence or absence of this element is determined on a case-by-case analysis of the facts and the evidence.

2018As a result, we reject the Department's argument regarding Civ.R. 23(B)(2). {¶ 74} Civ.R. 23(B)(3) states that a class action may be maintained if, in addition to satisfying the requirements in Civ.R. 23(A), "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." The common questions of law or fact "must present a significant aspect of the case * * * [and] must be capable of re

2018As a result, we reject the Department's argument regarding Civ.R. 23(B)(2). {¶ 74} Civ.R. 23(B)(3) states that a class action may be maintained if, in addition to satisfying the requirements in Civ.R. 23(A), "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." The common questions of law or fact "must present a significant aspect of the case * * * [and] must be capable of re

2018Cuyahoga Nos. 104251 and 104252, 2016-Ohio-7965 , 2016 WL 7076639 , ¶ 19 (finding class certification under Civ.R. 23(B)(2) would be improper because even if indemnification were granted, a case-by-case analysis as to causation would be necessary); Cullen, 137 Ohio St.3d 373 , 2013-Ohio-4733 , 999 N.E.2d 614 , at ¶ 27 (a declaration that the insurer's practices were illegal and violated fiduciary obligations only laid a foundation that would require subsequent individual determination of liability).

2018Cuyahoga Nos. 104251 and 104252, 2016-Ohio-7965 , 2016 WL 7076639 , ¶ 19 (finding class certification under Civ.R. 23(B)(2) would be improper because even if indemnification were granted, a case-by-case analysis as to causation would be necessary); Cullen, 137 Ohio St.3d 373 , 2013-Ohio-4733 , 999 N.E.2d 614 , at ¶ 27 (a declaration that the insurer's practices were illegal and violated fiduciary obligations only laid a foundation that would require subsequent individual determination of liability).

2018Cuyahoga Nos. 104251 and 104252, 2016-Ohio-7965 , 2016 WL 7076639 , ¶ 19 (finding class certification under Civ.R. 23(B)(2) would be improper because even if indemnification were granted, a case-by-case analysis as to causation would be necessary); Cullen, 137 Ohio St.3d 373 , 2013-Ohio-4733 , 999 N.E.2d 614 , at ¶ 27 (a declaration that the insurer's practices were illegal and violated fiduciary obligations only laid a foundation that would require subsequent individual determination of liability).

2017Rather, each case cited by Bridget employs a case-by-case analysis of the facts presented instead of applying a bright line rule based simply upon the provisions contained in the trust agreement. 19 {¶ 69} As the Supreme Court of Vermont observed in Chilkott , a case cited by Bridget on appeal, a "review of opinions from other states on this question reveals there is no unanimity as to whether trial courts should consider or divide future interests in trusts in making a property division * * * [b]ecause characteristics of trusts differ so greatly, case law turns 'on the attributes of the respe

2017Rather, each case cited by Bridget employs a case-by-case analysis of the facts presented instead of applying a bright line rule based simply upon the provisions contained in the trust agreement. 19 {¶ 69} As the Supreme Court of Vermont observed in Chilkott , a case cited by Bridget on appeal, a "review of opinions from other states on this question reveals there is no unanimity as to whether trial courts should consider or divide future interests in trusts in making a property division * * * [b]ecause characteristics of trusts differ so greatly, case law turns 'on the attributes of the respe

2017Rather, each case cited by Bridget employs a case-by-case analysis of the facts presented instead of applying a bright line rule based simply upon the provisions contained in the trust agreement. 19 {¶ 69} As the Supreme Court of Vermont observed in Chilkott , a case cited by Bridget on appeal, a "review of opinions from other states on this question reveals there is no unanimity as to whether trial courts should consider or divide future interests in trusts in making a property division * * * [b]ecause characteristics of trusts differ so greatly, case law turns 'on the attributes of the respe

2017Rather, each case cited by Bridget employs a case-by-case analysis of the facts presented instead of applying a bright line rule based simply upon the provisions contained in the trust agreement. 19 {¶ 69} As the Supreme Court of Vermont observed in Chilkott , a case cited by Bridget on appeal, a "review of opinions from other states on this question reveals there is no unanimity as to whether trial courts should consider or divide future interests in trusts in making a property division * * * [b]ecause characteristics of trusts differ so greatly, case law turns 'on the attributes of the respe

2015We concluded that the policy should have been promulgated as a rule, noting that “the commissioner’s policy herein was adopted in lieu of a case-by-case analysis of each taxpayer’s liability.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 93 .