case-by-case inquiry in Illinois

2025The Banks court then held that, where an assistant public defender asserts that another 15 No. 1-23-1760 assistant from the same office has rendered ineffective assistance, a case-by-case inquiry must be conducted to determine whether “any circumstances peculiar to the case indicate the presence of an actual conflict of interest.” Id. at 44 . ¶ 46 We must also briefly discuss our standard of review.

2025In cases involving the public defender’s office, “a case-by-case inquiry should be conducted to determine whether any circumstances peculiar to the case indicate the presence of an actual conflict of interest.” Banks, 121 Ill. 2d at 44 .

1994In Banks, the court overruled the per se rule established in People v. Smith (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 622 , 230 N.E.2d 169 , and People v. Terry (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 75 , 262 N.E.2d 923 , and held that where an assistant public defender asserts that another assistant from the same office has rendered ineffective assistance, a case-by-case inquiry should be conducted to determine whether any circumstances peculiar to the case indicate the existence of an actual conflict of interest.

1994In Banks, the court overruled the per se rule established in People v. Smith (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 622 , 230 N.E.2d 169 , and People v. Terry (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 75 , 262 N.E.2d 923 , and held that where an assistant public defender asserts that another assistant from the same office has rendered ineffective assistance, a case-by-case inquiry should be conducted to determine whether any circumstances peculiar to the case indicate the existence of an actual conflict of interest.

2023Rather, it has opted for “a case-by-case inquiry *** whereby it is determined whether any facts peculiar to the case preclude the representation of competing interests by separate members of the public defender’s office.” Id.

2020“Rather than applying a per se rule, thereby disqualifying an entire public defender’s office whenever one of its members is confronted with a conflict, a case- by-case inquiry is contemplated whereby it is determined whether any facts peculiar to the case preclude the representation of competing interests by separate members of the public defender’s office.” Miller, 79 Ill. 2d at 462 . ¶ 22 In Spreitzer, our supreme court considered a similar, though not identical, situation to the one presented in the instant case.

2015Based on that conversation, defendant calls into question his appellate counsel's "willing- ness to represent a sex offender." ¶ 57 In People v. Robinson, 79 Ill. 2d 147, 158-59 , 402 N.E.2d 157, 162 (1979), the supreme court held that "the avoidance of conflicts of interest which result in failure to provide effective assistance of counsel does not require us to hold that the individual attorneys who com- prise the staff of a public defender['s office] are members of an entity which should be subject to the rule that if one attorney is disqualified by reason of a conflict of interest then no

2015Based on that conversation, defendant calls into question his appellate counsel's "willing- ness to represent a sex offender." ¶ 57 In People v. Robinson, 79 Ill. 2d 147, 158-59 , 402 N.E.2d 157, 162 (1979), the supreme court held that "the avoidance of conflicts of interest which result in failure to provide effective assistance of counsel does not require us to hold that the individual attorneys who com- prise the staff of a public defender['s office] are members of an entity which should be subject to the rule that if one attorney is disqualified by reason of a conflict of interest then no

2015See Reliable Fire Equipment Co. v. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871 .

2015See Reliable Fire Equipment Co. v. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871 .

2019Hardin, 217 Ill. 2d at 302 .

2014The Hardin court elaborated as follows: “In the context of a potential conflict between two public defenders, the conflict issue will normally be raised by the defendant. *** The defendant must sketch, in limited detail, a picture of how the working relationship between the public defenders created an appearance of impropriety. [Citation.] Relevant factors include whether the two public defenders were trial partners in the defendant’s case [citations]; whether they were in hierarchical positions where one supervised or was supervised by the other [citations]; or whether the size, structure, an

2015Ill. 2009) (in determining whether particular transaction was primarily consumer or business in nature within meaning of TILA, courts look to “entire surrounding factual circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mauro v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 145, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (under TILA, “ ‘[w]hether an investment loan is for a personal or a business purpose requires a case by case analysis’ ” (quoting Thorns v. Sundance Properties, 726 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1984))). ¶ 27 Thus, the fact that a debtor’s personal residence was used to secure the loan does not automa

2015Ill. 2009) (in determining whether particular transaction was primarily consumer or business in nature within meaning of TILA, courts look to "entire surrounding factual circumstances" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mauro v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 145, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (under TILA, " '[w]hether an investment loan is for a personal or a business purpose requires a case by case analysis' " (quoting Thorns v. Sundance Properties, 726 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1984)). ¶ 27 Thus, the fact that a debtor's personal residence was used to secure the loan does not automat

2015Ill. 2009) (in determining whether particular transaction was primarily consumer or business in nature within meaning of TILA, courts look to “entire surrounding factual circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mauro v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 145, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (under TILA, “ ‘[w]hether an investment loan is for a personal or a business purpose requires a case by case analysis’ ” (quoting Thorns v. Sundance Properties, 726 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1984))). ¶ 27 Thus, the fact that a debtor’s personal residence was used to secure the loan does not automa

2015Ill. 2009) (in determining whether particular transaction was primarily consumer or business in nature within meaning of TILA, courts look to "entire surrounding factual circumstances" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mauro v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 145, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (under TILA, " '[w]hether an investment loan is for a personal or a business purpose requires a case by case analysis' " (quoting Thorns v. Sundance Properties, 726 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1984)). ¶ 27 Thus, the fact that a debtor's personal residence was used to secure the loan does not automat

2005Compare United States v. Arango , 879 F.2d 1501, 1506 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding search of vehicle despite fact that arrest occurred one block from vehicle), with United States v. Hudgins , 52 F.3d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1995) ("However, where the defendant has voluntarily exited the automobile and begun walking away from the automobile before the officer has initiated contact with him, the case does not fit within Belton 's bright-line rule, and a case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of the search under Chimel becomes necessary"); see also Stehman , 203 Ill. 2d at 36-39 (collecting cases).

2005Compare United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1506 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding search of vehicle despite fact that arrest occurred one block from vehicle), with United States v. Hudgins, 52 F.3d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1995) (“However, where the defendant has voluntarily exited the automobile and begun walking away from the automobile before the officer has initiated contact with him, the case does not fit within Belton’s bright-line rule, and a case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of the search under Chimel becomes necessary”); see also Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d at 36-39 (collecting cases).

2005Compare United States v. Arango , 879 F.2d 1501, 1506 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding search of vehicle despite fact that arrest occurred one block from vehicle), with United States v. Hudgins , 52 F.3d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1995) ("However, where the defendant has voluntarily exited the automobile and begun walking away from the automobile before the officer has initiated contact with him, the case does not fit within Belton 's bright-line rule, and a case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of the search under Chimel becomes necessary"); see also Stehman , 203 Ill. 2d at 36-39 (collecting cases).

2005Compare United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1506 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding search of vehicle despite fact that arrest occurred one block from vehicle), with United States v. Hudgins, 52 F.3d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1995) (“However, where the defendant has voluntarily exited the automobile and begun walking away from the automobile before the officer has initiated contact with him, the case does not fit within Belton’s bright-line rule, and a case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of the search under Chimel becomes necessary”); see also Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d at 36-39 (collecting cases).

2005Compare United States v. Arango , 879 F.2d 1501, 1506 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding search of vehicle despite fact that arrest occurred one block from vehicle), with United States v. Hudgins , 52 F.3d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1995) ("However, where the defendant has voluntarily exited the automobile and begun walking away from the automobile before the officer has initiated contact with him, the case does not fit within Belton 's bright-line rule, and a case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of the search under Chimel becomes necessary"); see also Stehman , 203 Ill. 2d at 36-39 (collecting cases).

2005Compare United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1506 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding search of vehicle despite fact that arrest occurred one block from vehicle), with United States v. Hudgins, 52 F.3d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1995) (“However, where the defendant has voluntarily exited the automobile and begun walking away from the automobile before the officer has initiated contact with him, the case does not fit within Belton’s bright-line rule, and a case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of the search under Chimel becomes necessary”); see also Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d at 36-39 (collecting cases).

1981Ed. 2d 426 , 98 S. Ct. 1173 ; People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109 ; People v. Kester (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162 ; People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 286 ; People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 329 ) furnish guidance adequate to avoid conflicts of interest which will impede the furnishing of effective assistance of counsel.’ ( 79 Ill. 2d 147, 159-60 .) In People v. Miller (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 454 , we said that where the question of conflict of interest arises ‘a case-by-case inquiry is contemplated whereby it is determined whether any facts peculiar to the case preclude the representation of com

1980Ed. 2d 426 , 98 S. Ct. 1173 ; People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109 ; People v. Kester (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162 ;People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 286 ; People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 329 ) furnish guidance adequate to avoid conflicts of interest which will impede the furnishing of effective assistance of counsel.” ( 79 Ill. 2d 147, 159-60 .) In People v. Miller (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 454 , we said that where the question of conflict of interest arises “a case-by-case inquiry is contemplated whereby it is determined whether any facts peculiar to the case preclude the representation of comp

1987(See People v. Walton (1979), 78 Ill.2d 197, 200-01 (recognizing distinction between actual and per se conflicts of interest).) Nevertheless, the court's "case-by-case inquiry" here is satisfied in only one sentence: "Here, defendants have not indicated, and our examination of the record does not reveal, circumstances which suggest that actual conflicts of interest were present." ( 121 Ill.2d at 44 .) The court's "case-by-case inquiry," it appears, is but window dressing for a new per se rule that loyalty to the public defender's office or a lawyer's associates in it cannot form the basis of a

1987(See People v. Walton (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 197, 200-01 (recognizing distinction between actual and per se conflicts of interest).) Nevertheless, the court’s “case-by-case inquiry” here is satisfied in only one sentence: “Here, defendants have not indicated, and our examination of the record does not reveal, circumstances which suggest that actual conflicts of interest were present.” (121 Ill. 2d at 44.) The court’s “case-by-case inquiry,” it appears, is but window dressing for a new per se rule that loyalty to the public defender’s office or a lawyer’s associates in it cannot form the basis of a