110 California opinions name it 4 courts 1974–2026 27 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Citizens Against Airport Pollution v. City of San Josegreen2 sentences2017(Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (a); Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314, 343 (Atherton).) The use of a program EIR can: "(1) Provide an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects and alternatives than would be practical in an EIR on an individual action, [¶] (2) Ensure consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-by-case analysis, [¶] (3) Avoid duplicative reconsideration of basic policy considerations, [¶] (4) Allow the lead agency to consider broad policy alternatives and program wide mitigation measures at an 2017(Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (a); Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314 , 343, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 ( Atherton ).) The use of a program EIR can: "(1) Provide an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects and alternatives than would be practical in an EIR on an individual action, [¶] (2) Ensure consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-by-case analysis, [¶] (3) Avoid duplicative reconsideration of basic policy considerations, [¶] (4) Allow the lead agency to consider broad policy alternatives and program wide mi | 4 | 4 |
Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authoritygreen2 sentences2017(Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (a); Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314 , 343, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 ( Atherton ).) The use of a program EIR can: "(1) Provide an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects and alternatives than would be practical in an EIR on an individual action, [¶] (2) Ensure consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-by-case analysis, [¶] (3) Avoid duplicative reconsideration of basic policy considerations, [¶] (4) Allow the lead agency to consider broad policy alternatives and program wide mi 2017(Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (a); Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314 , 343, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 ( Atherton ).) The use of a program EIR can: "(1) Provide an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects and alternatives than would be practical in an EIR on an individual action, [¶] (2) Ensure consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-by-case analysis, [¶] (3) Avoid duplicative reconsideration of basic policy considerations, [¶] (4) Allow the lead agency to consider broad policy alternatives and program wide mi | 3 | 4 |
Mickens v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2022When that has occurred, the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary. [Citations.] But only in ‘circumstances of that magnitude’ do we forgo individual inquiry into whether counsel’s inadequate performance undermined the reliability of the verdict.” (Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 166 , italics added; see Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421 .) Although a motion to dismiss undoubtedly qualifies as a critical stage in the proceedings (given, if it is granted, the commitment petition is dismissed), it appears our Supreme Court in Dool 2020When [there has been such a denial], the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary.’ ” (Lightsey, at pp. 699–700, quoting 2 Daniel incorrectly identified the date of his conviction as 2012, the year he committed the crime, but this discrepancy did not affect the trial court’s decision. 7 Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 166 .) Even if the right to counsel arises under a California statute, its denial may be “ ‘analogous to’ [the] structural error” of the total deprivation of counsel at trial if it “ ‘operate[s] to deny a criminal defe | 2 | 5 |
In Re Jhgreen2 sentences2021Further, the very nature of determining a child’s best interests call for a case-by-case analysis, not a mechanical rule.” (Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p.191; In re J.H. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 174 , 182–183.) Here, minor has experienced significant turmoil in his life and suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder, selective mutism, and major depressive disorder. 2015Further, the very nature of determining a child’s best interests calls for a case-by-case analysis, not a mechanical rule.” (In re Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 191 ; see also In re J.H., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 182–183.) “Unless there is no attempt to serve notice on a parent, in which case the error has been held to be reversible per se [citations], errors in notice do not automatically require reversal but are subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of prejudice.” (In re J.H., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 183 .) And, “[c]onstitutional issues are reviewed | 2 | 4 |
People v. Amwest Surety Insurancegreen2 sentences2026Co. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 915, 923 .) “‘No rigid rules have been developed’” for what kind of showing will support a rational basis for a trial court’s belief, “‘and a case-by-case analysis is always performed.’” (People v. Ranger Ins. 2025Co. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 915, 923 [under section 1305.1, “a case-by-case analysis is always performed”].) 11 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 2 | 3 |
Mounts v. Uyedagreen2 sentences2000Unless it is in total conflict with the Constitution, any overbreadth is cured by a case-by-case analysis of the particular fact situation. [Citation.] A statute will be declared invalid in its entirety only when its scope cannot be limited to constitutionally applicable situations except by reading in numerous qualifications and exceptions, i.e., rewriting it, or if it is invalid in certain situations and cannot be enforced in others without danger of an uncertain or vague future application. [Citation.]” (Mounts v. Uyeda (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 111, 121-122 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 730 ].) Appellant co 2000Unless it is in total conflict with the Constitution, any overbreadth is cured by a case-by-case analysis of the particular fact situation. [Citation.] A statute will be declared invalid in its entirety only when its scope cannot be limited to constitutionally applicable situations except by reading in numerous qualifications and exceptions, i.e., rewriting it, or if it is invalid in certain situations and cannot be enforced in others without danger of an uncertain or vague future application. [Citation.]” (Mounts v. Uyeda (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 111, 121-122 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 730 ].) Appellant co | 2 | 3 |
Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.green2 sentences2024(Alan, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 905 [rule 8.104(a)(1) “does not require litigants . . . to guess, at their peril,” whether their duty to file a notice of appeal is triggered].) Requiring entry of, or service of notice of entry of, a “judgment” — so denominated — to start the time to appeal leaves little room for confusion about when there is finality, and therefore comports with the importance of having “bright lines . . . in this area, to avoid both inadvertent forfeiture of the right to appeal and excessive protective appeals by parties afraid they might suffer such a forfeiture.” (Baycol, su 2024(Alan, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 905 [rule 8.104(a)(1) “does not require litigants . . . to guess, at their peril,” whether their duty to file a notice of appeal is triggered].) Requiring entry of, or service of notice of entry of, a “judgment” — so denominated — to start the time to appeal leaves little room for confusion about when there is finality, and therefore comports with the importance of having “bright lines . . . in this area, to avoid both inadvertent forfeiture of the 16 MEINHARDT v. CITY OF SUNNYVALE Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. right to appeal and excessive protective appea | 2 | 2 |
James 3 Corp. v. Truck Insurance Exchangegreen2 sentences2021Exchange (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1101 (James 3); see Golden Eagle Ins. 2021Exchange (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1101 (James 3); see Golden Eagle Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Finney v. Gomezgreen2 sentences2019(Finney, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 541 [so noting].) For these reasons, we decline to follow Cassel. 2019(Finney, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 541 [so noting].) For these reasons, we decline to follow Cassel. | 2 | 2 |
Schwab v. Southern California Gas Co.green2 sentences2019(Schwab, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326 [noting how Cassel’s rule turns on the defaulting defendant’s access to information].) This rule substantially dims section 580’s “bright- line” rule of formal notice by replacing the straightforward inquiry into what is pled in the operative pleadings with a case- by-case inquiry into what individual defendants knew or should have known (Airs Aromatic, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018 ), and in so doing, risks depriving defaulting defendants of their 15 due process-based right to proper notice of their maximum exposure. 2019(Schwab, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326 [noting how Cassel’s rule turns on the defaulting defendant’s access to information].) This rule substantially dims section 580’s “bright- line” rule of formal notice by replacing the straightforward inquiry into what is pled in the operative pleadings with a case- by-case inquiry into what individual defendants knew or should have known (Airs Aromatic, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018 ), and in so doing, risks depriving defaulting defendants of their 15 due process-based right to proper notice of their maximum exposure. | 2 | 2 |
L. A. Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. C.P. (In re J.P.)green2 sentences2024Particularized analysis is critical.” (In re J.P. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 789, 799 .) An error is harmless “unless it is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error.” (In re R.F. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 459 , 474.) Although the juvenile court erred in denying Mother’s motion to represent herself, our review of the record shows it is not reasonably probable that a more favorable outcome would have resulted if Mother had been allowed to represent herself. 2022(See In re J.P. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 789, 799 [appellate court’s consideration of whether error is harmless “is by definition a case-by- case analysis”].) In J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at page 855, the appellate court concluded, contrary to the juvenile court, that the “mother [had] presented evidence to support a finding that J.D. ha[d] a ‘substantial, positive, emotional attachment’ to her sufficient to meet the 36 second element [of the exception].” The J.D. court specifically rejected the agency’s assertion that the mother had not satisfied the second element (id. at p. 859), going so fa | 1 | 3 |
Kirk v. First American Title Insurancegreen2 sentences2019Co., supra , 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 800 , 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 [noting "the Hendriksen [Henriksen] rule that vicarious disqualification should be automatic in cases of a tainted attorney possessing actual confidential information from a representation, who switches sides in the same case"].) If, however, the attorney represented the adverse party in a different case, then "a case-by-case analysis based on the circumstances present in, and policy interests implicated by, the case" is appropriate. ( Kirk v. First American Title Ins. 2019Co., supra , 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 800 , 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 [noting "the Hendriksen [Henriksen] rule that vicarious disqualification should be automatic in cases of a tainted attorney possessing actual confidential information from a representation, who switches sides in the same case"].) If, however, the attorney represented the adverse party in a different case, then "a case-by-case analysis based on the circumstances present in, and policy interests implicated by, the case" is appropriate. ( Kirk v. First American Title Ins. | 1 | 3 |
County of Orange v. Ranger Ins. Co.green2 sentences2026Co. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 820, 824 .) Often, “‘“the only reasons before the trial court are the evidence or representations furnished by defendant’s counsel,”’” and the cases show that courts “‘“have liberally relied on their representations.”’” (People v. Ranger Ins. 2013Co. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 820, 823 (Ranger II).) There is a “clear abuse of discretion” if there is no “rational basis to believe there is a sufficient excuse for the bailee’s nonappearance.” (Ibid.) “ ‘No rigid rules have been developed’ ” as to the types of showings that support a rational basis for a trial court’s belief, “ ‘and a case-by-case analysis is always performed. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 824.) In most cases, “ ‘ “the only reasons before the trial court are the evidence or representations furnished by defendant’s counsel,” ’ ” and the cases show that courts “ ‘ “have l | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Cronicgreen2 sentences2014(United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648 , 658–659 [ 104 S.Ct. 2039 ] (Cronic).) “‘When that has occurred, the likelihood 2 In addition, such objections would have preserved the issue of prosecutorial misconduct for appellate review. 14 that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary.’” (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 700 .) In Cronic, the Supreme Court explained, “[T]he adversarial process protected by the Sixth Amendment requires that the accused have ‘counsel acting in the role of an advocate.’ [Citation.] The right to the effective assist 2014(United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648 , 658–659 [ 104 S.Ct. 2039 ] (Cronic).) “‘When that has occurred, the likelihood 2 In addition, such objections would have preserved the issue of prosecutorial misconduct for appellate review. 14 that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary.’” (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 700 .) In Cronic, the Supreme Court explained, “[T]he adversarial process protected by the Sixth Amendment requires that the accused have ‘counsel acting in the role of an advocate.’ [Citation.] The right to the effective assist | 1 | 2 |
| Diane Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases Thomas Barford Jerry Stumpgreen | 1 | 2 |
| In Re Zachary G.green | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Fletchergreen | 1 | 1 |
| MERCURY INTERACTIVE CORPORATION v. Kleingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Disability Support Alliance v. Heartwood Enterprises, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barr v. Matteogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Guillermo Robles v. Dominos Pizza LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Doolingreen | 1 | 1 |
| The People v. Zavalagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Elizaldegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordovagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Orange County Social Services Agency v. Doris F.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Alvarezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Environmental Impact Report Coordinated Proceedingsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Yarbroughgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tobe v. City of Santa Anagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Justice P.
green
2 sentences2015The parent must show that the undoing of the prior order would be in the best interests of the child. [Citation.]’” (In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 960 .) Determining whether granting a section 388 petition and modifying a prior order are in a child’s best interest “calls for a case-by-case analysis, not a mechanical rule.” (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 191 ; In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 530 [“best interests is a complex idea” that requires consideration of a number of factors].) Although the focus in a dependency proceeding 14 after termination of reu 2015Further, the very nature of determining a child’s best interests calls for a case-by-case analysis, not a mechanical rule.” (In re Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 191 ; see also In re J.H., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 182–183.) “Unless there is no attempt to serve notice on a parent, in which case the error has been held to be reversible per se [citations], errors in notice do not automatically require reversal but are subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of prejudice.” (In re J.H., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 183 .) And, “[c]onstitutional issues are reviewed | 8 | 2007–2015 |
Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agency
green
2 sentences2017(Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (a); Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314 , 343, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 ( Atherton ).) The use of a program EIR can: "(1) Provide an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects and alternatives than would be practical in an EIR on an individual action, [¶] (2) Ensure consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-by-case analysis, [¶] (3) Avoid duplicative reconsideration of basic policy considerations, [¶] (4) Allow the lead agency to consider broad policy alternatives and program wide mi 2017(Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (a); Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314 , 343, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 ( Atherton ).) The use of a program EIR can: "(1) Provide an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects and alternatives than would be practical in an EIR on an individual action, [¶] (2) Ensure consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-by-case analysis, [¶] (3) Avoid duplicative reconsideration of basic policy considerations, [¶] (4) Allow the lead agency to consider broad policy alternatives and program wide mi | 4 | 2014–2017 |
Citizens for Responsible Equitable Environment Development v. City of San Diego
green
2 sentences2017(Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (a); Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314 , 343, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 ( Atherton ).) The use of a program EIR can: "(1) Provide an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects and alternatives than would be practical in an EIR on an individual action, [¶] (2) Ensure consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-by-case analysis, [¶] (3) Avoid duplicative reconsideration of basic policy considerations, [¶] (4) Allow the lead agency to consider broad policy alternatives and program wide mi 2017(Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (a); Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314 , 343, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 ( Atherton ).) The use of a program EIR can: "(1) Provide an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects and alternatives than would be practical in an EIR on an individual action, [¶] (2) Ensure consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-by-case analysis, [¶] (3) Avoid duplicative reconsideration of basic policy considerations, [¶] (4) Allow the lead agency to consider broad policy alternatives and program wide mi | 4 | 2014–2017 |
Latinos Unidos De Napa v. City of Napa
green
2 sentences2017(Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (a); Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314, 343 (Atherton).) The use of a program EIR can: "(1) Provide an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects and alternatives than would be practical in an EIR on an individual action, [¶] (2) Ensure consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-by-case analysis, [¶] (3) Avoid duplicative reconsideration of basic policy considerations, [¶] (4) Allow the lead agency to consider broad policy alternatives and program wide mitigation measures at an 2017(Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (a); Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314 , 343, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 ( Atherton ).) The use of a program EIR can: "(1) Provide an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects and alternatives than would be practical in an EIR on an individual action, [¶] (2) Ensure consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-by-case analysis, [¶] (3) Avoid duplicative reconsideration of basic policy considerations, [¶] (4) Allow the lead agency to consider broad policy alternatives and program wide mi | 4 | 2014–2017 |
May v. City of Milpitas
green
2 sentences2017(Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (a); Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314 , 343, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 ( Atherton ).) The use of a program EIR can: "(1) Provide an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects and alternatives than would be practical in an EIR on an individual action, [¶] (2) Ensure consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-by-case analysis, [¶] (3) Avoid duplicative reconsideration of basic policy considerations, [¶] (4) Allow the lead agency to consider broad policy alternatives and program wide mi 2017(Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (a); Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314 , 343, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 ( Atherton ).) The use of a program EIR can: "(1) Provide an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects and alternatives than would be practical in an EIR on an individual action, [¶] (2) Ensure consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-by-case analysis, [¶] (3) Avoid duplicative reconsideration of basic policy considerations, [¶] (4) Allow the lead agency to consider broad policy alternatives and program wide mi | 4 | 2014–2017 |
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn.
green
2 sentences2026(See 8 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (2025 4th ed.) § 28:1, p. 714 [developments with mixed residential and commercial components are governed by the Davis-Stirling Act].) 11. escape obligations under a written instrument upsets the expectations of all the other parties governed by that instrument ... that [it] will be uniformly and predictably enforced.” (Nahrstedt, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 384 .) The court rejected a case-by-case inquiry into the reasonableness of a use restriction because such inquiries would impose substantial litigation costs and strain the social fabric of the developme 2026(See 8 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (2025 4th ed.) § 28:1, p. 714 [developments with mixed residential and commercial components are governed by the Davis-Stirling Act].) 11. escape obligations under a written instrument upsets the expectations of all the other parties governed by that instrument ... that [it] will be uniformly and predictably enforced.” (Nahrstedt, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 384 .) The court rejected a case-by-case inquiry into the reasonableness of a use restriction because such inquiries would impose substantial litigation costs and strain the social fabric of the developme | 3 | 2000–2026 |
Peracchi v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2023But petitioner does not argue the authority to exercise a Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenge should hinge upon a case-by-case analysis of the amount of new evidence or factfinding that will be required in a particular proceeding (cf. Peracchi, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1260 ), and we cannot see how that would be a workable rule. 2023But petitioner does not argue the authority to exercise a Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenge should hinge upon a case-by-case analysis of the amount of new evidence or factfinding that will be required in a particular proceeding (cf. Peracchi, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1260 ), and we cannot see how that would be a workable rule. | 3 | 2020–2023 |
Dynamic Concepts, Inc. v. Truck Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences2018Exchange , supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007 , 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 882 .) A case by case analysis is required: *234 "The potential for conflict requires a careful analysis of the parties' respective interests to determine whether they can be reconciled (such as by a defense based on total nonliability) or whether an actual conflict of interest precludes insurer-appointed defense counsel from presenting a quality defense for the insured. 2018Exchange , supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007 , 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 882 .) A case by case analysis is required: *234 "The potential for conflict requires a careful analysis of the parties' respective interests to determine whether they can be reconciled (such as by a defense based on total nonliability) or whether an actual conflict of interest precludes insurer-appointed defense counsel from presenting a quality defense for the insured. | 3 | 2001–2018 |
In Re Baycol Cases I & II
green
2 sentences2024(Alan, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 905 [rule 8.104(a)(1) “does not require litigants . . . to guess, at their peril,” whether their duty to file a notice of appeal is triggered].) Requiring entry of, or service of notice of entry of, a “judgment” — so denominated — to start the time to appeal leaves little room for confusion about when there is finality, and therefore comports with the importance of having “bright lines . . . in this area, to avoid both inadvertent forfeiture of the right to appeal and excessive protective appeals by parties afraid they might suffer such a forfeiture.” (Baycol, su 2024(Alan, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 905 [rule 8.104(a)(1) “does not require litigants . . . to guess, at their peril,” whether their duty to file a notice of appeal is triggered].) Requiring entry of, or service of notice of entry of, a “judgment” — so denominated — to start the time to appeal leaves little room for confusion about when there is finality, and therefore comports with the importance of having “bright lines . . . in this area, to avoid both inadvertent forfeiture of the 16 MEINHARDT v. CITY OF SUNNYVALE Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. right to appeal and excessive protective appea | 2 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Boyer
red
2 sentences2024Instead, as explained by the high court, its discussion was simply intended to illustrate the point that “the case-by-case analysis that we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of other types of evidence under the substantial evidence test is preferable [to the rule set forth in Gould] because it permits an 11 individualized assessment of the probative value of the particular out-of-court identification at issue.” (Cuevas, at p. 269.) Further, to the extent there was any ambiguity on this point, the California Supreme Court subsequently clarified it’s view in Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th 412 , where 2024Instead, as explained by the high court, its discussion was simply intended to illustrate the point that “the case-by-case analysis that we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of other types of evidence under the substantial evidence test is preferable [to the rule set forth in Gould] because it permits an 11 individualized assessment of the probative value of the particular out-of-court identification at issue.” (Cuevas, at p. 269.) Further, to the extent there was any ambiguity on this point, the California Supreme Court subsequently clarified it’s view in Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th 412 , where | 2 | 2023–2024 |
People v. Ranger Insurance
green
2 sentences2023Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 945, 952 .) “ ‘In order for the court to have reason to believe that sufficient excuse may exist, our Supreme Court has stated in a similar context there must be “some rational basis” for belief at the time of defendant’s nonappearance that sufficient excuse may exist.’ ” (People v. Amwest Surety Inc. Co. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 915, 923 (Amwest).) An appellate court performs a case-by-case analysis when deciding whether a trial court had reason to believe a sufficient excuse may exist. 2013Co. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 820, 823 (Ranger II).) There is a “clear abuse of discretion” if there is no “rational basis to believe there is a sufficient excuse for the bailee’s nonappearance.” (Ibid.) “ ‘No rigid rules have been developed’ ” as to the types of showings that support a rational basis for a trial court’s belief, “ ‘and a case-by-case analysis is always performed. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 824.) In most cases, “ ‘ “the only reasons before the trial court are the evidence or representations furnished by defendant’s counsel,” ’ ” and the cases show that courts “ ‘ “have l | 2 | 2013–2023 |
Dolan-King v. Rancho Santa Fe Assn.
green
2 sentences2022Schwindt quotes Dolan-King v. Rancho Santa Fe Assn. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 965, 975 , for the proposition: “Restrictions are evaluated for reasonableness in light of ‘the restriction’s effect on the project as a whole,’ not from the perspective of the individual homeowner. [Citations.] Accordingly, courts do not conduct a case-by- case analysis of the restrictions to determine the effect on an individual homeowner [but 5 The Omars argue the trial court was mistaken as to “patio area” portion of its ruling. 2004Both as to the governing Covenant and subsequently enacted restrictions, the inquiry should be whether their provisions are reasonable “in light of ‘the restriction’s effect on the project as a whole,’ not from the perspective of the individual homeowner. [Citations.] Accordingly, courts do not conduct a case-by-case analysis of the restrictions to determine the effect on an individual homeowner; we must consider the reasonableness of the restrictions by looking at the goals and concerns of the entire development.” (Dolan-King I, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 975 .) We disagree with Dolan-King t | 2 | 2004–2022 |
Airs Aromatics, LLC v. CBL Data Recovery Techs., Inc.
green
2 sentences2019(Schwab, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326 [noting how Cassel’s rule turns on the defaulting defendant’s access to information].) This rule substantially dims section 580’s “bright- line” rule of formal notice by replacing the straightforward inquiry into what is pled in the operative pleadings with a case- by-case inquiry into what individual defendants knew or should have known (Airs Aromatic, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018 ), and in so doing, risks depriving defaulting defendants of their 15 due process-based right to proper notice of their maximum exposure. 2019(Schwab, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326 [noting how Cassel’s rule turns on the defaulting defendant’s access to information].) This rule substantially dims section 580’s “bright- line” rule of formal notice by replacing the straightforward inquiry into what is pled in the operative pleadings with a case- by-case inquiry into what individual defendants knew or should have known (Airs Aromatic, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018 ), and in so doing, risks depriving defaulting defendants of their 15 due process-based right to proper notice of their maximum exposure. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Orange County Social Services Agency v. Marcelino M.
green
2 sentences2017Thus, we cannot say the juvenile court's error in precluding cross-examination of the preparer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Brenda M., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 777 , 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 686 .) The harmless error analysis is by definition a case-by-case analysis. 2017Thus, we cannot say the juvenile court's error in precluding cross-examination of the preparer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Brenda M., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 777 , 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 686 .) The harmless error analysis is by definition a case-by-case analysis. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Prohibitively High Arbitration Costs “[I]t is substantively unconscionable to require a consumer to give up the right to utilize the judicial system, while imposing arbitral forum fees that are prohibitively high.” (Gutierrez, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 90 .) In Gutierrez , the court held that “a mandatory arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable if it requires the payment of unaffordable fees to initiate the process.” (Id. at p. 98.) In determining the affordability of arbitration costs, a court should conduct a case-by-case analysis, with the party resisting arbitration bearin 2009We acknowledge that Gutierrez, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 77 , and Independent Assn., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 396 , adopted a case-by-case analysis in imposing arbitral expenses. | 2 | 2009–2016 |
Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood
green
2 sentences2013The Supreme Court rejected the bright-line rules proposed by the litigants, stating that neither position was “consistent with CEQA‟s interpretation and policy foundation.” (Save Tara, supra, at p. 138 .) Instead, the court adopted a position that requires a case-by-case analysis: “A CEQA compliance condition can be a legitimate ingredient in a preliminary public-private agreement for exploration of a proposed project, but if the agreement, viewed in light of all the surrounding circumstances, commits the public agency as a practical matter to the project, the simple insertion of a CEQA compli 2013The court‟s position was consistent with “the general principle that before conducting CEQA review, agencies must not „take any action‟ that significantly furthers a project „in a manner that forecloses alternatives or mitigation measures that would ordinarily be part of CEQA review of that public project.‟ (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15004, subd. (b)(2)(B); [citations].” (Save Tara, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 138 .) The general principle set forth in subdivision (b)(2)(B) of Guidelines section 15004 is not, by its terms, limited to projects involving EIR‟s and, therefore, we conclude that it al | 2 | 2013–2013 |
| John Bruce Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Incorporated green | 2 | 2003–2009 |
| In Re Jasmine G. green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
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| People v. Frahs green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. J.J. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Watson green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
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Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.