7 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Concerned Citizens of South Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Boroughgreen2 sentences2022The superior court addressed this concern, noting that a 106 Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974). 107 Id. 108 Id. 109 Id. 110 Id. -34- 7609 “government’s tax structure must be objective, not subjective” and that if the statute used an effective tax rate, “Alaska’s use of the foreign country’s tax rate as an identification tool for tax haven countries would be thwarted because the inquiry would become corporation specific, requiring tax officials to analyze each and every corporate structure to determine whether the affiliated gro 2022The superior court addressed this concern, noting that a 106 Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974). 107 Id. 108 Id. 109 Id. 110 Id. -34- 7609 “government’s tax structure must be objective, not subjective” and that if the statute used an effective tax rate, “Alaska’s use of the foreign country’s tax rate as an identification tool for tax haven countries would be thwarted because the inquiry would become corporation specific, requiring tax officials to analyze each and every corporate structure to determine whether the affiliated gro | 1 | 1 |
Paul Satterfield v. District Attorney Philadelphiagreen1 sentence2020Att’y Phila., 872 F.3d 152, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The fact (continued...) – 15 – 2665 Here, Powell’s underlying post-conviction relief claim is that his trial counsel was ineffective and that this ineffective assistance of trial counsel deprived Powell of a favorable plea agreement that would have resulted in a significantly lower sentence than the one he received after trial. | 1 | 1 |
David Miller v. Tony Maysgreen1 sentence2020P. 60(b)(6) is “identical with Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(6)”). 42 See Cox, 757 F.3d at 122 (directing trial courts to apply a “flexible, multifactor approach to Rule 60(b)(6) motions” that takes into account “all the particulars of a movant’s case”); Miller v. Mays, 879 F.3d 691, 698 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting that “Rule 60(b)(6) motions necessitate ‘a case-by-case inquiry’ in which the district court ‘intensively balance[s] numerous factors, including the competing policies of the finality of judgments and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the fac | 1 | 1 |
Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.green1 sentence2020P. 60(b)(6) is “identical with Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(6)”). 42 See Cox, 757 F.3d at 122 (directing trial courts to apply a “flexible, multifactor approach to Rule 60(b)(6) motions” that takes into account “all the particulars of a movant’s case”); Miller v. Mays, 879 F.3d 691, 698 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting that “Rule 60(b)(6) motions necessitate ‘a case-by-case inquiry’ in which the district court ‘intensively balance[s] numerous factors, including the competing policies of the finality of judgments and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the fac | 1 | 1 |
Jermont Cox v. Martin Horngreen1 sentence2020P. 60(b)(6) is “identical with Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(6)”). 42 See Cox, 757 F.3d at 122 (directing trial courts to apply a “flexible, multifactor approach to Rule 60(b)(6) motions” that takes into account “all the particulars of a movant’s case”); Miller v. Mays, 879 F.3d 691, 698 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting that “Rule 60(b)(6) motions necessitate ‘a case-by-case inquiry’ in which the district court ‘intensively balance[s] numerous factors, including the competing policies of the finality of judgments and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the fac | 1 | 1 |
Stephen West v. Wayne Carpentergreen1 sentence2020P. 60(b)(6) is “identical with Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(6)”). 42 See Cox, 757 F.3d at 122 (directing trial courts to apply a “flexible, multifactor approach to Rule 60(b)(6) motions” that takes into account “all the particulars of a movant’s case”); Miller v. Mays, 879 F.3d 691, 698 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting that “Rule 60(b)(6) motions necessitate ‘a case-by-case inquiry’ in which the district court ‘intensively balance[s] numerous factors, including the competing policies of the finality of judgments and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the fac | 1 | 1 |
Maisy W. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Servicesgreen2 sentences2014Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 175 P.3d 1263, 1267 (Alaska 2008)). 7 Id. at 1104 (citing Ben M., 204 P.3d at 1018 ). -5- 1516 the Indian family and that those efforts were unsuccessful.”8 This is a case-by-case inquiry, and active efforts need not be perfect.9 “In general, active efforts will be found when OCS takes the client through the steps of the plan rather than requiring that the plan be performed on its own,”10 but not if “the client must develop his or her own resources towards bringing [the plan] to fruition.”11 “In assessing whether OCS met the active efforts requirement, a co 2014Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 175 P.3d 1263, 1267 (Alaska 2008)). 7 Id. at 1104 (citing Ben M., 204 P.3d at 1018 ). -5- 1516 the Indian family and that those efforts were unsuccessful.”8 This is a case-by-case inquiry, and active efforts need not be perfect.9 “In general, active efforts will be found when OCS takes the client through the steps of the plan rather than requiring that the plan be performed on its own,”10 but not if “the client must develop his or her own resources towards bringing [the plan] to fruition.”11 “In assessing whether OCS met the active efforts requirement, a co | 1 | 1 |
Philbin v. Matanuska-Susitna Boroughgreen1 sentence2004See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 (1982); Johnson v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, 836 P.2d 896, 906-09 (Alaska 1991) ("a determination of the appropriate preclusive effect of administrative decisions is possible only on a case by case analysis"). [1] 991 P.2d 1263, 1266-67 (Alaska 1999). [2] 978 P.2d 86 , 88 n. 2, 89 (Alaska 1999); see also Martech Constr. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Alaska State Department of Fish & Gamegreen2 sentences2004See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 (1982); Johnson v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, 836 P.2d 896, 906-09 (Alaska 1991) ("a determination of the appropriate preclusive effect of administrative decisions is possible only on a case by case analysis"). [1] 991 P.2d 1263, 1266-67 (Alaska 1999). [2] 978 P.2d 86 , 88 n. 2, 89 (Alaska 1999); see also Martech Constr. 2004See generally Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83 (1982); Johnson v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, 836 P.2d 896, 906-09 (Alaska 1991) ("a determination of the appropriate pre-clusive effect of administrative decisions is possible only on a case by case analysis”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. George Samuel Walter Rogersgreen2 sentences1983See United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 500 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 , 97 S.Ct. 2182 , 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977). [7] The *1053 relevant factual inquiry in such an analysis is whether, under the circumstances, the jury will be afforded a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the out-of-court statement. 1983See United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 500 (8th Cir.1976), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 918 , 97 S.Ct. 2182 , 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977). 7 The relevant factual inquiry in such an analysis is whether, under the circumstances, the jury will be afforded a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the out-of-court statement. | 1 | 1 |
Ware v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1983See United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 500 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 , 97 S.Ct. 2182 , 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977). [7] The *1053 relevant factual inquiry in such an analysis is whether, under the circumstances, the jury will be afforded a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the out-of-court statement. 1983See United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 500 (8th Cir.1976), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 918 , 97 S.Ct. 2182 , 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977). 7 The relevant factual inquiry in such an analysis is whether, under the circumstances, the jury will be afforded a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the out-of-court statement. | 1 | 1 |
Blanton v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1983See United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 500 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 , 97 S.Ct. 2182 , 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977). [7] The *1053 relevant factual inquiry in such an analysis is whether, under the circumstances, the jury will be afforded a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the out-of-court statement. 1983See United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 500 (8th Cir.1976), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 918 , 97 S.Ct. 2182 , 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977). 7 The relevant factual inquiry in such an analysis is whether, under the circumstances, the jury will be afforded a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the out-of-court statement. | 1 | 1 |
Montecalvo v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1983See United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 500 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 , 97 S.Ct. 2182 , 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977). [7] The *1053 relevant factual inquiry in such an analysis is whether, under the circumstances, the jury will be afforded a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the out-of-court statement. 1983See United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 500 (8th Cir.1976), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 918 , 97 S.Ct. 2182 , 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977). 7 The relevant factual inquiry in such an analysis is whether, under the circumstances, the jury will be afforded a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the out-of-court statement. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gonzalez v. Crosby
green
1 sentence2020P. 60(b)(6) is “identical with Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(6)”). 42 See Cox, 757 F.3d at 122 (directing trial courts to apply a “flexible, multifactor approach to Rule 60(b)(6) motions” that takes into account “all the particulars of a movant’s case”); Miller v. Mays, 879 F.3d 691, 698 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting that “Rule 60(b)(6) motions necessitate ‘a case-by-case inquiry’ in which the district court ‘intensively balance[s] numerous factors, including the competing policies of the finality of judgments and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the fac | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ben M. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services
green
1 sentence2014Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 175 P.3d 1263, 1267 (Alaska 2008)). 7 Id. at 1104 (citing Ben M., 204 P.3d at 1018 ). -5- 1516 the Indian family and that those efforts were unsuccessful.”8 This is a case-by-case inquiry, and active efforts need not be perfect.9 “In general, active efforts will be found when OCS takes the client through the steps of the plan rather than requiring that the plan be performed on its own,”10 but not if “the client must develop his or her own resources towards bringing [the plan] to fruition.”11 “In assessing whether OCS met the active efforts requirement, a co | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Miller
green
1 sentence2010In making this argument, Chase relies primarily on the type of analysis conducted by the Alaska Supreme Court in State v. Miller, 207 P.3d 541 (Alaska 2009). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Shook
green
1 sentence2004See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 (1982); Johnson v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, 836 P.2d 896, 906-09 (Alaska 1991) ("a determination of the appropriate preclusive effect of administrative decisions is possible only on a case by case analysis"). [1] 991 P.2d 1263, 1266-67 (Alaska 1999). [2] 978 P.2d 86 , 88 n. 2, 89 (Alaska 1999); see also Martech Constr. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Holmberg v. State, Division of Risk Management
green
1 sentence1991Holmberg, 796 P.2d at 825 ; Byayuk, 684 P.2d at 122 ; Jeffries, 604 P.2d at 8-9 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Byayuk
green
1 sentence1991Holmberg, 796 P.2d at 825 ; Byayuk, 684 P.2d at 122 ; Jeffries, 604 P.2d at 8-9 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Jeffries v. Glacier State Telephone Co.
green
1 sentence1991Holmberg, 796 P.2d at 825 ; Byayuk, 684 P.2d at 122 ; Jeffries, 604 P.2d at 8-9 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.