case-by-case analysis in Missouri

2008Id.

2007Id.

2021Nelson, 195 S.W.3d at 513 ; Seyler, 201 S.W.3d at 64-65 .

2021Nelson, 195 S.W.3d at 513 ; Seyler, 201 S.W.3d at 64-65 .

2017“In determining. whether suffi-. cient evidence supports a presumption of undue influence, we apply a case-by-case analysis because the exercise of undue influence is often proved by circumstantial evidence.” Id.

2017“Persons exerting undue influence will do so in as subtle, furtive, indirect and elusive a manner as possible and such influence may therefore be shown indirectly by the reasonable and natural inferences drawn from the facts and circumstances proved.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

2016Id. at 498 .

2016"Because federal summary judgment serves a different purpose, it is difficult to view the federal cases construing the federal rule as ‘particularly’ persuasive any longer ... in the determination of [Missouri] summary judgment motions which are, by their very nature, susceptible primarily of a case-by-case analysis.” ITT, 854 S.W.2d at 380 . 8 .

2015Mickens , 535 U.S, at 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237 .

2014As noted by the United States Supreme Court: “The drafters [of the Federal Copyright Act] resisted pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive categories of fair use, but structured the provision as an affirma *730 tive defense requiring a case-by-case analysis.” Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 561 , 105 S.Ct. 2218 , 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985).

2014As noted by the United States Supreme Court: “The drafters [of the Federal Copyright Act] resisted pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive categories of fair use, but structured the provision as an affirma *730 tive defense requiring a case-by-case analysis.” Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 561 , 105 S.Ct. 2218 , 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985).

2010“We, review the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and will disturb the judgment only when the verdict is manifestly unjust.” Brown, 298 S.W.3d at 21 .

2010“A case-by-case analysis is utilized to evaluate punitive damages awards.” Id.

2008Id.

2008Id.

2007In both of those cases, this Court applied the holdings prospectively to all persons potentially affected, Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 118 ; Sumners v. Sumners, 701 S.W.2d 720, 722-25 (Mo. banc 1985), and there was no effort to determine who had notice of the pending suit and who did not, nor to conduct a case-by-case analysis with independent fact finders to evaluate the relative injustices.

2007In both of those cases, this Court applied the holdings prospectively to all persons potentially affected, Cardinal Glennon, 583 S.W.2d at 118 ; Sumners v. Sumners, 701 S.W.2d 720, 722-25 (Mo. banc 1985), and there was no effort to determine who had notice of the pending suit and who did not, nor to conduct a case-by-case analysis with independent fact finders to evaluate the relative injustices.

2002Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 .

2002Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 .

2002Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 369 , 113 S.Ct. at 843 n. 2.

2002Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 369 , 113 S.Ct. at 843 n. 2.

1994Id. at 180 .

1992See Godsy v. Godsy, 504 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Mo.App.1973); Matthews, 581 S.W.2d at 471 (quoting Davis v. Pitti, 472 S.W.2d 382 (Mo.1971)). “[P]ersons exerting undue influence will do so in as subtle, furtive, indirect and elusive a manner as possible and ... such influence may therefore be shown ‘indirectly by the reasonable and natural inferences drawn from the facts and circumstances proved....’” Robertson v. Estate of Zimmerman, 778 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Mo.App.1989) (quoting Salisbury v. Gardner, 515 S.W.2d 881 (Mo.App.1974)). “[I]t is impossible to set forth a rigid formula of what facts must be e

1992See Godsy v. Godsy, 504 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Mo.App.1973); Matthews, 581 S.W.2d at 471 (quoting Davis v. Pitti, 472 S.W.2d 382 (Mo.1971)). “[P]ersons exerting undue influence will do so in as subtle, furtive, indirect and elusive a manner as possible and ... such influence may therefore be shown ‘indirectly by the reasonable and natural inferences drawn from the facts and circumstances proved....’” Robertson v. Estate of Zimmerman, 778 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Mo.App.1989) (quoting Salisbury v. Gardner, 515 S.W.2d 881 (Mo.App.1974)). “[I]t is impossible to set forth a rigid formula of what facts must be e

1992See Godsy v. Godsy, 504 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Mo.App.1973); Matthews, 581 S.W.2d at 471 (quoting Davis v. Pitti, 472 S.W.2d 382 (Mo.1971)). “[P]ersons exerting undue influence will do so in as subtle, furtive, indirect and elusive a manner as possible and ... such influence may therefore be shown ‘indirectly by the reasonable and natural inferences drawn from the facts and circumstances proved....’” Robertson v. Estate of Zimmerman, 778 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Mo.App.1989) (quoting Salisbury v. Gardner, 515 S.W.2d 881 (Mo.App.1974)). “[I]t is impossible to set forth a rigid formula of what facts must be e

1982While People v. Wheeler, supra does appear to sanction a case by case test for use of peremptory challenges, State v. Baker, supra is controlling precedent in Missouri and precludes consideration of the California doctrine as applicable here.

1964The amended information was sufficient in form and substance to charge the crimes of burglary in the second degree and stealing under § 560.156, V.A.M.S., State v. Edmonds, Mo.Sup., 347 S.W.2d 158 [3], and to charge defendant under the habitual criminal act, § 556.280, V.A.M.S.