Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Oklahoma opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolphgreen2 sentences2007See Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama, 531 U.S. at 91, n. 6 , 121 S.Ct. at 522 (noting that assertions that arbitration costs are too high must be supported by proof of the costs, such as filing fees, administrative fees, and arbitrator's fees, that will in fact be imposed for the arbitration); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that there should be a case-by-case analysis of whether the costs of arbitration renders an arbitration agreement unenforceable). 2007See Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama, 531 U.S. at 91, n. 6 , 121 S.Ct. at 522 (noting that assertions that arbitration costs are too high must be supported by proof of the costs, such as filing fees, administrative fees, and arbitrator's fees, that will in fact be imposed for the arbitration); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that there should be a case-by-case analysis of whether the costs of arbitration renders an arbitration agreement unenforceable). | 2 | 2 |
John Bruce Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Incorporatedgreen2 sentences2007See Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama, 531 U.S. at 91, n. 6 , 121 S.Ct. at 522 (noting that assertions that arbitration costs are too high must be supported by proof of the costs, such as filing fees, administrative fees, and arbitrator's fees, that will in fact be imposed for the arbitration); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that there should be a case-by-case analysis of whether the costs of arbitration renders an arbitration agreement unenforceable). 2007See Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama, 531 U.S. at 91, n. 6 , 121 S.Ct. at 522 (noting that assertions that arbitration costs are too high must be supported by proof of the costs, such as filing fees, administrative fees, and arbitrator's fees, that will in fact be imposed for the arbitration); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir.2001) (concluding that there should be a case-by-case analysis of whether the costs of arbitration renders an arbitration agreement unenforceable). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Kinsey
green
2 sentences2022Id. 2022Id. | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Broadrick v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences1999Id. ¶ 7 Section 891 is not substantially overbroad, and whatever overbreadth may exist can be cured through a case-by-case analysis. 1999Id., 413 U.S. at 615-616 , 93 S.Ct. at 2917-2918 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
United States v. Ursery
green
2 sentences1996The Ursery Court specifically rejected that analysis for a civil forfeiture; instead, it noted that the case-by-case balancing approach used in Halper “had been supplanted in Austin by a categorical approach that found a civil sanction to be punitive if it could not ‘fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose.’” Id. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2145 , 135 L.Ed.2d at 567 . 1996The Ursery Court specifically rejected that analysis for a civil forfeiture; instead, it noted that the case-by-case balancing approach used in Halper “had been supplanted in Austin by a categorical approach that found a civil sanction to be punitive if it could not ‘fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose.’” Id. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2145 , 135 L.Ed.2d at 567 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Morgan v. State
red
2 sentences1987While Morgan, supra, sets forth a well-reasoned rule, the better approach is the one which is adopted by the majority, as it allows for a case-by-case analysis. 1987While Morgan, supra, sets forth a well-reasoned rule, the better approach is the one which is adopted by the majority, as it allows for a case-by-case analysis. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Kirkland v. General Motors Corporation
green
1 sentence1983Case law construing this language recognizes that malicious or oppressive intent may be inferred from "complete indifference *521 to consequences", "conscious or reckless disregard of the safety of others" or even from "gross negligence", but mere violation of a statute is not sufficient as an evidentiary predicate for punitive damages award. [9] A pronouncement of norms that adapt existing punitive damages liability standards to litigation over misconduct in marketing or manufacturing unsafe products must be postponed to await a case-by-case analysis. [10] NOTES [1] 521 P.2d 1353 (Okl. 1974). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Oden v. Russell
green
2 sentences1983Case law construing this language recognizes that malicious or oppressive intent may be inferred from "complete indifference *521 to consequences", "conscious or reckless disregard of the safety of others" or even from "gross negligence", but mere violation of a statute is not sufficient as an evidentiary predicate for punitive damages award. [9] A pronouncement of norms that adapt existing punitive damages liability standards to litigation over misconduct in marketing or manufacturing unsafe products must be postponed to await a case-by-case analysis. [10] NOTES [1] 521 P.2d 1353 (Okl. 1974). 1983Case law construing this language recognizes that malicious or oppressive intent may be inferred from "complete indifference *521 to consequences", "conscious or reckless disregard of the safety of others" or even from "gross negligence", but mere violation of a statute is not sufficient as an evidentiary predicate for punitive damages award. [9] A pronouncement of norms that adapt existing punitive damages liability standards to litigation over misconduct in marketing or manufacturing unsafe products must be postponed to await a case-by-case analysis. [10] NOTES [1] 521 P.2d 1353 (Okl. 1974). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Garland Coal & Mining Company v. Clifton Few
green
1 sentence1983Kurn v. Radencic, 193 Okl. 126 , 141 P.2d 580 (1943). [9] Garland Coal & Mining Co. v. Few, 267 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.1959); A.T. & S.F. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1983Case law construing this language recognizes that malicious or oppressive intent may be inferred from "complete indifference *521 to consequences", "conscious or reckless disregard of the safety of others" or even from "gross negligence", but mere violation of a statute is not sufficient as an evidentiary predicate for punitive damages award. [9] A pronouncement of norms that adapt existing punitive damages liability standards to litigation over misconduct in marketing or manufacturing unsafe products must be postponed to await a case-by-case analysis. [10] NOTES [1] 521 P.2d 1353 (Okl. 1974). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Smith v. United States Gypsum Co.
green
1 sentence1983Case law construing this language recognizes that malicious or oppressive intent may be inferred from "complete indifference *521 to consequences", "conscious or reckless disregard of the safety of others" or even from "gross negligence", but mere violation of a statute is not sufficient as an evidentiary predicate for punitive damages award. [9] A pronouncement of norms that adapt existing punitive damages liability standards to litigation over misconduct in marketing or manufacturing unsafe products must be postponed to await a case-by-case analysis. [10] NOTES [1] 521 P.2d 1353 (Okl. 1974). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Davidson v. First Bank & Trust Co., Yale
green
1 sentence1983Case law construing this language recognizes that malicious or oppressive intent may be inferred from "complete indifference *521 to consequences", "conscious or reckless disregard of the safety of others" or even from "gross negligence", but mere violation of a statute is not sufficient as an evidentiary predicate for punitive damages award. [9] A pronouncement of norms that adapt existing punitive damages liability standards to litigation over misconduct in marketing or manufacturing unsafe products must be postponed to await a case-by-case analysis. [10] NOTES [1] 521 P.2d 1353 (Okl. 1974). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Main v. Levine
green
2 sentences1983Case law construing this language recognizes that malicious or oppressive intent may be inferred from "complete indifference *521 to consequences", "conscious or reckless disregard of the safety of others" or even from "gross negligence", but mere violation of a statute is not sufficient as an evidentiary predicate for punitive damages award. [9] A pronouncement of norms that adapt existing punitive damages liability standards to litigation over misconduct in marketing or manufacturing unsafe products must be postponed to await a case-by-case analysis. [10] NOTES [1] 521 P.2d 1353 (Okl. 1974). 1983Case law construing this language recognizes that malicious or oppressive intent may be inferred from "complete indifference *521 to consequences", "conscious or reckless disregard of the safety of others" or even from "gross negligence", but mere violation of a statute is not sufficient as an evidentiary predicate for punitive damages award. [9] A pronouncement of norms that adapt existing punitive damages liability standards to litigation over misconduct in marketing or manufacturing unsafe products must be postponed to await a case-by-case analysis. [10] NOTES [1] 521 P.2d 1353 (Okl. 1974). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Kurn v. Radencic
green
2 sentences1983Kurn v. Radencic, 193 Okl. 126 , 141 P.2d 580 (1943). [9] Garland Coal & Mining Co. v. Few, 267 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.1959); A.T. & S.F. 1983Kurn v. Radencic, 193 Okl. 126 , 141 P.2d 580 (1943). [9] Garland Coal & Mining Co. v. Few, 267 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.1959); A.T. & S.F. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.