case-by-case analysis in Arizona

2021“Once vested, those rights cannot be retroactively impaired by the public employer.” Godbey, 131 Ariz. at 21 (citing Yeazell, 98 Ariz. 109 ; City of Phx. v. Boerger, 5 Ariz. App. 445 (1967). 8 PLEA, et al. v. CITY OF PHOENIX Decision of the Court ¶29 The City argues these claims will “turn on a case-by-case inquiry into whether putative class members reasonably intended and genuinely believed that [wage enhancement] was a retirement benefit set forth in CBAs.” But the issue is whether claims under the Pension and Contract Clauses satisfy the commonality requirement.

2021“Once vested, those rights cannot be retroactively impaired by the public employer.” Godbey, 131 Ariz. at 21 (citing Yeazell, 98 Ariz. 109 ; City of Phx. v. Boerger, 5 Ariz. App. 445 (1967). 8 PLEA, et al. v. CITY OF PHOENIX Decision of the Court ¶29 The City argues these claims will “turn on a case-by-case inquiry into whether putative class members reasonably intended and genuinely believed that [wage enhancement] was a retirement benefit set forth in CBAs.” But the issue is whether claims under the Pension and Contract Clauses satisfy the commonality requirement.

2021“Once vested, those rights cannot be retroactively impaired by the public employer.” Godbey, 131 Ariz. at 21 (citing Yeazell, 98 Ariz. 109 ; City of Phx. v. Boerger, 5 Ariz. App. 445 (1967). 8 PLEA, et al. v. CITY OF PHOENIX Decision of the Court ¶29 The City argues these claims will “turn on a case-by-case inquiry into whether putative class members reasonably intended and genuinely believed that [wage enhancement] was a retirement benefit set forth in CBAs.” But the issue is whether claims under the Pension and Contract Clauses satisfy the commonality requirement.

2019“In what is necessarily a case-by-case inquiry, some factors will not apply,” but a court abuses its discretion “by neglecting an applicable factor.” Rainwater v. Rainwater, 177 Ariz. 500, 502 (App. 1993). ¶4 The goal of spousal maintenance is “to promote a diligent effort to become financially independent,” a goal that “must be balanced with some realistic appraisal of the probabilities that the receiving spouse will in fact subsequently be able to support herself in some reasonable approximation of the standard of living established during the marriage.” Hughes v. Hughes, 177 Ariz. 522 , 523

2019Accordingly, although a court has discretion to award indefinite maintenance to a spouse who is unlikely to achieve financial independence, Rainwater, 177 Ariz. at 503 , a court generally does not abuse its discretion by fixing an award’s duration unless “countervailing factors subordinate the objective of requiring an effort toward independence by the receiving spouse,” see Hughes, 177 Ariz. at 525 . ¶5 Wife does not challenge the monthly amount of the spousal maintenance award, arguing instead that the superior court abused its discretion by awarding maintenance for only 48 months instead of

2015Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1561 .

2015Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1561 .

2014In addressing whether due process requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent in proceedings to terminate parental rights, the Court in Lassiter approved the following case-by-case analysis to be conducted, “in the first instance” by the trial court: The court first “must balance” the three elements propounded in Mathews — “the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions” — “against each other, and then set their net weight in the scales against the presumption that there is a right to appointed co

2013In Dowling, the Court suggested that collateral estoppel based on an earlier acquittal could depend on a case-by-case analysis that would require a defendant to prove, from the entire record, that “the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding.” Id. at 350 .

2013But, as the Court later clarified in United States v. Watts, “it is impossible to know exactly why a jury found a defendant not guilty on a certain charge.” 519 U.S. 148, 155 , 117 S.Ct. 633 , 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) (per curiam).

2013But, as the Court later clarified in United States v. Watts, “it is impossible to know exactly why a jury found a defendant not guilty on a certain charge.” 519 U.S. 148, 155 , 117 S.Ct. 633 , 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) (per curiam).

2004See Michail, 225 Cal.Rptr. at 404 n. 1; Bierlein v. Byrne, *293 103 Wash-App. 865, 14 P.3d 823, 824-26 (2000); Cantu, 752 P.2d at 391 .

2003See, e.g., United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360 (D.C.Cir. 1989); Thomas v. State, 761 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2000); People v. Femengel, 216 Mich.App. 420 , 549 N.W.2d 361 (1996); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 Mass. 737 , 575 N.E.2d 350 (1991).

2003See, e.g., United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360 (D.C.Cir. 1989); Thomas v. State, 761 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2000); People v. Femengel, 216 Mich.App. 420 , 549 N.W.2d 361 (1996); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 Mass. 737 , 575 N.E.2d 350 (1991).

2003Conversely, if the defendant voluntarily left the automobile and began walking away before the police officer initiated contact, “the case does not fit within Belton’s bright-line rule, and a case-by-case analysis of the reasonableness of the search under Chimel becomes necessary.” Id. ¶ 21 Under this approach, which views a defendant as a “recent occupant” of a vehicle for purposes of the Belton rule only when the police initiated contact when the arrestee was still in the vehicle, state and federal courts have found Belton inapplicable when the defendant left the vehicle before such contact,

2003See, e.g., United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360 (D.C.Cir. 1989); Thomas v. State, 761 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2000); People v. Femengel, 216 Mich.App. 420 , 549 N.W.2d 361 (1996); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 Mass. 737 , 575 N.E.2d 350 (1991).

2003See, e.g., United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360 (D.C.Cir. 1989); Thomas v. State, 761 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2000); People v. Femengel, 216 Mich.App. 420 , 549 N.W.2d 361 (1996); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 Mass. 737 , 575 N.E.2d 350 (1991).

2003See, e.g., United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360 (D.C.Cir. 1989); Thomas v. State, 761 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2000); People v. Femengel, 216 Mich.App. 420 , 549 N.W.2d 361 (1996); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 Mass. 737 , 575 N.E.2d 350 (1991).

2003See, e.g., United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360 (D.C.Cir. 1989); Thomas v. State, 761 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2000); People v. Femengel, 216 Mich.App. 420 , 549 N.W.2d 361 (1996); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 Mass. 737 , 575 N.E.2d 350 (1991).

1999If jury eligibility turned on a case-by-case analysis, "we would have the anomalous situation where some persons would be entitled to a jury trial and others would not, although charged with exactly the same substantive Arizona crime." Id. ¶ 11 The City argues that a potential one-year license suspension is not a "grave consequence" warranting a jury trial, and it relies mainly on State v. Harrison, 164 Ariz. 316, 317 , 792 P.2d 779, 780 (App.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1093 , 111 S.Ct. 979 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1064 (1991).

1999If jury eligibility turned on a case-by-case analysis, “we would have the anomalous situation where some persons would be entitled to a jury trial and others would not, although charged with exactly the same substantive Arizona crime.” Id. 1111 The City argues that a potential one-year license suspension is not a “grave consequence” warranting a jury trial, and it relies mainly on State v. Harrison, 164 Ariz. 316, 317 , 792 P.2d 779, 780 (App.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1093 , 111 S.Ct. 979 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1064 (1991).