case-by-case analysis in Tennessee

121 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2026 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (14)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Mossgreen tenn · 1986 · cited in 24 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2015–2026 2 sentences 2026Every sentencing decision necessarily requires a case-by- case analysis considering “the nature of the offense and the totality of the circumstances ... including a defendant’s background.” Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 168 (quoting State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tenn. 1986)). 2025Every sentencing decision necessarily requires a case-by-case analysis considering “the nature of the offense and the totality of the circumstances . . . including a defendant’s background.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991) (quoting State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tenn. 1986)).	24	24
State v. Ashbygreen tenn · 1991 · cited in 24 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2015–2026 2 sentences 2026Every sentencing decision necessarily requires a case-by- case analysis considering “the nature of the offense and the totality of the circumstances ... including a defendant’s background.” Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 168 (quoting State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tenn. 1986)). 2025Every sentencing decision necessarily requires a case-by-case analysis considering “the nature of the offense and the totality of the circumstances . . . including a defendant’s background.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991) (quoting State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tenn. 1986)).	21	24
State v. Binghamgreen tenncrimapp · 1995 · cited in 68 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2024 2 sentences 2024“There is no bright line rule for determining when probation should be granted,” and “[e]ach sentencing decision necessarily involves a case-by-case analysis.” State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d 448, 456 (Tenn. Crim. 2020Id.	3	68
Eleanor Schiessle v. Donald E. Stephensgreen ca7 · 1983 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2000–2001 2 sentences 2001However, the court in Clinard, 46 S.W.3d at 183 (footnote omitted), also affirmed that, “[i]n these days of monolithic law firms and increased opportunity and mobility for both clients and attorneys, a per se rule of vicarious disqualification is not feasible.” Accordingly, as an exception to the DR 5-105(D) rule of vicarious disqualification, the court adopted the case-by-case analysis employed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983), in determining whether an attorney’s prior representation mandates vicarious di 2000However, the court in Clinard, No. M1998-00555-SC-R11-CV, 2001 WL 530834, at *3 (footnote omitted), also affirmed that, “[i]n these days of monolithic law firms and increased opportunity and mobility for both clients and attorneys, a per se rule of vicarious disqualification is not feasible.” Accordingly, as an exception to the DR 5-105(D) rule of vicarious disqualification, the court adopted the case-by-case analysis employed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983), in determining whether an attorney’s prior rep	2	2
Clinard v. Blackwoodgreen tenn · 2001 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2000–2001 2 sentences 2001However, the court in Clinard, 46 S.W.3d at 183 (footnote omitted), also affirmed that, “[i]n these days of monolithic law firms and increased opportunity and mobility for both clients and attorneys, a per se rule of vicarious disqualification is not feasible.” Accordingly, as an exception to the DR 5-105(D) rule of vicarious disqualification, the court adopted the case-by-case analysis employed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1983), in determining whether an attorney’s prior representation mandates vicarious di 2000However, the court in Clinard, No. M1998-00555-SC-R11-CV, 2001 WL 530834, at *3 (footnote omitted), also affirmed that, “[i]n these days of monolithic law firms and increased opportunity and mobility for both clients and attorneys, a per se rule of vicarious disqualification is not feasible.” Accordingly, as an exception to the DR 5-105(D) rule of vicarious disqualification, the court adopted the case-by-case analysis employed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983), in determining whether an attorney’s prior rep	2	2
State v. Hoopergreen tenn · 2000 · cited in 17 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2006–2024 2 sentences 2024App. 1995), overruled on other grounds, State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tenn. 2000). 2010Id.	1	17
State of Tennessee v. Christine Caudlegreen tenn · 2012 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 2 sentences 2014We conclude that following our supreme court’s opinion in State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 279 (Tenn. 2012), we should employ a case-by-case analysis of whether the trial transcript is necessary for “meaningful review” of sentencing determinations. 2014Id. (holding that when a transcript of a guilty plea submission hearing is not contained in the record, reviewing courts “should determine on a case-by-case basis whether the record is sufficient for a meaningful review”).	1	1
LILLIAN PEBBLES MORRISON v. CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC., MARK F. SHANKLE, SR. v. PEP BOYS — MANNY, MOE & JACK, INC.green ca6 · 2003 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006For this reason, if the reviewing court finds that the cost-splitting provision would deter a substantial number of similarly situated potential litigants, it should refuse to enforce the cost-splitting provision in order to serve the underlying functions of the federal statute. 317 F.3d at 663 (6th Cir.2003). 2006For this reason, if the reviewing court finds that the cost-splitting provision would deter a substantial number of similarly situated potential litigants, it should refuse to enforce the cost-splitting provision in order to serve the underlying functions of the federal statute. 317 F.3d at 663 (6th Cir.2003).	1	1
Pamela D. Green, Cross-Appellant v. Dorothy J. Arn, Cross-Appelleegreen ca6 · 1987 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 1 sentence 2003See, e.g., United States v. Mateo, 950 F.2d 44, 48-50 (1st Cir. 1991) (attorney failed to appear); Tucker v. Day, 969 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1992) (defense counsel sat mute throughout entire resentencing proceeding); Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1259-64 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated, 484 U.S. 806 , 108 S. Ct. 52 (1987), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 , 109 S. Ct. 847 (1989) (defense counsel absent from courtroom during critical stage of trial).	1	1
United States v. David Mateogreen ca1 · 1991 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 1 sentence 2003See, e.g., United States v. Mateo, 950 F.2d 44, 48-50 (1st Cir. 1991) (attorney failed to appear); Tucker v. Day, 969 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1992) (defense counsel sat mute throughout entire resentencing proceeding); Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1259-64 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated, 484 U.S. 806 , 108 S. Ct. 52 (1987), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 , 109 S. Ct. 847 (1989) (defense counsel absent from courtroom during critical stage of trial).	1	1
Raymond Alton Tucker v. Ed Day, Wardengreen ca5 · 1992 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 1 sentence 2003See, e.g., United States v. Mateo, 950 F.2d 44, 48-50 (1st Cir. 1991) (attorney failed to appear); Tucker v. Day, 969 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1992) (defense counsel sat mute throughout entire resentencing proceeding); Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1259-64 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated, 484 U.S. 806 , 108 S. Ct. 52 (1987), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 , 109 S. Ct. 847 (1989) (defense counsel absent from courtroom during critical stage of trial).	1	1
Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Education and Welfaregreen cadc · 1974 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 1 sentence 2002The court stressed that no single factor was dispositive to this case-by-case analysis, asserting that “[i]n light of the myriad of organizational arrangements that may be confronted, under the functional equivalency approach, ‘each new arrangement must be examined anew and in its own context.’ ” Id. (quoting Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 245-46 (D.C.Cir.1974)).	1	1
State v. Biniongreen tenncrimapp · 1994 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 1 sentence 2001In State v. Binion, 900 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994), this court concluded that a motorist’s attempts to avoid a roadblock may give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 10 We recognized, however, that a determination of whether reasonable suspicion exists is necessarily fact-specific, requiring a case-by-case analysis: Whether reasonable suspicion exists must be determined from the totality of circumstances on a case by ease basis.	1	1
Mondelli v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen nj · 1986 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993 1 sentence 1993Id. at 731, quoting Mondelli v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 193 N.J.Super. 522 , 475 A.2d 76 (1984) (Petrella, J.A.D., concurring in part and dissenting in part).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (17)

Case	Cited	Years
ACOSTA green · 1985 1 sentence 2019Id.	1	2019–2019
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams green scotus · 2001 2 sentences 2006Additionally, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 , 121 S.Ct. 1302 , 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001); Livingston v. Associates Finance, Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir.2003); Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort. 2006Additionally, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 , 121 S.Ct. 1302 , 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001); Livingston v. Associates Finance, Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir.2003); Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort.	1	2006–2006
Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph green scotus · 2000 2 sentences 2006Following an extensive discussion, the Court held: Our conclusion that the proper inquiry is a case-by-case analysis rather than a per se rule is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 , 121 S.Ct. 513 , 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000). 2006Following an extensive discussion, the Court held: Our conclusion that the proper inquiry is a case-by-case analysis rather than a per se rule is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 , 121 S.Ct. 513 , 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000).	1	2006–2006
John Bruce Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Incorporated green ca4 · 2001 2 sentences 2006In identifying this Court’s focus, it relies upon and is guided by Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir.2001) in which the court held that the appropriate inquiry for determining whether an arbitration clause is unenforceable due to costs is “a case-by-case analysis that focuses, among other things, upon the claimant’s ability to pay arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and whether the cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims.” Id. at 556 . 2006In identifying this Court’s focus, it relies upon and is guided by Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir.2001) in which the court held that the appropriate inquiry for determining whether an arbitration clause is unenforceable due to costs is “a case-by-case analysis that focuses, among other things, upon the claimant’s ability to pay arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and whether the cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims.” Id. at 556 .	1	2006–2006
Marc Livingston v. Associates Finance, Inc. green ca7 · 2003 2 sentences 2006Additionally, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 , 121 S.Ct. 1302 , 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001); Livingston v. Associates Finance, Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir.2003); Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort. 2006Additionally, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 , 121 S.Ct. 1302 , 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001); Livingston v. Associates Finance, Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir.2003); Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort.	1	2006–2006
Neubauer v. Hostetter green iowa · 1992 1 sentence 2005That case involved a lease containing a provision requiring the landlord to have insurance on the premises and is, thus, not directly in point as to the issue before this Court; but, the extensive and authoritative discussion by the Vermont court is expositive of both the majority rule founded in Sutton and the minority rules, one based in part on Neubauer v. Hostetter, 485 N.W.2d 87 (Iowa 1992), the other a case-by-case analysis rule based on Page v. Scott, 567 S.W.2d 101 (Ark.1978).	1	2005–2005
Page v. Scott green ark · 1978 1 sentence 2005That case involved a lease containing a provision requiring the landlord to have insurance on the premises and is, thus, not directly in point as to the issue before this Court; but, the extensive and authoritative discussion by the Vermont court is expositive of both the majority rule founded in Sutton and the minority rules, one based in part on Neubauer v. Hostetter, 485 N.W.2d 87 (Iowa 1992), the other a case-by-case analysis rule based on Page v. Scott, 567 S.W.2d 101 (Ark.1978).	1	2005–2005
Pamela D. Green, Cross-Appellant v. Dorothy J. Arn, Cross-Appellee green ca6 · 1988 1 sentence 2003See, e.g., United States v. Mateo, 950 F.2d 44, 48-50 (1st Cir. 1991) (attorney failed to appear); Tucker v. Day, 969 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1992) (defense counsel sat mute throughout entire resentencing proceeding); Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1259-64 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated, 484 U.S. 806 , 108 S. Ct. 52 (1987), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 , 109 S. Ct. 847 (1989) (defense counsel absent from courtroom during critical stage of trial).	1	2003–2003
Illinois v. Duncan green scotus · 1987 1 sentence 2003See, e.g., United States v. Mateo, 950 F.2d 44, 48-50 (1st Cir. 1991) (attorney failed to appear); Tucker v. Day, 969 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1992) (defense counsel sat mute throughout entire resentencing proceeding); Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1259-64 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated, 484 U.S. 806 , 108 S. Ct. 52 (1987), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 , 109 S. Ct. 847 (1989) (defense counsel absent from courtroom during critical stage of trial).	1	2003–2003
Arn v. Green green scotus · 1987 1 sentence 2003See, e.g., United States v. Mateo, 950 F.2d 44, 48-50 (1st Cir. 1991) (attorney failed to appear); Tucker v. Day, 969 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1992) (defense counsel sat mute throughout entire resentencing proceeding); Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1259-64 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated, 484 U.S. 806 , 108 S. Ct. 52 (1987), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 , 109 S. Ct. 847 (1989) (defense counsel absent from courtroom during critical stage of trial).	1	2003–2003
Connecticut v. Plourde green scotus · 1989 1 sentence 2003See, e.g., United States v. Mateo, 950 F.2d 44, 48-50 (1st Cir. 1991) (attorney failed to appear); Tucker v. Day, 969 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1992) (defense counsel sat mute throughout entire resentencing proceeding); Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1259-64 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated, 484 U.S. 806 , 108 S. Ct. 52 (1987), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 , 109 S. Ct. 847 (1989) (defense counsel absent from courtroom during critical stage of trial).	1	2003–2003
California v. Radke green scotus · 1989 1 sentence 2003See, e.g., United States v. Mateo, 950 F.2d 44, 48-50 (1st Cir. 1991) (attorney failed to appear); Tucker v. Day, 969 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1992) (defense counsel sat mute throughout entire resentencing proceeding); Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1259-64 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated, 484 U.S. 806 , 108 S. Ct. 52 (1987), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 , 109 S. Ct. 847 (1989) (defense counsel absent from courtroom during critical stage of trial).	1	2003–2003
Connecticut Humane Society v. Freedom of Information Commission green conn · 1991 1 sentence 2002The court stressed that no single factor was dispositive to this case-by-case analysis, asserting that “[i]n light of the myriad of organizational arrangements that may be confronted, under the functional equivalency approach, ‘each new arrangement must be examined anew and in its own context.’ ” Id. (quoting Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 245-46 (D.C.Cir.1974)).	1	2002–2002
Gebhardt v. O'ROURKE green mich · 1994 1 sentence 2000In Gebhardt v. O’Rourke, 510 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. 1994), the plaintiff was convicted of aiding and abetting her then-fiancé in the alleged rape of his ten-year-old daughter.	1	2000–2000
Anderson Ex Rel. Anderson v. Stream green minn · 1980 1 sentence 1994The court also was concerned that the standard added “to the potential for arbitrary decision-making in the area.” 295 N.W.2d at 598 .	1	1994–1994
Mondelli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. green njsuperctappdiv · 1984 2 sentences 1993Id. at 731, quoting Mondelli v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 193 N.J.Super. 522 , 475 A.2d 76 (1984) (Petrella, J.A.D., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 1993Id. at 731, quoting Mondelli v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 193 N.J.Super. 522 , 475 A.2d 76 (1984) (Petrella, J.A.D., concurring in part and dissenting in part).	1	1993–1993
Kendall v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. green mo · 1982	1	1985–1985

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103 (102) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303 (102) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102 (84) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113 (56) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401 (51) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210 (49) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114 (44) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-313 (12) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115 (11) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106 (11) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112 (10) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101 (7)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TN 121 (1985–2026) CA 110 (1974–2026) IL 90 (1978–2025) NY 83 (1972–2026) TX 75 (1972–2025) OH 72 (1979–2025) WA 63 (1986–2026) CT 61 (1986–2025) PA 60 (1974–2025) NJ 55 (1958–2026) LA 53 (1985–2024) NM 49 (1983–2024) FL 43 (1976–2026) CO 43 (1976–2026) NC 40 (1984–2026) ID 34 (1978–2026) RI 32 (1985–2022) WI 30 (1977–2024) MD 29 (1975–2025) MI 28 (1981–2024) MO 24 (1964–2021) IA 23 (1996–2023) MS 23 (1979–2024) KS 22 (1981–2022) MA 21 (1982–2024) VA 21 (1980–2024) SC 20 (1984–2020) OR 18 (1952–2025) AZ 18 (1985–2025) MN 17 (1988–2025) UT 17 (1989–2025) KY 16 (1987–2026) GA 14 (1992–2023) NE 12 (1983–2023) MT 11 (1993–2025) HI 10 (1994–2025) OK 9 (1983–2022) ND 9 (1985–2024) WV 8 (1983–2025) DC 8 (1986–2016) VT 8 (1992–2020) AL 7 (1986–2007) AK 7 (1983–2022) IN 7 (1993–2019) NV 6 (2008–2016) WY 6 (1984–2024) ME 5 (1992–2018) AR 5 (1981–2008) NH 4 (1991–2007) SD 3 (2001–2023) DE 2 (2013–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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