case-by-case analysis in New Mexico

2024As such, “harmless error review necessarily 11 requires a case-by-case analysis.” Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 44 . 12 {15} We emphasize that “constitutional error cannot be deemed harmless simply 13 because there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” Alvarez-Lopez, 14 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 32 .

2021The pastor’s testimony also served to buttress the testimony of the State’s first two witnesses, since the pastor indicated that Defendant admitted to “ha[ving] sex” with Victim after being made aware that the pastor knew about the meeting Defendant had with his family. {15} Nevertheless, “harmless error review necessarily requires a case-by-case analysis[,]” Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 44 , and we conclude that the error here was harmless despite the emphasis placed on the pastor’s testimony at trial.

2017See United States v. Katz, 178 F.3d 2 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A case by case analysis will encounter some images in 3 which the models are prepubescent children who are so obviously less than [eighteen] 4 years old that expert testimony is not necessary or helpful to the fact finder.”); State 5 v. Reinpold, 824 N.W.2d 713 , 723 & n.20, 724 (Neb. 2013) (noting that several courts 6 have concluded that it is not always necessary for the prosecution to present expert 7 testimony on the minor’s age); State v. May, 829 A.2d 1106, 1118-19 (N.J.

2017See United States v. Katz, 178 F.3d 19 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A case by case analysis will encounter some images in 23 1 which the models are prepubescent children who are so obviously less than [eighteen] 2 years old that expert testimony is not necessary or helpful to the fact finder.”); State 3 v. Reinpold, 824 N.W.2d 713 , 723 & n.20, 724 (Neb. 2013) (noting that several courts 4 have concluded that it is not always necessary for the prosecution to present expert 5 testimony on the minor’s age); State v. May, 829 A.2d 1106, 1118-19 (N.J.

2023Instead, we interpret the seminal political question cases of Baker v. Carr and Marbury as requiring a case- by-case analysis, Baker, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (“Much confusion results from the capacity of the ‘political question’ label to obscure the need for case-by-case inquiry.

2023Instead, we interpret the seminal political question cases of Baker v. Carr and Marbury as requiring a case-by-case analysis, Baker, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (“Much confusion results from the capacity of the ‘political question’ label to obscure the need for case-by-case inquiry.

2016State v. 9 Morales, 2002-NMCA-052, ¶¶ 21, 23 , 132 N.M.146, 45 P.3d 406 , overruled on other 10 grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008 , ¶ 37 n.6, 275 P.3d 110 . 11 {30} Additionally, “[i]mproperly admitted evidence is not grounds for a new trial 12 unless the error is determined to be harmful.” Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 25 . 13 “[H]armless error review necessarily requires a case-by-case analysis” of whether a 14 guilty verdict is attributable to a particular evidentiary error.

2016State v. 9 Morales, 2002-NMCA-052, ¶¶ 21, 23 , 132 N.M.146, 45 P.3d 406 , overruled on other 10 grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008 , ¶ 37 n.6, 275 P.3d 110 . 11 {30} Additionally, “[i]mproperly admitted evidence is not grounds for a new trial 12 unless the error is determined to be harmful.” Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 25 . 13 “[H]armless error review necessarily requires a case-by-case analysis” of whether a 14 guilty verdict is attributable to a particular evidentiary error.

2015See, e.g., Capitol Hill Group, 569 F.3d at 489-90 (holding that malpractice claims stemming from services provided in bankruptcy proceedings fall within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court); Grausz, 321 F.3d at 474 (holding that a claim for affirmative relief from malpractice could have been filed in bankruptcy court with an objection to a fee application); In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 200 F.3d at 389-91 (recognizing that a fee application in bankruptcy court is a contested matter to which an objection may be filed and that an affirmative malpractice claim may be filed with such an object

2015See, e.g., Capitol Hill 14 Group, 569 F.3d at 489-90 (holding that malpractice claims stemming from services 15 provided in bankruptcy proceedings fall within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 16 court); Grausz, 321 F.3d at 474 (holding that a claim for affirmative relief from 17 malpractice could have been filed in bankruptcy court with an objection to a fee 18 application); In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 200 F.3d at 389-91 (recognizing that a fee 14 1 application in bankruptcy court is a contested matter to which an objection may be 2 filed and that an affirmative malpractice claim may be fil

2015See, e.g., Capitol Hill Group, 569 F.3d at 489-90 (holding that malpractice claims stemming from services provided in bankruptcy proceedings fall within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court); Grausz, 321 F.3d at 474 (holding that a claim for affirmative relief from malpractice could have been filed in bankruptcy court with an objection to a fee application); In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 200 F.3d at 389-91 (recognizing that a fee application in bankruptcy court is a contested matter to which an objection may be filed and that an affirmative malpractice claim may be filed with such an object

2015See, e.g., Capitol Hill 14 Group, 569 F.3d at 489-90 (holding that malpractice claims stemming from services 15 provided in bankruptcy proceedings fall within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 16 court); Grausz, 321 F.3d at 474 (holding that a claim for affirmative relief from 17 malpractice could have been filed in bankruptcy court with an objection to a fee 18 application); In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 200 F.3d at 389-91 (recognizing that a fee 14 1 application in bankruptcy court is a contested matter to which an objection may be 2 filed and that an affirmative malpractice claim may be fil

2015See, e.g., Capitol Hill Group, 569 F.3d at 489-90 (holding that malpractice claims stemming from services provided in bankruptcy proceedings fall within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court); Grausz, 321 F.3d at 474 (holding that a claim for affirmative relief from malpractice could have been filed in bankruptcy court with an objection to a fee application); In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 200 F.3d at 389-91 (recognizing that a fee application in bankruptcy court is a contested matter to which an objection may be filed and that an affirmative malpractice claim may be filed with such an object

2015See, e.g., Capitol Hill 14 Group, 569 F.3d at 489-90 (holding that malpractice claims stemming from services 15 provided in bankruptcy proceedings fall within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 16 court); Grausz, 321 F.3d at 474 (holding that a claim for affirmative relief from 17 malpractice could have been filed in bankruptcy court with an objection to a fee 18 application); In re Intelogic Trace, Inc., 200 F.3d at 389-91 (recognizing that a fee 14 1 application in bankruptcy court is a contested matter to which an objection may be 2 filed and that an affirmative malpractice claim may be fil

2011When, 17 at trial, the Public Defender Department claims that a conflict exists, the district court 18 shall: (1) determine whether a conflict of interest or other 19 disqualification of the office of public defender in fact exists, (2) 20 determine whether the conflict or disqualification is local or statewide, 21 (3) if the conflict or disqualification is local, direct the Chief Public 5 1 Defender to provide a staff attorney or contract attorney from another 2 county or district to represent the indigent, and (4) if the conflict or 3 disqualification extends beyond the county or district, t

2011When, 17 at trial, the Public Defender Department claims that a conflict exists, the district court 18 shall: (1) determine whether a conflict of interest or other 19 disqualification of the office of public defender in fact exists, (2) 20 determine whether the conflict or disqualification is local or statewide, 21 (3) if the conflict or disqualification is local, direct the Chief Public 5 1 Defender to provide a staff attorney or contract attorney from another 2 county or district to represent the indigent, and (4) if the conflict or 3 disqualification extends beyond the county or district, t

2010Capco Acquisub, Inc. v. Greka Energy Corp., 2007-NMCA-011, ¶ 27 , 140 N.M. 920 , 149 P.3d 1017 (‘Whether an appellant’s conduct amounts to excusable neglect will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.”); see also Sunwest Bank v. Roderiguez, 108 N.M. 211, 214 , 770 P.2d 533, 536 (1989) (holding that courts should analyze claims of excusable neglect based on the circumstances of each case).

2010Capco Acquisub, Inc. v. Greka Energy Corp., 2007-NMCA-011, ¶ 27 , 140 N.M. 920 , 149 P.3d 1017 (‘Whether an appellant’s conduct amounts to excusable neglect will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.”); see also Sunwest Bank v. Roderiguez, 108 N.M. 211, 214 , 770 P.2d 533, 536 (1989) (holding that courts should analyze claims of excusable neglect based on the circumstances of each case).

2024Cf., e.g., State v. Johnson, 2004-NMSC-029 , 13 ¶¶ 7, 32, 43, 136 N.M. 348 , 98 P.3d 998 (holding that the admission of testimonial 14 hearsay in a criminal trial without requiring confrontation was not harmless error 15 because the out-of-court statement “provided the only direct evidence of guilt”). 16 {39} We reiterate that our holding is based on the case-by-case analysis required 17 under Guthrie.

2024Cf., e.g., State v. Johnson, 2004-NMSC-029 , 13 ¶¶ 7, 32, 43, 136 N.M. 348 , 98 P.3d 998 (holding that the admission of testimonial 14 hearsay in a criminal trial without requiring confrontation was not harmless error 15 because the out-of-court statement “provided the only direct evidence of guilt”). 16 {39} We reiterate that our holding is based on the case-by-case analysis required 17 under Guthrie.

2011In contrast, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits applied a bright-line test, under which, “if the questions asked do not lengthen the stop, the questions are valid.” Id. ¶ 31. {13} We adopted the former analysis, relying specifically on United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir.2001), and United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir.2001), because “[o]ur case law has consistently disfavored a bight-line test in analyzing Fourth Amendment questions.” Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 34 , 138 N.M. 414 , 120 P.3d 836 .

2005See, e.g., Murillo, 255 F.3d at 1174 (holding that an officer must “articulate suspicious factors that are particularized and objective” in order to expand questioning beyond his or her justification for the initiation of contact); Ramos, 42 F.3d at 1163 (noting that a police officer must have suspicions raised by answers to routine questions in order to ask questions not reasonably related to the initial purpose of the stop). {31} We recognize that the Seventh and Fifth Circuits analyze permissible questions by police officers at valid traffic stops differently from the Tenth, Ninth and Eight

2017See United States v. Katz, 178 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A case by case analysis will encounter some images in which the models are prepubescent children who are so obviously less than [eighteen] years old that expert testimony is not necessary or helpful to the fact finder.”); State v. Reinpold, 824 N.W.2d 713 , 723 & n.20, 724 (Neb. 2013) (noting that several courts have concluded that it is not always necessary for the prosecution to present expert testimony on the minor’s age); State v. May, 829 A.2d 1106, 1118-19 (N.J.

2012See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) ("The inquiry ... [is] whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error."); see also Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, ¶ 37 , 146 N.M. 378 , 210 P.3d 804 ("[H]armless error analysis requires an appellate court to review the effect of an error in the unique context of the specific evidence presented at a given trial.").

2012See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) ("The inquiry ... [is] whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error."); see also Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, ¶ 37 , 146 N.M. 378 , 210 P.3d 804 ("[H]armless error analysis requires an appellate court to review the effect of an error in the unique context of the specific evidence presented at a given trial.").

2012See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) ("The inquiry ... [is] whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error."); see also Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, ¶ 37 , 146 N.M. 378 , 210 P.3d 804 ("[H]armless error analysis requires an appellate court to review the effect of an error in the unique context of the specific evidence presented at a given trial.").

2012See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) ("The inquiry ... [is] whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error."); see also Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, ¶ 37 , 146 N.M. 378 , 210 P.3d 804 ("[H]armless error analysis requires an appellate court to review the effect of an error in the unique context of the specific evidence presented at a given trial.").

2012See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) ("The inquiry ... [is] whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error."); see also Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, ¶ 37 , 146 N.M. 378 , 210 P.3d 804 ("[H]armless error analysis requires an appellate court to review the effect of an error in the unique context of the specific evidence presented at a given trial.").

2011See, e.g., People v. Arreola, 7 Cal.4th 1144 , 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 631 , 875 P.2d 736, 746 (1994).

2011See, e.g., People v. Arreola, 7 Cal.4th 1144 , 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 631 , 875 P.2d 736, 746 (1994).