case-by-case analysis in South Carolina

20 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

Case	Followed	Cited
Schmerber v. Californiagreen scotus · 1966 · cited in 3 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 2 sentences 2020See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (holding the warrantless blood draw of a DUI suspect was valid because the law enforcement officer, dealing with a car accident, could "reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence'"); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 165 (holding the determination of whether a warrantless blood draw of a DUI suspect qualifies as an exigent circumstance involves a case-by-case analysis of the totality of the circumstances and that the natural dissipation 2020See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (holding the warrantless blood draw of a DUI suspect was valid because the law enforcement officer, dealing with a car accident, could "reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence'"); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 165 (holding the determination of whether a warrantless blood draw of a DUI suspect qualifies as an exigent circumstance involves a case-by-case analysis of the totality of the circumstances and that the natural dissipation	3	3
Missouri v. McNeelygreen scotus · 2013 · cited in 3 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 2 sentences 2020See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (holding the warrantless blood draw of a DUI suspect was valid because the law enforcement officer, dealing with a car accident, could "reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence'"); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 165 (holding the determination of whether a warrantless blood draw of a DUI suspect qualifies as an exigent circumstance involves a case-by-case analysis of the totality of the circumstances and that the natural dissipation 2020See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (holding the warrantless blood draw of a DUI suspect was valid because the law enforcement officer, dealing with a car accident, could "reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence'"); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 165 (holding the determination of whether a warrantless blood draw of a DUI suspect qualifies as an exigent circumstance involves a case-by-case analysis of the totality of the circumstances and that the natural dissipation	3	3
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen scotus · 2016 · cited in 3 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 2 sentences 2020See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (holding the warrantless blood draw of a DUI suspect was valid because the law enforcement officer, dealing with a car accident, could "reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence'"); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 165 (holding the determination of whether a warrantless blood draw of a DUI suspect qualifies as an exigent circumstance involves a case-by-case analysis of the totality of the circumstances and that the natural dissipation 2020See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (holding the warrantless blood draw of a DUI suspect was valid because the law enforcement officer, dealing with a car accident, could "reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence'"); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 165 (holding the determination of whether a warrantless blood draw of a DUI suspect qualifies as an exigent circumstance involves a case-by-case analysis of the totality of the circumstances and that the natural dissipation	3	3
State v. Gatesgreen sc · 1977 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984 2 sentences 1984Shaw, supra, while approving the standards set out in Chapman, supra, for evaluating whether a Doyle violation is reversible error, holds that the determination must be made on a case-by-case analysis, citing Davis, supra. Our Court has held that testimony concerning a defendant’s refusal to give a statement to an officer, if error, would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where defendant’s “uncorroborated version of his part in the robbery was obviously incredible and the jury understandably did not believe him.” State v. Gates, supra 269 S. C. at 561, 238 S. E. (2d) 680 . 1984Shaw, supra, while approving the standards set out in Chapman, supra, for evaluating whether a Doyle violation is reversible error, holds that the determination must be made on a case-by-case analysis, citing Davis, supra. Our Court has held that testimony concerning a defendant’s refusal to give a statement to an officer, if error, would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where defendant’s “uncorroborated version of his part in the robbery was obviously incredible and the jury understandably did not believe him.” State v. Gates, supra 269 S. C. at 561, 238 S. E. (2d) 680 .	1	2
State v. Dostergreen sc · 1981 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 2 sentences 2019See Doster , 276 S.C. at 651 , 284 S.E.2d at 220 ("The public policy protecting confidential communications must be balanced against the public interest in the proper administration of justice." (emphasis added)). 715 Third, some jurisdictions take a middle-ground approach and find the answer depends on a case-by-case analysis of the facts. 7 This is the general approach we adopt when determining if the attorney-client privilege has been waived in a tort action against an insurer for bad faith refusal to deny coverage. 2019See Doster , 276 S.C. at 651 , 284 S.E.2d at 220 ("The public policy protecting confidential communications must be balanced against the public interest in the proper administration of justice." (emphasis added)). 715 Third, some jurisdictions take a middle-ground approach and find the answer depends on a case-by-case analysis of the facts. 7 This is the general approach we adopt when determining if the attorney-client privilege has been waived in a tort action against an insurer for bad faith refusal to deny coverage.	1	1
Milliken & Co. v. South Carolina Employment Security Commissiongreen scctapp · 1994 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 2 sentences 2013Comm'n, 315 S.C. 492, 497 , 445 S.E.2d 640, 644 (Ct. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 321 S.C. 349 , 468 S.E.2d 638 (1996) ("[T]he question of whether conduct is connected with work necessitates a case by case analysis."). 4. 2013Comm'n, 315 S.C. 492, 497 , 445 S.E.2d 640, 644 (Ct. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 321 S.C. 349 , 468 S.E.2d 638 (1996) ("[T]he question of whether conduct is connected with work necessitates a case by case analysis."). 4.	1	1
Milliken & Co. v. South Carolina Employment Security Commissiongreen sc · 1996 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 2 sentences 2013Comm'n, 315 S.C. 492, 497 , 445 S.E.2d 640, 644 (Ct. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 321 S.C. 349 , 468 S.E.2d 638 (1996) ("[T]he question of whether conduct is connected with work necessitates a case by case analysis."). 4. 2013Comm'n, 315 S.C. 492, 497 , 445 S.E.2d 640, 644 (Ct. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 321 S.C. 349 , 468 S.E.2d 638 (1996) ("[T]he question of whether conduct is connected with work necessitates a case by case analysis."). 4.	1	1
Lloyd v. Stategreen ga · 1988 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009See, e.g., Lloyd v. State, 258 Ga. 645 , 373 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1988) (finding defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, and stating “[w]e prefer to examine the facts of each case and grant relief where there is at least an inference from the evidence that the defendant would have accepted the offer as made or something similar”); Hanzelka v. State, 682 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. Ct.App.1984) (“This Court has concluded further that counsel’s 613 deficient performance prejudiced Hanzelka in that under the terms of the plea bargain he would not have served any time in jail.”). 2009See, e.g., Lloyd v. State, 258 Ga. 645 , 373 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1988) (finding defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, and stating “[w]e prefer to examine the facts of each case and grant relief where there is at least an inference from the evidence that the defendant would have accepted the offer as made or something similar”); Hanzelka v. State, 682 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. Ct.App.1984) (“This Court has concluded further that counsel’s 613 deficient performance prejudiced Hanzelka in that under the terms of the plea bargain he would not have served any time in jail.”).	1	1
Hanzelka v. Stategreen texapp · 1984 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 1 sentence 2009See, e.g., Lloyd v. State, 258 Ga. 645 , 373 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1988) (finding defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, and stating “[w]e prefer to examine the facts of each case and grant relief where there is at least an inference from the evidence that the defendant would have accepted the offer as made or something similar”); Hanzelka v. State, 682 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. Ct.App.1984) (“This Court has concluded further that counsel’s *613 deficient performance prejudiced Hanzelka in that under the terms of the plea bargain he would not have served any time in jail.”).	1	1
In re the Marriage of Cargillgreen colo · 1993 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 1 sentence 2001See generally Love, supra, at 289; In re Marriage of Cargill, 843 P.2d 1335, 1341 (Colo.1993); Peters v. Peters, 214 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Iowa 1974).	1	1
Peters v. Petersgreen iowa · 1974 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See generally Love, supra, at 289; In re Marriage of Cargill, 843 P.2d 1335, 1341 (Colo.1993); Peters v. Peters, 214 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Iowa 1974). 2001Fry, 85 Cal.Rptr. at 128 ; Peters, 214 N.W.2d at 156 ; Richards, 353 A.2d at 144 .	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

Case	Cited	Years
Mitchell v. Wisconsin green scotus · 2019 2 sentences 2020In Mitchell, the United States Supreme Court held the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement "almost always" justifies the warrantless drawing of blood from unconscious DUI suspects. 139 S. Ct. at 2531 . 2020In Mitchell, the United States Supreme Court held the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement "almost always" justifies the warrantless drawing of blood from unconscious DUI suspects. 139 S. Ct. at 2531 .	3	2020–2020
Fickett v. Superior Court of Pima County green arizctapp · 1976 2 sentences 2019In Fickett v. Superior Court of Pima County , 27 Ariz.App. 793 , 558 P.2d 988 (1976), another case we relied on in Fabian , the court similarly recognized the factors 163 are for use in a specific case-by-case analysis, 558 P.2d at 990 , and in particular in cases in which a person's liability to the beneficiary of an estate is in question, 558 P.2d at 989 -90 . 2019In Fickett v. Superior Court of Pima County , 27 Ariz.App. 793 , 558 P.2d 988 (1976), another case we relied on in Fabian , the court similarly recognized the factors 163 are for use in a specific case-by-case analysis, 558 P.2d at 990 , and in particular in cases in which a person's liability to the beneficiary of an estate is in question, 558 P.2d at 989 -90 .	3	2018–2019
State v. Powers green washctapp · 2004 2 sentences 2005The Court of Appeals of Washington, in State v. Powers, 124 Wash.App. 92 , 99 P.3d 1262 (2004), rejected a bright line rule that all 911 recordings are nontestimonial, opting instead to employ a case-by-case analysis into whether statements contained on a 911 recording originated from interrogation. 2005The Court of Appeals of Washington, in State v. Powers , 99 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004), rejected a bright line rule that all 911 recordings are nontestimonial, opting instead to employ a case-by-case analysis into whether statements contained on a 911 recording originated from interrogation.	2	2005–2005
Moore v. Moore green sc · 1989 2 sentences 2020"The rebuttable presumption standard requires a case by case analysis." Moore, 300 S.C. at 80 , 386 S.E.2d at 458 . 2020"The rebuttable presumption standard requires a case by case analysis." Moore, 300 S.C. at 80 , 386 S.E.2d at 458 .	1	2020–2020
In Re Kunstler. green ca4 · 1990 1 sentence 2018The party seeking sanctions may avoid such problems by notifying his opponent and the court of his intention to pursue sanctions at the earliest possible date." Id.	1	2018–2018
Wickham v. Equity Fire & Casualty Co. green oklacivapp · 1994 2 sentences 2010Instead, the court held that “the determination of whether the policy definition of ‘occupying’ is satisfied should be left to a case-by-case analysis, depending on the circumstances of the accident, the use of the vehicle, the relevant terms of the coverage at issue, and any underlying public policy considerations.” Id. 2010Therefore, the court found a man who was struck by another car while fixing the tire on a car was “occupying” the vehicle. 10 Id.	1	2010–2010
Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Systems & Services, Inc. green sc · 2001 2 sentences 2006Code Ann. § 33-14-300 310 (2006) (delineating grounds and procedures for judicial dissolution of a corporation); Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Systems & Services, Inc. , 343 S.C. 587 , 541 S.E.2d 257 (2001) (articulating that the definition of oppression is best left to judicial construction based on a case-by-case analysis of the fact-specific circumstances in each case). 2006Code Ann. § 33-14-300 310 (2006) (delineating grounds and procedures for judicial dissolution of a corporation); Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Systems & Services, Inc. , 343 S.C. 587 , 541 S.E.2d 257 (2001) (articulating that the definition of oppression is best left to judicial construction based on a case-by-case analysis of the fact-specific circumstances in each case).	1	2006–2006
State v. Powers green washctapp · 2004 1 sentence 2005The Court of Appeals of Washington, in State v. Powers, 124 Wash.App. 92 , 99 P.3d 1262 (2004), rejected a bright line rule that all 911 recordings are nontestimonial, opting instead to employ a case-by-case analysis into whether statements contained on a 911 recording originated from interrogation.	1	2005–2005
Peirson v. Calhoun green scctapp · 1992 2 sentences 2001Splawn, 311 S.C. at 425 , 429 S.E.2d at 807 ; Peirson v. Calhoun, 308 S.C. 246 , 417 S.E.2d 604 (Ct.App.1992). 2001Splawn, 311 S.C. at 425 , 429 S.E.2d at 807 ; Peirson v. Calhoun, 308 S.C. 246 , 417 S.E.2d 604 (Ct.App.1992).	1	2001–2001
Fry v. Fry green calctapp · 1970 1 sentence 2001Fry, 85 Cal.Rptr. at 128 ; Peters, 214 N.W.2d at 156 ; Richards, 353 A.2d at 144 .	1	2001–2001
Richards v. Richards green njsuperctappdiv · 1976 1 sentence 2001Fry, 85 Cal.Rptr. at 128 ; Peters, 214 N.W.2d at 156 ; Richards, 353 A.2d at 144 .	1	2001–2001
Splawn v. Splawn green sc · 1993 2 sentences 2001Splawn, 311 S.C. at 425 , 429 S.E.2d at 807 ; Peirson v. Calhoun, 308 S.C. 246 , 417 S.E.2d 604 (Ct.App.1992). 2001Splawn, 311 S.C. at 425 , 429 S.E.2d at 807 ; Peirson v. Calhoun, 308 S.C. 246 , 417 S.E.2d 604 (Ct.App.1992).	1	2001–2001
State in Interest of KAW green nj · 1986 2 sentences 1991State In Interest of K.A.W., 104 N.J. 112 , 515 A. (2d) 1217 (1986); People v. Morris, 61 N.Y. (2d) 290, 473 N.Y.S. (2d) 769, 461 N.E. (2d) 1256 (1984). 1991State In Interest of K.A.W. , 104 N.J. 112 , 515 A. (2d) 1217 (1986); People v. Morris , 61 N.Y. (2d) 290, 473 N.Y.S. (2d) 769, 461 N.E. (2d) 1256 (1984).	1	1991–1991
State Ex Rel. McLeod v. McInnis green sc · 1982 1 sentence 1987Case-by-case analysis is necessary because “there is tolerated in complex areas of government of necessity from time to time some overlap of authority and some encroachment to a limited degree.” Id. at 313, 295 S. E. (2d) at 636 .	1	1987–1987

Statutes the citing opinions construe

SC § S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TN 121 (1985–2026) CA 110 (1974–2026) IL 90 (1978–2025) NY 83 (1972–2026) TX 75 (1972–2025) OH 72 (1979–2025) WA 63 (1986–2026) CT 61 (1986–2025) PA 60 (1974–2025) NJ 55 (1958–2026) LA 53 (1985–2024) NM 49 (1983–2024) FL 43 (1976–2026) CO 43 (1976–2026) NC 40 (1984–2026) ID 34 (1978–2026) RI 32 (1985–2022) WI 30 (1977–2024) MD 29 (1975–2025) MI 28 (1981–2024) MO 24 (1964–2021) IA 23 (1996–2023) MS 23 (1979–2024) KS 22 (1981–2022) MA 21 (1982–2024) VA 21 (1980–2024) SC 20 (1984–2020) OR 18 (1952–2025) AZ 18 (1985–2025) MN 17 (1988–2025) UT 17 (1989–2025) KY 16 (1987–2026) GA 14 (1992–2023) NE 12 (1983–2023) MT 11 (1993–2025) HI 10 (1994–2025) OK 9 (1983–2022) ND 9 (1985–2024) WV 8 (1983–2025) DC 8 (1986–2016) VT 8 (1992–2020) AL 7 (1986–2007) AK 7 (1983–2022) IN 7 (1993–2019) NV 6 (2008–2016) WY 6 (1984–2024) ME 5 (1992–2018) AR 5 (1981–2008) NH 4 (1991–2007) SD 3 (2001–2023) DE 2 (2013–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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