60 Pennsylvania opinions name it 7 courts 1974–2025 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. McAfeegreen2 sentences2022Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004). 2006Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa.Super.2004). ¶ 19 We conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine what allegations constitute a substantial question. | 4 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Kylegreen2 sentences2017“This interpretation and resultant bright-line rule,” the Court explained, “will obviate the necessity of evi-dentiary hearings into the particulars of each electronic monitoring program around the Commonwealth, which would be necessary to implement a case-by-case test.” Id. at 22. 2015In Chiappini, the lead opinion, authored by Justice Zappala and joined by then Chief Justice Flaherty and Justice Newman, “suggested a case-by-case test for determining whether a person on an electronic monitoring program has spent time in Section 9760 custody, which would require the examination of the extent of control exercised by those in authority in the program.” Kyle, supra, 874 A.2d at 19 . | 3 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Brickergreen2 sentences2017“A claim that a sentence is manifestly excessive such that it constitutes too severe a punishment raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Kelly, 33 A.3d 638, 640 (Pa. Super. 2011); Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa. Super. 2005) (appellant raised a substantial question when he claimed that a sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence and failed to consider substantial mitigating factors). “[A]n averment that the court sentenced based solely on the seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors raises a - 13 - J-S89040-16 substantial question.” Com 2016“We conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine what allegations constitute a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b). “[A]n averment that the court sentenced based solely on the seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 875 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Malovichgreen2 sentences2017“We conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine what allegations constitute a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b). 2016“We conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine what allegations constitute a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Sweeneygreen2 sentences2016Therefore, “resolution of the problem turns upon a case by case analysis with particular attention to the reasons given by the trial court at the time the request for withdrawal is denied.” Id. 1998Therefore, “resolution of the problem turns upon a case by case analysis with particular attention to the reasons given by the trial court at the time the request for withdrawal is denied.” Id. | 2 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. BOROVICHKAgreen2 sentences2025See Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2011). 2022Rather, when determining whether suppression is the appropriate remedy, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances of the case.” Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing O’ Shea, supra at 1030 ); see also Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967, 972 (Pa.Super. 2008) (when deciding suppression issues based on MPJA violations, a reviewing court must engage in a case-by-case analysis, based on the totality of the circumstances). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Henrygreen2 sentences2022Rather, when determining whether suppression is the appropriate remedy, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances of the case.” Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing O’ Shea, supra at 1030 ); see also Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967, 972 (Pa.Super. 2008) (when deciding suppression issues based on MPJA violations, a reviewing court must engage in a case-by-case analysis, based on the totality of the circumstances). 2011Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967, 972 (Pa. Super.2008). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Perrygreen2 sentences2017“A claim that a sentence is manifestly excessive such that it constitutes too severe a punishment raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Kelly, 33 A.3d 638, 640 (Pa. Super. 2011); Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa. Super. 2005) (appellant raised a substantial question when he claimed that a sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence and failed to consider substantial mitigating factors). “[A]n averment that the court sentenced based solely on the seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors raises a - 13 - J-S89040-16 substantial question.” Com 2016“A claim that a sentence is manifestly excessive such that it constitutes too severe a punishment raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Kelly, 33 A.3d 638, 640 (Pa. Super. 2011); -6- J-S71044-16 Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa. Super. 2005) (concluding appellant raised a substantial question when he claimed that a sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence and failed to consider substantial mitigating factors). “[A]n averment that the court sentenced based solely on the seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors raises a substantial questi | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Kellygreen2 sentences2017“A claim that a sentence is manifestly excessive such that it constitutes too severe a punishment raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Kelly, 33 A.3d 638, 640 (Pa. Super. 2011); Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa. Super. 2005) (appellant raised a substantial question when he claimed that a sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence and failed to consider substantial mitigating factors). “[A]n averment that the court sentenced based solely on the seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors raises a - 13 - J-S89040-16 substantial question.” Com 2016“A claim that a sentence is manifestly excessive such that it constitutes too severe a punishment raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Kelly, 33 A.3d 638, 640 (Pa. Super. 2011); -6- J-S71044-16 Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa. Super. 2005) (concluding appellant raised a substantial question when he claimed that a sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence and failed to consider substantial mitigating factors). “[A]n averment that the court sentenced based solely on the seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors raises a substantial questi | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Chester, M., Aplt.green2 sentences2016See Chester, supra at 65 . 2015See Chester, 101 A.3d at 65 . | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Mageegreen2 sentences2023Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1102 (quoting Magee, 177 A.3d at 322-23 ). 2023Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1102 (quoting Magee, 177 A.3d at 322-23 ). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Vanskivergreen2 sentences2006After Chiappini , came the Delaware County 2003 en banc Superior court decision in Commonwealth v. Vanskiver, 819 A.2d 69 (Pa.Super.2003), which denied credit for time served, but did so employing the case-by-case basis of Chiap-pini, and concluding that the terms of the electronic monitoring were not so restrictive as to be considered “in custody.” To the extent Vanskiver used the case-by-case test, it also was overruled by Kyle . 2005See Vanskiver, 819 A.2d at 79 (Graci, J., concurring). | 1 | 2 |
D'Agata National Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen1 sentence2022Remaining aware that this is a case-by-case inquiry and that each matter will depend on its evidence, the foregoing cases suggest that the personal comfort doctrine may apply when the claimant’s time away from the work premises is informal in nature, purely devoted to personal comfort of a physical nature, such as a cigarette break or to procure food, and brief enough that the course of employment is not broken. 1912 Hoover House Rest., 103 A.3d at 444 (cigarette break outside of restaurant); Dixon, 764 A.2d at 637 (takeout food from restaurant in building lobby); D’Agata, 479 A.2d at 99 (cup | 1 | 1 |
U.S. Airways v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen1 sentence2022Remaining aware that this is a case-by-case inquiry and that each matter will depend on its evidence, the foregoing cases suggest that the personal comfort doctrine may apply when the claimant’s time away from the work premises is informal in nature, purely devoted to personal comfort of a physical nature, such as a cigarette break or to procure food, and brief enough that the course of employment is not broken. 1912 Hoover House Rest., 103 A.3d at 444 (cigarette break outside of restaurant); Dixon, 764 A.2d at 637 (takeout food from restaurant in building lobby); D’Agata, 479 A.2d at 99 (cup | 1 | 1 |
1912 Hoover House Restaurant v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen1 sentence2022Remaining aware that this is a case-by-case inquiry and that each matter will depend on its evidence, the foregoing cases suggest that the personal comfort doctrine may apply when the claimant’s time away from the work premises is informal in nature, purely devoted to personal comfort of a physical nature, such as a cigarette break or to procure food, and brief enough that the course of employment is not broken. 1912 Hoover House Rest., 103 A.3d at 444 (cigarette break outside of restaurant); Dixon, 764 A.2d at 637 (takeout food from restaurant in building lobby); D’Agata, 479 A.2d at 99 (cup | 1 | 1 |
Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen1 sentence2018Giant Eagle , 39 A.3d at 298 (conducting an ambiguity analysis as to the meaning of "compensation" in section 314(a) and concluding that it "need not always include medical benefits"). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Chiappinigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Chopakgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| McKune v. Lilegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKlinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Com. v. Dentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Drucegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. McCalmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Cronicgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Estate of Brockermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matukonis v. Trainergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rossi v. Pennsylvania State Universitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holden v. Hardygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Beachem v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Reviewgreen1 sentence2024Id.; Shaffer, 928 A.2d at 394 ; but see Beachem, 760 A.2d at 71 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Devlin
green
2 sentences2020The Court emphasized that a case-by-case inquiry, which considered the nature of the crime and the age of the victim, was appropriate, and the Commonwealth must only fix the date of the offense “with reasonable certainty.” Id. at 890-92 . 2019The Court emphasized that a case-by-case inquiry, which considered the nature of the crime and the age of the victim, was appropriate, and the Commonwealth must only fix the date of the offense “with reasonable certainty.” Id. at 890-92 . - 13 - J-A29018-18 In this case, the trial court considered the facts and the controlling authority and concluded that the Commonwealth had fixed the time frame of the charged offenses with “reasonable certainty” considering the age of the victim at the time of the alleged crimes. | 3 | 2019–2024 |
Joella, R. v. Cole, A.
green
2 sentences2024Instead, Mutual Benefit says, “even if the landlord is required by the lease to insure the property, Pennsylvania courts must perform a case-by-case inquiry - 17 - J-A16024-23 into the reasonable expectations of the parties about whether the tenant would be an implied co-insured under the landlord’s insurance policy, based upon the language of the lease agreement itself.” Mutual Benefit’s Brief at 18-19 (citing Joella, supra). 2023Instead, Mutual Benefit says, “even if the landlord is required by the lease to insure the property, Pennsylvania courts must perform a case-by-case inquiry - 17 - J-A16024-23 into the reasonable expectations of the parties about whether the tenant would be an implied co-insured under the landlord’s insurance policy, based upon the language of the lease agreement itself.” Mutual Benefit’s Brief at 18-19 (citing Joella, supra). | 2 | 2023–2024 |
Remy v. Michael D'S Carpet Outlets
green
2 sentences2019However, Pennsylvania does not adopt a per se rule on subrogation, but instead adopts a case by case analysis.”) (citing Remy, 571 A.2d 446 ); see also Dattel Family Ltd. 2019However, Pennsylvania does not adopt a per se rule on subrogation, but instead adopts a case by case analysis.”) (citing Remy, 571 A.2d 446 ); see also Dattel Family Ltd. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Kriston
green
2 sentences2007Kyle thus noted that the Chiappini plurality’s case-by-case test was an aberration within a general trend against allowing credit for home arrest, which had been in place since Commonwealth v. Kriston, 527 Pa. 90 , 588 A.2d 898 (1991) (holding that credit generally is not due for time spent on home monitoring, but for equitable reasons, credit was awarded). ¶ 12 The Kyle Court, with only Justice Newman dissenting, concluded that: In summary, the proposed case-by-case test for credit for time served, as set forth by the lead opinion in Chiappini , was not endorsed by a majority of the Court and 2007Kyle thus noted that the Chiappini plurality’s case-by-case test was an aberration within a general trend against allowing credit for home arrest, which had been in place since Commonwealth v. Kriston, 527 Pa. 90 , 588 A.2d 898 (1991) (holding that credit generally is not due for time spent on home monitoring, but for equitable reasons, credit was awarded). ¶ 12 The Kyle Court, with only Justice Newman dissenting, concluded that: In summary, the proposed case-by-case test for credit for time served, as set forth by the lead opinion in Chiappini , was not endorsed by a majority of the Court and | 2 | 2005–2007 |
Shaffer v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
green
1 sentence2024Id.; Shaffer, 928 A.2d at 394 ; but see Beachem, 760 A.2d at 71 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In Re Broad Mountain Development Co., LLC
green
1 sentence2023In re Broad Mountain, 17 A.3d at 443 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth v. Strickler
green
1 sentence2023The totality-of-the-circumstances test [ultimately centers] on whether the suspect has in some way been restrained by physical force or show of coercive authority. [See Strickler, 757 A.2d at 890 ]. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth v. Hann
green
1 sentence2023The Court reviewed practices in other jurisdictions and concluded the language of Rule 536(A)(2)(d) “implicates a case-by-case analysis of when forfeiture is or is not proper, and whether that forfeiture should be for the full sum of the bail or some reduced amount.” Id. at 67 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth v. O'Shea
green
1 sentence2022Rather, when determining whether suppression is the appropriate remedy, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances of the case.” Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing O’ Shea, supra at 1030 ); see also Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967, 972 (Pa.Super. 2008) (when deciding suppression issues based on MPJA violations, a reviewing court must engage in a case-by-case analysis, based on the totality of the circumstances). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2020Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Dale Manufacturing Co. v. Bressi
green
1 sentence2018Co., 421 A.2d at 654 . [J-24-2018] - 7 “compensation,” as used in article III of the WCA, is required whenever that word is capable of at least two valid interpretations. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re KTEL
green
1 sentence2016Id. (declining to quash or dismiss appeal or to waive issues, in light of purpose to expedite disposition of children’s fast track appeals, where mother filed her concise statement three days after notice of appeal and late filing did not prejudice other parties in case). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Commonwealth v. Sandusky
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 668 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| S.J.S. v. M.J.S. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| O'Reilly v. (a) Hickory On Green Homeowners Ass'n green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Commonwealth v. Conahan green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Commonwealth v. Frye green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Morgan's Home Equipment Corp. v. Martucci green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| United Refining Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Wilkes-Barre Iron & Wire Works, Inc. v. Pargas of Wilkes-Barre, Inc. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Motheral v. Burkhart green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Skinner v. Flymo, Inc. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Angelet v. Shivar green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Gillespie-Linton v. Miles green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Sostock v. Reiss green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Jacob v. New Kensington Y.M.C.A. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.