8 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
John Bruce Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Incorporatedgreen2 sentences2016See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir.2001) (“[A]ppropriate inquiry is one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum in a particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, ie., a case-by-case analysis that focuses, among other things, upon the claimant’s ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims”); Burden v. Check Into Cash, LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir.2001) (fin 2016See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[A]ppropriate inquiry is one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum in a particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, i.e., a case-by-case analysis that focuses, among other things, upon the claimant’s ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims”); Burden v. Check into Cash, LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2001) ( | 1 | 1 |
Beverly Burden v. Check Into Cash of Kentucky, LLCgreen2 sentences2016See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir.2001) (“[A]ppropriate inquiry is one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum in a particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, ie., a case-by-case analysis that focuses, among other things, upon the claimant’s ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims”); Burden v. Check Into Cash, LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir.2001) (fin 2016See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[A]ppropriate inquiry is one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum in a particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, i.e., a case-by-case analysis that focuses, among other things, upon the claimant’s ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims”); Burden v. Check into Cash, LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2001) ( | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Stanley Sowa, Jr., Also Known as Alfred Junior, IIgreen1 sentence2009See Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990); U.S. v. Ross, 123 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.1997); see also U.S. v. Sabath, 990 F.Supp. 1007, 1017-18 (N.D.Ill.1998) (adding Seventh Circuit to tally of circuits using balancing test rather than rigid standard of fault, based on careful reading of U.S. v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447 (7th Cir.1994)). 17 *602 Before adopting its standard for analyzing preindictment delay in Howell, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the guidance offered by the United States Supreme Court. [I]n both Lovasco and Marion , the Supreme Court made it clear that the administration | 1 | 1 |
Wilton Howell v. W.R. Barker Attorney General of the State of North Carolinagreen1 sentence2009See Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990); U.S. v. Ross, 123 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.1997); see also U.S. v. Sabath, 990 F.Supp. 1007, 1017-18 (N.D.Ill.1998) (adding Seventh Circuit to tally of circuits using balancing test rather than rigid standard of fault, based on careful reading of U.S. v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447 (7th Cir.1994)). 17 *602 Before adopting its standard for analyzing preindictment delay in Howell, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the guidance offered by the United States Supreme Court. [I]n both Lovasco and Marion , the Supreme Court made it clear that the administration | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Sabathgreen1 sentence2009See Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990); U.S. v. Ross, 123 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.1997); see also U.S. v. Sabath, 990 F.Supp. 1007, 1017-18 (N.D.Ill.1998) (adding Seventh Circuit to tally of circuits using balancing test rather than rigid standard of fault, based on careful reading of U.S. v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447 (7th Cir.1994)). 17 *602 Before adopting its standard for analyzing preindictment delay in Howell, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the guidance offered by the United States Supreme Court. [I]n both Lovasco and Marion , the Supreme Court made it clear that the administration | 1 | 1 |
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William ROSS, Defendant-Appellantgreen1 sentence2009See Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990); U.S. v. Ross, 123 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.1997); see also U.S. v. Sabath, 990 F.Supp. 1007, 1017-18 (N.D.Ill.1998) (adding Seventh Circuit to tally of circuits using balancing test rather than rigid standard of fault, based on careful reading of U.S. v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447 (7th Cir.1994)). 17 *602 Before adopting its standard for analyzing preindictment delay in Howell, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the guidance offered by the United States Supreme Court. [I]n both Lovasco and Marion , the Supreme Court made it clear that the administration | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lovascogreen2 sentences2009Rather than establishing a black-letter test for determining unconstitutional preindictment delay, the Court examined the facts in conjunction with the basic due process inquiry: “whether the action complained of ... violates those ‘fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions’... and which define ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency.’ ” Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790 , 97 S.Ct. at 2048 (citations omitted). 2009Rather than establishing a black-letter test for determining unconstitutional preindictment delay, the Court examined the facts in conjunction with the basic due process inquiry: “whether the action complained of ... violates those ‘fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions’... and which define ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency.’ ” Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790 , 97 S.Ct. at 2048 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cecilgreen2 sentences2007Thus, the case-by-case analysis rests on the reasonableness of the actions of the police and has been explained in the following manner: the “reasonableness” of a warrantless search or entry under the emergency doctrine is established by the “compelling need to render immediate assistance to the victim of a crime, or insure the safety of the occupants of a house when the police reasonably believe them to be in distress and in need of protection.” Id., 173 W.Va. at 32 , 311 S.E.2d at 150 (internal citations omitted). 2007Thus, the case-by-case analysis rests on the reasonableness of the actions of the police and has been explained in the following manner: the “reasonableness” of a warrantless search or entry under the emergency doctrine is established by the “compelling need to render immediate assistance to the victim of a crime, or insure the safety of the occupants of a house when the police reasonably believe them to be in distress and in need of protection.” Id., 173 W.Va. at 32 , 311 S.E.2d at 150 (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Welch v. Helveringgreen2 sentences1995See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 , 54 S.Ct. 8 , 78 L.Ed. 212 (1933). 1995See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 , 54 S.Ct. 8 , 78 L.Ed. 212 (1933). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Delbert Mobley
green
1 sentence2025We believe that the reasoning of Mobley is sound; a case-by-case analysis of immediacy and exigency, i.e., whether questions posed to a suspect in the absence of Miranda warnings were prompted by “an objectively reasonable concern for immediate danger to police or public,” Mobley, 40 F.3d at 693 , will ensure that the Quarles exception is not applied so broadly as to swallow the Miranda rule wholesale. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2025Thus, we hold that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph
green
2 sentences2016Consistent with Green Tree, the court in Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93 , 655 S.E.2d 362 (2008), found an arbitration clause substantively unconscionable because the collective effect of its provisions would have precluded the plaintiffs from “ ‘vindicating [their] ... rights in the arbitral forum.’” Id. at 371 (quoting Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 , 121 S.Ct. 513 ). 2016Consistent with Green Tree, the court in Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93 , 655 S.E.2d 362 (2008), found an arbitration clause substantively unconscionable because the collective effect of its provisions would have precluded the plaintiffs from “ ‘vindicating [their] ... rights in the arbitral forum.’” Id. at 371 (quoting Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 , 121 S.Ct. 513 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Consistent with Green Tree, the court in Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93 , 655 S.E.2d 362 (2008), found an arbitration clause substantively unconscionable because the collective effect of its provisions would have precluded the plaintiffs from “ ‘vindicating [their] ... rights in the arbitral forum.’” Id. at 371 (quoting Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 , 121 S.Ct. 513 ). 2016Consistent with Green Tree, the court in Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93 , 655 S.E.2d 362 (2008), found an arbitration clause substantively unconscionable because the collective effect of its provisions would have precluded the plaintiffs from “ ‘vindicating [their] ... rights in the arbitral forum.’” Id. at 371 (quoting Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 , 121 S.Ct. 513 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Taylor v. Hoffman
green
2 sentences2003However, we held in Syllabus Point 7 of Taylor v. Hoffman, 209 W.Va. 172 , 544 S.E.2d 387 (2001) that this period of limitations was not retroactive, and a case-by-case analysis should be applied to cases filed before the 1999 amendment. 2003However, we held in Syllabus Point 7 of Taylor v. Hoffman, 209 W.Va. 172 , 544 S.E.2d 387 (2001) that this period of limitations was not retroactive, and a case-by-case analysis should be applied to cases filed before the 1999 amendment. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Paul v. National Life
green
2 sentences1998We therefore adhere to the rule that the doctrine of lex loci delicti will not be invoked where “the application of the substantive law of a foreign state ... contravenes the public policy of this State.” Paul, 177 W.Va. at 433 , 352 S.E.2d at 556 . 1998We therefore adhere to the rule that the doctrine of lex loci delicti will not be invoked where “the application of the substantive law of a foreign state ... contravenes the public policy of this State.” Paul, 177 W.Va. at 433 , 352 S.E.2d at 556 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.
green
2 sentences1983Syllabus Point 4, Morningstar, supra. Although we noted in Momingstar that products liability cases require a case-by-case analysis, we provided a general outline to be followed. “[T]he cause of action rests in tort, and ... the initial inquiry, in order to fix liability on the manufacturer, focuses on the nature of the defect and whether the defect was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.” Id. 162 W.Va. at 888 , 253 S.E.2d at 682 . 1983Syllabus Point 4, Morningstar, supra. Although we noted in Momingstar that products liability cases require a case-by-case analysis, we provided a general outline to be followed. “[T]he cause of action rests in tort, and ... the initial inquiry, in order to fix liability on the manufacturer, focuses on the nature of the defect and whether the defect was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.” Id. 162 W.Va. at 888 , 253 S.E.2d at 682 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.