detailed analysis in Kansas

1980A detailed analysis of the statute is unnecessary since that was done in Aylward Production Corp. v. Corporation Commission, 162 Kan. 428 , 176 P.2d 861 .

1980A detailed analysis of the statute is unnecessary since that was done in Aylward Production Corp. v. Corporation Commission, 162 Kan. 428 , 176 P.2d 861 .

2024Our Supreme Court provided a detailed analysis of the corpus delicti rule in State v. Dern, 303 Kan. 384, 399-411 , 362 P.3d 566 (2015), where the defendant was also convicted of aggravated indecent liberties of a child.

2024Our Supreme Court provided a detailed analysis of the corpus delicti rule in State v. Dern, 303 Kan. 384, 399-411 , 362 P.3d 566 (2015), where the defendant was also convicted of aggravated indecent liberties of a child.

2021Co., 269 Kan. 272, 279 , 3 P.3d 81 (2000), after our Supreme Court conducted a detailed analysis of attorney fee shifting statutes (both federal and state), the court held that "[t]he primary purpose of the Kansas fee-shifting statute [K.S.A. 40-256] is to benefit the insured." (Emphasis added.) We do not discern that the district court intended to penalize AmGuard or award a windfall to AV Homes.

2021Co., 269 Kan. 272, 279 , 3 P.3d 81 (2000), after our Supreme Court conducted a detailed analysis of attorney fee shifting statutes (both federal and state), the court held that "[t]he primary purpose of the Kansas fee-shifting statute [K.S.A. 40-256] is to benefit the insured." (Emphasis added.) We do not discern that the district court intended to penalize AmGuard or award a windfall to AV Homes.

2021And it has the effect of depriving a plaintiff bringing state and federal claims in a federal court action of any forum to adjudicate the state claims if the federal court declines to retain supplemental jurisdiction over them after dismissing only the federal claims on the merits." 46 Kan.

2019The possibility of someone suffering from a gunshot wound inside the house necessitated an immediate search. "[A]n officer may continue an emergency investigation until assured there is no one inside in need of assistance—particularly when the officer encounters circumstances that continue to raise suspicions." Neighbors, 299 Kan. at 251 .

2017Although the district court here didn't set forth a detailed analysis of the issue, we suspect that its review was like that of the district court in State v. Stone, 291 Kan. 13 , 237 P.3d 1229 (2010), and, one might argue, that of the dissent in our case, which separately reviews each listed factor.

2017Although the district court here didn't set forth a detailed analysis of the issue, we suspect that its review was like that of the district court in State v. Stone, 291 Kan. 13 , 237 P.3d 1229 (2010), and, one might argue, that of the dissent in our case, which separately reviews each listed factor.

2015First, it noted the following standard of review: “ ‘(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the appellate cour

2015First, it noted the following standard of review: “ ‘(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the appellate cour

2015First, it noted the following standard of review: “ ‘(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the appellate cour

2010The detailed analysis required of such claims is both premature and inconsistent with the purpose of a summaiy proceeding.” 884 A.2d at 510 .

2007This court held that the buyers’ failure to conduct a more detailed test of the roof, along with their decision to allow the sellers to contract for limited liability, prevented a claim for negligent misrepresentation. 35 Kan.

2006However, trial courts were directed to “give a detailed analysis of all the factors explaining the reasons for [their] decision[s]” and warned that “[a] conclusoiy determination that unfit once means unfit always will not be accepted.” 20 Kan.

2006Its ultimate holding was: “Where either tire owner or the driver of a vehicle is covered by the minimum insurance limits required by law, tire vehicle is not ‘uninsured’ within the meaning of the Kansas uninsured motorist statutes, and the injured parties are not permitted access to tire uninsured motorist coverage in their own policies.” 13 Kan.

2001Coscia held “[tjhat exoneration by postconviction relief is a prerequisite to recovery for legal malpractice arising out of a criminal proceeding.” 25 Cal. 4th at 1199 .

1996(A detailed analysis of our pre-Hall cases is set out at 246 Kan. at 758-59.)” 250 Kan. at 601 .

1996And one cannot ignore the fact that in many instances the award for impaired earning capacity may be overshadowed by a highly impressionistic award for pain and suffering.” 462 U.S. at 552 .

1992(A detailed analysis of our pr e-Hall cases is set out at 246 Kan. at 758-59 .) Aggravated kidnapping requires an allegation that bodily harm was inflicted.

1992State v. Smith, 245 Kan. 381, 396 , 781 P.2d 666 (1989).

1992State v. Smith, 245 Kan. 381, 396 , 781 P.2d 666 (1989).

1983Fighting words are those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” 228 Kan. 186 , Syl. ¶ 4. *671 See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 214 , 94 S.Ct. 970 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 408 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 (1972).

1983Fighting words are those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” 228 Kan. 186 , Syl. ¶ 4. *671 See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 214 , 94 S.Ct. 970 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 408 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 (1972).

1983Fighting words are those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” 228 Kan. 186 , Syl. ¶ 4. *671 See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 214 , 94 S.Ct. 970 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 408 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 (1972).

1983Fighting words are those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” 228 Kan. 186 , Syl. ¶ 4. *671 See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 214 , 94 S.Ct. 970 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 408 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 (1972).

1983Fighting words are those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” 228 Kan. 186 , Syl. ¶ 4. *671 See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 214 , 94 S.Ct. 970 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 408 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 (1972).

1980Let us now turn to a detailed analysis of the cases which have defined the term “prurient.” In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 489 , the following test for obscenity was adopted: “[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.” Prurient interest was defined in Roth at 487 , n. 20: “[MJaterial having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.

1967Rogers v. Richmond, supra. In our view, the New York procedure employed in this case did not afford a reliable determination of the voluntariness of the confession offered in evidence at the trial, did not adequately protect Jackson’s right to be free of a conviction based upon a coerced confession and therefore cannot withstand constitutional attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .” (pp. 376, 377.) Specific reference is made to the opinion in Jackson v. Denno, supra, for the detailed analysis and reasons assigned for the foregoing rule.

1965(Morlan v. Smith, 191 Kan. 218 , 380 P. 2d 312 ; Allen v. Ellis, 191 Kan. 311 , 380 P. 2d 408 ; Letcher v. Derricott, 191 Kan. 596 , 383 P. 2d 533 .) Without attempting a detailed analysis of each decision, we deem it sufficient to say that the foregoing cases establish the general rule that police reports of accident investigations are not admissible as substantive evidence.

1965(Morlan v. Smith, 191 Kan. 218 , 380 P. 2d 312 ; Allen v. Ellis, 191 Kan. 311 , 380 P. 2d 408 ; Letcher v. Derricott, 191 Kan. 596 , 383 P. 2d 533 .) Without attempting a detailed analysis of each decision, we deem it sufficient to say that the foregoing cases establish the general rule that police reports of accident investigations are not admissible as substantive evidence.

1965(Morlan v. Smith, 191 Kan. 218 , 380 P. 2d 312 ; Allen v. Ellis, 191 Kan. 311 , 380 P. 2d 408 ; Letcher v. Derricott, 191 Kan. 596 , 383 P. 2d 533 .) Without attempting a detailed analysis of each decision, we deem it sufficient to say that the foregoing cases establish the general rule that police reports of accident investigations are not admissible as substantive evidence.

1965(Morlan v. Smith, 191 Kan. 218 , 380 P. 2d 312 ; Allen v. Ellis, 191 Kan. 311 , 380 P. 2d 408 ; Letcher v. Derricott, 191 Kan. 596 , 383 P. 2d 533 .) Without attempting a detailed analysis of each decision, we deem it sufficient to say that the foregoing cases establish the general rule that police reports of accident investigations are not admissible as substantive evidence.

1965(Morlan v. Smith, 191 Kan. 218 , 380 P. 2d 312 ; Allen v. Ellis, 191 Kan. 311 , 380 P. 2d 408 ; Letcher v. Derricott, 191 Kan. 596 , 383 P. 2d 533 .) Without attempting a detailed analysis of each decision, we deem it sufficient to say that the foregoing cases establish the general rule that police reports of accident investigations are not admissible as substantive evidence.

1965(Morlan v. Smith, 191 Kan. 218 , 380 P. 2d 312 ; Allen v. Ellis, 191 Kan. 311 , 380 P. 2d 408 ; Letcher v. Derricott, 191 Kan. 596 , 383 P. 2d 533 .) Without attempting a detailed analysis of each decision, we deem it sufficient to say that the foregoing cases establish the general rule that police reports of accident investigations are not admissible as substantive evidence.

1964All actions brought under this section shall have precedence in any court and on motion shall be advanced over any civil cause of different nature pending in such court, and such action shall be tried and determined as other civil actions. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) A detailed analysis of the statute is unnecessary since that was done in Jackson v. State Corporation Commission, 183 Kan. 246 , 326 P. 2d 280 , Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm., 192 Kan. 1 , 386 P. 2d 266 , and Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm., 192 Kan. 29 , 386 P. 2d 288 .

1964All actions brought under this section shall have precedence in any court and on motion shall be advanced over any civil cause of different nature pending in such court, and such action shall be tried and determined as other civil actions. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) A detailed analysis of the statute is unnecessary since that was done in Jackson v. State Corporation Commission, 183 Kan. 246 , 326 P. 2d 280 , Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm., 192 Kan. 1 , 386 P. 2d 266 , and Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm., 192 Kan. 29 , 386 P. 2d 288 .

1964All actions brought under this section shall have precedence in any court and on motion shall be advanced over any civil cause of different nature pending in such court, and such action shall be tried and determined as other civil actions. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) A detailed analysis of the statute is unnecessary since that was done in Jackson v. State Corporation Commission, 183 Kan. 246 , 326 P. 2d 280 , Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm., 192 Kan. 1 , 386 P. 2d 266 , and Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm., 192 Kan. 29 , 386 P. 2d 288 .

1964All actions brought under this section shall have precedence in any court and on motion shall be advanced over any civil cause of different nature pending in such court, and such action shall be tried and determined as other civil actions. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) A detailed analysis of the statute is unnecessary since that was done in Jackson v. State Corporation Commission, 183 Kan. 246 , 326 P. 2d 280 , Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm., 192 Kan. 1 , 386 P. 2d 266 , and Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm., 192 Kan. 29 , 386 P. 2d 288 .

1964All actions brought under this section shall have precedence in any court and on motion shall be advanced over any civil cause of different nature pending in such court, and such action shall be tried and determined as other civil actions. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) A detailed analysis of the statute is unnecessary since that was done in Jackson v. State Corporation Commission, 183 Kan. 246 , 326 P. 2d 280 , Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm., 192 Kan. 1 , 386 P. 2d 266 , and Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm., 192 Kan. 29 , 386 P. 2d 288 .

1964All actions brought under this section shall have precedence in any court and on motion shall be advanced over any civil cause of different nature pending in such court, and such action shall be tried and determined as other civil actions. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) A detailed analysis of the statute is unnecessary since that was done in Jackson v. State Corporation Commission, 183 Kan. 246 , 326 P. 2d 280 , Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm., 192 Kan. 1 , 386 P. 2d 266 , and Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm., 192 Kan. 29 , 386 P. 2d 288 .

1960Suffice it to say it was enacted to prevent physical or economic waste; to protect correlative rights of producers; to assure ratable taking within a common pool; to prevent discrimination among pools, and the legal device selected to accomplish those purposes is “proration.” In its simplest form, proration is the restriction of production of oil by allocating the current market demand among the pools of the state and between the wells of each pool in proportion to their potential production to secure to each producer his fair share of the oil produced from a common reservoir —or, as the statu

1960Suffice it to say it was enacted to prevent physical or economic waste; to protect correlative rights of producers; to assure ratable taking within a common pool; to prevent discrimination among pools, and the legal device selected to accomplish those purposes is “proration.” In its simplest form, proration is the restriction of production of oil by allocating the current market demand among the pools of the state and between the wells of each pool in proportion to their potential production to secure to each producer his fair share of the oil produced from a common reservoir —or, as the statu