detailed analysis in Arizona

2014For these reasons, we find no error, fundamental or 10 STATE v. LEYBA Decision of the Court otherwise, in the failure to make more specific, express findings pursuant to Rule 403. ¶27 Finally, within his argument, Leyba asserts State v. Baldenegro, 188 Ariz. 10 , 932 P.2d 275 (App. 1996), requires that at least two statutorily defined criteria for gang membership be present before evidence of gang affiliation may be admissible.

2014For these reasons, we find no error, fundamental or 10 STATE v. LEYBA Decision of the Court otherwise, in the failure to make more specific, express findings pursuant to Rule 403. ¶27 Finally, within his argument, Leyba asserts State v. Baldenegro, 188 Ariz. 10 , 932 P.2d 275 (App. 1996), requires that at least two statutorily defined criteria for gang membership be present before evidence of gang affiliation may be admissible.

2014Therefore, “the record sufficiently demonstrates that the necessary factors were argued, considered, and balanced by the trial court as part of its ruling,” id., even though the court did not provide a detailed analysis pursuant to Rule 403.

2007Therefore, we agree with the state that Paris- Sheldon cannot “use the attorney-client privilege as a shield to block inquiry into an issue that she raised.” See Alexander v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 157, 163 , 685 P.2d 1309, 1315 (1984) (“If the client himself does not treat the particular communication as privileged, that communication will not be recognized as a confidence.”). ¶16 Paris-Sheldon also contends, relying on Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office v. Superior Court, 187 Ariz. 162 , 927 P.2d 822 (App. 1996), that a trial court must determine whether a defendant’s motion for sub

2007Therefore, we agree with the state that Paris- Sheldon cannot “use the attorney-client privilege as a shield to block inquiry into an issue that she raised.” See Alexander v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 157, 163 , 685 P.2d 1309, 1315 (1984) (“If the client himself does not treat the particular communication as privileged, that communication will not be recognized as a confidence.”). ¶16 Paris-Sheldon also contends, relying on Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office v. Superior Court, 187 Ariz. 162 , 927 P.2d 822 (App. 1996), that a trial court must determine whether a defendant’s motion for sub

2007As a result, [daughter] was born and must now live in an impaired condition." Id. ¶ 24 In a detailed analysis, the Walker court described a category of lawsuits brought by children who allege what it called claims for "wrongful life." Some such actions are brought by "normal but unwanted children who seek damages either from parents, doctors, or institutions negligently responsible for their conception or birth." Id. [4] Other such claims are brought by "impaired children" who "allege that because of defendants' *260 negligence, their parents either decided to conceive them ignorant of the ris

2007As a result, [daughter] was born and must now live in an impaired condition." Id. ¶ 24 In a detailed analysis, the Walker court described a category of lawsuits brought by children who allege what it called claims for "wrongful life." Some such actions are brought by "normal but unwanted children who seek damages either from parents, doctors, or institutions negligently responsible for their conception or birth." Id. [4] Other such claims are brought by "impaired children" who "allege that because of defendants' *260 negligence, their parents either decided to conceive them ignorant of the ris

2000And yet, if you look at the opinion of the court of appeals, 194 Ariz. 224 , 979 P.2d 1017 , applying the same Rothweiler test, you will see a plausible approach that reaches the exact opposite conclusion.

2000And yet, if you look at the opinion of the court of appeals, 194 Ariz. 224 , 979 P.2d 1017 , applying the same Rothweiler test, you will see a plausible approach that reaches the exact opposite conclusion.

1993The court of appeals determined that by conducting this detailed analysis, the LaBarre court did not construe subsection (B) “as merely converting consecutive sentences into concurrent ones.” Saunders, 169 Ariz. at 429 , 819 P.2d at 1015 .

1993The court of appeals determined that by conducting this detailed analysis, the LaBarre court did not construe subsection (B) “as merely converting consecutive sentences into concurrent ones.” Saunders, 169 Ariz. at 429 , 819 P.2d at 1015 .

1993A detailed analysis of this factor was provided in Title USA v. Maricopa County, 168 Ariz. 10 , 810 P.2d 633 (Tax 1991), the predecessor to this case.

1993A detailed analysis of this factor was provided in Title USA v. Maricopa County, 168 Ariz. 10 , 810 P.2d 633 (Tax 1991), the predecessor to this case.

1991This detailed analysis of Bassett is necessary at this juncture because of the discussion of that case in City of Phoenix v. Santa Anita Development Corp., 141 Ariz. 179 , 685 P.2d 1331 (App.1984).

1991This detailed analysis of Bassett is necessary at this juncture because of the discussion of that case in City of Phoenix v. Santa Anita Development Corp., 141 Ariz. 179 , 685 P.2d 1331 (App.1984).

1980Unlike the case of West Texas Utilities Co. v. Harris, 231 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.Civ.App.1950), where the court held that the object would have struck the wire even if a proper clearance had been maintained, the evidence in the present case did not mandate a similar conclusion.

1977The nonretroactivity of Supreme Court decisions in civil cases was the subject of a detailed inquiry in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971).

1977The nonretroactivity of Supreme Court decisions in civil cases was the subject of a detailed inquiry in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971).

1974In light of the instruction given, counsel for plaintiff was powerless to effectively respond and the plaintiff was clearly prejudiced. 1 I feel compelled to express my disenchantment with our holding in Anderson v. Gobea, 18 Ariz.App. 277 , 501 P.2d 453 (1972), followed by the majority, having since reflected further on the matter.

1974In light of the instruction given, counsel for plaintiff was powerless to effectively respond and the plaintiff was clearly prejudiced. 1 I feel compelled to express my disenchantment with our holding in Anderson v. Gobea, 18 Ariz.App. 277 , 501 P.2d 453 (1972), followed by the majority, having since reflected further on the matter.

1957Upon authority of the Whitfield decisions, supra; Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Sun Valley Bus Lines, 70 Ariz. 65 , 216 P.2d 404 , and Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Old Pueblo Transit Co., 79 Ariz. 327 , 289 P.2d 406 , the judgment is affirmed.

1957Upon authority of the Whitfield decisions, supra; Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Sun Valley Bus Lines, 70 Ariz. 65 , 216 P.2d 404 , and Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Old Pueblo Transit Co., 79 Ariz. 327 , 289 P.2d 406 , the judgment is affirmed.

1957Upon authority of the Whitfield decisions, supra; Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Sun Valley Bus Lines, 70 Ariz. 65 , 216 P.2d 404 , and Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Old Pueblo Transit Co., 79 Ariz. 327 , 289 P.2d 406 , the judgment is affirmed.

1957Upon authority of the Whitfield decisions, supra; Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Sun Valley Bus Lines, 70 Ariz. 65 , 216 P.2d 404 , and Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Old Pueblo Transit Co., 79 Ariz. 327 , 289 P.2d 406 , the judgment is affirmed.