30 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1888–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Guardianship of Llgreen2 sentences2015In In re Guardianship of L.L., 745 N.E.2d 222, 227 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied, we recognized that when "a guardianship proceeding ... is, in essence, a child custody proceeding that raises important concerns about parental rights, and the 'best interests’ of children,” we generally apply "a more detailed test than might arguably be required by the plain language of the [guardianship] statute.” 3 . 2013Under Ind. Code § 29-3-5-3 , a trial court may appoint a guardian to a minor if “the appointment of a guardian is necessary as a means of providing care and supervision of 7 the physical person or property of the . . . minor.” With respect to the termination of a guardianship, Ind. Code § 29-3-12-1 (c) provides that a trial court may terminate any guardianship if “the guardianship is no longer necessary for any other reason.” “In determining whether a guardianship should be terminated, however, we have generally applied a more detailed test than required by the plain language of the statute.” | 4 | 4 |
Roydes v. Cappygreen2 sentences2015Indiana Code § 29-3-12-1(c)(4) provides that a trial court “may terminate any guardianship if … the guardianship is no longer necessary.…” However, “[i]n determining whether a guardianship should be terminated, … we have generally applied a more detailed test than required by the plain language of the [guardianship] statute.” Roydes v. Cappy, 762 N.E.2d 1268, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 2014Indiana Code § 29-3-12-1(c)(4) provides that a trial court “may terminate any guardianship if ... the guardianship is no longer necessary....” However, “[i]n determining whether a guardianship should be terminated, ... we have generally applied a more detailed test than required by the plain language of the [guardianship] statute.” Roydes v. Cappy, 762 N.E.2d 1268, 1274 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). | 4 | 4 |
Utility Center, Inc. d/b/a Aqua Indiana, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, Indianagreen1 sentence2025Accordingly, I conclude that judicial review of necessity is performed as part of our duty to review capriciousness. [26] Although our Supreme Court has stated that the necessity of a taking is a “legislative determination,” Utility Center, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 985 N.E.2d 731, 733 (Ind. 2013), the Court engaged in a detailed analysis of necessity in condemnation actions in Meyer v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co., 258 N.E.2d 7 Capricious is typically defined as part of “arbitrary and capricious,” which our Courts have defined as: [A] decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is mad | 1 | 1 |
Kiel Stone v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Stone v. State, 128 N.E.3d 475, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). | 1 | 1 |
Marquise Lee v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2023“An error is fundamental, and thus reviewable despite failure to object, if it made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Young v. State, 30 N.E.3d 719, 726 (Ind. 2015) (quotation omitted). [14] Baker has not shown fundamental error. | 1 | 1 |
Tl v. Jlgreen1 sentence2020See id. (holding that trial court erred in concluding that Mother’s proposed relocation was not in good faith and for a legitimate reason but noting, “our inquiry does not end there, because the trial court also determined that relocation was not in the children’s best interests,” and ultimately affirming on that ground); see also H.H. v. A.A., 3 N.E.3d 30, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Watson v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See also Watson v. State, 776 N.E.2d 914, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting Watson’s contention that he was unaware of the potential risk of navigating a curve at a high speed, reasoning that a posted sign warned of an upcoming curve and concluding that “[he] cannot now claim that he was unaware of the danger of an incident.”). [20] In addition, all the school bus’s signals and signage, including its stop arm, were functional and engaged. | 1 | 1 |
H.H. v. A.A.green1 sentence2020See id. (holding that trial court erred in concluding that Mother’s proposed relocation was not in good faith and for a legitimate reason but noting, “our inquiry does not end there, because the trial court also determined that relocation was not in the children’s best interests,” and ultimately affirming on that ground); see also H.H. v. A.A., 3 N.E.3d 30, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Spangler, Jennings & Dougherty P.C. v. Indiana Insurancegreen2 sentences2009Co., 729 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ind.2000). 2009Co., 729 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ind.2000). | 1 | 1 |
Freson v. Combsgreen1 sentence2001See id. (affirming the trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment where the movants only submitted pleadings and unverified affidavits in support of the motion). 2 The second statute that Turner cites, Ind.Code § 22-18-2-8, provides, in part: "[al city, town, or county may adopt an ordinance that includes more stringent or detailed requirements that do not conflict with the commission's rules, but the ordinance is subject to approval under seetion 5 of this chapter." Turner argues that the self-fueling area selected by Gilbert was a more stringent or detailed requirement than the re | 1 | 1 |
Marriage of Clark v. Atkinsgreen1 sentence1998See Clark v. Atkins, 489 N.E.2d 90, 94 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (trial court’s failure to determine whether it had jurisdiction under the UCCJL, did not constitute reversible error, where trial court in fact had jurisdiction), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.green2 sentences1976For a detailed analysis of the question, see Love, supra note 1, at 130-160. [30] Id. [31] The court in Theis did rely upon Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70 , 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965), which is based heavily upon the principles and policies developing in the products liability area. 1976For a detailed analysis of the question, see Love, supra note 1, at 130-160. [30] Id. [31] The court in Theis did rely upon Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70 , 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965), which is based heavily upon the principles and policies developing in the products liability area. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Inlow v. Henderson, Daily, Withrow & DeVoe
green
2 sentences2010Pheffer argues that Ed III misreads Inlow because Ed III "ignores this Court's detailed analysis in Inlow, which holds that `[d]espite the personal representative's plenary authority to collect and manage the assets of an estate, a few mechanisms in the Probate Code allow for the intervention of heirs ... apart from the personal representative,'" and that Pheffer "availed herself of both methods outlined by this Court in the Inlow opinion." Appellant's Reply Brief at 3 (quoting Inlow, 787 N.E.2d at 392 ). 2010Pheffer argues that Ed III misreads Imlow because Ed III "ignores this Court's detailed analysis in Inilow, which holds that '[dJespite the personal representative's plenary authority to collect and manage the assets of an estate, a few mechanisms in the Probate Code allow for the intervention of heirs apart from the personal representative," and that Pheffer "availed herself of both methods outlined by this Court in the In-low opinion." Appellant's Reply Brief at 3 (quoting Inlow, 787 N.E.2d at 392 ). | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Williams v. City of Detroit
green
2 sentences1968Michigan followed this trend in Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231 , 111 N. W. 2d 1 . 1968Michigan followed this trend in Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231 , 111 N. W. 2d 1 . | 2 | 1968–1968 |
Scott v. Marshall County Board of Zoning Appeals
green
1 sentence2011The Applicants argue that there was no evidence presented to the BZA that the proposed expansion did not comply with the requirements of Section 10.02 while asserting that “[t]he testimony of adjacent landowners regarding objections unrelated to establishing whether the application fully complied with these development requirements is wholly irrelevant.” Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Wills
green
1 sentence2005Id. at 165 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Goldsberry v. Grubbs
green
1 sentence2000Id. at *295 479. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Douglass v. Irvin
green
2 sentences1991The “superior knowledge” rule, however, was recently pared down and explained by our supreme court in Douglass, supra. After a detailed analysis of Hoosier Cardinal Corp. and the growth of the “superior knowledge” rule, Douglass overruled Wingett, supra, and prior cases “to the extent language in [those] cases may be read to create an independent ‘equal or superior knowledge’ rule as a prerequisite element of or limitation upon the existence of a landowner’s duty of care.” Id. 549 N.E.2d at 371 . 1991The “superior knowledge” rule, however, was recently pared down and explained by our supreme court in Douglass, supra. After a detailed analysis of Hoosier Cardinal Corp. and the growth of the “superior knowledge” rule, Douglass overruled Wingett, supra, and prior cases “to the extent language in [those] cases may be read to create an independent ‘equal or superior knowledge’ rule as a prerequisite element of or limitation upon the existence of a landowner’s duty of care.” Id. 549 N.E.2d at 371 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Wingett v. Teledyne Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991The “superior knowledge” rule, however, was recently pared down and explained by our supreme court in Douglass, supra. After a detailed analysis of Hoosier Cardinal Corp. and the growth of the “superior knowledge” rule, Douglass overruled Wingett, supra, and prior cases “to the extent language in [those] cases may be read to create an independent ‘equal or superior knowledge’ rule as a prerequisite element of or limitation upon the existence of a landowner’s duty of care.” Id. 549 N.E.2d at 371 . 1991The “superior knowledge” rule, however, was recently pared down and explained by our supreme court in Douglass, supra. After a detailed analysis of Hoosier Cardinal Corp. and the growth of the “superior knowledge” rule, Douglass overruled Wingett, supra, and prior cases “to the extent language in [those] cases may be read to create an independent ‘equal or superior knowledge’ rule as a prerequisite element of or limitation upon the existence of a landowner’s duty of care.” Id. 549 N.E.2d at 371 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Kurylowicz
green
1 sentence1991The Kurylowicz court undertook a detailed analysis focusing upon the common reason underlying other states' policy against declaring insurance policies void ab fnitfo based on misinformation given on the application: "'We conclude that an automobile liability insurer must undertake a reasonable investigation of the insured's insurability within a reasonable period of time from the acceptance of the application and the issuance of a policy.... [T/ke insurer cannot then successfully defend upon the ground of its own failure reasonably to investigate the application.! [Barrera v. State Farm Mutua | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Pope v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1991With reference to the third test, or "literary value" test, for obscenity, the majority opinion in Pope stated: ''The proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary member of any given community would find serious literary ... value in allegedly obscene material, but whether a reasonable person would find such value...." 107 S.Ct. at 1921 . 1991With reference to the third test, or "literary value" test, for obscenity, the majority opinion in Pope stated: "The proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary member of any given community would find serious literary .. . value in allegedly obscene material, but whether a reasonable person would find such value... ." 107 S.Ct. at 1921 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Peckham v. SMITH, a MINOR, ETC.
green
2 sentences1981In re Estate of Beck v. Campbell (1968), 143 Ind.App. 291 , 240 N.E.2d 88 ; Peckham v. Smith, a Minor, etc. (1960), 130 Ind.App. 452 , 165 N.E.2d 609 . 1981In re Estate of Beck v. Campbell (1968), 143 Ind.App. 291 , 240 N.E.2d 88 ; Peckham v. Smith, a Minor, etc. (1960), 130 Ind.App. 452 , 165 N.E.2d 609 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
In RE ESTATE OF BECK v. Campbell
green
2 sentences1981In re Estate of Beck v. Campbell (1968), 143 Ind.App. 291 , 240 N.E.2d 88 ; Peckham v. Smith, a Minor, etc. (1960), 130 Ind.App. 452 , 165 N.E.2d 609 . 1981In re Estate of Beck v. Campbell (1968), 143 Ind.App. 291 , 240 N.E.2d 88 ; Peckham v. Smith, a Minor, etc. (1960), 130 Ind.App. 452 , 165 N.E.2d 609 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Wilhoite v. State
neutral
2 sentences1975Asher was decided before Emerson and used a part of the more detailed test as it had been developed in Wilhoite v. State, (1971) 255 Ind. 599 , 266 N.E.2d 23 . 1975Asher was decided before Emerson and used a part of the more detailed test as it had been developed in Wilhoite v. State, (1971) 255 Ind. 599 , 266 N.E.2d 23 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Graham v. State
green
2 sentences1972The majority opinion does accurately summarize the evidence, however, and the careful reader can see for himself that the standards of proof established in Graham v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 525 , 255 N.E.2d 652 , 20 Ind. Dec. 343 , have not been met. 1972The majority opinion does accurately summarize the evidence, however, and the careful reader can see for himself that the standards of proof established in Graham v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 525 , 255 N.E.2d 652 , 20 Ind. Dec. 343 , have not been met. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Rauck v. State
neutral
1 sentence1888Rauck v. State, 110 Ind. 384 . | 1 | 1888–1888 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.