16 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1958–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State of Tennessee v. Christine Caudlegreen1 sentence2021We agree with the State. -3- “[T]he abuse of discretion standard, accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness, applies to within-range sentences that reflect a decision based upon the purposes and principles of sentencing, including questions related to probation or any other alternative sentence.” State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sprattgreen1 sentence2017State v. Spratt, 31 S.W.3d 587, 598 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Marla H., Individually and as Next Best Friend to her Daughter Moriah F. H. v. Knox Countygreen1 sentence2017See generally Marla H. v. Knox Cty., 361 S.W.3d 518 , 530–37 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (undertaking a detailed analysis of whether 2 I express no opinion, however, as to whether the trial court reached the correct decision. -4- the defendant owed a duty under the Satterfield factors, despite the fact that a trial on the merits had occurred and the defendant was found liable). | 1 | 1 |
City of Johnson City v. Outdoor West, Inc.green1 sentence2000In reviewing this issue, we are mindful that jury instructions given at trial should not be measured against a “standard of perfection.” City of Johnson City v. Outdoor West, Inc., 947 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1997) (citing Grissom v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville, 817 S.W.2d 679, 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)). | 1 | 1 |
Grissom v. Metropolitan Government of Nashvillegreen1 sentence2000In reviewing this issue, we are mindful that jury instructions given at trial should not be measured against a “standard of perfection.” City of Johnson City v. Outdoor West, Inc., 947 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1997) (citing Grissom v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville, 817 S.W.2d 679, 685 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jeffersongreen1 sentence1988State v. Jefferson, 529 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tenn.1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State of Tennessee v. Charles D. Sprunger
green
2 sentences2017As an initial matter, any affidavit in support of a 2 For a more detailed analysis of the requirements of Tennessee’s forfeiture statutes, see Sprunger, 458 S.W.3d at 494–99. -5- forfeiture warrant must state: (1) the legal and factual basis upon which the property is seized; (2) information concerning co-owners of the property; and (3) information concerning any secured interests in the property and the factual and legal basis that makes the property subject to forfeiture notwithstanding the secured interest. 2017For a more detailed analysis of the requirements of Tennessee’s forfeiture statutes, see Sprunger, 458 S.W.3d at 494-99 . 3 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Reetz v. Michigan
green
2 sentences1958Reetz v. [People of State of] Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 , 23 S.Ct. 390 , 47 L.Ed. 563 .” The Legislature of the State of Tennessee by Chapter 572 of the Private Acts of 1933 authorized the municipality of Chattanooga to enact such electrical examining ordinances as in its discretion might be necessary to safeguard its citizens and property. 1958Reetz v. [People of State of] Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 , 23 S.Ct. 390 , 47 L.Ed. 563 .” The Legislature of the State of Tennessee by Chapter 572 of the Private Acts of 1933 authorized the municipality of Chattanooga to enact such electrical examining ordinances as in its discretion might be necessary to safeguard its citizens and property. | 2 | 1958–1958 |
Whorton v. Bockting
green
2 sentences2010In Whorton v. Bockting, the Supreme Court held that Crawford did not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review when Crawford was decided. 549 U.S. at 409 , 127 S.Ct. 1173 . 2010In Whorton v. Bockting, the Supreme Court held that Crawford did not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review when Crawford was decided. 549 U.S. at 409 , 127 S.Ct. 1173 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
City of Brentwood v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals
green
1 sentence2010In City of Brentwood v. Metropolitan Board, 149 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), using federal case law, the court explained that “history associates the word ‘aggrieved’ with a congressional intent to cast the statutory net broadly – beyond the common law interest and substantive statutory rights upon which prudential standing traditionally rests.” With this premise, the court held that a neighboring city, Brentwood, had standing to appeal the decision of the Davidson County Board of Zoning Appeals issuance of a building permit for a billboard in Davidson County along the corridor with Brentw | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. McCary
green
1 sentence2004Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Prescott v. Duncan
green
1 sentence2001Moreover, the case of Prescott v. Duncan, upon which the Dykes court relied, engaged in a detailed analysis of the history of county government, and it listed the sheriff among those officers who perform “function[s] of local-self government” within the county. 126 Tenn. 106 , 148 S.W. 229 , 233 (1912). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Stringer v. Black
green
2 sentences1994The Court followed the harmless error standard set out by the United States Supreme Court in Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 , -, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1137 , 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). 1994The Court followed the harmless error standard set out by the United States Supreme Court in Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 , -, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1137 , 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Beal v. Rose
green
2 sentences1983For a more detailed analysis of the United States Supreme Court cases on the issue of standing involved here, see Beal v. Rose, 532 F.Supp. 306 (M.D.Tenn.1981). 1983NOTES [1] Defendant's statement given September 7, 1979. [2] For a more detailed analysis of the United States Supreme Court cases on the issue of standing involved here, see Beal v. Rose, 532 F. Supp. 306 (M.D.Tenn. 1981). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Dean v. Wabash Railroad
green
2 sentences1959The definition of each is simply stated in the learned Opinion of the late Presiding Judge Faw of our Court of Appeals, in Gulf Refining Co. et al v. Frazier, 15 Tenn. App. 662, 689 , when he quoted with approval this statement: “ ‘Objective symptoms are those which the surgeon discovers from a physical examination of his patient; subjective symptoms are those he learns from what his patient tells him.’ Dean v. Wabash Railroad Co., 229 Mo. 425, 442 , 129 S. W. 953 .” In that same Opinion there is a detailed analysis, with proper citations, of how far a physician may go when examining a patient 1959The definition of each is simply stated in the learned Opinion of the late Presiding Judge Faw of our Court of Appeals, in Gulf Refining Co. et al v. Frazier, 15 Tenn. App. 662, 689 , when he quoted with approval this statement: “ ‘Objective symptoms are those which the surgeon discovers from a physical examination of his patient; subjective symptoms are those he learns from what his patient tells him.’ Dean v. Wabash Railroad Co., 229 Mo. 425, 442 , 129 S. W. 953 .” In that same Opinion there is a detailed analysis, with proper citations, of how far a physician may go when examining a patient | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Gulf Refining Co. v. Frazier
green
1 sentence1959The definition of each is simply stated in the learned Opinion of the late Presiding Judge Faw of our Court of Appeals, in Gulf Refining Co. et al v. Frazier, 15 Tenn. App. 662, 689 , when he quoted with approval this statement: “ ‘Objective symptoms are those which the surgeon discovers from a physical examination of his patient; subjective symptoms are those he learns from what his patient tells him.’ Dean v. Wabash Railroad Co., 229 Mo. 425, 442 , 129 S. W. 953 .” In that same Opinion there is a detailed analysis, with proper citations, of how far a physician may go when examining a patient | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.