detailed analysis in Texas

2026See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(M); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 , 234–35 (Tex. 2019) (addressing due process and due course of law considerations with respect to appellate review of grounds (D) and (E) and holding that an appellate court must provide a detailed analysis if affirming the termination on either ground).

2025See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(M); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 , 234–35 (Tex. 2019) (addressing due process and due course of law considerations with respect to appellate review of grounds (D) and (E) and holding that an appellate court must provide a detailed analysis if affirming the termination on either ground).

2009See, e.g., Peavey v. State, 248 S.W.3d 455, 465 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, pet. ref'd) (providing a detailed analysis and application of automatism as a defense to DWI); see also Stamper v. State, No. 05-02-01730-CR, 2003 WL 21540414 , at *1 (Tex.App.-Dallas July 9, 2003, no. pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (acknowledging that the appellant incorrectly argued involuntary intoxication when she should have argued involuntary act); Waters v. State, No. 01-96-00631-CR, 2001 WL 754759 , at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 29, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (analy

2009See, e.g., Peavey v. State, 248 S.W.3d 455, 465 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, pet. ref’d) (providing a detailed analysis and application of automatism as a defense to DWI); see also Stamper v. State, No. 05-02-01730-CR, 2003 WL 21540414 , at *1 (Tex.App.-Dallas July 9, 2003, no. pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (acknowledging that the appellant incorrectly argued involuntary intoxication when she should have argued involuntary act); Waters v. State, No. 01-96-00631-CR, 2001 WL 754759 , at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 29, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (analyz

2022In re D.O., 338 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, no pet.).

2021In re D.O., 338 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, no pet.).

2006See Lewis , 911 S.W.2d at 7 .

2005See Lewis, 911 S.W.2d at 7 .

2019See N.G., 2019 WL 2147263 , at *4 (citing In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498 , 504–05 (Tex. 2014)).

2019See id.

2012In addition to attacking the order’s use of “and/or” and the retention of “in the interest of justice,” United (supported by ami-cus curiae E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.) urges that we require trial courts to conduct, in new-trial orders based on factual sufficiency, the same detailed analysis we required of appellate courts in Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986).

2012While I agree that trial judges should provide valid, substantive reasons for granting a motion for new trial, I agree with the Court that we should not require trial courts to prepare new trial orders with the same detailed analysis required of appellate courts in Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d, 629, 635 (Tex.1986).

2008Patel v. Williams, 237 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

2008Patel v. Williams , 237 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

2007P. 193.3(a), (b); In re Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc., 175 S.W.3d 253, 261 (Tex.2005); see also Marathon Oil Co. v. Moye, 893 S.W.2d 585, 591 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding) (holding that party asserting privilege met burden by providing affidavits and a detailed privilege log).

2007P. 193.3(a), (b); In re Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. , 175 S.W.3d 253, 261 (Tex. 2005); see also Marathon Oil Co. v. Moye , 893 S.W.2d 585, 591 (Tex. App. C Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding) (holding that party asserting privilege met burden by providing affidavits and a detailed privilege log).

2007P. 193.3(a), (b); In re Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc., 175 S.W.3d 253, 261 (Tex.2005); see also Marathon Oil Co. v. Moye, 893 S.W.2d 585, 591 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding) (holding that party asserting privilege met burden by providing affidavits and a detailed privilege log).

2007P. 193.3(a), (b); In re Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. , 175 S.W.3d 253, 261 (Tex. 2005); see also Marathon Oil Co. v. Moye , 893 S.W.2d 585, 591 (Tex. App. C Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding) (holding that party asserting privilege met burden by providing affidavits and a detailed privilege log).

2004See In re A.J.K., 116 S.W.3d 165 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (containing a detailed analysis of Subchapter E). -4- deadline, if the party also files a motion for extension that reasonably explains the need for the extension.

2004See In re A.J.K. , 116 S.W.3d 165 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (containing a detailed analysis of Subchapter E) . 6: 6 In this respect, there is no difference in the provisions of Family Code Section 107.013 in effect before September 1, 2003, and the amended provisions effective on that date.

2024See Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 327 (Tex. 1998) (conducting a minimum-contacts analysis in a divorce case relating to the distribution of Texas property that was part of the marital estate); see also Smith v. Lanier, 998 S.W.2d 324, 333 (Tex. App.— Austin 1999 , pet. denied) (conducting separate minimum-contacts analyses to determine the character of an estate’s property—i.e., separate or community—and to determine the propriety of jurisdiction over the nonresident representative of the deceased’s estate in her individual capacity).

2024See id.

2024See Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 327 (Tex. 1998) (conducting a minimum-contacts analysis in a divorce case relating to the distribution of Texas property that was part of the marital estate); see also Smith v. Lanier, 998 S.W.2d 324, 333 (Tex. App.— Austin 1999 , pet. denied) (conducting separate minimum-contacts analyses to determine the character of an estate’s property—i.e., separate or community—and to determine the propriety of jurisdiction over the nonresident representative of the deceased’s estate in her individual capacity).

2020See Ahmed, 99 S.W.3d at 688-689 .

2019See Tyler v. State, 563 S.W.3d 493, 503 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.).6 In accordance with our decision in Tyler, we hold that article 102.008(a) is facially constitutional.

2018See Salinas v. Rafati , 948 S.W.2d 286 , 288 (Tex. 1997) (finding that granting of motion to disregard "automatically" denied motion for judgment on verdict); Acord v. General Motors Corp. , 669 S.W.2d 111 , 114 (Tex. 1984) (presuming objection to charge was overruled because trial court did not alter objection language); John Hill Cayce, Jr. et al., Civil Appeals in Texas: Practicing Under the New Rules of Appellate Procedure , 49 BAYLOR L.[ ]REV. 867, 874 n.[ ]10 (1997) (discussing new rule 33.1(a)(2)(A) ); State Bar of Texas Appellate Section, Significant Features of the New Texas Rules of