detailed analysis in New Mexico

2007The Court of Appeals concluded that New Mexico does not read “plan” so broadly and that, even if we did, the evidence would not be cross-admissible because the crimes against Jamie S. and Ursula C. were not “strikingly similar.” Id. ¶ 26; see also Jones, 120 N.M. at 187 , 899 P.2d at 1141 (noting that the case law in New Mexico has developed such that “it is now clear that a more detailed analysis needs to be done than simply comparing superficial similarity”).

2007The Court of Appeals concluded that New Mexico does not read “plan” so broadly and that, even if we did, the evidence would not be cross-admissible because the crimes against Jamie S. and Ursula C. were not “strikingly similar.” Id. ¶ 26; see also Jones, 120 N.M. at 187 , 899 P.2d at 1141 (noting that the case law in New Mexico has developed such that “it is now clear that a more detailed analysis needs to be done than simply comparing superficial similarity”).

2001Thus, Rule 11-404(B) prohibits the use of evidence when its purpose is to show criminal propensity: “to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” The admonition of former Judge Hartz of this Court bears repeating: “One cannot ignore the long tradition of courts and commentators expressing fear that jurors are too likely to give undue weight to evidence of a defendant’s prior misconduct and perhaps even to convict the defendant solely because of a belief that the defendant is a bad person.” Lamure, 115 N.M. at 71 , 846 P.2d at 1080 . {14} When reviewing a

2001Thus, Rule 11-404(B) prohibits the use of evidence when its purpose is to show criminal propensity: “to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” The admonition of former Judge Hartz of this Court bears repeating: “One cannot ignore the long tradition of courts and commentators expressing fear that jurors are too likely to give undue weight to evidence of a defendant’s prior misconduct and perhaps even to convict the defendant solely because of a belief that the defendant is a bad person.” Lamure, 115 N.M. at 71 , 846 P.2d at 1080 . {14} When reviewing a

2024See ACLU of N.M. v. Duran, 2016-NMCA-063, ¶ 45 , 392 P.3d 181 (providing that “[w]here appropriate, courts should conduct an in camera review of the documents at issue” when determining if documents are responsive or if privilege applies under IPRA) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Santa Fe Pac.

2021See Freeman v. Fairchild, 2018-NMSC-023, ¶ 18 , 416 P.3d 264 (concluding that the district court is to consider specific, enumerated factors when it “is considering whether to grant a motion for summary judgment as a sanction for abusive litigation conduct”).

2021See Freeman v. Fairchild, 2018-NMSC-023, ¶ 18 , 416 P.3d 264 (concluding that the district court is to consider specific, enumerated factors when it “is considering whether to grant a motion for summary judgment as a sanction for abusive litigation conduct”).

2020See Allen v. Allen, 1982-NMSC-118 , ¶ 13, 98 N.M. 652 , 651 P.2d 1296 (“Transmutation is a general term used to describe arrangements between spouses to convert property from separate property to community property and vice versa.”); see also Nichols, 1982-NMSC-071 , ¶¶ 23-30 (providing a detailed analysis of transmutation by commingling and transmutation by gift); Bayer, 1990-NMCA-106 , ¶ 20 (discussing community liens and stating that “[w]hen community efforts, labor, industry, or funds enhance the value of separate property, such enhancement is community property for which the community is

2020See Allen v. Allen, 1982-NMSC-118 , ¶ 13, 98 N.M. 652 , 651 P.2d 1296 (“Transmutation is a general term used to describe arrangements between spouses to convert property from separate property to community property and vice versa.”); see also Nichols, 1982-NMSC-071 , ¶¶ 23-30 (providing a detailed analysis of transmutation by commingling and transmutation by gift); Bayer, 1990-NMCA-106 , ¶ 20 (discussing community liens and stating that “[w]hen community efforts, labor, industry, or funds enhance the value of separate property, such enhancement is community property for which the community is

2012In the context of probate proceedings, “each proceeding before the district court or probate court is indep endent of any other pro ceeding invo lving the same estate.” Id.; see In re Estate of Newalla, 114 N.M. 290, 294 , 837 P.2d 1373, 1377 (Ct. App. 1992) (“To hold that orders terminating separate proceedings are final orders is to give finality a practical, rather than a technical, construction.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2012In the context of probate proceedings, “each proceeding before the district court or probate court is indep endent of any other pro ceeding invo lving the same estate.” Id.; see In re Estate of Newalla, 114 N.M. 290, 294 , 837 P.2d 1373, 1377 (Ct. App. 1992) (“To hold that orders terminating separate proceedings are final orders is to give finality a practical, rather than a technical, construction.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2008See State v. Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 9-46 , 141 N.M. 185 , 152 P.3d 828 (discussing the detailed analysis involved when a motion for severance of offenses is raised).

2008See State v. Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 9-46 , 141 N.M. 185 , 152 P.3d 828 (discussing the detailed analysis involved when a motion for severance of offenses is raised).

2007See Piña, 2001-NMCA-055, ¶¶ 20-22, 24 , 130 N.M. 661 , 29 P.3d 1062 (stating that the resisting party “must assert the ... privilege with sufficient detail so that [the requesting party], and ultimately the trial court, may assess the claim of privilege as to each withheld communication ”); Hartman, 1997-NMCA-032, ¶¶ 18-25 , 123 N.M. 220 , 937 P.2d 979 (discussing the detail necessary for a party to properly claim work-product immunity). b.

2007See Piña, 2001-NMCA-055, ¶¶ 20-22, 24 , 130 N.M. 661 , 29 P.3d 1062 (stating that the resisting party “must assert the ... privilege with sufficient detail so that [the requesting party], and ultimately the trial court, may assess the claim of privilege as to each withheld communication ”); Hartman, 1997-NMCA-032, ¶¶ 18-25 , 123 N.M. 220 , 937 P.2d 979 (discussing the detail necessary for a party to properly claim work-product immunity). b.

2006Finally, San Lorenzo has failed and refused to provide the Water[M]aster or his assistants with access to the measuring devices installed on the San Lorenzo ditch. {18} The memorandum opinion filed by the district court states that it appears that the answer filed by the Water Master raises questions of fact and that mandamus should not issue when issues of fact are raised. “ ‘The rights of the parties may not be adjudicated by mandamus.’ ” (quoting Concerned Residents for Neighborhood, Inc. v. Shollenbarger, 113 N.M. 667, 670 , 831 P.2d 603, 606 (Ct.App.1991)).

2006Finally, San Lorenzo has failed and refused to provide the Water[M]aster or his assistants with access to the measuring devices installed on the San Lorenzo ditch. {18} The memorandum opinion filed by the district court states that it appears that the answer filed by the Water Master raises questions of fact and that mandamus should not issue when issues of fact are raised. “ ‘The rights of the parties may not be adjudicated by mandamus.’ ” (quoting Concerned Residents for Neighborhood, Inc. v. Shollenbarger, 113 N.M. 667, 670 , 831 P.2d 603, 606 (Ct.App.1991)).

2005After a detailed analysis of the methodologies, the court appears to have been convinced that the plaintiffs’ experts could devise for use at trial a likely method to determine damages using actual market data as well as forecasts and models, and based on a “market [that] is in fact highly structured with prices set according to pre-set criteria enumerated in company pricing manuals.” Id. at 324-25 . {59} However, the court in In re Cardizem did not view the measure of damages in direct purchaser-antitrust overcharge cases to be actual harm, but, rather, “a surrogate-the full overcharge.” Id.

2005After a detailed analysis of the methodologies, the court appears to have been convinced that the plaintiffs’ experts could devise for use at trial a likely method to determine damages using actual market data as well as forecasts and models, and based on a “market [that] is in fact highly structured with prices set according to pre-set criteria enumerated in company pricing manuals.” Id. at 324-25 . {59} However, the court in In re Cardizem did not view the measure of damages in direct purchaser-antitrust overcharge cases to be actual harm, but, rather, “a surrogate-the full overcharge.” Id.

2001I think it more likely that in 1973 the Legislature broadened the child abuse statute without ever considering the possibility that the death of a child resulting from a driving offense could constitute child abuse resulting in death. {47} The Court of Appeals did not conduct a detailed inquiry into the language, history, and purpose of these statutes under the double jeopardy clause because it believed that our opinion in State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 86-87 , 792 P.2d 408, 418-19 (1990), established the proposition that a lesser offense, *474 as measured by the degree of felony, must be vacat

2001I think it more likely that in 1973 the Legislature broadened the child abuse statute without ever considering the possibility that the death of a child resulting from a driving offense could constitute child abuse resulting in death. {47} The Court of Appeals did not conduct a detailed inquiry into the language, history, and purpose of these statutes under the double jeopardy clause because it believed that our opinion in State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 86-87 , 792 P.2d 408, 418-19 (1990), established the proposition that a lesser offense, *474 as measured by the degree of felony, must be vacat

1997In a recent case, State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777, 779 , 932 P.2d 1, 3 (1997), the Supreme Court provided a detailed analysis of what is required to fairly invoke a ruling of the trial court, thus preserving an issue for appellate review.

1997In a recent case, State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777, 779 , 932 P.2d 1, 3 (1997), the Supreme Court provided a detailed analysis of what is required to fairly invoke a ruling of the trial court, thus preserving an issue for appellate review.

1995Compare State v. Lamure, 115 N.M. 61, 65-67 , 846 P.2d 1070, 1074-76 (Ct.App.1992), cert. denied, 114 N.M. 720 , 845 P.2d 814 (1993), with id. at 68-72, 846 P.2d at 1077-81 (Hartz, J., specially concurring), and see Rael, 117 N.M. at 540 , 873 P.2d at 286 (approving Hartz view), and State v. Montoya, 116 N.M. 72, 73-75 , 860 P.2d 202, 203-05 (Ct.App.) (same), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 709 , 858 P.2d 85 (1993).

1995Compare State v. Lamure, 115 N.M. 61, 65-67 , 846 P.2d 1070, 1074-76 (Ct.App.1992), cert. denied, 114 N.M. 720 , 845 P.2d 814 (1993), with id. at 68-72, 846 P.2d at 1077-81 (Hartz, J., specially concurring), and see Rael, 117 N.M. at 540 , 873 P.2d at 286 (approving Hartz view), and State v. Montoya, 116 N.M. 72, 73-75 , 860 P.2d 202, 203-05 (Ct.App.) (same), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 709 , 858 P.2d 85 (1993).

1995Contrary to earlier cases, from which one may have gotten the impression that evidence of other bad acts would be admissible if those other acts were sufficiently similar to the act for which defendant is on trial, e.g., State v. Corbin, 111 N.M. 707, 711-12 , 809 P.2d 57, 61-62 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 720 , 809 P.2d 634 (1991); State v. Burdex, 100 N.M. 197, 203-04 , 668 P.2d 313, 319-20 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 192 , 668 P.2d 308 (1983), it is now clear that a more detailed analysis needs to be done than simply comparing superficial similarity.

1995Contrary to earlier cases, from which one may have gotten the impression that evidence of other bad acts would be admissible if those other acts were sufficiently similar to the act for which defendant is on trial, e.g., State v. Corbin, 111 N.M. 707, 711-12 , 809 P.2d 57, 61-62 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 720 , 809 P.2d 634 (1991); State v. Burdex, 100 N.M. 197, 203-04 , 668 P.2d 313, 319-20 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 192 , 668 P.2d 308 (1983), it is now clear that a more detailed analysis needs to be done than simply comparing superficial similarity.

1995Compare State v. Lamure, 115 N.M. 61, 65-67 , 846 P.2d 1070, 1074-76 (Ct.App.1992), cert. denied, 114 N.M. 720 , 845 P.2d 814 (1993), with id. at 68-72, 846 P.2d at 1077-81 (Hartz, J., specially concurring), and see Rael, 117 N.M. at 540 , 873 P.2d at 286 (approving Hartz view), and State v. Montoya, 116 N.M. 72, 73-75 , 860 P.2d 202, 203-05 (Ct.App.) (same), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 709 , 858 P.2d 85 (1993).

1995Compare State v. Lamure, 115 N.M. 61, 65-67 , 846 P.2d 1070, 1074-76 (Ct.App.1992), cert. denied, 114 N.M. 720 , 845 P.2d 814 (1993), with id. at 68-72, 846 P.2d at 1077-81 (Hartz, J., specially concurring), and see Rael, 117 N.M. at 540 , 873 P.2d at 286 (approving Hartz view), and State v. Montoya, 116 N.M. 72, 73-75 , 860 P.2d 202, 203-05 (Ct.App.) (same), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 709 , 858 P.2d 85 (1993).

1995Contrary to earlier cases, from which one may have gotten the impression that evidence of other bad acts would be admissible if those other acts were sufficiently similar to the act for which defendant is on trial, e.g., State v. Corbin, 111 N.M. 707, 711-12 , 809 P.2d 57, 61-62 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 720 , 809 P.2d 634 (1991); State v. Burdex, 100 N.M. 197, 203-04 , 668 P.2d 313, 319-20 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 192 , 668 P.2d 308 (1983), it is now clear that a more detailed analysis needs to be done than simply comparing superficial similarity.

1974Ed.2d 105 ; See, also, United States v. Stephens, supra; United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 139 (3rd Cir. 1974).

1974Because of the conflict between rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, two questions must be answered. (1) Did the juvenile properly invoke the privilege? (2) If so, did the court err in allowing his testimony on direct to go to the jury nonetheless? (1) "If on direct a witness testifies to incriminating matters, he is considered to have waived the privilege as to those matters and may not, on cross, decline to answer questions as to details of the matters he has already revealed. [Citations omitted.] However, if the testimony sought to be elicited on cross is not merely a more d