detailed standard in West Virginia

2026“The detailed standard for our review of an order of the Public Service Commission contained in Syllabus Point 2 of Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, 166 W.

2025“The detailed standard for our review of an order of the Public Service Commission contained in Syllabus Point 2 of Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, 166 W.Va. 423 , 276 S.E.2d 179 (1981), may be summarized as follows: (1) whether the Commission exceeded its statutory jurisdiction and powers; (2) whether there is adequate evidence to support the Commission’s findings; and, (3) whether the substantive result of the Commission’s order is proper.” Syllabus Point 1, Central West Virginia Refuse, Incorporated v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 190 W.

2025“The detailed standard for our review of an order of the Public Service Commission contained in Syllabus Point 2 of Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, 166 W.Va. 423 , 276 S.E.2d 179 (1981), may be summarized as follows: (1) whether the Commission exceeded its statutory jurisdiction and powers; (2) whether there is adequate evidence to support the Commission’s findings; and, (3) whether the substantive result of the Commission’s order is proper.” Syllabus Point 1, Central West Virginia Refuse, Incorporated v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 190 W.

2023“The detailed standard for our review of an order of the Public Service Commission contained in Syllabus Point 2 of Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, 166 W.Va. 423 , 276 S.E.2d 179 (1981), may be summarized as follows: (1) whether the Commission exceeded its statutory jurisdiction and powers; (2) whether there is adequate evidence to support the Commission’s findings; and, (3) whether the substantive result of the Commission’s order is proper.” Syllabus Point 1, Central West i Virginia Refuse, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 190 W.

2012This Court has also stated that ‘“an order of the public service commission based upon its finding of facts will not be disturbed unless such finding is contrary to the evidence, or is without evidence to support it, or is arbitrary, or results from a misapplication of legal principles.’ United Fuel Gas Company v. The Public Service Commission, 143 W.Va. 33 , [ 99 S.E.2d 1 (1957) ].” Syllabus Point 5, in part, Boggs v. Public Service Comm’n, 154 W.Va. 146 , 174 S.E.2d 331 (1970).

2012This Court has also stated that ‘“an order of the public service commission based upon its finding of facts will not be disturbed unless such finding is contrary to the evidence, or is without evidence to support it, or is arbitrary, or results from a misapplication of legal principles.’ United Fuel Gas Company v. The Public Service Commission, 143 W.Va. 33 , [ 99 S.E.2d 1 (1957) ].” Syllabus Point 5, in part, Boggs v. Public Service Comm’n, 154 W.Va. 146 , 174 S.E.2d 331 (1970).

2012This Court has also stated that ‘“an order of the public service commission based upon its finding of facts will not be disturbed unless such finding is contrary to the evidence, or is without evidence to support it, or is arbitrary, or results from a misapplication of legal principles.’ United Fuel Gas Company v. The Public Service Commission, 143 W.Va. 33 , [ 99 S.E.2d 1 (1957) ].” Syllabus Point 5, in part, Boggs v. Public Service Comm’n, 154 W.Va. 146 , 174 S.E.2d 331 (1970).

2012This Court has also stated that ‘“an order of the public service commission based upon its finding of facts will not be disturbed unless such finding is contrary to the evidence, or is without evidence to support it, or is arbitrary, or results from a misapplication of legal principles.’ United Fuel Gas Company v. The Public Service Commission, 143 W.Va. 33 , [ 99 S.E.2d 1 (1957) ].” Syllabus Point 5, in part, Boggs v. Public Service Comm’n, 154 W.Va. 146 , 174 S.E.2d 331 (1970).

2024Va. 600 , 827 S.E.2d 224 (2019). 2. “‘The detailed standard for our review of an order of the Public Service Commission contained in Syllabus Point 2 of Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, 166 W.Va. 423 , 276 S.E.2d 179 (1981), may be summarized as follows: (1) whether the Commission exceeded its statutory jurisdiction and powers; (2) whether there is adequate evidence to support the Commission’s findings; and, (3) whether the substantive result of the Commission’s order is proper.’ Syl.

2022Va. 423 , 276 S.E.2d 179 (1981), may be summarized as follows: [ ] whether the Commission exceeded its statutory jurisdiction and powers[.]” Syllabus point 2, in part, Sierra Club v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 241 W.

2025Nichols was decided before Rule 701 was amended to include the requirement that the proffered lay opinion “must not be based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” However, the Nichols Court’s detailed analysis of the separate helpfulness factor is, all the same, instructive for our analysis. 71 Id. at 436 , 541 S.E.2d at 314 . 72 Id. 34 aid of an opinion.”73 We noted our longstanding precedent that precludes lay witnesses from offering opinions when facts adequately enable the jury to reach its own conclusion,74 and determined that under those

2025Nichols was decided before Rule 701 was amended to include the requirement that the proffered lay opinion “must not be based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” However, the Nichols Court’s detailed analysis of the separate helpfulness factor is, all the same, instructive for our analysis. 71 Id. at 436 , 541 S.E.2d at 314 . 72 Id. 34 aid of an opinion.”73 We noted our longstanding precedent that precludes lay witnesses from offering opinions when facts adequately enable the jury to reach its own conclusion,74 and determined that under those

2020Va. at 121 , 529 S.E.2d at 361 . 6 (“An accused may waive sundry constitutional rights and privileges, if he or she does so intelligently and voluntarily.”) In the instant case not only did each petitioner sign a detailed waiver, but also the circuit court held a W.

2015All parties agree that the interpretation of City of Kenova v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., 196 W.Va. 426 , 473 S.E.2d 141 (1996), is critical to the resolution of this appeal.

2015All parties agree that the interpretation of City of Kenova v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., 196 W.Va. 426 , 473 S.E.2d 141 (1996), is critical to the resolution of this appeal.

2009Where controversies exist as to whether there is liability, and if so for how much, Congress has not said that parties may not settle their claims without litigation. 332 U.S. at 631 , 68 S.Ct. at 298-99 , 92 L.Ed. 242 .

2009Where controversies exist as to whether there is liability, and if so for how much, Congress has not said that parties may not settle their claims without litigation. 332 U.S. at 631 , 68 S.Ct. at 298-99 , 92 L.Ed. 242 .

2004Charles Town General Hosp. v. Sanders, 210 W.Va. 118, 122-23 , 556 S.E.2d 85, 89-90 (2001) (recognizing that “relief of this nature is reserved for rather extraordinary cases” and stating that “we employ a detailed analysis of various criteria” “when deciding whether prohibitory relief is appropriate”).

2004Charles Town General Hosp. v. Sanders, 210 W.Va. 118, 122-23 , 556 S.E.2d 85, 89-90 (2001) (recognizing that "relief of this nature is reserved for rather extraordinary cases" and stating that "we employ a detailed analysis of various criteria" "when deciding whether prohibitory relief is appropriate").

2002Syllabus point one of Sexton v. Public Service Commission, 188 W.Va. 305 , 423 S.E.2d 914 (1992), also provides the following guidance: "` "[A]n order of the public service commission based upon its finding of facts will not be disturbed unless such finding is contrary to the evidence, or is without evidence to support it, or is arbitrary, or results from a misapplication of legal principles." United Fuel Gas Company v. The Public Service Commission, 143 W.Va. 33 , 99 S.E.2d 1 (1957).' Syllabus Point 5, in part, Boggs v. Public Service Comm'n, 154 W.Va. 146 , 174 S.E.2d 331 (1970)." Syllabus P

2002Syllabus point one of Sexton v. Public Service Commission, 188 W.Va. 305 , 423 S.E.2d 914 (1992), also provides the following guidance: "` "[A]n order of the public service commission based upon its finding of facts will not be disturbed unless such finding is contrary to the evidence, or is without evidence to support it, or is arbitrary, or results from a misapplication of legal principles." United Fuel Gas Company v. The Public Service Commission, 143 W.Va. 33 , 99 S.E.2d 1 (1957).' Syllabus Point 5, in part, Boggs v. Public Service Comm'n, 154 W.Va. 146 , 174 S.E.2d 331 (1970)." Syllabus P

2002Syllabus point one of Sexton v. Public Service Commission, 188 W.Va. 305 , 423 S.E.2d 914 (1992), also provides the following guidance: "` "[A]n order of the public service commission based upon its finding of facts will not be disturbed unless such finding is contrary to the evidence, or is without evidence to support it, or is arbitrary, or results from a misapplication of legal principles." United Fuel Gas Company v. The Public Service Commission, 143 W.Va. 33 , 99 S.E.2d 1 (1957).' Syllabus Point 5, in part, Boggs v. Public Service Comm'n, 154 W.Va. 146 , 174 S.E.2d 331 (1970)." Syllabus P

2002Syllabus point one of Sexton v. Public Service Commission, 188 W.Va. 305 , 423 S.E.2d 914 (1992), also provides the following guidance: "` "[A]n order of the public service commission based upon its finding of facts will not be disturbed unless such finding is contrary to the evidence, or is without evidence to support it, or is arbitrary, or results from a misapplication of legal principles." United Fuel Gas Company v. The Public Service Commission, 143 W.Va. 33 , 99 S.E.2d 1 (1957).' Syllabus Point 5, in part, Boggs v. Public Service Comm'n, 154 W.Va. 146 , 174 S.E.2d 331 (1970)." Syllabus P

2000Va.Code § 33-6-31 permits insurers to "incorporat[e] in [policies of motor vehicle insurance] such terms, conditions and exclusions as may be consistent with the premium charged." Because a "public statute[ ]" may serve as a source of authority for public policy issues, see Morris, 191 W.Va. at 433 n. 5, 446 S.E.2d at 655 n. 5, a detailed analysis of this permissive provision would be instructive to our inquiry. "`The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.' Syllabus point 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 15

2000Va.Code § 33-6-31 permits insurers to "incorporat[e] in [policies of motor vehicle insurance] such terms, conditions and exclusions as may be consistent with the premium charged." Because a "public statute[ ]" may serve as a source of authority for public policy issues, see Morris, 191 W.Va. at 433 n. 5, 446 S.E.2d at 655 n. 5, a detailed analysis of this permissive provision would be instructive to our inquiry. "`The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.' Syllabus point 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 15

2000Va.Code § 33-6-31 permits insurers to "incorporat[e] in [policies of motor vehicle insurance] such terms, conditions and exclusions as may be consistent with the premium charged." Because a "public statute[ ]" may serve as a source of authority for public policy issues, see Morris, 191 W.Va. at 433 n. 5, 446 S.E.2d at 655 n. 5, a detailed analysis of this permissive provision would be instructive to our inquiry. "`The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.' Syllabus point 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 15

2000Va.Code § 33-6-31 permits insurers to "incorporat[e] in [policies of motor vehicle insurance] such terms, conditions and exclusions as may be consistent with the premium charged." Because a "public statute[ ]" may serve as a source of authority for public policy issues, see Morris, 191 W.Va. at 433 n. 5, 446 S.E.2d at 655 n. 5, a detailed analysis of this permissive provision would be instructive to our inquiry. "`The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.' Syllabus point 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 15

2000ACF Industries, Inc. v. Vieweg, 204 W.Va. 525 , 514 S.E.2d 176 (1999).

2000ACF Industries, Inc. v. Vieweg, 204 W.Va. 525 , 514 S.E.2d 176 (1999).

1996This Court stated: “To determine if a plaintiff has substantially prevailed, we compare the plaintiffs last settlement demand before filing suit to the amount awarded by the jury.” 193 W.Va. at 353, 456 S.E.2d at 197 .

1995In Canestraro, 179 W.Va. at 795 , 374 S.E.2d at 319 , we made a detailed analysis of various provisions of the SMCRA that dealt with state programs regulating surface coal mining and came to these conclusions: “Clearly, Congress intended that state provisions be no less stringent or effective than the federal provisions. ... “[W]hen there is a conflict between the federal and state provisions, the less restrictive state provision must yield to the more stringent federal provision[.]” This quoted language clearly expresses the concept of the primacy of federal law governing the operations of su

1995In Canestraro, 179 W.Va. at 795 , 374 S.E.2d at 319 , we made a detailed analysis of various provisions of the SMCRA that dealt with state programs regulating surface coal mining and came to these conclusions: “Clearly, Congress intended that state provisions be no less stringent or effective than the federal provisions. ... “[W]hen there is a conflict between the federal and state provisions, the less restrictive state provision must yield to the more stringent federal provision[.]” This quoted language clearly expresses the concept of the primacy of federal law governing the operations of su

1994There is no such detailed forfeiture procedure in the federal law under 21 U.S.C. § 881 . 14 The general federal forfeiture statute is found in 19 U.S.C. § 1615 , which places the burden to establish probable cause, where there is no process, on the government, by stating that “... probable cause shall be first shown for the institution of such suit or action, to be judged of by the court....” Recently, in United States v. $191,-910.00 in United States Currency, 16 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir.1994), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made a detailed analysis of this language and concluded “that 19 U.S.

1994There is no such detailed forfeiture procedure in the federal law under 21 U.S.C. § 881 . 14 The general federal forfeiture statute is found in 19 U.S.C. § 1615 , which places the burden to establish probable cause, where there is no process, on the government, by stating that “... probable cause shall be first shown for the institution of such suit or action, to be judged of by the court....” Recently, in United States v. $191,-910.00 in United States Currency, 16 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir.1994), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made a detailed analysis of this language and concluded “that 19 U.S.

1993We addressed the idea of rehabilitative alimony in syllabus point 1 of Molnar v. Molnar, 173 W.Va. 200 , 314 S.E.2d 73 (1984): “The concept of ‘rehabilitative alimony’ generally connotes an attempt to encourage a dependent spouse to become self-supporting by providing alimony for a limited period of time during which gainful employment can be obtained.” Rehabilitative alimony has been used when a younger, dependent spouse enters a marriage with marketable skills but then deteriorate through lack of use, or the dependent spouse is capable of becoming self-supporting through academic study or tr

1993We addressed the idea of rehabilitative alimony in syllabus point 1 of Molnar v. Molnar, 173 W.Va. 200 , 314 S.E.2d 73 (1984): “The concept of ‘rehabilitative alimony’ generally connotes an attempt to encourage a dependent spouse to become self-supporting by providing alimony for a limited period of time during which gainful employment can be obtained.” Rehabilitative alimony has been used when a younger, dependent spouse enters a marriage with marketable skills but then deteriorate through lack of use, or the dependent spouse is capable of becoming self-supporting through academic study or tr

1993In Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 171 W.Va. at 498 , 300 S.E.2d at 611 , we summarized the detailed standard for our review of an order of the PSC contained in Syllabus Point 2 of Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra: “(1) [Wjhether the Commission exceeded its statutory jurisdiction and powers; (2) whether there is adequate evidence to support the Commission’s findings; and, (3) whether the substantive result of the Commission’s order is proper.” *419 III.

1993In Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 171 W.Va. at 498 , 300 S.E.2d at 611 , we summarized the detailed standard for our review of an order of the PSC contained in Syllabus Point 2 of Monongahela Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra: “(1) [Wjhether the Commission exceeded its statutory jurisdiction and powers; (2) whether there is adequate evidence to support the Commission’s findings; and, (3) whether the substantive result of the Commission’s order is proper.” *419 III.

1992A similar statement appears in Boardman v. United Services Automobile Association, 470 So.2d at 1038 , where the Mississippi Supreme Court held: “[O]ne of the important principles we enforce is that no foreign state’s substantive law will be enforced in courts of this state where to do so would be offensive to the deeply ingrained or strongly felt public policy of the state.” A more detailed analysis of this approach was attempted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Simmons’ Estate, supra, where the issue was whether the decedents had the insured’s