detailed analysis in Florida

2016The detailed inquiry and waiver verified by counsel are required by rule 8.165 to determine whether k waiver of counsel was made “knowingly and intelligently in consideration of [the juvenile’s] age, education,- experience, mental condition, and the nature and complexity of the case.” Id. at 212 (quoting P.L.S. v. State, 745 So.2d 555, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).

2016The detailed inquiry and waiver verified by counsel are required by rule 8.165 to determine whether a waiver of counsel was made "knowingly and intelligently in consideration of [the juvenile's] age, education, experience, mental condition, and the nature and complexity of the case." Id. at 212 (quoting P.L.S. v. State, 745 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).

2001The "requirement of a detailed inquiry recognizes that `[i]t is extremely doubtful that any child of limited experience can possibly comprehend the importance of counsel.'" P.L.S. v. State, 745 So.2d 555, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (quoting G.L.D. v. State, 442 So.2d 401, 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)).

2001The “requirement of a detailed inquiry recognizes that ‘[i]t is extremely doubtful that any child of limited experience can possibly comprehend the importance of counsel.’ ” P.L.S. v. State, 745 So.2d 555, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (quoting G.L.D. v. State, 442 So.2d 401, 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)).

2016The detailed inquiry and waiver verified by counsel are required by rule 8.165 to determine whether k waiver of counsel was made “knowingly and intelligently in consideration of [the juvenile’s] age, education,- experience, mental condition, and the nature and complexity of the case.” Id. at 212 (quoting P.L.S. v. State, 745 So.2d 555, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).

2016The detailed inquiry and waiver verified by counsel are required by rule 8.165 to determine whether a waiver of counsel was made "knowingly and intelligently in consideration of [the juvenile's] age, education, experience, mental condition, and the nature and complexity of the case." Id. at 212 (quoting P.L.S. v. State, 745 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).

2021The sentencing order further explains that the trial court “considered the testimony and observed the demeanor of all witnesses, reviewed all exhibits introduced into evidence, weighed the argument by counsel and the Defendant, reviewed Defendant’s two mental health evaluations, and reviewed the [PSI].” Then, as authorized by Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 194 (Fla. 2010), the trial court “group[ed] into categories proposed mitigating factors that are related in content,” conducted a detailed analysis, and assigned weight to each of the four categories it found, which were childhood 5.

2020The sentencing order further explains that the trial court “considered the testimony and observed the demeanor of all witnesses, reviewed all exhibits introduced into evidence, weighed the argument by counsel and the Defendant, reviewed Defendant’s two mental health evaluations, and reviewed the [PSI].” Then, as authorized by Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 194 (Fla. 2010), the trial court “group[ed] into categories proposed mitigating factors that are related in content,” conducted a detailed analysis, and assigned weight to each of the four categories it found, which were childhood 5.

2001Although some cases without explanation call the error in failing to comply with rule 8.165 "fundamental," the Fifth District reasoned in J.R.V. v. State, 715 So.2d 1135, 1139 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), that because the juvenile has a constitutional right to assistance of counsel in delinquency proceedings, the denial of that right constitutes fundamental error.

2001Although some cases without explanation call the error in failing to comply with rule 8.165 “fundamental,” the Fifth District reasoned in J.R.V. v. State, 715 So.2d 1135, 1139 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), that because the juvenile has a constitutional right to assistance of counsel in delinquency proceedings, the denial of that right constitutes fundamental error.

2026See § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (defining stalking as “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ing], harass[ing], or cyberstalk[ing] another person”); see also Sutton, 332 So. 3d at 1005 (“In order to be entitled to a stalking injunction two separate instances of stalking must be proven by competent substantial evidence.” (quotation omitted)). 1 We review the trial court’s findings of fact for competent substantial evidence, “[b]ut the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to justify imposing an injunction is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Sutton v. Fowler, 332 So. 3d

2024See id. at 450 (“Exercising judicial restraint in a facial challenge ‘frees the Court not only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from premature interpretations . . . .’ ” (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960))).

2024See id. at 450 (“Exercising judicial restraint in a facial challenge ‘frees the Court not only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from premature interpretations . . . .’ ” (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960))).

2024See note 4, supra. 17 the Florida Constitution and has long been the standard by which trial courts have been guided in determining whether to deny bail.” Paul, 783 So. 2d at 1052 .

2017In Williams , we provided a detailed analysis of Mobley and distinguished it, holding that “Mobley is inapplicable here because, unlike in Mobley , the VOPs in this case ultimately alleged that, during the defendant’s probation term, he had absconded from supervision, culminating with the allegation that his ‘current whereabouts is unknown.’ ” Id. at 920.

2017Williams held “when a probationer absconds from supervision, the probationary period is tolled until the probationer is once more placed under probationary supervision.” Id. at 920-21 .

2016See Malone v. State, 852 So.2d 412, 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that trial court’s duty to perform Nelson inquiry was triggered by defendant’s request for substitute counsel based on counsel’s failure “to file certain requested motions”).

2015The State cites Linehan v. State, 442 So.2d 244, 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), in which the Second District provided a detailed analysis of whether voluntary intoxication was a defense to arson in section 806.01(1), Florida Statutes (1981).

2000See Cross v. Lakeview Center, Inc., 529 So.2d 307, 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

1999In Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Florida, N.A., 666 So.2d 580, 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), Judge Altenbernd described the following two-step analysis for evaluating the question of whether unobjected to, improper argument constitutes fundamental error: First, the trial court must determine whether the error was so pervasive, inflammatory, and prejudicial as to preclude the jury's rational consideration of the case....

1999See id. at 1028-35 (Anderson, J., dissenting). [6] Lightbourne's second 3.850 motion focused primarily on attacking the reliability of the jailhouse informants, including affidavits and other exculpatory information concerning Chavers and Carson.