detailed analysis in Massachusetts

2024See Graham, supra. As in Baker, supra, we need "not enter upon a detailed inquiry whether the union's implicit interpretation of the seniority provision[s] was correct." Suffice it to say that the hearing officer concluded that the relevant contractual language is "unclear," a conclusion with which we agree.

2024We acknowledge that the judge could have conducted a more detailed inquiry into juror no. 3's work relationship with the 5 student prosecutor, and that the record does not fully support her remark later in the proceeding that juror no. 3 knew the student prosecutor "in a very kind of happenstance way" that did not involve "socializing." Nevertheless, the primary purpose of inquiries directed to prospective jurors is to "determine whether [they] will set aside their own opinions," impartially consider the evidence presented, and "follow the instructions of the judge." Commonwealth v. Stroyny, 4

2024L. c. 30A, § 1 (6), and "the examiner's detailed written decision was balanced and fair," see Smith v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 65 Mass. App. Ct. 803, 813 (2006), we do not disturb the board's decision.

2023Id.; Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294-95 (2002). -------------------------------------------- [22] Although juries today are extensively instructed regarding the limitations of eyewitness identification, it was not error at the time of Mercado's trial to refuse to give a more detailed instruction.

2016The trustee of a trust that contains an ascertainable standard must engage in a detailed inquiry into each beneficiary’s needs and finances, and must “give serious and responsible consideration both as to the propriety of the amounts and as to their consistency with the terms and purposes of the trust.” See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Rodd, 356 Mass. 584, 588-589 (1970).

2016See, e.g., Marden v. Mallard Decoy Club, Inc., 361 Mass. 105, 107 (1972) (“easement granted in general terms is . . .. available for all reasonable uses to which the dominant estate may thereafter be devoted”); Labounty v. Vickers, 352 Mass. 337, 345 (1967) (“The question as to the extent and limits of a reasonable right of way . . . [is] largely one of fact. . . ”); Restatement of Property, supra at § 4.10 comment c (“Resolution of the conflict [over changed use] often demands a detailed inquiry into the particular facts and circumstances of the case, and the issues as to intent, reasonable e

2016See, e.g., Marden v. Mallard Decoy Club, Inc., 361 Mass. 105, 107 (1972) (“easement granted in general terms is . . .. available for all reasonable uses to which the dominant estate may thereafter be devoted”); Labounty v. Vickers, 352 Mass. 337, 345 (1967) (“The question as to the extent and limits of a reasonable right of way . . . [is] largely one of fact. . . ”); Restatement of Property, supra at § 4.10 comment c (“Resolution of the conflict [over changed use] often demands a detailed inquiry into the particular facts and circumstances of the case, and the issues as to intent, reasonable e

2011See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 34-35 (2011) (providing a detailed analysis of when under Teague a “new rule” has been created).

2004When we discussed the purpose of the incest statute and concluded in Commonwealth v. Smith, 431 Mass. 417, 422 (2000), that “protecting] children within the family from sexual impositions by their elders” and not “eugenics” was the most compelling purpose for the incest prohibition, we relied heavily on the detailed analysis provided by the commentaries to the Model Penal Code.

1989Accordingly, we cannot say that the plaintiffs’ constitutional claim is “ ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,’ . . . ‘wholly unsubstantial,’ . . . ‘obviously frivolous,’ . . . ‘plainly unsubstantial,’ . . . or ‘no longer open *78 to discussion,’ ” (citations omitted), Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-537 (1974), or that it otherwise fails to meet “the painstakingly minimal standard of substantiality.” Stratos, supra at 319 .

1989The Globe argues that, even if autopsy reports are medical records, we must indulge in a detailed analysis to determine whether the autopsy reports are “of a personal nature and relate to a particular individual.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432-434 (1983).

1985P. 12 (c) (3) (A), 378 Mass. 866 (1979), and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969), a plea judge, on the record and in open court, must tell the defendant that a guilty plea waives his right to trial with or without a jury, his right to confront witnesses against him, and his privilege against self-incrimination. 2 Michigan has a detailed rule concerning the acceptance of guilty pleas which requires the judge to tell the defendant that, if his plea is accepted, he gives up various rights, including “the right . . . (iii) to be presumed innocent until proved guilty; [and] (iv) to have the

1985This defendant’s limited powers of comprehension demand a detailed inquiry, what has been called “a compendious reminder.” Ciummei v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 510 (1979).

1978Giving due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses, it is our conclusion that the judge’s findings, which are comprehensive, are not only not clearly erroneous (see Taylor v. Lassell, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 539, 540 [1976]; Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P. 52a) but are amply supported by the evidence.

1976The defendant claims that the judge erred in not instructing the jury in language adapted from Maynard v. Royal Worcester Corset Co. 200 Mass. 1, 7-8 (1908).

1975Such a claim must be measured by a delicate balancing of the four factors listed by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530-533 (1972): the length of delay, the reasons for delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.