44 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2025 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People of Michigan v. Johnny Ray Kennedygreen2 sentences2025Although a defendant need not “provide the court with a detailed analysis of the assistance an appointed expert might provide,” a “defendant’s bare assertion that an expert would be beneficial cannot, without more, entitle him or her to an expert[.]” Kennedy, 502 Mich at 226-227 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2024Though the defendant is not “expected to provide the court with a detailed analysis of the assistance an appointed expert might provide,” a “defendant’s bare assertion that an expert would be beneficial cannot, without more, entitle him or her to an expert[.]” Id. at 226-227 (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 4 | 10 |
Bocquet v. Herringgreen2 sentences2022While we did not perform a detailed analysis of the statute’s text, we rejected the defendant’s contention that the jury finding should be dispositive because “to hold that the language of this section applies only to exceptional cases arising under the act would be to import something into the statute which is at variance with its evident meaning.” Id. at 43 . 18 Bocquet v Herring, 972 SW2d 19, 20 (Tex, 1998). 8 and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” 19 It held that the statute “does not require an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party” because “it provides that th 2022While we did not perform a detailed analysis of the statute’s text, we rejected the defendant’s contention that the jury finding should be dispositive because “to hold that the language of this section applies only to exceptional cases arising under the act would be to import something into the statute which is at variance with its evident meaning.” Id. at 43 . 18 Bocquet v Herring, 972 SW2d 19, 20 (Tex, 1998). 8 and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” 19 It held that the statute “does not require an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party” because “it provides that th | 3 | 3 |
Raines v. Byrdgreen2 sentences2001Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist even more dramatically stated the case in his majority opinion in Raines v Byrd, 521 US 811, 818, 820 ; 117 S Ct 2312 ; 138 L Ed 2d 849 (1997): “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” * * * “[T]he law of Art HI standing is built on a single basic idea — the idea of separation of powers.” In Michigan, standing has developed on a track parallel to the federal doctrine, albeit by way of an additional constitutiona 2001Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist even more dramatically stated the case in his majority opinion in Raines v Byrd, 521 US 811, 818, 820 ; 117 S Ct 2312 ; 138 L Ed 2d 849 (1997): “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” * * * “[T]he law of Art HI standing is built on a single basic idea — the idea of separation of powers.” In Michigan, standing has developed on a track parallel to the federal doctrine, albeit by way of an additional constitutiona | 2 | 2 |
Ake v. Oklahomagreen1 sentence2024Ake instructs that due process requires, for example, that when a defendant’s sanity will be “a significant factor at trial, the State must . . . assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” Ake, 470 US at 83 (emphasis added). 5 C. | 1 | 1 |
Snyder v. Kinggreen2 sentences1982See, also, Snyder v King, 199 Mich 345, 357 ; 165 NW 840 ; 1 ALR 893 (1917); 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence, §§ 6-9, pp 340-350; 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 328c, pp 154-156. 5 38 Mich App 719, 726-727 ; 197 NW2d 160 (1972). 6 See, also, Braman v Bosworth, 112 Mich App 518, 520-523 ; 316 NW2d 255 (1982), for a detailed analysis of the proposition set forth in Garnet v Jenks, supra. In Braman , the plaintiff testified in her deposition that defendant Dolen was not negligent; however, another witness, defendant Bosworth, testified in his deposition that Dolen was, in fact, operating his automobile in a 1982See, also, Snyder v King, 199 Mich 345, 357 ; 165 NW 840 ; 1 ALR 893 (1917); 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence, §§ 6-9, pp 340-350; 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 328c, pp 154-156. 5 38 Mich App 719, 726-727 ; 197 NW2d 160 (1972). 6 See, also, Braman v Bosworth, 112 Mich App 518, 520-523 ; 316 NW2d 255 (1982), for a detailed analysis of the proposition set forth in Garnet v Jenks, supra. In Braman , the plaintiff testified in her deposition that defendant Dolen was not negligent; however, another witness, defendant Bosworth, testified in his deposition that Dolen was, in fact, operating his automobile in a | 1 | 1 |
| Parrish v. B F Goodrich Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lane v. Ruhl
green
2 sentences2022While we did not perform a detailed analysis of the statute’s text, we rejected the defendant’s contention that the jury finding should be dispositive because “to hold that the language of this section applies only to exceptional cases arising under the act would be to import something into the statute which is at variance with its evident meaning.” Id. at 43 . 18 Bocquet v Herring, 972 SW2d 19, 20 (Tex, 1998). 8 and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” 19 It held that the statute “does not require an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party” because “it provides that th 2022While we did not perform a detailed analysis of the statute’s text, we rejected the defendant’s contention that the jury finding should be dispositive because “to hold that the language of this section applies only to exceptional cases arising under the act would be to import something into the statute which is at variance with its evident meaning.” Id. at 43 . 18 Bocquet v Herring, 972 SW2d 19, 20 (Tex, 1998). 8 and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” 19 It held that the statute “does not require an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party” because “it provides that th | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Wood v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences2018We note that the trial court provided a detailed analysis of the “reasonableness” factors set forth in MRPC 1.5(a) and in Wood v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exch, 413 Mich 573 ; 321 NW2d 653 (1982). 2018We note that the trial court provided a detailed analysis of the “reasonableness” factors set forth in MRPC 1.5(a) and in Wood v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exch, 413 Mich 573 ; 321 NW2d 653 (1982). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Though some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government, the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article HI. [Citations omitted.] In Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211, 219-225 ; 115 S Ct 1447 ; 131 L Ed 2d 328 (1995), Justice Scalia, in another majority opinion, provided a detailed analysis of the concern with preserving the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches, that traced its history back to the framers of the U.S. Constitution. 2001Though some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government, the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article HI. [Citations omitted.] In Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211, 219-225 ; 115 S Ct 1447 ; 131 L Ed 2d 328 (1995), Justice Scalia, in another majority opinion, provided a detailed analysis of the concern with preserving the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches, that traced its history back to the framers of the U.S. Constitution. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Souden v. Souden
green
1 sentence2024Id. at 416-417 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer
green
1 sentence2022Vodvarka also provides a detailed analysis of the threshold requirement that courts find proper cause or a change in circumstances warranting modification to a custody arrangement before moving to evaluate a child’s custodial environment and best interests, id. at 509-517 , though this requirement is not specifically at issue in this appeal. -3- changes to parenting time and school enrollment rendered him unable to take the children to and from school and reduced his parenting time “from approximately 182 overnights under the prior order to approximately 62 overnights, a reduction of 120 days | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Grewe v. Mount Clemens General Hospital
green
2 sentences2021Were this Court not bound by the Michigan Supreme Court’s order in Reeves v Midmichigan Health, 489 Mich 908 ; 769 NW2d 468 (Mem) (2011), I would conclude that the Supreme Court’s detailed analysis of ostensible agency and its ruling in Grewe v Mt Clemens Hosp, 404 Mich 240 ; 273 NW2d 429 (1978), supports a reversal of the trial court’s ruling in the present case. 2021Were this Court not bound by the Michigan Supreme Court’s order in Reeves v Midmichigan Health, 489 Mich 908 ; 769 NW2d 468 (Mem) (2011), I would conclude that the Supreme Court’s detailed analysis of ostensible agency and its ruling in Grewe v Mt Clemens Hosp, 404 Mich 240 ; 273 NW2d 429 (1978), supports a reversal of the trial court’s ruling in the present case. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Joseph Ayotte v. Department of Health and Human Services
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 493-494 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. Cronic
green
2 sentences2018He contends that this is a structural defect that warrants reversal of his convictions without a showing of prejudice under United States v Cronic, 466 US 648 ; 104 S Ct 2039 ; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984). 2018He contends that this is a structural defect that warrants reversal of his convictions without a showing of prejudice under United States v Cronic, 466 US 648 ; 104 S Ct 2039 ; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Pierron v. Pierron
green
1 sentence2018Pierron II, 486 Mich at 92 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Capital Area District Library v. Michigan Open Carry, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017In CADL, this Court rejected the direct application of the preemption provisions of MCL 123.1102 because a district library was not contained within the definition of a “local unit of 1 298 Mich App 220 ; 826 NW2d 736 (2012). -1- government” under MCL 123.1101(a).2 The opinion then goes on to provide a detailed analysis of the applicability of field preemption and the application of the factors under People v Llewellyn.3 I need not extensively review the issue of field preemption here as the CADL opinion does an admirable job of doing just that. 2017In CADL, this Court rejected the direct application of the preemption provisions of MCL 123.1102 because a district library was not contained within the definition of a “local unit of 1 298 Mich App 220 ; 826 NW2d 736 (2012). -1- government” under MCL 123.1101(a).2 The opinion then goes on to provide a detailed analysis of the applicability of field preemption and the application of the factors under People v Llewellyn.3 I need not extensively review the issue of field preemption here as the CADL opinion does an admirable job of doing just that. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Dunigan
green
1 sentence2016Dunigan, 299 Mich App at 589-590 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Allstaedt v. Ochs
neutral
2 sentences2015We engaged in a detailed analysis of the trial court’s factual findings, id., unpub op at 2-6, and ultimately stated: As noted in Allstaedt v Ochs, 302 Mich 232, 237 ; 4 NW2d 530 (1942), the statutory presumption arising from the joint accounts can be rebutted by competent evidence. 2015We engaged in a detailed analysis of the trial court’s factual findings, id., unpub op at 2-6, and ultimately stated: As noted in Allstaedt v Ochs, 302 Mich 232, 237 ; 4 NW2d 530 (1942), the statutory presumption arising from the joint accounts can be rebutted by competent evidence. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Great Lakes Concrete Pole Corp. v. Eash
green
1 sentence2015Great Lakes Concrete Pole Corp, 148 Mich App at 656 n 6. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Smith v. Khouri
green
1 sentence2014Plaintiff’s primary arguments on appeal are that defendant failed to establish that the objected-to attorney fees and litigation costs 2 were reasonable and that the trial court abused its discretion by totally disregarding the reasonableness factors enunciated in Smith, 481 Mich at 529-530 .3 With respect to the Smith factors, as mentioned above, the prior panel stated that “under MCR 3.206(C)(2)(a), the court is not necessarily required to undertake the detailed analysis described in Smith[.]” Fisher, slip op at 12. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Brown v. Loveman
green
1 sentence2014Brown, 260 Mich App at 598 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Neal v. Department of Corrections
neutral
1 sentence2007The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering immediate sanctions against the plaintiff for noncompliance with a court order, and this Court should not dilute the trial court's contempt power by now conditionally reversing the sanctions imposed. [3] NOTES [1] For a more detailed analysis of this Court's duty to provide written reasons for its decision, see my statements in Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228, 1231 , 729 N.W.2d 451 (2006); People v. Parsons, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor Inc., 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); Neal v. Dep't of Corre | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2007The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering immediate sanctions against the plaintiff for noncompliance with a court order, and this Court should not dilute the trial court's contempt power by now conditionally reversing the sanctions imposed. [3] NOTES [1] For a more detailed analysis of this Court's duty to provide written reasons for its decision, see my statements in Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228, 1231 , 729 N.W.2d 451 (2006); People v. Parsons, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor Inc., 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); Neal v. Dep't of Corre 2007The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering immediate sanctions against the plaintiff for noncompliance with a court order, and this Court should not dilute the trial court's contempt power by now conditionally reversing the sanctions imposed. [3] NOTES [1] For a more detailed analysis of this Court's duty to provide written reasons for its decision, see my statements in Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228, 1231 , 729 N.W.2d 451 (2006); People v. Parsons, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor Inc., 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); Neal v. Dep't of Corre | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Parsons
green
1 sentence2007The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering immediate sanctions against the plaintiff for noncompliance with a court order, and this Court should not dilute the trial court's contempt power by now conditionally reversing the sanctions imposed. [3] NOTES [1] For a more detailed analysis of this Court's duty to provide written reasons for its decision, see my statements in Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228, 1231 , 729 N.W.2d 451 (2006); People v. Parsons, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor Inc., 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); Neal v. Dep't of Corre | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Grievance Administrator v. Fieger
green
2 sentences2007The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering immediate sanctions against the plaintiff for noncompliance with a court order, and this Court should not dilute the trial court's contempt power by now conditionally reversing the sanctions imposed. [3] NOTES [1] For a more detailed analysis of this Court's duty to provide written reasons for its decision, see my statements in Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228, 1231 , 729 N.W.2d 451 (2006); People v. Parsons, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor Inc., 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); Neal v. Dep't of Corre 2007The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering immediate sanctions against the plaintiff for noncompliance with a court order, and this Court should not dilute the trial court's contempt power by now conditionally reversing the sanctions imposed. [3] NOTES [1] For a more detailed analysis of this Court's duty to provide written reasons for its decision, see my statements in Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228, 1231 , 729 N.W.2d 451 (2006); People v. Parsons, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor Inc., 477 Mich. 1044 , 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007); Neal v. Dep't of Corre | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Poole
green
1 sentence2001Courts should also consider any other circumstance bearing on the reliability of the statement at issue. [ Id. ] In light of those factors and after reviewing "all the circumstances surrounding the portion of the statement inculpating defendant," the Court of Appeals was "convinced that [the statement] lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to provide the jury with a satisfactorybasis for evaluating the truth of the statement." However, the Court failed to set forth a detailed analysis. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Sanchez v. Lagoudakis
green
2 sentences1998II In its opinion affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals offered a detailed analysis of the central issues presented in this case. 217 Mich.App. at 538-557 , 552 N.W.2d 472 . 1998II In its opinion affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals offered a detailed analysis of the central issues presented in this case. 217 Mich.App. at 538-557 , 552 N.W.2d 472 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Sexton
green
2 sentences1998We undertook a detailed analysis of retroactivity principles earlier this year in People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43 ; 580 NW2d 404 (1998). 1998We undertook a detailed analysis of retroactivity principles earlier this year in People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43 ; 580 NW2d 404 (1998). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.
green
1 sentence1987A similar detailed analysis was done by the Washington Supreme Court in Harbeson v Parke Davis, Inc, 98 Wash 2d 460, 467-478; 656 P2d 483 (1983). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Braman v. Bosworth
neutral
2 sentences1982See, also, Snyder v King, 199 Mich 345, 357 ; 165 NW 840 ; 1 ALR 893 (1917); 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence, §§ 6-9, pp 340-350; 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 328c, pp 154-156. 5 38 Mich App 719, 726-727 ; 197 NW2d 160 (1972). 6 See, also, Braman v Bosworth, 112 Mich App 518, 520-523 ; 316 NW2d 255 (1982), for a detailed analysis of the proposition set forth in Garnet v Jenks, supra. In Braman , the plaintiff testified in her deposition that defendant Dolen was not negligent; however, another witness, defendant Bosworth, testified in his deposition that Dolen was, in fact, operating his automobile in a 1982See, also, Snyder v King, 199 Mich 345, 357 ; 165 NW 840 ; 1 ALR 893 (1917); 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence, §§ 6-9, pp 340-350; 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 328c, pp 154-156. 5 38 Mich App 719, 726-727 ; 197 NW2d 160 (1972). 6 See, also, Braman v Bosworth, 112 Mich App 518, 520-523 ; 316 NW2d 255 (1982), for a detailed analysis of the proposition set forth in Garnet v Jenks, supra. In Braman , the plaintiff testified in her deposition that defendant Dolen was not negligent; however, another witness, defendant Bosworth, testified in his deposition that Dolen was, in fact, operating his automobile in a | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Gamet v. Jenks
green
2 sentences1982See, also, Snyder v King, 199 Mich 345, 357 ; 165 NW 840 ; 1 ALR 893 (1917); 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence, §§ 6-9, pp 340-350; 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 328c, pp 154-156. 5 38 Mich App 719, 726-727 ; 197 NW2d 160 (1972). 6 See, also, Braman v Bosworth, 112 Mich App 518, 520-523 ; 316 NW2d 255 (1982), for a detailed analysis of the proposition set forth in Garnet v Jenks, supra. In Braman , the plaintiff testified in her deposition that defendant Dolen was not negligent; however, another witness, defendant Bosworth, testified in his deposition that Dolen was, in fact, operating his automobile in a 1982See, also, Snyder v King, 199 Mich 345, 357 ; 165 NW 840 ; 1 ALR 893 (1917); 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence, §§ 6-9, pp 340-350; 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 328c, pp 154-156. 5 38 Mich App 719, 726-727 ; 197 NW2d 160 (1972). 6 See, also, Braman v Bosworth, 112 Mich App 518, 520-523 ; 316 NW2d 255 (1982), for a detailed analysis of the proposition set forth in Garnet v Jenks, supra. In Braman , the plaintiff testified in her deposition that defendant Dolen was not negligent; however, another witness, defendant Bosworth, testified in his deposition that Dolen was, in fact, operating his automobile in a | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Mitchell v. Carson green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Ross v. Consumers Power Co. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Gould v. Johnson neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Manchester neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| State v. Coliton green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| People v. Lorenzo Williams green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Detroit Free Press Co. v. Bagg neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| McBride v. Kerby green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| McLouth Steel Corp. v. Corporation & Securities Commission green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.