48 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1956–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Timothy W. Menkegreen2 sentences1976In United States v. Menke, 468 F.2d 20, 24 (3d Cir. 1972), the court stated: "In [Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1969)], we held that where a defendant is given the detailed warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona . . . and thereafter `voluntarily submits to interrogation and freely offers information on the existence and location of specifically identified evidence, and further agrees to surrender the evidence to the police, fully cognizant of his right to remain silent and fully aware that the information he provides may be used against him, the *77 seizure 1976In United States v. Menke, 468 F.2d 20, 24 (3d Cir. 1972), the court stated: “In [Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1969)], we held that where a defendant is given the detailed warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona ... and thereafter ‘voluntarily submits to interrogation and freely offers information on the existence and location of specifically identified evidence, and further agrees to surrender the evidence to the police, fully cognizant of his right to remain silent and fully aware that the information he provides may be used against him, the seizure of su | 3 | 3 |
Neder v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (stating that a finding of structural error, which requires automatic reversal, is reserved for “a very limited class of cases”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). [J-89A-2015 and J-89B-2015] - 52 2016See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (stating that a finding of structural error, which requires automatic reversal, is reserved for “a very limited class of cases”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). [J-89A-2015 and J-89B-2015] - 52 | 2 | 2 |
Lorah v. Luppold Roofing Co., Inc.green2 sentences2001See Lorah v. Luppold Roofing Co., 424 Pa.Super. 439, 445 , 622 A.2d 1383, 1386 (1993) (“[T]he tenor of our law is that the violation of safety conditions alone cannot be the basis for a finding that the Peculiar Risk Doctrine applies, as many, if not most, industrial [accidents] result from a failure to follow ... safety regulations.”); Peffer, 406 Pa.Super. at 465 , 594 A.2d at 713 (“Violation of .safety conditions alone, however, cannot be a basis for carving out exceptions to the rule that the owner is not liable for injuries incurred by employees of a subcontractor, as to do so would nulli 2001See Lorah v. Luppold Roofing Co., 424 Pa.Super. 439, 445 , 622 A.2d 1383, 1386 (1993) (“[T]he tenor of our law is that the violation of safety conditions alone cannot be the basis for a finding that the Peculiar Risk Doctrine applies, as many, if not most, industrial [accidents] result from a failure to follow ... safety regulations.”); Peffer, 406 Pa.Super. at 465 , 594 A.2d at 713 (“Violation of .safety conditions alone, however, cannot be a basis for carving out exceptions to the rule that the owner is not liable for injuries incurred by employees of a subcontractor, as to do so would nulli | 2 | 2 |
Peffer v. Penn 21 Associatesgreen2 sentences2001See Lorah v. Luppold Roofing Co., 424 Pa.Super. 439, 445 , 622 A.2d 1383, 1386 (1993) (“[T]he tenor of our law is that the violation of safety conditions alone cannot be the basis for a finding that the Peculiar Risk Doctrine applies, as many, if not most, industrial [accidents] result from a failure to follow ... safety regulations.”); Peffer, 406 Pa.Super. at 465 , 594 A.2d at 713 (“Violation of .safety conditions alone, however, cannot be a basis for carving out exceptions to the rule that the owner is not liable for injuries incurred by employees of a subcontractor, as to do so would nulli 2001See Lorah v. Luppold Roofing Co., 424 Pa.Super. 439, 445 , 622 A.2d 1383, 1386 (1993) (“[T]he tenor of our law is that the violation of safety conditions alone cannot be the basis for a finding that the Peculiar Risk Doctrine applies, as many, if not most, industrial [accidents] result from a failure to follow ... safety regulations.”); Peffer, 406 Pa.Super. at 465 , 594 A.2d at 713 (“Violation of .safety conditions alone, however, cannot be a basis for carving out exceptions to the rule that the owner is not liable for injuries incurred by employees of a subcontractor, as to do so would nulli | 2 | 2 |
Melwood Corp. v. Zoning Board of Adjustmentgreen1 sentence2025See Melwood Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 528 A.2d 668, 670 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (“[W]here the fact[]finder has failed to make necessary 1 Because Licensee held a CDL, she was entitled to receive “the more detailed warning” “that refusal to submit to the test will result in [her] being disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle.” Bergenstock v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 311 A.3d 1201 , 1207 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (quoting 75 Pa.C.S. § 1613(c)) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Davis, G.green1 sentence2025See id. at 1027 ; see also Davis, 262 A.3d at 596 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Postiegreen2 sentences2025See Postie, 200 A.3d at 1026 . 2025See id. at 1027 ; see also Davis, 262 A.3d at 596 . | 1 | 1 |
Banfield, Aplts. v. Secretary of the Comgreen1 sentence2024See id. (citing and quoting Banfield v. Cortes, 110 A.3d 155, 170 (Pa. 2015); Dayhoff v. Weaver, 808 A.2d 1002 , 1010 n.21 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); and In re Gen. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Adoption of R.J.S.green1 sentence2023See R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 516 (holding that remand is proper where the evidence of record is insufficient to permit an assessment of the emotional bonds between parent and children). | 1 | 1 |
WMI Group, Inc. v. Fox, C.green1 sentence2023See WMI Grp., Inc. v. Fox, 109 A.3d 740 , 744 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2015) (noting that this Court may consider documents not included in the record but which are in the reproduced record where neither party disputes the accuracy of the documents) -4- J-A28031-22 agreement entered into between [Toll and the SEC] relating to the documents, records, and disclosures . . . to the SEC[,]” and “a detailed privilege log of all documents, records, and disclosures Toll . . . provided, produced, or otherwise made to the SEC.” See Order, 7/15/21, at ¶¶ 3-4 (underline in original) (“the July 2021 order”).3 Toll | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bondgreen1 sentence2018When a “representative of the Commonwealth is responsible for scheduling cases,” “faithful compliance with the legal forms of proof” is required, including a detailed inquiry “into the Commonwealth’s assertions of necessary delay,” supported by “trial schedules and justifications.” Commonwealth v. Bond, 532 A.2d 339, 343 (Pa. 1987) (plurality opinion). | 1 | 1 |
J.R.M. v. J.E.A.green1 sentence2018Father's complaints of error are addressed in the court's written memorandum containing a detailed analysis of the aforementioned statutory factors and in comments made to the parents at the conclusion of trial, to which the undersigned defers for additionai explanation, see J.R.M. v. J.EA., 33 A.3d 647, 650 (Pa.Super.2011). | 1 | 1 |
M.J.M. v. M.L.G.green1 sentence2018Mother acknowledges that the trial court need not set forth a detailed analysis of the evidence of record, citing M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 336 (Pa. Super. 2013), but contends that the “problem in the case at bar is that there is no indication that the trial court considered” Child’s testimony. | 1 | 1 |
Russo Appealgreen1 sentence2017As stated in In re Russo, the general rule "must yield to the paramount principle that the best interests of each individual child must be the determining factor." In re Russo, 346 A.2d 355, 357 (Pa. Super. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Leachgreen1 sentence2014See Leach, 729 A.2d at 611 (stating that a course of conduct can be established by a repetitive pattern of behavior); see also 5 Recently, an en banc panel of this Court, in Commonwealth v. Kelly, 2014 PA Super 243 (Pa. Super. 2014), engaged in a detailed analysis of the meaning of the phrase “course of conduct” as used in the grading provision of the corruption of minors statute, and held that “the use of the phrase ‘course of conduct’ in the first provision of [the statute] imposes a requirement of multiple acts over time, in the same manner in which the term is used in the harassment … stat | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kellygreen1 sentence2014See Leach, 729 A.2d at 611 (stating that a course of conduct can be established by a repetitive pattern of behavior); see also 5 Recently, an en banc panel of this Court, in Commonwealth v. Kelly, 2014 PA Super 243 (Pa. Super. 2014), engaged in a detailed analysis of the meaning of the phrase “course of conduct” as used in the grading provision of the corruption of minors statute, and held that “the use of the phrase ‘course of conduct’ in the first provision of [the statute] imposes a requirement of multiple acts over time, in the same manner in which the term is used in the harassment … stat | 1 | 1 |
Welsh v. State Employees' Retirement Boardgreen1 sentence2007That role does not include making a detailed inquiry into the mental state, the physical and financial condition of the retiring member or to second-guess the member’s choice.” Welsh v. State Employees’ Retirement Board, 808 A.2d 261, 264 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lemongreen1 sentence2006See Commonwealth v. Lemon, 804 A.2d 34, 38 (Pa.Super.2002) (stating that “when an appellant fails to identify in a vague Pa. R.A.P.1925(b) statement the specific issues he/she wants to raise on appeal, the issue is waived, even if the trial court guesses correctly and addresses the issue in its Pa.R.A.P.1925(a) opinion.”). ¶ 13 Indeed, the trial court eloquently expressed its frustration when tackling the Wells’s questions in its opinion and even urged this Court to find them waived due to their lack of clarity. | 1 | 1 |
| Haynie v. Hogue Lumber & Supply Co. of Gulfport, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Paper Products Co. v. Pittsburghgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Paper Products Co. v. Pittsburghgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Bakergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fenell Estategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burchard v. Sebergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Frisina v. Stanleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rice v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Proctorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Danielsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Adler v. Montefiore Hospital Ass'ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Miami v. Spicygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Timpany v. New Jerseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blaz v. Manninggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gerard E. Berne
green
2 sentences1976In United States v. Menke, 468 F.2d 20, 24 (3d Cir. 1972), the court stated: "In [Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1969)], we held that where a defendant is given the detailed warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona . . . and thereafter `voluntarily submits to interrogation and freely offers information on the existence and location of specifically identified evidence, and further agrees to surrender the evidence to the police, fully cognizant of his right to remain silent and fully aware that the information he provides may be used against him, the *77 seizure 1976In United States v. Menke, 468 F.2d 20, 24 (3d Cir. 1972), the court stated: “In [Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1969)], we held that where a defendant is given the detailed warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona ... and thereafter ‘voluntarily submits to interrogation and freely offers information on the existence and location of specifically identified evidence, and further agrees to surrender the evidence to the police, fully cognizant of his right to remain silent and fully aware that the information he provides may be used against him, the seizure of su | 3 | 1975–1976 |
In the Interest of T.M.T.
green
2 sentences2015T., 64 A. 3d 1119 (Pa. Super. 2013).' The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that incarceration, while not a litmus test, can be determinative in a termination proceeding. 2015T., 64 A.3d 1119 (Pa. Super. 2013). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Edmunds
green
2 sentences1998He does not adequately argue that the requirements for plain feel, as set out in B.C., were not met .nor does he raise as support for his claim the case discussed at length by the majority, Commonwealth v. Fink, 700 A.2d 447 (Pa.Super.1997). 4 Instead, he offers a detailed analysis under the formula set forth in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991), and argues that plain feel should not apply in this case: [The plain feel] standard does not provide appropriate, equitable guarantees of privacy throughout our Commonwealth; and as there is no way to ensure this, this Honorab 1998He does not adequately argue that the requirements for plain feel, as set out in B.C., were not met .nor does he raise as support for his claim the case discussed at length by the majority, Commonwealth v. Fink, 700 A.2d 447 (Pa.Super.1997). 4 Instead, he offers a detailed analysis under the formula set forth in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991), and argues that plain feel should not apply in this case: [The plain feel] standard does not provide appropriate, equitable guarantees of privacy throughout our Commonwealth; and as there is no way to ensure this, this Honorab | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Commonwealth v. Finley
green
1 sentence2025On April 16, 2021, PCRA counsel submitted a no-merit letter pursuant to [Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc)], concluding that the issues raised in [Pagan’s pro se] PCRA [petition] lacked merit. [PCRA counsel] simultaneously filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel[.] PCRA counsel attached to his Motion a copy of the six-page No Merit Letter he sent to [Pagan] which provided a detailed analysis of [Pagan’s] claims and informed [Pagan] that counsel was unable to find any issues of merit for PCRA consideration. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Turner
green
1 sentence2025On April 16, 2021, PCRA counsel submitted a no-merit letter pursuant to [Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc)], concluding that the issues raised in [Pagan’s pro se] PCRA [petition] lacked merit. [PCRA counsel] simultaneously filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel[.] PCRA counsel attached to his Motion a copy of the six-page No Merit Letter he sent to [Pagan] which provided a detailed analysis of [Pagan’s] claims and informed [Pagan] that counsel was unable to find any issues of merit for PCRA consideration. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Dayhoff v. Weaver
green
1 sentence2024See id. (citing and quoting Banfield v. Cortes, 110 A.3d 155, 170 (Pa. 2015); Dayhoff v. Weaver, 808 A.2d 1002 , 1010 n.21 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); and In re Gen. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In Re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of Santelia
green
1 sentence2021Even where it is established that a parent has failed to perform parental duties for a period in excess of six months, such a finding does not, in and of itself, support an order terminating parental rights. [In re Santelia, 465 A.2d at 23 .] Rather, the trial court must examine the individual circumstances and any explanation offered by the parent to determine if that evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants permitting the involuntary termination of said parent’s parental rights.” In re T.L.G., 505 A.2d [at 629-30.] In In re T.L.G., [the] natural mother was se | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Hughes v. Fink, Fink and Associates
green
1 sentence2018In Hughes v. Fink, Fink & Associates, 718 A.2d 316 (Pa. Super. 1998), we provided the following detailed analysis of a series of cases decided by our Supreme Court, which govern the entry of a judgment of non pros in this Commonwealth: In James Bros. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
James Bros. Co. v. Union B. & T. Co. of DuBois
green
2 sentences2018Lumber Co. v. Union Banking & Trust Co. of DuBois, 432 Pa. 129 , 247 A.2d 587 (1968), our Supreme Court announced that judgment of non pros is properly entered when: (1) a party to the proceeding has shown a want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude; (2) there is no compelling reason for the delay; and (3) the delay has caused some prejudice to the adverse party. 2018Lumber Co. v. Union Banking & Trust Co. of DuBois, 432 Pa. 129 , 247 A.2d 587 (1968), our Supreme Court announced that judgment of non pros is properly entered when: (1) a party to the proceeding has shown a want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude; (2) there is no compelling reason for the delay; and (3) the delay has caused some prejudice to the adverse party. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
North Carolina v. Alford
green
2 sentences2014However, a defendant still has the possibility of entering into an Alford5 plea. ____________________________________________ 3 As is properly surmised from the four-page citation, Pander provides a detailed analysis of issue of certification versus affidavit. 4 Appellant’s Brief at 13 5 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970). -6- J-S49018-14 An Alford plea is a nolo contendere plea in which the defendant does not admit guilt but waives trial and voluntarily, knowingly and understandingly consents to the imposition of punishment by the trial court. 2014However, a defendant still has the possibility of entering into an Alford5 plea. ____________________________________________ 3 As is properly surmised from the four-page citation, Pander provides a detailed analysis of issue of certification versus affidavit. 4 Appellant’s Brief at 13 5 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970). -6- J-S49018-14 An Alford plea is a nolo contendere plea in which the defendant does not admit guilt but waives trial and voluntarily, knowingly and understandingly consents to the imposition of punishment by the trial court. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Goldman v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
neutral
2 sentences2012Goldman v. SEPTA, 608 Pa. 138 , 10 A.3d 898 (2010) (order). 9 II. 2012Goldman v. SEPTA, 608 Pa. 138 , 10 A.3d 898 (2010) (order). 9 II. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer
green
2 sentences2010Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 552 , 103 S.Ct. 2541 , 76 L.Ed.2d 768 (1983) (citation omitted). 2010Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 552 , 103 S.Ct. 2541 , 76 L.Ed.2d 768 (1983) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Interstate Commerce Commission v. Gold Kist, Inc. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Fleming v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Hamlett v. Conco, Inc. neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| 28 East Jackson Enterprises, Inc. v. Cullerton green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Woods v. Harden green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Bearden v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, State Employees' Retirement Board green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Johnson v. Diesinger green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Marron v. PA. ST. EMP. RET. BD. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Commonwealth v. Yount green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Commonwealth v. Hayes green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Commonwealth v. Fink green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Kiser v. Schlosser green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Thompson v. City of Philadelphia green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Commonwealth v. Edmiston green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Commonwealth v. Jasper green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Foster v. McKeesport Hospital green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| United States v. James W. Williams green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| In re the Council of Aliquippa green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| In re Jacqueline F. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Thornton v. Weaber green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Ford v. Jeffries green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Manton v. Marini green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Esenwein v. Commonwealth Ex Rel. Esenwein green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Beth-Allen Sales Co. v. Hartford Insurance Group green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Bailey v. Bailey green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Gelling v. Texas green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Ed. of Ohio green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.