reasonable suspicion standard in Kansas

2025See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (noting that the objective standard of reasonable suspicion requires the court to ask whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of seizure or search would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the search or seizure was appropriate); Jones, 300 Kan. at 645 (an officer is not required to neatly package the reasonable suspicion factors in a single succinct answer; the court is required to consider 'the totality of the circumstances, all facts and inferences, [and] not a select few')." Cash, 313 Kan. at 130.

2021See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (noting that the objective standard of reasonable suspicion requires the court to ask whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of seizure or search would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the search or seizure was appropriate); Jones, 300 Kan. at 645 (an officer is not required to neatly package the reasonable suspicion factors in a single succinct answer; the court is required to consider "the totality of the circumstances, all facts and inferences, [and] not a select few").

2025Jones, 300 Kan. at 637 ; see K.S.A. 22-2402(1).

2021See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (noting that the objective standard of reasonable suspicion requires the court to ask whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of seizure or search would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the search or seizure was appropriate); Jones, 300 Kan. at 645 (an officer is not required to neatly package the reasonable suspicion factors in a single succinct answer; the court is required to consider "the totality of the circumstances, all facts and inferences, [and] not a select few").

2022See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274-75 (noting 19 Court has "deliberately avoided reducing [the reasonable suspicion standard] to '"a neat set of legal rules"'" but observing that "[e]ven if in many instances the factual 'mosaic' analyzed for a reasonable-suspicion determination would preclude one case from squarely controlling another, 'two decisions when viewed together may usefully add to the body of law on the subject'").

2020Recognizing that sometimes the distinction between probable cause and reasonable suspicion is blurred, the Supreme Court clarified that "[t]he reasonable suspicion inquiry 'falls considerably short' of 51% accuracy, see United States v. Arvisu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S. Ct. 744 , 151 L.

2025See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S. Ct. 673 , 145 L.

2025See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S. Ct. 673 , 145 L.

2022See State v. Cash, 313 Kan. 121 , 130, 483 P.3d 1047 (2021) ("The reasonable suspicion analysis requires use of an objective standard based on the totality of the circumstances, not a subjective standard based on the detaining officer's personal belief.").

2022Cf. Shivers, 1 F.4th at 931 (Eighth Amendment contains no specific directive as to inmate classifications or housing placements and plaintiff's allegations of an Eighth Amendment violation cannot demonstrate a breach of a mandatory duty sufficient to overcome discretionary function immunity under the FTCA).

2021See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S. Ct. 1769 , 135 L.

2021See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S. Ct. 1769 , 135 L.

2019State v. Lowery , 308 Kan. 359 , 370, 420 P.3d 456 (2018).

2019See, e.g., Lowery , 308 Kan. at 370, 420 P.3d 456 (finding no reasonable suspicion to extend the stop when the driver was nervous, a minor discrepancy was shown between the driver's and passenger's accounts of the pair's travels, and the two were traveling in a rented car); State v. Messner , 55 Kan.

2019The State took the position that the reasonable suspicion framework of how long an officer can detain for a drug dog has been "sort of foreclosed under Rodriguez [ v. United States , 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 , 191 L.

2019The State took the position that the reasonable suspicion framework of how long an officer can detain for a drug dog has been "sort of foreclosed under Rodriguez [ v. United States , 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 , 191 L.

2018The State also cites United States v. Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 2011), in which the court recognized this could be at least relevant to a reasonable suspicion analysis depending on circumstances.

2018The State also cites United States v. Ludwig , 641 F.3d 1243 , 1249 (10th Cir. 2011), in which the court recognized this could be at least relevant to a reasonable suspicion analysis depending on circumstances.

2018But in United States v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 544 (6th Cir. 2002), there were "three cellular telephones in the passenger compartment" and the officers claimed the presence of multiple phones "was typical of drug couriers." The Sixth Circuit reasoned, "Three cell phones in one car does seem slightly odd, and we are certainly not prepared to hold that the presence of several cell phones cannot contribute to reasonable suspicion . . . .

2018But in United States v. Townsend , 305 F.3d 537 , 544 (6th Cir. 2002), there were "three cellular telephones in the passenger compartment" and the officers claimed the presence of multiple phones "was typical of drug couriers." The Sixth Circuit reasoned, "Three cell phones in one car does seem slightly odd, and we are certainly not prepared to hold that the presence of several cell phones cannot contribute to reasonable suspicion ....

2018In United States v. Vaughan , 700 F.3d 705 , 712 (4th Cir. 2012), there were four phones in a car containing two people, at least two "of the pre-paid type known to the detaining officer to be associated with narcotics trafficking." The Fourth Circuit held "the presence of the phones constitute[d] a valid factor in a reasonable suspicion analysis." 700 F.3d at 712 .

2018In United States v. Vaughan , 700 F.3d 705 , 712 (4th Cir. 2012), there were four phones in a car containing two people, at least two "of the pre-paid type known to the detaining officer to be associated with narcotics trafficking." The Fourth Circuit held "the presence of the phones constitute[d] a valid factor in a reasonable suspicion analysis." 700 F.3d at 712 .

2011The warrant supplies the officers with probable cause to arrest the person it names and describes, not a license to duck the reasonable suspicion requirement and stop someone they only have a subjective hunch is that person.”); Dennis v. State, 927 So. 2d 173, 175 (Fla. Dist.

2009See Moore, 283 Kan. at 354 (explaining the reasonable suspicion standard); see also United States v. Trujillo, 404 F.3d 1238, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 2005) (upholding the search of a parolee’s residence where the parolee failed a drug test 4 months prior to the search, refused a drug test 1 day before the search, and a de *212 tective had information from unknown sources that the parolee may be involved in drug dealing); State v. Uhlig, 38 Kan.

2009See Moore, 283 Kan. at 354 (explaining the reasonable suspicion standard); see also United States v. Trujillo, 404 F.3d 1238, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 2005) (upholding the search of a parolee’s residence where the parolee failed a drug test 4 months prior to the search, refused a drug test 1 day before the search, and a de *212 tective had information from unknown sources that the parolee may be involved in drug dealing); State v. Uhlig, 38 Kan.

2007The DeMarco court discussed the role “nervousness” plays in the reasonable suspicion inquiry: “ It is certainly not uncommon for most citizens — whether innocent or guiliy — to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted by a law enforcement officer. [Citations omitted.]’ ” 263 Kan. at 736 (quoting United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 948 [10th Cir. 1997]).