reasonable suspicion analysis in District of Columbia

2022Our decision in this case is consistent with precedent, both from this court and the Supreme Court, reaffirming post-Wardlow “the fact intensive and context-dependent nature of the reasonable suspicion analysis.” Miles, 181 A.3d at 641 (citing Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 158 (2013); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)); see also In re D.A.D., 763 A.2d 1152 , 1155–56 (D.C. 2000) (examining flight and location of where police were responding to reports of shooting, in conjunction with other facts, in assessing reasonable, articul

2018See Gomez v. United States , 597 A.2d 884 , 889 (D.C. 1991) ("Each case turns on its particular facts, and 'case matching' is of limited utility in Fourth Amendment analysis ...."); see also Arvizu , 534 U.S. at 273 -74 , 122 S.Ct. 744 ("[W]e have deliberately avoided reducing [the reasonable-suspicion analysis] to 'a neat set of legal rules.' " (quoting Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690 , 695-696, 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) ) ).

2022Our decision in this case is consistent with precedent, both from this court and the Supreme Court, reaffirming post-Wardlow “the fact intensive and context-dependent nature of the reasonable suspicion analysis.” Miles, 181 A.3d at 641 (citing Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 158 (2013); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)); see also In re D.A.D., 763 A.2d 1152 , 1155–56 (D.C. 2000) (examining flight and location of where police were responding to reports of shooting, in conjunction with other facts, in assessing reasonable, articul

2018See, e.g. , Navarette v. California , --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 1683 , 1687, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) ; Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 1564, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ; Arvizu , 534 U.S. at 273 -74 , 122 S.Ct. 744 .

2025We recognize that “a defendant’s flight can be a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.” Miles v. United States, 181 A.3d 633, 641 (D.C. 2018).

2024We consider the import of Mr. Mayo’s flight at this point in his encounter with the GRU. “[A] defendant’s flight [from the police] can be a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.” Miles v. United States, 181 A.3d 633, 641 (D.C. 2018).

2018The touchstone case on the relevance of a suspect's flight in the reasonable suspicion analysis is Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000).

2018The touchstone case on the relevance of a suspect's flight in the reasonable suspicion analysis is Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000).

2018See Gomez v. United States, 597 A.2d 884, 889 (D.C. 1991) (―Each case turns on its particular facts, and ‗case matching‘ is of limited utility in Fourth Amendment analysis . . . .‖); see also Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273–74 (―[W]e have deliberately avoided reducing [the reasonable-suspicion analysis] to ‗a neat set of legal rules.‘‖ (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 695–696 (1996))). 16 The government contends that because Mr. Miles failed to argue at the suppression hearing that his flight was provoked and then testified at trial that he did not flee from the officers at all, he ca

2018See Gomez v. United States , 597 A.2d 884 , 889 (D.C. 1991) ("Each case turns on its particular facts, and 'case matching' is of limited utility in Fourth Amendment analysis ...."); see also Arvizu , 534 U.S. at 273 -74 , 122 S.Ct. 744 ("[W]e have deliberately avoided reducing [the reasonable-suspicion analysis] to 'a neat set of legal rules.' " (quoting Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690 , 695-696, 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) ) ).

2025“The courts in the District of Columbia have . . . rejected articulable suspicion arguments based upon guilt by association.” (John) Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 315 (D.C. 1989) (en banc); see also Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 30 (D.C. 1989) (“We agree that guilt by association is a very dangerous principle . . . .”).

2022But as we have previously explained and once more reaffirm, “flight cannot imply consciousness of guilt in all cases.” Id. (quoting Duhart v. United States, 589 A.2d 895, 900 (D.C. 1991) (quoting Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 316 (D.C. 1989) (en banc)).

2018See Gomez v. United States , 597 A.2d 884 , 889 (D.C. 1991) ("Each case turns on its particular facts, and 'case matching' is of limited utility in Fourth Amendment analysis ...."); see also Arvizu , 534 U.S. at 273 -74 , 122 S.Ct. 744 ("[W]e have deliberately avoided reducing [the reasonable-suspicion analysis] to 'a neat set of legal rules.' " (quoting Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690 , 695-696, 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) ) ).

2018See Gomez v. United States , 597 A.2d 884 , 889 (D.C. 1991) ("Each case turns on its particular facts, and 'case matching' is of limited utility in Fourth Amendment analysis ...."); see also Arvizu , 534 U.S. at 273 -74 , 122 S.Ct. 744 ("[W]e have deliberately avoided reducing [the reasonable-suspicion analysis] to 'a neat set of legal rules.' " (quoting Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690 , 695-696, 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) ) ).

2012In determining whether this reasonable suspicion standard has been met, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, Peay v. United States, 597 A.2d 1318, 1320 (D.C.1991) (en banc) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)), as “viewed through the lens of a reasonable police officer, guided by his training and experience,” Bennett, 26 A.3d at 751 (quoting Pinkney, 851 A.2d at 493 ) (internal editing and quotation marks omitted).

2012In determining whether this standard has been met, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, Peay v. United States, 597 A.2d 1318, 1320 (D.C.1991) (en banc) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)), as viewed “through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training....” Johnson v. United States, 33 A.3d 361, 370 (D.C.2011) (quoting Singleton v. United States, 998 A.2d 295, 300 (D.C.2010)).

2024State v. Hawkins, 2019-Ohio-4210, ¶ 20 , quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).

2018At the same time, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his partial concurrence and dissent, the Court in Wardlow stopped short of endorsing "the proposition that 'flight is ... necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity,' " and "adher[ed] to the view that '[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion ... is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules,' but must be determined by looking to 'the totality of the circumstances.' " Id. at 126 , 120 S.Ct. 673 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Sokolow , 490 U.S. at 7 -8 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 ) (ellips

2012Other courts applying the second prong of Gant have held that reasonable belief is akin to the reasonable suspicion standard applied to brief investigatory stops under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2012Other courts applying the second prong of Gant have held that reasonable belief is akin to the reasonable suspicion standard applied to brief investigatory stops under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2022Our decision in this case is consistent with precedent, both from this court and the Supreme Court, reaffirming post-Wardlow “the fact intensive and context-dependent nature of the reasonable suspicion analysis.” Miles, 181 A.3d at 641 (citing Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 158 (2013); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)); see also In re D.A.D., 763 A.2d 1152 , 1155–56 (D.C. 2000) (examining flight and location of where police were responding to reports of shooting, in conjunction with other facts, in assessing reasonable, articul

2018See, e.g. , Navarette v. California , --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 1683 , 1687, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) ; Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 1564, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ; Arvizu , 534 U.S. at 273 -74 , 122 S.Ct. 744 .

2025“The courts in the District of Columbia have . . . rejected articulable suspicion arguments based upon guilt by association.” (John) Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 315 (D.C. 1989) (en banc); see also Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 30 (D.C. 1989) (“We agree that guilt by association is a very dangerous principle . . . .”).

2024As the Supreme Court observed in Wardlow, “[h]eadlong flight . . . is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.” 528 U.S. at 124 ; see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 59 (2018) (observing that “deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of law officers are strong indicia of mens rea” which “can be treated as ‘suspicious behavior’ that factors into the totality of the circumstances” (ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted)); Glover, 589 U.S. at 383 (acknowledging Wardlow’s determina

2024See also Brown, 925 F.3d at 1156-57 (explaining that “the burden of aggressive and intrusive police action . . . falls disproportionately on African-American, and sometimes Latino, males” and, thus, “racial dynamics in our society . . . [can] offer an innocent explanation of flight” that cannot be discounted in a reasonable suspicion analysis (internal quotation marks omitted)); Flores, 2024 WL 1919992 , at *11 (Evans, J., concurring) (acknowledging the “unfortunate and longstanding realities of policing in many minority communities across the country, as well as the police killings of . . . t

2024See also Brown, 925 F.3d at 1156-57 (explaining that “the burden of aggressive and intrusive police action . . . falls disproportionately on African-American, and sometimes Latino, males” and, thus, “racial dynamics in our society . . . [can] offer an innocent explanation of flight” that cannot be discounted in a reasonable suspicion analysis (internal quotation marks omitted)); Flores, 2024 WL 1919992 , at *11 (Evans, J., concurring) (acknowledging the “unfortunate and longstanding realities of policing in many minority communities across the country, as well as the police killings of . . . t

2024At one point the court overruled a defense objection to certain testimony on the ground that the testimony went to whether the officer “believed that there was reasonable, articulable suspicion . . . that the defendant was either armed or in the process of discarding evidence.” On appeal, the government frames the question in terms of reasonable suspicion and does not suggest that the police had, or needed, probable cause to frisk the jacket. 5 Mr. Champion devotes much of his briefing to a separate contention—that the officer needed, and lacked, reasonable articulable suspicion to order him o

2024As the Supreme Court observed in Wardlow, “[h]eadlong flight . . . is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.” 528 U.S. at 124 ; see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 59 (2018) (observing that “deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of law officers are strong indicia of mens rea” which “can be treated as ‘suspicious behavior’ that factors into the totality of the circumstances” (ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted)); Glover, 589 U.S. at 383 (acknowledging Wardlow’s determina

2024See also Brown, 925 F.3d at 1156-57 (explaining that “the burden of aggressive and intrusive police action . . . falls disproportionately on African-American, and sometimes Latino, males” and, thus, “racial dynamics in our society . . . [can] offer an innocent explanation of flight” that cannot be discounted in a reasonable suspicion analysis (internal quotation marks omitted)); Flores, 2024 WL 1919992 , at *11 (Evans, J., concurring) (acknowledging the “unfortunate and longstanding realities of policing in many minority communities across the country, as well as the police killings of . . . t

2022“In determining whether this reasonable suspicion standard has been met, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, as viewed through the lens of a reasonable police officer, guided by [the officer’s] training and experience.” United States v. Taylor, 49 A.3d 818, 824-25 (D.C. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e do not examine each factor in isolation from the others . . . .” Hampleton v. United States, 10 A.3d 137, 143 (D.C. 2010) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

2022“Even if each specific act . . . could be perceived in isolation as an innocent act, the observing police officer may see a combination of facts that make out an articulable suspicion.” Id.

2022But as we have previously explained and once more reaffirm, “flight cannot imply consciousness of guilt in all cases.” Id. (quoting Duhart v. United States, 589 A.2d 895, 900 (D.C. 1991) (quoting Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 316 (D.C. 1989) (en banc)).

2022Our decision in this case is consistent with precedent, both from this court and the Supreme Court, reaffirming post-Wardlow “the fact intensive and context-dependent nature of the reasonable suspicion analysis.” Miles, 181 A.3d at 641 (citing Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 158 (2013); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)); see also In re D.A.D., 763 A.2d 1152 , 1155–56 (D.C. 2000) (examining flight and location of where police were responding to reports of shooting, in conjunction with other facts, in assessing reasonable, articul

2022“In determining whether this reasonable suspicion standard has been met, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, as viewed through the lens of a reasonable police officer, guided by [the officer’s] training and experience.” United States v. Taylor, 49 A.3d 818, 824-25 (D.C. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e do not examine each factor in isolation from the others . . . .” Hampleton v. United States, 10 A.3d 137, 143 (D.C. 2010) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

2018See State v. Benton , 304 Conn. 838 , 43 A.3d 619 , 628 (2012) (explaining that "the judicial concern over provoked flight ... pertains to situations in which police have engaged in the sort of provocative conduct that could cause a reasonable individual to take flight for reasons other than criminal culpability"); cf. Pridgen , 134 A.3d at 303 & n.17 (declining to focus the reasonable suspicion analysis on the defendant's flight, and instead focusing on what the defendant "did as he ran," because "a suspect's flight at the sight of officers who are targeting him with a flashlight may provide

2018See State v. Benton , 304 Conn. 838 , 43 A.3d 619 , 628 (2012) (explaining that "the judicial concern over provoked flight ... pertains to situations in which police have engaged in the sort of provocative conduct that could cause a reasonable individual to take flight for reasons other than criminal culpability"); cf. Pridgen , 134 A.3d at 303 & n.17 (declining to focus the reasonable suspicion analysis on the defendant's flight, and instead focusing on what the defendant "did as he ran," because "a suspect's flight at the sight of officers who are targeting him with a flashlight may provide

2017That is, the police “must have more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.’” Howard, 929 A.2d at 845 (citation omitted).

2017That is, the police “must have more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.’ ” Howard, 929 A.2d at 845 (citation omitted).

2017Nevertheless, the reasonable suspicion standard “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Wilson v. United States, 802 A.2d 367, 369 (D.C. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2017Nevertheless, the reasonable suspicion standard “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Wilson v. United States, 802 A.2d 367, 369 (D.C. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2017App. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Moore, 781 S.E.2d 897, 902 (S.C. 2016) (criticizing “law enforcement’s reliance on the seemingly omnipresent factor of nervousness”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2473 (2016).

2017App. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Moore, 415 S.C. 245 , 781 S.E.2d 897 , 902 (2016) (criticizing “law enforcement’s reliance on the seemingly omnipresent factor of nervousness”), cer t. denied, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2473 , 195 L.Ed.2d 809 (2016).