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23 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lownesgreen2 sentences2008State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶16 , 695 NW2d 718, 722 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶13 , 625 NW2d 275, 279 ); see also State v. Lownes, 499 NW2d 896, 898-99 (SD 1993) (recognizing that the "reasonable suspicion" standard is less demanding than "probable cause") (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 US 325, 330 , 110 SCt 2412, 2416 , 110 LE2d 301,309 (1990)). [¶12.] In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we recognize that "[w]hile the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon `specific and articulable facts which t 2008State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶ 16 , 695 N.W.2d 718, 722 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 13 , 625 N.W.2d 275, 279 ); see also State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 898-99 (S.D.1993) (recognizing that the “reasonable suspicion” standard is less demanding than “probable cause”) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 (1990)). [¶ 12.] In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we recognize that “[w]hile the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon ‘specific and articul | 2 | 4 |
State v. Quartiergreen2 sentences2009United States v. Escobar, 389 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir.2004) (internal citation omitted). 6 [¶ 23.] In making the reasonable suspicion determination, reviewing courts “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” “This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 12 2009United States v. Escobar, 389 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir.2004) (internal citation omitted). 6 [¶ 23.] In making the reasonable suspicion determination, reviewing courts “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” “This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 12 | 2 | 2 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2008State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶16 , 695 NW2d 718, 722 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶13 , 625 NW2d 275, 279 ); see also State v. Lownes, 499 NW2d 896, 898-99 (SD 1993) (recognizing that the "reasonable suspicion" standard is less demanding than "probable cause") (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 US 325, 330 , 110 SCt 2412, 2416 , 110 LE2d 301,309 (1990)). [¶12.] In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we recognize that "[w]hile the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon `specific and articulable facts which t 2008State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶ 16 , 695 N.W.2d 718, 722 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 13 , 625 N.W.2d 275, 279 ); see also State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 898-99 (S.D.1993) (recognizing that the “reasonable suspicion” standard is less demanding than “probable cause”) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 (1990)). [¶ 12.] In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we recognize that “[w]hile the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon ‘specific and articul | 1 | 6 |
State v. Aaberggreen2 sentences2008State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶ 16 , 695 N.W.2d 718, 722 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 13 , 625 N.W.2d 275, 279 ); see also State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 898-99 (S.D.1993) (recognizing that the “reasonable suspicion” standard is less demanding than “probable cause”) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 (1990)). [¶ 12.] In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we recognize that “[w]hile the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon ‘specific and articul 2008State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶ 16 , 695 N.W.2d 718, 722 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 13 , 625 N.W.2d 275, 279 ); see also State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 898-99 (S.D.1993) (recognizing that the “reasonable suspicion” standard is less demanding than “probable cause”) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 (1990)). [¶ 12.] In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we recognize that “[w]hile the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon ‘specific and articul | 1 | 2 |
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences2008State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶ 16 , 695 N.W.2d 718, 722 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 13 , 625 N.W.2d 275, 279 ); see also State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 898-99 (S.D.1993) (recognizing that the “reasonable suspicion” standard is less demanding than “probable cause”) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 (1990)). [¶ 12.] In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we recognize that “[w]hile the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon ‘specific and articul 2008State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶ 16 , 695 N.W.2d 718, 722 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 13 , 625 N.W.2d 275, 279 ); see also State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 898-99 (S.D.1993) (recognizing that the “reasonable suspicion” standard is less demanding than “probable cause”) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 (1990)). [¶ 12.] In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we recognize that “[w]hile the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon ‘specific and articul | 1 | 2 |
State v. Chavezgreen2 sentences2004ISSUE [¶ 5.] Did the officer have a reasonable suspicion of a violation of law sufficient to support the stop of Webb’s vehicle? [¶ 6.] The necessity of a reasonable suspicion of a violation of law to support a traffic stop was most recently discussed in State v. Chavez, 2003 SD 93, ¶¶ 15-16 , 668 N.W.2d 89 , 95: The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. 2004ISSUE [¶ 5.] Did the officer have a reasonable suspicion of a violation of law sufficient to support the stop of Webb’s vehicle? [¶ 6.] The necessity of a reasonable suspicion of a violation of law to support a traffic stop was most recently discussed in State v. Chavez, 2003 SD 93, ¶¶ 15-16 , 668 N.W.2d 89 , 95: The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Wilkinsongreen2 sentences2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.2011) (where the vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir.2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approaching the vehi 2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2011) (where the -7- #26232 vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approac | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jose Martinez Escobar Vicky Lynn Loos, Also Known as Vicky L. Reppuhngreen1 sentence2009United States v. Escobar, 389 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir.2004) (internal citation omitted). 6 [¶ 23.] In making the reasonable suspicion determination, reviewing courts “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” “This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 12 | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sleepgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ballardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lockstedtgreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thillgreen2 sentences2008State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶16 , 695 NW2d 718, 722 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶13 , 625 NW2d 275, 279 ); see also State v. Lownes, 499 NW2d 896, 898-99 (SD 1993) (recognizing that the "reasonable suspicion" standard is less demanding than "probable cause") (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 US 325, 330 , 110 SCt 2412, 2416 , 110 LE2d 301,309 (1990)). [¶12.] In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we recognize that "[w]hile the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon `specific and articulable facts which t 2008State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶ 16 , 695 N.W.2d 718, 722 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 13 , 625 N.W.2d 275, 279 ); see also State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 898-99 (S.D.1993) (recognizing that the “reasonable suspicion” standard is less demanding than “probable cause”) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 (1990)). [¶ 12.] In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we recognize that “[w]hile the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon ‘specific and articul | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Tuckergreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Devils Lake v. Lawrencegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Maurstadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Scott Paynegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Oraldo Treto-Harogreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Steven G. Loneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Eidahlgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Dustin C. Baskingreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Jeremy D. Hagenowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Shannon Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Galvangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bacagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Uriostegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mooregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Terry v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cunygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Graf v. State, Department of Commerce & Regulationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Leongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Softgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Texasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Arvizu
green
2 sentences2009United States v. Escobar, 389 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir.2004) (internal citation omitted). 6 [¶ 23.] In making the reasonable suspicion determination, reviewing courts “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” “This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 12 2009United States v. Escobar, 389 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir.2004) (internal citation omitted). 6 [¶ 23.] In making the reasonable suspicion determination, reviewing courts “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” “This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 12 | 5 | 2002–2010 |
State v. Kissner
green
2 sentences1993We have examined the question of whether information provided to police by an anonymous private citizen has a sufficient degree of reliability to create a reasonable suspicion of a violation and justify a vehicle stop in Kissner, 390 N.W.2d at 58 , State v. Czmowski, 393 N.W.2d 72 (S.D.1986), and Lownes, 499 N.W.2d at 896 . 1993We have examined the question of whether information provided to police by an anonymous private citizen has a sufficient degree of reliability to create a reasonable suspicion of a violation and justify a vehicle stop in Kissner, 390 N.W.2d at 58 , State v. Czmowski, 393 N.W.2d 72 (S.D.1986), and Lownes, 499 N.W.2d at 896 . | 2 | 1993–1995 |
State v. Czmowski
green
2 sentences1993We have examined the question of whether information provided to police by an anonymous private citizen has a sufficient degree of reliability to create a reasonable suspicion of a violation and justify a vehicle stop in Kissner, 390 N.W.2d at 58 , State v. Czmowski, 393 N.W.2d 72 (S.D.1986), and Lownes, 499 N.W.2d at 896 . 1993We have examined the question of whether information provided to police by an anonymous private citizen has a sufficient degree of reliability to create a reasonable suspicion of a violation and justify a vehicle stop in Kissner, 390 N.W.2d at 58 , State v. Czmowski, 393 N.W.2d 72 (S.D.1986), and Lownes, 499 N.W.2d at 896 . | 2 | 1993–1995 |
People v. Ingle
green
2 sentences1993The standard, which we will define as the reasonable suspicion standard, was more precisely defined in People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413 , 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 , 330 N.E.2d 39 (1975). 1993The standard, which we will define as the reasonable suspicion standard, was more precisely defined in People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413 , 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 , 330 N.E.2d 39 (1975). | 2 | 1983–1993 |
State v. Biteler
neutral
1 sentence2026Therefore, the circuit court did not err in applying the reasonable suspicion standard when assessing the validity of the stop. [¶11.] As to the court’s ruling on the merits of the motion to suppress, Hawley argues Officer Woehl did not have a valid justification for the stop because it was based on his mistaken interpretation of SDCL 32-26-18.1. “[T]he starting point when interpreting a statute must always be the language itself.” Biteler, 2025 S.D. 73, ¶ 13 , 29 N.W.3d at 897 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bettelyoun, 2022 S.D. 14, ¶ 24 , 972 N.W.2d 124 , 131). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Bettelyoun, Ehret, Osborne
neutral
1 sentence2026Therefore, the circuit court did not err in applying the reasonable suspicion standard when assessing the validity of the stop. [¶11.] As to the court’s ruling on the merits of the motion to suppress, Hawley argues Officer Woehl did not have a valid justification for the stop because it was based on his mistaken interpretation of SDCL 32-26-18.1. “[T]he starting point when interpreting a statute must always be the language itself.” Biteler, 2025 S.D. 73, ¶ 13 , 29 N.W.3d at 897 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bettelyoun, 2022 S.D. 14, ¶ 24 , 972 N.W.2d 124 , 131). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.
green
2 sentences2022In any event, the State is not pursuing this alternative argument on appeal. -3- #29485 Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 , 68 S. Ct. 525, 542 , 92 L. 2022In any event, the State is not pursuing this alternative argument on appeal. -3- #29485 Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 , 68 S. Ct. 525, 542 , 92 L. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Grooms v. United States
green
1 sentence2016Megginson v. United States, 556 U.S. 1230, 1230 , 129 S.Ct. 1982, 1982 , 173 L.Ed.2d 1288 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("This case thus appears to present an important question regarding ' the meaning and specificity of the reasonable suspicion requirement in Gant."). ' On the other hand, Justice Scalia — the author of the concurring opinion in Thornton adopted .by the Gant majority — suggests another view. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Megginson v. United States
green
2 sentences2016Megginson v. United States, 556 U.S. 1230, 1230 , 129 S.Ct. 1982, 1982 , 173 L.Ed.2d 1288 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("This case thus appears to present an important question regarding ' the meaning and specificity of the reasonable suspicion requirement in Gant."). ' On the other hand, Justice Scalia — the author of the concurring opinion in Thornton adopted .by the Gant majority — suggests another view. 2016Megginson v. United States, 556 U.S. 1230, 1230 , 129 S.Ct. 1982, 1982 , 173 L.Ed.2d 1288 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("This case thus appears to present an important question regarding ' the meaning and specificity of the reasonable suspicion requirement in Gant."). ' On the other hand, Justice Scalia — the author of the concurring opinion in Thornton adopted .by the Gant majority — suggests another view. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Patrick Nolan McSwain
green
2 sentences2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.2011) (where the vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir.2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approaching the vehi 2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2011) (where the -7- #26232 vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approac | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Redinger
green
2 sentences2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.2011) (where the vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir.2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approaching the vehi 2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2011) (where the -7- #26232 vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approac | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Edgerton
green
2 sentences2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.2011) (where the vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir.2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approaching the vehi 2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2011) (where the -7- #26232 vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approac | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Pena-Montes
green
2 sentences2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.2011) (where the vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir.2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approaching the vehi 2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2011) (where the -7- #26232 vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approac | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. James Garry Horn
green
2 sentences2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.2011) (where the vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir.2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approaching the vehi 2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2011) (where the -7- #26232 vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approac | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Farley
green
2 sentences2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.2011) (where the vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir.2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approaching the vehi 2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.2011) (where the vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir.2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approaching the vehi | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. James Jenkins, Derrick Luther, A/K/A Derrick Hall
green
2 sentences2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.2011) (where the vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir.2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approaching the vehi 2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2011) (where the -7- #26232 vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approac | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Chatton
green
2 sentences2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.2011) (where the vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir.2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approaching the vehi 2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.2011) (where the vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir.2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approaching the vehi | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Diaz
green
2 sentences2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.2011) (where the vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir.2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approaching the vehi 2013See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2011) (where the -7- #26232 vehicle was stopped because an officer saw its license plate tag unlawfully covered in plastic and it was argued the officer should have verified the validity of the tag and let the driver go); United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but, after pulling the vehicle over, the officer observed a dealer tag); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2006) (where the vehicle was stopped for lack of a license plate, but on approac | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Herrboldt
green
2 sentences2010State v. Quartier, 2008 SD 62, ¶ 10 , 753 N.W.2d 885, 888 (citing State v. Herrboldt, 1999 SD 55, ¶ 8 , 593 N.W.2d 805, 808 ). [¶ 16.] As we have noted on prior occasions, “articulating a precise definition of reasonable suspicion is ‘not possible.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Aaberg, 2006 SD 58, ¶10 , 718 N.W.2d 598, 600 ). 2010State v. Quartier, 2008 SD 62, ¶ 10 , 753 N.W.2d 885, 888 (citing State v. Herrboldt, 1999 SD 55, ¶ 8 , 593 N.W.2d 805, 808 ). [¶ 16.] As we have noted on prior occasions, “articulating a precise definition of reasonable suspicion is ‘not possible.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Aaberg, 2006 SD 58, ¶10 , 718 N.W.2d 598, 600 ). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Kenyon green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Barton
green
2 sentences2008State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶ 16 , 695 N.W.2d 718, 722 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 13 , 625 N.W.2d 275, 279 ); see also State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 898-99 (S.D.1993) (recognizing that the “reasonable suspicion” standard is less demanding than “probable cause”) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 (1990)). [¶ 12.] In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we recognize that “[w]hile the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon ‘specific and articul 2008State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶ 16 , 695 N.W.2d 718, 722 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 13 , 625 N.W.2d 275, 279 ); see also State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 898-99 (S.D.1993) (recognizing that the “reasonable suspicion” standard is less demanding than “probable cause”) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 (1990)). [¶ 12.] In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we recognize that “[w]hile the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon ‘specific and articul | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Muller
green
2 sentences2008State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶ 16 , 695 N.W.2d 718, 722 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 13 , 625 N.W.2d 275, 279 ); see also State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 898-99 (S.D.1993) (recognizing that the “reasonable suspicion” standard is less demanding than “probable cause”) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 (1990)). [¶ 12.] In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we recognize that “[w]hile the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon ‘specific and articul 2008State v. Lockstedt, 2005 SD 47, ¶ 16 , 695 N.W.2d 718, 722 (quoting State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 13 , 625 N.W.2d 275, 279 ); see also State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 898-99 (S.D.1993) (recognizing that the “reasonable suspicion” standard is less demanding than “probable cause”) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 (1990)). [¶ 12.] In applying the reasonable suspicion standard, we recognize that “[w]hile the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon ‘specific and articul | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| United States v. Cortez green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| United States v. Sokolow green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| City of Fargo v. Ovind green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Lamont green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| United States v. Wilson neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| James v. State green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Middleton green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Everson green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Boatman green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Spenner v. CITY OF SIOUX FALLS, SOUTH DAKOTA green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Saiz green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Coe green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| State v. Boardman green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Whitson v. Department of Public Safety green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.