reasonable suspicion standard in New Jersey

2026The reasonable suspicion standard requires "some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). "[R]aw, inchoate suspicion grounded in speculation cannot be the basis for a valid stop." Scriven, 226 N.J. at 34 .

2026The reasonable suspicion standard requires "some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). "[R]aw, inchoate suspicion grounded in speculation cannot be the basis for a valid stop." State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 34 (2016).

2026The reasonable suspicion standard requires "some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). "[R]aw, inchoate suspicion grounded in speculation cannot be the basis for a valid stop." Scriven, 226 N.J. at 34 .

2026The reasonable suspicion standard requires "some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). "[R]aw, inchoate suspicion grounded in speculation cannot be the basis for a valid stop." State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 34 (2016).

2025See Stovall, 170 N.J. at 357 (explaining that the reasonable suspicion analysis involves a consideration of "the events which occurred leading up to the stop").

2020Application of the reasonable suspicion standard is "highly fact sensitive and, therefore, not 'readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set A-5939-17T4 11 of legal rules.'" Ibid. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). "[A]n investigatory stop becomes a de facto arrest when 'the officers' conduct is more intrusive than necessary for an investigatory stop.'" State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 478 (1998) (quoting United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 1984)).

2024The reasonable suspicion inquiry considers an officer's background and training and permits the officer "to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative A-0864-21 19 information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.'" United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).

2024The reasonable suspicion inquiry considers the officers' A-1876-20 14 background and training, and permits them "to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.'" United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).

2026The reasonable suspicion inquiry, moreover, must account for the officers' background and training, which permits them "to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.'" Ibid. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)); see also Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 26 ("[T]he reputation or history of an area and an officer's experience with and knowledge of the suspected transfer of narcotics [are] relevant factors to determine the validity of a Terry[4] stop.").

2025Additionally, the reasonable suspicion inquiry weighs the officers' background and training that permits them "'to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that "might well elude an untrained person."'" Ibid. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).

2026The reasonable suspicion standard requires "some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). "[R]aw, inchoate suspicion grounded in speculation cannot be the basis for a valid stop." Scriven, 226 N.J. at 34 .

2026The reasonable suspicion standard requires "some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). "[R]aw, inchoate suspicion grounded in speculation cannot be the basis for a valid stop." State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 34 (2016).

2021The reasonable suspicion standard requires only "some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." Id. at 511 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).

2019In determining whether an investigative detention is A-4233-17T4 7 justified under the reasonable suspicion standard, "a court must consider the 'totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.'" Id. at 361 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).

2024In Rosario, the Court recognized that nervous behavior or lack of eye contact with police cannot drive the reasonable suspicion analysis, given the wide range of behaviors exhibited by different people for varying reasons and under different circumstances while in the presence of police. 229 N.J. at 277 .

2024The Court noted that the defendant's otherwise innocuous activity—"'scuffling around' and leaning toward the passenger seat" of a car as the police approached the vehicle with a flashlight—was untethered to any "corroborated criminal activity" and did "not provide a reasonable basis to suspect criminality." Id. at 277-78 .

2026The reasonable suspicion inquiry, moreover, must account for the officers' background and training, which permits them "to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.'" Ibid. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)); see also Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 26 ("[T]he reputation or history of an area and an officer's experience with and knowledge of the suspected transfer of narcotics [are] relevant factors to determine the validity of a Terry[4] stop.").

2025Reasonable suspicion is defined as "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting [a] person stopped of criminal activity." State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 22 (2004) (quoting State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002)).

2024Super. 111 (App. Div. 1995) (finding nervousness, by itself, does not establish dangerousness); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 47 (1990) ("'[M]ere furtive gestures of an occupant of an automobile do not give rise to an articulable suspicion suggesting criminal activity.'" (quoting State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1989))).

2024Ibid; see also Nyema, 249 N.J. at 533 (finding that "nervous behavior or lack of eye contact with police cannot drive the reasonable suspicion analysis given the wide range of behavior exhibited by many different people for varying reasons while in the presence of police"); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 47 (1990) (noting that "[o]rdinarily, mere furtive gestures of an occupant of an automobile do not give rise to an articulable A-0520-23 21 suspicion suggesting criminal activity").

2022In State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398 (2012), and State v. Caldwell, 158 N.J. 452 (1999), the Court determined that police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an evidentiary stop based on descriptions limited to the race and sex of the suspect.

2022In State v. Shaw, this Court determined that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop when law enforcement arrived at a multi-unit apartment building to execute an arrest warrant for a Black, male fugitive. 213 N.J. 398, 401, 403 (2012).

2019Where, as here, an "anonymous tip is conveyed through a 9-1-1 call and contains sufficient information to trigger public safety concerns and to provide an ability to identify the person, a police officer may undertake an investigatory stop of that individual." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 429 (2014).

2018In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, a court should consider "the totality of the circumstances . . . ." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 431-32 (2014) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 471 (1981)).

2018Id. at 27 (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 272). 5 A-3172-16T1 Thus, "[t]he police must verify that the tip is reliable by some independent corroborative effort." Id. at 26 (citing Ala. v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1990)).

2018Id. at 27 (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 272). 5 A-3172-16T1 Thus, "[t]he police must verify that the tip is reliable by some independent corroborative effort." Id. at 26 (citing Ala. v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1990)).

2003Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, satisfying the doctrine of reasonable suspicion "requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for [taking the police action]." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 , 145 L.Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000).

2003Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, satisfying the doctrine of reasonable suspicion "requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for [taking the police action]." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 , 145 L.Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000).

2025In other words, . . . unless there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic stop, any further detention to effectuate a consent search is unconstitutional. [ 170 N.J. at 647 .] The Court further explained the reasonable suspicion requirement has the "prophylactic purpose of preventing the police from turning a routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition for criminal activity unrelated to the stop." Ibid.

2025In other words, . . . unless there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic stop, any further detention to effectuate a consent search is unconstitutional. [ 170 N.J. at 647 .] The Court further explained the reasonable suspicion requirement has the "prophylactic purpose of preventing the police from turning a routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition for criminal activity unrelated to the stop." Ibid.

2020Such observations are those that, in view of officer's experience and knowledge, taken together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, reasonably A-0137-19T4 8 warrant the limited intrusion upon the individual's freedom. [Davis, 104 N.J. at 504 (citations omitted).] The reasonable suspicion standard requires "some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003).

2003Such observations are those that, in view of [the] officer’s experience and knowledge, taken together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, reasonably] warrant the limited intrusion upon the individual’s freedom. [State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 , 517 A.2d 859 (1986).] The United States Supreme Court has described the reasonable-suspicion standard as requiring “some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

2025An investigatory stop "may not be based on arbitrary police practices, the officer's subjective good faith, or a mere hunch." State v. Shaw, 237 N.J. 588, 612 (2019) (quoting State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 343 (2014)).

2025An investigatory stop "may not be based on arbitrary police practices, the officer's subjective good faith, or a mere hunch." State v. Shaw, 237 N.J. 588, 612 (2019) (quoting State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 343 (2014)).

2024Super. 111 (App. Div. 1995) (finding nervousness, by itself, does not establish dangerousness); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 47 (1990) ("'[M]ere furtive gestures of an occupant of an automobile do not give rise to an articulable suspicion suggesting criminal activity.'" (quoting State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1989))).

2024Probable cause "requires 'a practical, common sense determination whether, given all of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.'" State v. Myers, 442 N.J.

2021The reasonable suspicion standard is far lower than probable cause, ibid., and is determined by objective "cumulative factors in a totality of the circumstances analysis[.]" State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 250 (2007).

2021Therefore, a police officer may conduct an investigatory stop if, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is reasonable "suspicion to believe an individual has just engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity." State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 487 (2001) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ).

2020Application of the reasonable suspicion standard is "highly fact sensitive and, therefore, not 'readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set A-5939-17T4 11 of legal rules.'" Ibid. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). "[A]n investigatory stop becomes a de facto arrest when 'the officers' conduct is more intrusive than necessary for an investigatory stop.'" State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 478 (1998) (quoting United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 1984)).

2020Application of the reasonable suspicion standard is "highly fact sensitive and, therefore, not 'readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set A-5939-17T4 11 of legal rules.'" Ibid. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). "[A]n investigatory stop becomes a de facto arrest when 'the officers' conduct is more intrusive than necessary for an investigatory stop.'" State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 478 (1998) (quoting United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 1984)).

2019State v. Ates, 426 N.J.

2019The "Indispensable Protection" of Supervisory Review Even before the reasonable suspicion standard was excised from the Wiretap Act, our Supreme Court acknowledged that "the conditions for authorization of consensual wiretaps [we]re not as strict as those applicable to non-consensual wiretaps." State v. Worthy, 141 N.J. 368, 381 (1995).

2019The Court nevertheless considered the prior authorization requirement to be vital, noting that, in cases of consensual interceptions, it was the "sole protection" citizens had "from overly zealous and completely discretionary law-enforcement practices." Ibid.