reasonable suspicion standard in New Mexico

2024“We have defined and applied the reasonable suspicion standard in the same way when conducting both Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10 analyses.” Id. {15} Because we apply the same standard of reasonable suspicion under both the New Mexico and United States Constitutions, we conclude that the traffic stop did not violate the New Mexico Constitution.

2020“The two-part Terry analysis looks at [1] whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and [2] whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 10 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {12} Because an analysis of “whether police conduct was objectively reasonable extends beyond fact-finding[,]” we apply a de novo standard of review with respect to the reasonable suspicion inquiry, examining the totality of the circumstances.

2017See id. ¶ 39 (applying the same reasonable suspicion analysis to an 8 investigatory stop under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution as it 9 did under the Fourth Amendment). 10 {9} “Investigatory detention is permissible when there is a reasonable and 11 articulable suspicion that the law is being or has been broken.” State v. Jason L., 12 2000-NMSC-018 , ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 119 , 2 P.3d 856 (internal quotation marks and 13 citation omitted).

2017See id. ¶ 39 (applying the same reasonable suspicion analysis to an 8 investigatory stop under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution as it 9 did under the Fourth Amendment). 10 {9} “Investigatory detention is permissible when there is a reasonable and 11 articulable suspicion that the law is being or has been broken.” State v. Jason L., 12 2000-NMSC-018 , ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 119 , 2 P.3d 856 (internal quotation marks and 13 citation omitted).

2021“We analyze the reasonableness of a stop in accordance with the two-part test set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968): “(1) whether the stop was justified at its inception and (2) whether the officer’s action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference.” State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 7 , 1Although Defendant asserts that the New Mexico Constitution affords him greater protection than the United States Constitution in this case, our Supreme Court has “defined and applied the reasonable suspicion standard in the same way when conducting b

2017The ultimate question in a reasonable suspicion challenge is "whether the facts available to the officer warrant the officer, as a person of reasonable caution, to believe the action taken was appropriate." Hubble , 2009-NMSC-014 , ¶ 8, 206 P.3d 579 .

2013Ochoa defined a pretextual stop as “a detention supportable by reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a traffic offense has occurred, but is executed as a pretense to pursue a ‘hunch,’ a different more serious investigative agenda for which there is no reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” 2009-NMCA-002, ¶ 25 (emphasis added).

2013Ochoa defined a pretextual stop as “a detention supportable by reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a traffic offense has occurred, but is executed as a pretense to pursue a ‘hunch,’ a different more 3 serious investigative agenda for which there is no reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” 2009-NMCA-002, ¶ 25 (emphasis added).

2024See generally Yazzie, 2016-NMSC-026, ¶ 38 (“We have defined and applied the reasonable suspicion standard in the same way when conducting both Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10 analyses.”). tip was sufficiently reliable under the circumstances, id. ¶ 10; and (3) the balance of the possible threat of drunk driving to the safety of the public with the defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable seizure, id. ¶ 13.

2021“We analyze the reasonableness of a stop in accordance with the two-part test set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968): “(1) whether the stop was justified at its inception and (2) whether the officer’s action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference.” State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 7 , 1Although Defendant asserts that the New Mexico Constitution affords him greater protection than the United States Constitution in this case, our Supreme Court has “defined and applied the reasonable suspicion standard in the same way when conducting b

2016See, e.g., Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 43 (defining reasonable suspicion in a state constitutional analysis as a “particularized suspicion, based on all the circumstances[,] that a particular individual, the one detained, is breaking, or has broken the law” (alteration in original) (quoting Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018 , ¶¶ 19-20 (analyzing reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment))). {39} Accordingly, we apply the same reasonable suspicion analysis to the investigatory stop here under Article II, Section 10 as we did under the Fourth Amendment, and we hold that under the circumstances the traf

2016See, e.g., Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 43 (defining reasonable suspicion in a state constitutional analysis as a “particularized suspicion, based on all the circumstances[,] that a particular individual, the one detained, is breaking, or has broken the law” (alteration in original) (quoting Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018 , ¶¶ 19-20 (analyzing reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment))). {39} Accordingly, we apply the same reasonable suspicion analysis to the investigatory stop here under Article II, Section 10 as we did under the Fourth Amendment, and we hold that under the circumstances the traf

2017See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539 (explaining that “the mistake of law 16 relates to the antecedent question of whether it was reasonable for an officer to 17 suspect that the defendant’s conduct was illegal.

2017See Heien , 135 S.Ct. at 539 (explaining that "the mistake of law relates to the antecedent question of whether it was reasonable for an officer to suspect that the defendant's conduct was illegal.

2015See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (stating that because “[rjeasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause” it “can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause”); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (stating that the process of developing reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a brief investigatory stop “does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities” developed from “common sense conclusions about human behavior ... as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement”).

2015Defendant’s 4 argument evokes the sense of certainty that is required in a probable cause 5 determination, but it misses the mark in terms of the reasonable suspicion standard. 6 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (stating that because “[r]easonable 7 suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause” it “can arise from 8 information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause”); United 9 States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (stating that the process of developing 10 reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a brief investigatory stop “does not d

2015See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (stating that because “[rjeasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause” it “can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause”); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (stating that the process of developing reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a brief investigatory stop “does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities” developed from “common sense conclusions about human behavior ... as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement”).

2015Defendant’s 4 argument evokes the sense of certainty that is required in a probable cause 5 determination, but it misses the mark in terms of the reasonable suspicion standard. 6 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (stating that because “[r]easonable 7 suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause” it “can arise from 8 information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause”); United 9 States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (stating that the process of developing 10 reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a brief investigatory stop “does not d

2008See State v. Lovato, 112 N.M. 517, 522 , 817 P.2d 251, 256 (Ct.App.1991) (explaining that under certain circumstances, officers may draw "their guns and use reasonable force in effectuating [a] stop without such action automatically constituting an arrest"); see also State v. Jimmy R., 1997-NMCA-107, ¶¶ 2-4 , 124 N.M. 45 , 946 P.2d 648 (applying the reasonable suspicion standard in a case in which an officer drove up to the subjects, drew a weapon, ordered the subjects to the ground, handcuffed them, and searched them).

2008See State v. Lovato, 112 N.M. 517, 522 , 817 P.2d 251, 256 (Ct.App.1991) (explaining that under certain circumstances, officers may draw "their guns and use reasonable force in effectuating [a] stop without such action automatically constituting an arrest"); see also State v. Jimmy R., 1997-NMCA-107, ¶¶ 2-4 , 124 N.M. 45 , 946 P.2d 648 (applying the reasonable suspicion standard in a case in which an officer drove up to the subjects, drew a weapon, ordered the subjects to the ground, handcuffed them, and searched them).

2008See State v. Lovato, 112 N.M. 517, 522 , 817 P.2d 251, 256 (Ct.App.1991) (explaining that under certain circumstances, officers may draw "their guns and use reasonable force in effectuating [a] stop without such action automatically constituting an arrest"); see also State v. Jimmy R., 1997-NMCA-107, ¶¶ 2-4 , 124 N.M. 45 , 946 P.2d 648 (applying the reasonable suspicion standard in a case in which an officer drove up to the subjects, drew a weapon, ordered the subjects to the ground, handcuffed them, and searched them).

2008See State v. Lovato, 112 N.M. 517, 522 , 817 P.2d 251, 256 (Ct.App.1991) (explaining that under certain circumstances, officers may draw "their guns and use reasonable force in effectuating [a] stop without such action automatically constituting an arrest"); see also State v. Jimmy R., 1997-NMCA-107, ¶¶ 2-4 , 124 N.M. 45 , 946 P.2d 648 (applying the reasonable suspicion standard in a case in which an officer drove up to the subjects, drew a weapon, ordered the subjects to the ground, handcuffed them, and searched them).

2024See, e.g., State v. Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 20 , 137 N.M. 174 , 108 P.3d 1032 (“When police act as community caretakers, . . . the existence of reasonable suspicion or grounds for probable cause are not appropriate inquiries.”), holding modified on other grounds by State v. Yazzie, 2019-NMSC-008 , ¶ 23, 437 P.3d 182 . 4Although Defendant suggests Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution may require a more stringent reasonable suspicion standard than the Fourth Amendment standard discussed in Contreras, he does not present a developed argument for why we should construe Article II,

2024See, e.g., State v. Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 20 , 137 N.M. 174 , 108 P.3d 1032 (“When police act as community caretakers, . . . the existence of reasonable suspicion or grounds for probable cause are not appropriate inquiries.”), holding modified on other grounds by State v. Yazzie, 2019-NMSC-008 , ¶ 23, 437 P.3d 182 . 4Although Defendant suggests Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution may require a more stringent reasonable suspicion standard than the Fourth Amendment standard discussed in Contreras, he does not present a developed argument for why we should construe Article II,

2022Because the traffic stop was lawful, the only question before us is whether it was reasonable for Officer Frias to order Defendant, who was a passenger, to “stay in the car.”2 {8} Defendant’s argument rests on the premise that courts analyze the initial constitutionality of traffic stops under the reasonable suspicion analysis provided by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2021“We analyze the reasonableness of a stop in accordance with the two-part test set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968): “(1) whether the stop was justified at its inception and (2) whether the officer’s action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference.” State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 7 , 1Although Defendant asserts that the New Mexico Constitution affords him greater protection than the United States Constitution in this case, our Supreme Court has “defined and applied the reasonable suspicion standard in the same way when conducting b

2022Rather, as it pertains to the necessity of reasonable suspicion to support the seizure, Defendant acknowledges that “[o]ur courts have defined and applied the reasonable suspicion standard in the same way when conducting both Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10 analyses.” As such, “we assume without generally “depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). {7} There is no dispute in this case that Officer Frias had a lawful basi

1996To meet the reasonable suspicion standard the officer must be “ ‘aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts,’” id. (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 , 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2582 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)), that, when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring.

2005State v. Galvan, 90 N.M. 129, 131 , 560 P.2d 550, 552 (Ct.App.1977); see also State v. Montoya, 94 N.M. 542, 544 , 612 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Ct.App. 1980) (noting that “an awareness of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences,” must underlie the suspicion required to justify “intrusion into a sphere in which the defendant could maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy”).

1996To meet the reasonable suspicion standard the officer must be “ ‘aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts,’” id. (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 , 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2582 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)), that, when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring.

2024See, e.g., State v. Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 20 , 137 N.M. 174 , 108 P.3d 1032 (“When police act as community caretakers, . . . the existence of reasonable suspicion or grounds for probable cause are not appropriate inquiries.”), holding modified on other grounds by State v. Yazzie, 2019-NMSC-008 , ¶ 23, 437 P.3d 182 . 4Although Defendant suggests Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution may require a more stringent reasonable suspicion standard than the Fourth Amendment standard discussed in Contreras, he does not present a developed argument for why we should construe Article II,

2024See, e.g., State v. Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 20 , 137 N.M. 174 , 108 P.3d 1032 (“When police act as community caretakers, . . . the existence of reasonable suspicion or grounds for probable cause are not appropriate inquiries.”), holding modified on other grounds by State v. Yazzie, 2019-NMSC-008 , ¶ 23, 437 P.3d 182 . 4Although Defendant suggests Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution may require a more stringent reasonable suspicion standard than the Fourth Amendment standard discussed in Contreras, he does not present a developed argument for why we should construe Article II,

2024See, e.g., State v. Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 20 , 137 N.M. 174 , 108 P.3d 1032 (“When police act as community caretakers, . . . the existence of reasonable suspicion or grounds for probable cause are not appropriate inquiries.”), holding modified on other grounds by State v. Yazzie, 2019-NMSC-008 , ¶ 23, 437 P.3d 182 . 4Although Defendant suggests Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution may require a more stringent reasonable suspicion standard than the Fourth Amendment standard discussed in Contreras, he does not present a developed argument for why we should construe Article II,

2023Cf. State v. Contreras, 2003-NMCA-129, ¶ 21 , 134 N.M. 503 , 79 P.3d 1111 11 (recognizing within the reasonable suspicion analysis “the exigency of the possible 12 threat to public safety that a drunk driver poses”).

2023Cf. State v. Contreras, 2003-NMCA-129, ¶ 21 , 134 N.M. 503 , 79 P.3d 1111 11 (recognizing within the reasonable suspicion analysis “the exigency of the possible 12 threat to public safety that a drunk driver poses”).

2021State v. Martinez, 2020-NMSC-005, ¶ 18 , 457 P.3d 254 ; see id. (“[W]e have never interpreted the New Mexico Constitution to require more than a reasonable suspicion that the law is being or has been broken to conduct a temporary, investigatory traffic stop.”) (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 2Defendant also contends that the district court erred by failing to find Defendant was seized at the gas station because the district court misapprehended the law.

2021State v. Martinez, 2020-NMSC-005, ¶ 18 , 457 P.3d 254 ; see id. (“[W]e have never interpreted the New Mexico Constitution to require more than a reasonable suspicion that the law is being or has been broken to conduct a temporary, investigatory traffic stop.”) (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 2Defendant also contends that the district court erred by failing to find Defendant was seized at the gas station because the district court misapprehended the law.

2020See, e.g., State v. Doe, 1978-NMSC-072 , ¶ 14, 92 N.M. 100 , 583 P.2d 464 (“An arrest undertaken without probable cause does not vitiate all the authority of the arresting officer.”). {9} “Reasonable suspicion exists where an officer can point to specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts that, when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring.” Id. ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2020See, e.g., State v. Doe, 1978-NMSC-072 , ¶ 14, 92 N.M. 100 , 583 P.2d 464 (“An arrest undertaken without probable cause does not vitiate all the authority of the arresting officer.”). {9} “Reasonable suspicion exists where an officer can point to specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts that, when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring.” Id. ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2020In making this argument Defendant relies in part on King v. United States in which the court held that an alert describing a suspect as a “26-year old white male with a height between 5’10” and 6’3”, short dark hair, glasses, and a thin build” could apply to a “broad swath of the population” and therefore the description alone was not sufficient to support reasonable suspicion. 917 F.3d 409, 423 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom.

2017“Whether an investigatory detention is justified by reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the 3 circumstances, including the content of [the] information possessed by the police and its degree of reliability.” Simpson, 2016-NMCA-070, ¶ 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).