reasonable suspicion standard in Alaska

2018Further, allowing the dispatcher’s information to be imputed to justify the warrantless entry into a home appears to be at 69 Miller, 207 P.3d at 547-50 . 70 See Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (“Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion [required for reasonable suspicion] is . . . ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.” (first quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) then quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989)); State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 735-36 (Alaska App. 1983) (differentiating “quantum of

2015Trooper Ingram articulated specific and objective 28 (...continued) available at, http://dps.alaska.gov/statewide/docs/cjis/FY12_Annual_Report.pdf. 29 But the surnames of resident children usually will appear, since children usually bear the surname of at least one parent. 30 See State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 736 (Alaska App. 1983). 31 Gibson v. State, 708 P.2d 708, 709-10 (Alaska App. 1985) (“[T]he proper question [is] whether the officer could reasonably surmise that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity; that is, whether he could form the notion on slight proof.”). 32 See Coleman v

2018Further, allowing the dispatcher’s information to be imputed to justify the warrantless entry into a home appears to be at 69 Miller, 207 P.3d at 547-50 . 70 See Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (“Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion [required for reasonable suspicion] is . . . ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.” (first quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) then quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989)); State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 735-36 (Alaska App. 1983) (differentiating “quantum of

2015Trooper Ingram articulated specific and objective 28 (...continued) available at, http://dps.alaska.gov/statewide/docs/cjis/FY12_Annual_Report.pdf. 29 But the surnames of resident children usually will appear, since children usually bear the surname of at least one parent. 30 See State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 736 (Alaska App. 1983). 31 Gibson v. State, 708 P.2d 708, 709-10 (Alaska App. 1985) (“[T]he proper question [is] whether the officer could reasonably surmise that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity; that is, whether he could form the notion on slight proof.”). 32 See Coleman v

2025LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 10.10(d), at 578-88 (6th ed. 2020); see also State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1389-90 (Haw. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion as a matter of state constitutional law); State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260-61 (Utah 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379, 381- 83 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the reasonable suspicion standard protects the public interest while also protecting probationers from unwarranted intrusions into privacy). 58 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006) (concluding that parole conditions authori

2025LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 10.10(d), at 578-88 (6th ed. 2020); see also State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1389-90 (Haw. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion as a matter of state constitutional law); State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260-61 (Utah 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379 , 381- 83 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the reasonable suspicion standard protects the public interest while also protecting probationers from unwarranted intrusions into privacy). 58 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 , 847 (2006) (concluding that parole conditions autho

2025LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 10.10(d), at 578-88 (6th ed. 2020); see also State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1389-90 (Haw. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion as a matter of state constitutional law); State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260-61 (Utah 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379, 381- 83 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the reasonable suspicion standard protects the public interest while also protecting probationers from unwarranted intrusions into privacy). 58 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006) (concluding that parole conditions authori

2025LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 10.10(d), at 578-88 (6th ed. 2020); see also State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1389-90 (Haw. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion as a matter of state constitutional law); State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260-61 (Utah 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379 , 381- 83 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the reasonable suspicion standard protects the public interest while also protecting probationers from unwarranted intrusions into privacy). 58 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 , 847 (2006) (concluding that parole conditions autho

2025In State v. Ranstead, 421 P.3d 15, 19-20 (Alaska 2018) and State v. Pulusila, 467 P.3d 211, 219 (Alaska 2020), the supreme court noted that Article I, Section 12 of the Alaska Constitution had since been amended to include additional principles of criminal administration and that these additional principles may inform the analysis.

2025In State v. Ranstead, 421 P.3d 15, 19-20 (Alaska 2018) and State v. Pulusila, 467 P.3d 211, 219 (Alaska 2020), the supreme court noted that Article I, Section 12 of the Alaska Constitution had since been amended to include additional principles of criminal administration and that these additional principles may inform the analysis.

2025LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 10.10(d), at 578-88 (6th ed. 2020); see also State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1389-90 (Haw. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion as a matter of state constitutional law); State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260-61 (Utah 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379, 381- 83 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the reasonable suspicion standard protects the public interest while also protecting probationers from unwarranted intrusions into privacy). 58 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006) (concluding that parole conditions authori

2025LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 10.10(d), at 578-88 (6th ed. 2020); see also State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1389-90 (Haw. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion as a matter of state constitutional law); State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260-61 (Utah 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379, 381- 83 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the reasonable suspicion standard protects the public interest while also protecting probationers from unwarranted intrusions into privacy). 58 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006) (concluding that parole conditions authori

2025LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 10.10(d), at 578-88 (6th ed. 2020); see also State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1389-90 (Haw. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion as a matter of state constitutional law); State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260-61 (Utah 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379, 381- 83 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the reasonable suspicion standard protects the public interest while also protecting probationers from unwarranted intrusions into privacy). 58 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006) (concluding that parole conditions authori

2025LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 10.10(d), at 578-88 (6th ed. 2020); see also State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1389-90 (Haw. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion as a matter of state constitutional law); State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260-61 (Utah 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379 , 381- 83 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the reasonable suspicion standard protects the public interest while also protecting probationers from unwarranted intrusions into privacy). 58 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 , 847 (2006) (concluding that parole conditions autho

2025LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 10.10(d), at 578-88 (6th ed. 2020); see also State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1389-90 (Haw. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion as a matter of state constitutional law); State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260-61 (Utah 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379, 381- 83 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the reasonable suspicion standard protects the public interest while also protecting probationers from unwarranted intrusions into privacy). 58 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006) (concluding that parole conditions authori

2025LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 10.10(d), at 578-88 (6th ed. 2020); see also State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1389-90 (Haw. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion as a matter of state constitutional law); State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260-61 (Utah 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379 , 381- 83 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the reasonable suspicion standard protects the public interest while also protecting probationers from unwarranted intrusions into privacy). 58 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 , 847 (2006) (concluding that parole conditions autho

2025LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 10.10(d), at 578-88 (6th ed. 2020); see also State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1389-90 (Haw. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion as a matter of state constitutional law); State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260-61 (Utah 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379, 381- 83 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the reasonable suspicion standard protects the public interest while also protecting probationers from unwarranted intrusions into privacy). 58 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006) (concluding that parole conditions authori

2025LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 10.10(d), at 578-88 (6th ed. 2020); see also State v. Fields, 686 P.2d 1379, 1389-90 (Haw. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion as a matter of state constitutional law); State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260-61 (Utah 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379 , 381- 83 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the reasonable suspicion standard protects the public interest while also protecting probationers from unwarranted intrusions into privacy). 58 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 , 847 (2006) (concluding that parole conditions autho

2025In State v. Ranstead, 421 P.3d 15, 19-20 (Alaska 2018) and State v. Pulusila, 467 P.3d 211, 219 (Alaska 2020), the supreme court noted that Article I, Section 12 of the Alaska Constitution had since been amended to include additional principles of criminal administration and that these additional principles may inform the analysis.

2025In State v. Ranstead, 421 P.3d 15, 19-20 (Alaska 2018) and State v. Pulusila, 467 P.3d 211, 219 (Alaska 2020), the supreme court noted that Article I, Section 12 of the Alaska Constitution had since been amended to include additional principles of criminal administration and that these additional principles may inform the analysis.

2018Further, allowing the dispatcher’s information to be imputed to justify the warrantless entry into a home appears to be at 69 Miller, 207 P.3d at 547-50 . 70 See Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (“Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion [required for reasonable suspicion] is . . . ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.” (first quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) then quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989)); State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 735-36 (Alaska App. 1983) (differentiating “quantum of

2018Further, allowing the dispatcher’s information to be imputed to justify the warrantless entry into a home appears to be at 69 Miller, 207 P.3d at 547-50 . 70 See Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (“Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion [required for reasonable suspicion] is . . . ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.” (first quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) then quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989)); State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 735-36 (Alaska App. 1983) (differentiating “quantum of

2018Further, allowing the dispatcher’s information to be imputed to justify the warrantless entry into a home appears to be at 69 Miller, 207 P.3d at 547-50 . 70 See Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (“Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion [required for reasonable suspicion] is . . . ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.” (first quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) then quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989)); State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 735-36 (Alaska App. 1983) (differentiating “quantum of

2018“Assuming the police make a Terry stop in objective reliance on a flyer or bulletin, we hold that the evidence uncovered in the course of the stop is admissible if the police who issued the flyer or bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop, and if the stop that in fact occurred was not significantly more intrusive than would have been permitted the issuing department.” Id. at 233 . 68 See United States v. Russell, 436 F.3d 1086, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J., Concurring); Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 103 F. Supp. 3d 465, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); United States v. Christy,

2018“Assuming the police make a Terry stop in objective reliance on a flyer or bulletin, we hold that the evidence uncovered in the course of the stop is admissible if the police who issued the flyer or bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop, and if the stop that in fact occurred was not significantly more intrusive than would have been permitted the issuing department.” Id. at 233 . 68 See United States v. Russell, 436 F.3d 1086, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J., Concurring); Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 103 F. Supp. 3d 465, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); United States v. Christy,

2018“Assuming the police make a Terry stop in objective reliance on a flyer or bulletin, we hold that the evidence uncovered in the course of the stop is admissible if the police who issued the flyer or bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop, and if the stop that in fact occurred was not significantly more intrusive than would have been permitted the issuing department.” Id. at 233 . 68 See United States v. Russell, 436 F.3d 1086, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J., Concurring); Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 103 F. Supp. 3d 465, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); United States v. Christy,

2018Further, allowing the dispatcher’s information to be imputed to justify the warrantless entry into a home appears to be at 69 Miller, 207 P.3d at 547-50 . 70 See Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (“Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion [required for reasonable suspicion] is . . . ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.” (first quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) then quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989)); State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 735-36 (Alaska App. 1983) (differentiating “quantum of

2015Trooper Ingram articulated specific and objective 28 (...continued) available at, http://dps.alaska.gov/statewide/docs/cjis/FY12_Annual_Report.pdf. 29 But the surnames of resident children usually will appear, since children usually bear the surname of at least one parent. 30 See State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 736 (Alaska App. 1983). 31 Gibson v. State, 708 P.2d 708, 709-10 (Alaska App. 1985) (“[T]he proper question [is] whether the officer could reasonably surmise that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity; that is, whether he could form the notion on slight proof.”). 32 See Coleman v

2015Trooper Ingram articulated specific and objective 28 (...continued) available at, http://dps.alaska.gov/statewide/docs/cjis/FY12_Annual_Report.pdf. 29 But the surnames of resident children usually will appear, since children usually bear the surname of at least one parent. 30 See State v. Moran, 667 P.2d 734, 736 (Alaska App. 1983). 31 Gibson v. State, 708 P.2d 708, 709-10 (Alaska App. 1985) (“[T]he proper question [is] whether the officer could reasonably surmise that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity; that is, whether he could form the notion on slight proof.”). 32 See Coleman v

1988The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s finding that the search was not justified under T.L.O., although it recognized that the reasonable suspicion standard applied in T.L.O. required more than a “hunch of criminal activity.” Id. at 388 (quoting People v. Wells, 676 P.2d 698, 701 (Colo.1984)).