reasonable suspicion standard in Georgia

1998To meet the reasonable suspicion standard, an officer’s investigation during a traffic stop “ ‘ “must be justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct[.][Cits.]” ’ ” Jorgensen v. State, 207 Ga. App. 545, 546 ( 428 SE2d 440 ) (1993).

1998To meet the reasonable suspicion standard, an officer’s investigation during a traffic stop “ ‘ “must be justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct[.][Cits.]” ’ ” Jorgensen v. State, 207 Ga. App. 545, 546 ( 428 SE2d 440 ) (1993).

2020“To meet the reasonable suspicion standard, the police must have, under the totality of the circumstances, a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person is involved in criminal activity.” Id. (punctuation omitted).

2019To meet the reasonable suspicion standard for conducting a second-tier investigatory detention, "the police must have, under the totality of the circumstances, a particularized and objective basis for suspecting [that a] person is involved in criminal activity." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Walker v. State , 314 Ga. App. 67 , 70 (1), 722 S.E.2d 887 (2012).

2020This is not the type of “good faith” belief that a traffic violation is actually being committed[,] which would legally permit a stop of this vehicle as the credible evidence failed to articulate a factual basis for believing that this vehicle was in violation of OCGA § 40-8-73.1 (b).6 6 The trial court cited Terry v. State, 283 Ga. App. 158, 160 ( 640 SE2d 724 ) (2007) (affirming the denial of a motion to suppress because, “regardless of whether [the defendant’s] driving maneuvers were illegal,” the police officer “was authorized to conclude that in turning off the roadway, engaging in a poss

2020This is not the type of “good faith” belief that a traffic violation is actually being committed[,] which would legally permit a stop of this vehicle as the credible evidence failed to articulate a factual basis for believing that this vehicle was in violation of OCGA § 40-8-73.1 (b).6 6 The trial court cited Terry v. State, 283 Ga. App. 158, 160 ( 640 SE2d 724 ) (2007) (affirming the denial of a motion to suppress because, “regardless of whether [the defendant’s] driving maneuvers were illegal,” the police officer “was authorized to conclude that in turning off the roadway, engaging in a poss

2012To meet the reasonable suspicion standard, the police must have, under the totality of the circumstances, “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person is involved in criminal activity.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 301 Ga. App. 82, 84-85 ( 686 SE2d 793 ) (2009).

2012To meet the reasonable suspicion standard, the police must have, under the totality of the circumstances, “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person is involved in criminal activity.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 301 Ga. App. 82, 84-85 ( 686 SE2d 793 ) (2009).

2009See Garmon v. State, 271 Ga. 673, 678 (3) ( 524 SE2d 211 ) (1999) (considering insignificant the fact that the officers testified to their predetermined plan to stop all vehicles leaving a home under surveillance because “the legality of the initial stop and detention under a Terry-type rationale ... is based on objective criteria, not on the subjective or ulterior motive of police”); Stadnisky v. State, 285 Ga. App. 33, 37 (2) ( 645 SE2d 545 ) (2007) (rejecting appellant’s argument that he had been unlawfully detained by an unidentified officer who did not testify at the motion hearing becaus

2009See Garmon v. State, 271 Ga. 673, 678 (3) ( 524 SE2d 211 ) (1999) (considering insignificant the fact that the officers testified to their predetermined plan to stop all vehicles leaving a home under surveillance because “the legality of the initial stop and detention under a Terry-type rationale ... is based on objective criteria, not on the subjective or ulterior motive of police”); Stadnisky v. State, 285 Ga. App. 33, 37 (2) ( 645 SE2d 545 ) (2007) (rejecting appellant’s argument that he had been unlawfully detained by an unidentified officer who did not testify at the motion hearing becaus

2009See Garmon v. State, 271 Ga. 673, 678 (3) ( 524 SE2d 211 ) (1999) (considering insignificant the fact that the officers testified to their predetermined plan to stop all vehicles leaving a home under surveillance because “the legality of the initial stop and detention under a Terry-type rationale ... is based on objective criteria, not on the subjective or ulterior motive of police”); Stadnisky v. State, 285 Ga. App. 33, 37 (2) ( 645 SE2d 545 ) (2007) (rejecting appellant’s argument that he had been unlawfully detained by an unidentified officer who did not testify at the motion hearing becaus

2009See Garmon v. State, 271 Ga. 673, 678 (3) ( 524 SE2d 211 ) (1999) (considering insignificant the fact that the officers testified to their predetermined plan to stop all vehicles leaving a home under surveillance because “the legality of the initial stop and detention under a Terry-type rationale ... is based on objective criteria, not on the subjective or ulterior motive of police”); Stadnisky v. State, 285 Ga. App. 33, 37 (2) ( 645 SE2d 545 ) (2007) (rejecting appellant’s argument that he had been unlawfully detained by an unidentified officer who did not testify at the motion hearing becaus

2009See Garmon v. State, 271 Ga. 673, 678 (3) ( 524 SE2d 211 ) (1999) (considering insignificant the fact that the officers testified to their predetermined plan to stop all vehicles leaving a home under surveillance because “the legality of the initial stop and detention under a Terry-type rationale ... is based on objective criteria, not on the subjective or ulterior motive of police”); Stadnisky v. State, 285 Ga. App. 33, 37 (2) ( 645 SE2d 545 ) (2007) (rejecting appellant’s argument that he had been unlawfully detained by an unidentified officer who did not testify at the motion hearing becaus

2009See Garmon v. State, 271 Ga. 673, 678 (3) ( 524 SE2d 211 ) (1999) (considering insignificant the fact that the officers testified to their predetermined plan to stop all vehicles leaving a home under surveillance because “the legality of the initial stop and detention under a Terry-type rationale ... is based on objective criteria, not on the subjective or ulterior motive of police”); Stadnisky v. State, 285 Ga. App. 33, 37 (2) ( 645 SE2d 545 ) (2007) (rejecting appellant’s argument that he had been unlawfully detained by an unidentified officer who did not testify at the motion hearing becaus

2009See Garmon v. State, 271 Ga. 673, 678 (3) ( 524 SE2d 211 ) (1999) (considering insignificant the fact that the officers testified to their predetermined plan to stop all vehicles leaving a home under surveillance because “the legality of the initial stop and detention under a Terry-type rationale ... is based on objective criteria, not on the subjective or ulterior motive of police”); Stadnisky v. State, 285 Ga. App. 33, 37 (2) ( 645 SE2d 545 ) (2007) (rejecting appellant’s argument that he had been unlawfully detained by an unidentified officer who did not testify at the motion hearing becaus

2009See Garmon v. State, 271 Ga. 673, 678 (3) ( 524 SE2d 211 ) (1999) (considering insignificant the fact that the officers testified to their predetermined plan to stop all vehicles leaving a home under surveillance because “the legality of the initial stop and detention under a Terry-type rationale ... is based on objective criteria, not on the subjective or ulterior motive of police”); Stadnisky v. State, 285 Ga. App. 33, 37 (2) ( 645 SE2d 545 ) (2007) (rejecting appellant’s argument that he had been unlawfully detained by an unidentified officer who did not testify at the motion hearing becaus

1998Although this suspicion need not meet the standard of probable cause, it must be more than mere caprice or a hunch or an inclination.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Parker v. State, 233 Ga. App. 616, 617-618 (1) ( 504 SE2d 774 ) (1998).

1998Although this suspicion need not meet the standard of probable cause, it must be more than mere caprice or a hunch or an inclination.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Parker v. State, 233 Ga. App. 616, 617-618 (1) ( 504 SE2d 774 ) (1998).

1998“Although this suspicion need not meet the standard of probable cause, it must be more than mere caprice or a hunch or an inclination.” State v. Smith, 137 Ga. App. 101, 102 ( 223 SE2d 30 ) (1975).

1998“Although this suspicion need not meet the standard of probable cause, it must be more than mere caprice or a hunch or an inclination.” State v. Smith, 137 Ga. App. 101, 102 ( 223 SE2d 30 ) (1975).