reasonable suspicion standard in North Carolina

2015The reasonable suspicion standard is a “less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Barnard, 362 N.C. at 247 , 658 S.E.2d at 645 . (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2015The reasonable suspicion standard is a “less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Barnard, 362 N.C. at 247 , 658 S.E.2d at 645 . (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2023“The reasonable suspicion standard is a less demanding standard than probable cause and a considerably less [demanding standard] than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 19, 123 , 145 L.

2022“This requires either the driver’s consent or a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot.” Id. ¶ 17 The reasonable suspicion standard is “a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 145 L.

2026Traffic stops are reviewed under the reasonable suspicion standard which requires that “[t]he stop . . . be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441 (1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).

2023To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, only “some minimal level of objective justification is required.” Id. at 618 , 669 S.E.2d at 567 (citation omitted); see State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 442 , 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (providing that a justified traffic stop requires “something more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch”).

2022“Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are fully reviewable on appeal.” Williams, 366 N.C. at 114 , 726 S.E.2d at 165 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 1 Defendant argues that “this Court could—and should—rule under our State Constitution that probable cause is required to seize and investigate a parcel,” rather than continuing to apply the reasonable suspicion standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court.

2022“Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are fully reviewable on appeal.” Williams, 366 N.C. at 114 , 726 S.E.2d at 165 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 1 Defendant argues that “this Court could—and should—rule under our State Constitution that probable cause is required to seize and investigate a parcel,” rather than continuing to apply the reasonable suspicion standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court.

2026Traffic stops are reviewed under the reasonable suspicion standard which requires that “[t]he stop . . . be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.” State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441 (1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).

2026Terry searches are subject to the reasonable suspicion standard, Terry, 392 U.S. at 30–31, while warrantless searches of automobiles require probable cause, Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 592 (2018).

2024See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 ; see also State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (“The reasonable suspicion standard is - 10 - STATE V.

2024See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 ; see also State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (“The reasonable suspicion standard is - 10 - STATE V.

2022“This requires either the driver’s consent or a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot.” Id. ¶ 17 The reasonable suspicion standard is “a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 145 L.

2022“This requires either the driver’s consent or a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot.” Id. ¶ 17 The reasonable suspicion standard is “a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 145 L.

2022See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 , 252–53, 25 L.

2022See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 , 252–53, 25 L.

2022United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 , 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985).

2022United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 , 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985).

2020“To meet the reasonable suspicion standard, it is enough for the officer to reasonably believe that a driver has violated the law.” State v. Johnson, 370 N.C. 32, 38 , 803 S.E.2d 137, 141 (2017) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

2020“To meet the reasonable suspicion standard, it is enough for the officer to reasonably believe that a driver has violated the law.” State v. Johnson, 370 N.C. 32, 38 , 803 S.E.2d 137, 141 (2017) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

2017As long as Officer Gardin reasonably believed, and had some "minimal level of objective justification" to believe, Styles , 362 N.C. at 414 , 665 S.E.2d at 439 (quoting *141 Sokolow , 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 ), that defendant had just driven at a speed that was greater than was reasonable and prudent for the snowy and slushy conditions that Officer Gardin was observing, then the reasonable suspicion standard was met.

2017As long as Officer Gardin reasonably believed, and had some "minimal level of objective justification" to believe, Styles , 362 N.C. at 414 , 665 S.E.2d at 439 (quoting *141 Sokolow , 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 ), that defendant had just driven at a speed that was greater than was reasonable and prudent for the snowy and slushy conditions that Officer Gardin was observing, then the reasonable suspicion standard was met.

2021Ed. 2d at 576 (marks omitted) (noting the United States Supreme Court has “previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a high crime area among the relevant contextual considerations” in a reasonable suspicion analysis, and holding “it was not merely [the] respondent’s presence in [a high crime area] that aroused the officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police”); State v. Fields, 195 N.C.

2021Ed. 2d at 576 (marks omitted) (noting the United States Supreme Court has “previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a high crime area among the relevant contextual considerations” in a reasonable suspicion analysis, and holding “it was not merely [the] respondent’s presence in [a high crime area] that aroused the officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police”); State v. Fields, 195 N.C.

2021State v. McGirt, 122 N.C.

2021State v. McGirt, 122 N.C.

2016See McClendon, 350 N.C. at 636 -37 , 517 S.E.2d at 132-33 ; Euceda-Valle, 182 N.C.App. at 274 -75 , 641 S.E.2d at 863 . 5 Although we do not explicitly rely on Finding No. 4 in the trial court's written order as a factor in our reasonable suspicion analysis, the presence of multiple cell phones appears to have played a role in Officer Ward's decision to conduct an investigatory detention.

2016See McClendon, 350 N.C. at 636 -37 , 517 S.E.2d at 132-33 ; Euceda-Valle, 182 N.C.App. at 274 -75 , 641 S.E.2d at 863 . 5 Although we do not explicitly rely on Finding No. 4 in the trial court's written order as a factor in our reasonable suspicion analysis, the presence of multiple cell phones appears to have played a role in Officer Ward's decision to conduct an investigatory detention.

2016See, e.g., Otto, 366 N.C. at 136-37 , 726 S.E.2d at 827 (noting that traffic stops, as a type of brief investigatory seizure, are analyzed under the North Carolina Constitution using the reasonable suspicion standard).

2016See, e.g., Otto, 366 N.C. at 136-37 , 726 S.E.2d at 827 (noting that traffic stops, as a type of brief investigatory seizure, are analyzed under the North Carolina Constitution using the reasonable suspicion standard).

2016Id. at 502 , 725 S.E.2d at 43 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2012App._,_,_S.E.2d_,_, 2012 WL 924885 at *4 (No. COA11-980) (Mar. 20, 2012) (noting that the defendant’s nervousness and the fact the he was driving a car registered to another person were “appropriate factor[s] to consider in a reasonable suspicion analysis” (citing State v. Euceda-Valle, 182 N.C.

2012Furthermore, we note that a decision to the contrary would be inconsistent with the rationale underlying the reasonable suspicion doctrine. “[Reasonable suspicion” is a “commonsense, nontechnical conception[ ] that deal[s] with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 , 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 , 134 L.

2012Furthermore, we note that a decision to the contrary would be inconsistent with the rationale underlying the reasonable suspicion doctrine. “[Reasonable suspicion” is a “commonsense, nontechnical conception[ ] that deal[s] with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 , 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 , 134 L.

2023To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, only “some minimal level of objective justification is required.” Id. at 618 , 669 S.E.2d at 567 (citation omitted); see State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 442 , 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (providing that a justified traffic stop requires “something more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch”).

2023To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, only “some minimal level of objective justification is required.” Id. at 618 , 669 S.E.2d at 567 (citation omitted); see State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 442 , 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (providing that a justified traffic stop requires “something more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch”).

2026App. 714 (2016), particularly instructive of the principle that “the reasonable suspicion inquiry includes events that occur between the initiation and the completion of a stop.” Id. at 724 .

2026In Mangum, this Court reasoned that, because the defendant chose to continue driving in response to a police officer’s activation of his emergency lights, “there was no submission to the officer’s authority and therefore no seizure at that time.” Id. at. 726.

2023While the reasonable suspicion standard is less demanding than probable cause, it still requires that an informant’s tip carry some “indicia of reliability.” State v. Watkins, 120 N.C.

2014“This Court has determined that the reasonable suspicion standard requires that ‘[t]he stop . . . be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.’” Id. at 247 , 658 S.E.2d at 645 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441 , 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994), appeal after remand, 120 N.C.

2016See McClendon, 350 N.C. at 636 -37 , 517 S.E.2d at 132-33 ; Euceda-Valle, 182 N.C.App. at 274 -75 , 641 S.E.2d at 863 . 5 Although we do not explicitly rely on Finding No. 4 in the trial court's written order as a factor in our reasonable suspicion analysis, the presence of multiple cell phones appears to have played a role in Officer Ward's decision to conduct an investigatory detention.

2012App._,_,_S.E.2d_,_, 2012 WL 924885 at *4 (No. COA11-980) (Mar. 20, 2012) (noting that the defendant’s nervousness and the fact the he was driving a car registered to another person were “appropriate factor[s] to consider in a reasonable suspicion analysis” (citing State v. Euceda-Valle, 182 N.C.

2026Terry searches are subject to the reasonable suspicion standard, Terry, 392 U.S. at 30–31, while warrantless searches of automobiles require probable cause, Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 592 (2018).

2026ROWDY Opinion of the Court through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.” Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441–42 (first citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22; and then citing State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 706 (1979)).

2026Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ; see also Jackson, 368 N.C. at 77–78.

2026The reasonable suspicion standard requires “specific, articulable facts indicating present, ongoing criminal activity,” not “a mere inchoate suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” Id. at 77–78.

2024See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 ; see also State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (“The reasonable suspicion standard is - 10 - STATE V.

2024See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 ; see also State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (“The reasonable suspicion standard is - 10 - STATE V.

2023See Maready, 362 N.C. at 618 , 669 S.E.2d at 567 ; see Watkins, 337 N.C. at 442 , 446 S.E.2d at 70 ; see Stover, 200 N.C.